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Abstract 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the ICC or the Court) was 
adopted in 1998 with the expectation that it would be ratified by a majority of states. 
Nonetheless, there has been reluctance among some Arab and Muslim countries 
to ratify the Rome Statute. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one such country. Saudi 
Arabia has questioned the rights held by the Security Council to refer cases to the 
Court. It has also argued that the right of the Prosecutor of the Court to initiate the 
investigation of cases within the jurisdiction of the Court might violate a member 
state's right to sovereignty over its own territory. These issues of contention have 
been discussed in some previous research by writers interested in international 
criminal law. However, some commentators have suggested that Islamic law itself 
is not compatible with modern international law.  
This study seeks to investigate compatibilities and incompatibilities between 
international criminal law (the Rome Statute) and Islamic law. It uses a comparative 
approach in an attempt to find commonalities and differences. The focus is placed 
on general principles and jurisdictions. This is because principles and jurisdictions 
are considered at the top of the legal pyramid of both legal systems, and the rest 
of the provisions fall under those principles/jurisdictions. Moreover, the general 
principles of law reflect the true picture of human rights.  
The study aims to examine whether the absence of ratification by some Muslim 
countries was because of the non-conformity of the Rome Statute with Islamic law. 
The study makes clear that there is compatibility between the principles and 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute and Islamic law. This study is the first of its kind to 
undertake such an investigation.  
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted by 
the international community in 1998 to prohibit international crimes and 
prosecute those who have committed such crimes.1 However, there is still 
reluctance among some Muslim/Arab countries to ratify this Statute. This is 
because some Muslim/Arab countries do not agree with the rights of the 
Security Council to refer cases to the Court as well as the right of the 
Prosecutor of the Court to initiate the investigation of cases within the 
jurisdiction of the Court based on his own appreciation. 2  Thus, most 
Muslim/Arab countries remain outside the ICC. One of these countries is the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which relies on Sharí‘ah/Islamic law (both Islamic 
criminal law and Islamic international law are parts of Islamic law).3 However, 
Islamic law has been described by some as not constituting legitimate law 
 
1
 The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court. Rome (15 June-17 July 1998). Official Records. Volume II 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf> accessed 26 
May 2017. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) entered into force in 
July 2002 UNTS 2187 (the Rome Statute).   
2 See Articles 13,15, and 16 of the Rome Statute. See also the Arab Group’s statement by 
the representative of Sudan on behalf of Arab States. Further, The UN Diplomatic Conference 
concluded in Rome with a decision to issue an International Criminal Court Press Release 
L/2889 <http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html> accessed 13 April 2017; 
see UN A/CONF.18/13 (Vol. 11) Summary Record of the Plenary Meetings and of the 
Meetings of the Committee of the Whole. The six Islamic countries that have now ratified the 
Rome Statute are Jordan, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Comoros, and Palestine. This study 
uses terms of both Muslim countries and Islamic states based on the context; it will not engage 
in the discussion that makes a distinction between these terms. The view of Arab countries 
with regard to the ICC will be discussed in chapter two. 
3
 Sharí‘ah has been defined as an ‘umbrella of rules, regulations, values and normative 
framework covering all aspects and spheres of life for Muslims'. Islamic law is a term that 
refers to wider sources as well as Sharí‘ah, but Sharí‘ah itself derives from two main sources, 
the Quran and the Sunnah. ‘Islamic law covers the entire system of law and jurisprudence 
associated with the religion of Islam.’ Islamic criminal law has been defined as ‘the control of 
commission of the crimes so as to protect the rights and interests of the public and ensure 
peace in the society'. Islamic international law (siyar) covers both the rules and justifications 
for resorting to war, and it regulates operations and conduct in war. See Shaheen Sardar Ali, 
Modern Challenges to Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2016) 22; Mashood A 
Baderin International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford Monographs in International 
Law 2005) 32; Anwar Ullah Chowdhury, The Criminal Law of Islam (A. S. Noordeen 2002) 1; 
Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War Justification and Regulations (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011) 4. See further discussion in chapter three. It is important to note that when 
the researcher mentions Islamic law, he refers to the sources of Islamic law. When he 
mentions Islamic criminal law, he refers to the principles of law and prohibited crimes and 
their punishments. When he also mentions Islamic international law, he refers to the rules 
governing the conduct of war.  
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because it contains some principles that are not compatible with modern 
international law.4  
Arguments of incompatibility are often raised by those who debate the pros 
and cons of international law and Islamic law. One such argument claims that 
there cannot be harmonisation between Islamic law and international criminal 
law because there are different applications of Islamic law in different Muslim 
countries, and this creates different levels of incompatibility. 5  Another 
argument asserts that Islamic law is not a comprehensive legal system 
because it is based on God’s commands and prohibitions. 6  Furthermore, 
Huntington claims that Islam is 'a religion of the sword’ and he predicts 
continual conflict between the West and Islam, which will never develop into 
non-violent conflict or difference.’7 Spencer argues that Islam is a ‘totalitarian 
ideology’, in which all personal, social, and political spheres of human life are 
controlled by Islam.8 Davis also describes Islam as a religion that ‘actively 
seeks the subjugation and destruction of everything that is not itself'.9  
International criminal law, and in particular the Rome Statute, and Islamic law 
differ in terms of the main sources of law. The principal source of Islamic law 
is the ‘divine commands’ of Allah.10 However, the sources of the Rome Statute 
are the Statute itself and other international conventions such as the Geneva 
Conventions, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,11 all 
 
4
 See for example; Maurits Berger, ‘Islamic Views on International Law’ in Meerts Paul (ed), 
Culture and International Law (Hague Academic Coalition, The Hague 2008) 107; Michael 
Kelly, ‘Islam and International Criminal Law: A Brief (In) Compatibility Study’ (2010) Peace 
International Review 105. 
5 Kelly (n 4) 1. 
6 Max Rodenbeck, ‘Islam Confronts its Demons’ (2004) The New York Review of Books 14; 
see also Steven C Roach, ‘Arab States and the Role of Islam in the International Criminal 
Court’ (2005) 53 Political Studies Association 134; Kaltner, J, What Non-Muslims Should 
Know, Revised and Expanded (Augsburg Fortress, Publishers 2016) 16. 
7
 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & 
Schuster Paperbacks, New York 2003) 263. 
8 Robert Spencer (ed), The Myth of Islamic Tolerance (Prometheus Books, New York 2005) 
13. 
9 Gregory Davis, Religion of Peace? Islam's War Against the World (World Ahead 2006) 4. 
10 The Quran 5:3. Allah says, ‘This day I have perfected for you your religion and completed 
My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion'. See also Mashood A Baderin, 
International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law 2005); 
Farhad Malekian, Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Search 
(Volume 5, Brill Leiden, Boston 2011) 36. 
11
 See Article 21 of the Rome Statute. See also the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966), entered into force on 23 March 1976; The International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 
1976; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
December 1948, entered into force on 12 January 1951; The Geneva Convention (I) for the 
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of which may contribute to constituting some international general principles 
of law as recognised by civilised nations.12 Both legal systems, namely the 
Rome Statute and Islamic law, stem from different sources. These may share 
mechanisms for interpreting laws, as we will see in chapter three of this study.  
The Rome Statute is based on universal principles derived from international 
conventions of human rights and the different national legislation of member 
states.13 The principles of human rights are much broader than the principles 
stipulated in part 3 of the Rome Statute. However, the criminal principles of 
the Rome Statute are: a) nullum crimen sine lege, namely the principle of ‘no 
crime without law’;14 b) nulla poena sine lege, namely ‘no punishment without 
law’;15 c) non-retroactivity, which means ‘no punishment will be applied before 
the law is enacted and has entered into force;’ 16  and d) the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility.17 The other principles are codified in different 
parts of the Statute. These include ne bis in idem, namely a person shall not 
be tried twice for the same criminal conduct.18 The principle of presumption of 
innocence is codified in part six of the Statute.19 The principle of equality 
 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, entered into force on 21 October 1950; The Geneva Convention 
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
the Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, entered into force on 21 October 
1950; The Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 135, entered into force on 21 October 1950; and The Geneva Convention 
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
287, entered into force on 21 October 1950. See also Robert Cryer (ed), An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 2007) 153. 
12
 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides the source of the 
international law. It provides that ‘1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a) international conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states; b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c) the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d) subject to the provisions of Article 
59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not 
prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree 
thereto'. See for more information: Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of 
International Criminal Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 166; Rene David and John 
Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (London Stevens and Sons 1978) 421; J C 
Ochoa, ‘The Settlement of Disputes Concerning States arising from the Application of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Balancing Sovereignty and the Need for an 
Effective and Independent ICC’ (2007) International Criminal Law Review 1. 
13 The Rome Statute part 3 of General Principles of Criminal Law. 
14 Ibid Article 22.  
15
 Ibid Article 23. 
16 Ibid Article 24. 
17
 Ibid Article 25. 
18
 Ibid Article 20.  
19
 Article 66 of the Rome Statute, part six. 
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before the law has been stipulated in several international conventions.20 
Islamic criminal law has similar general principles, as we will see in chapter 
four of this study through examination and analysis in order to uncover 
compatibilities and incompatibilities. The general principles of the Rome 
Statute are supported by most states, including the United States of America, 
European countries, African states, and Muslim and Arab states.21 Indeed, 
some Arab and Muslim states have participated in, and positively support the 
existence of, the International Criminal Court.22  
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over international crimes. 
International crimes are defined and codified within Article 5 of the Statute. 
The jurisdiction comprises: a) war crimes; b) crimes against humanity; c) the 
crime of genocide; and d) crimes of aggression. These crimes are covered in 
Part 2 of the ICC Statute in Articles 5 to 10, and in The Elements of the 
Crimes.23 Furthermore, prohibited acts of genocide are covered in Article 6, 
while Article 7 covers prohibited criminal acts of crimes against humanity, and 
Article 8 covers war crimes in internal conflicts or international conflicts. These 
international crimes are discussed in the study. Chapter five discusses war 
crimes, chapter six focuses on crimes against humanity, and chapter seven 
discusses genocide crime. However, a discussion of the crime of aggression 
and the subject of jihad, as it is recognised in Islamic law, will not be 
undertaken in this thesis. The crime of aggression is a specific crime that 
differs from the other three core crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide) because it deals with the rules that govern resorting to armed 
force (jus ad bellum) rather than the regulation of the conduct of hostilities 
during armed conflict (jus in bello) and respect for the laws of humanity during 
 
20
 Articles 22, 23, and 24 of the Rome Statute may reflect the notion of this principle in their 
application. In The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 19 provides that 
‘Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him'. 
21
 See Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, UN 
A/CONF.18/13 (Vol. 11) Summary Record of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the 
Committee of the Whole <http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/contents.htm> accessed 6 
October 2019. See also Pierre Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in Roy S Lee, 
The International Criminal Court The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (Kluwer Law International 1999) 196. 
22
 Steven C Roach, ‘Arabic States and the Role of Islam in the International Criminal Court’ 
(2005) 53 Political Studies issue 1,144.  
23
 The Elements of Crimes adopted at the 2010 Review Conference are replicated from the 
Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Kampala, 31 May and 11 June 2010 (International Criminal Court publication, 
RC/11). 
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peacetime.24 Also, to date, there has not been a modern-day prosecution for 
the crime of aggression. While the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
adjudicated crimes against peace—the World War II equivalent of 
aggression—these trials were contentious for their political nature and one-
sidedness.25 This thesis will not discuss the concept of jihad, mainly because 
there is no equivalent concept in international criminal law. The concept of 
‘jihad’ is a broad subject and has a political aspect.26 Thus, the current study 
will omit a discussion about the crime of aggression and jihad because there 
is limited space in this study. Other researchers may wish to examine and 
analyse these subjects in detail in order to achieve valuable results. 
The Rome Statute criminalizes conduct in three main categories: war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide. Islamic international law can be seen 
to recognize similar categories of crime. The jurisdiction of both legal systems 
prohibits the killing of innocent people whether in peacetime or in international 
or internal conflicts. For instance, prohibiting the killing or injuring of individuals, 
particularly women and children, during a war, or in a state of peace.27 Islamic 
international law is broader than the provisions of the Rome Statute. Article 7 
of the Rome Statute stipulates that any attack against humanity must be 
widespread or systematic to be distinct from ordinary crimes,28 while Islamic 
international law seeks to deter any attack against humanity, whether or not 
the crime is widespread or systematic.29  
While this thesis seeks to uncover commonalities between Islamic law and 
international criminal law as codified in the Rome Statute, there is a big 
difference between both legal systems of law when it comes to punishments. 
 
24
 See Coalition of International Criminal Court website 
<http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/>accessed 6 October 2019 
25
 Ibid. 
26 For more information about jihad, see for example Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, 
‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law’ (2005) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 
321; Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011); Mohammad Abu-Nimer, ‘A Framework for Non-Violence and Peacebuilding 
in Islam’ (2000-2001) Journal of Law and Religion 15 (1/2) 217; Sobhi Mahmassani, The 
Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine ((Brill, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1966); Ibrahim Shinhata, Islamic Law and the World Community (Harvard 
International Law Journal 1962); Wahben al-Zuhili, Athār al-harb fi al-Islam, (5th edn, Dar Al-
fiker Syria 2012) 33 (Arabic source); Mohammed Cherif Bassiouni (ed), Jihad and Its 
Challenges to International and Domestic Law (Springer, 2010); Niaz A Shah, ‘The Use of 
Force under Islamic Law’ (2013) 24 (1) The European Journal of International Law 343. 
27
 See Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute. For Islamic law, see for example, Farhad 
Malekian, ‘The Homogeneity of International Criminal Court with Islamic Jurisprudence’ 
(2009) 9 (4) International Criminal Law Review 595.  
28
 Rome Statute, Article 7. See also Robert Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (eds), 
An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 2007) 187. 
29 Malekian (n 27). 
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The maximum punishment in the Rome Statute is thirty years or a life 
imprisonment sentence in accordance with Article 77. In Islamic criminal law, 
the ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ punishments (see chapter three for the explanation of 
these punishments and see chapter eight for more information about 
incompatibility) are stipulated in the main sources of Islamic law, namely the 
Quran and Sunnah. These differences are accepted as a given. The focus in 
this research is on mapping commonalities in substantive law; on general 
principles and crime definitions while being aware of differences in the area of 
punishment. 
Saudi Arabia’s reliance on Sharí‘ah/Islamic law extends to its international 
dealings with the international community and its adherence to international 
treaties and conventions.30 This means that any drive to establish and/or 
codify international laws requires a consideration of the perspectives of 
Islamic law. This process has encouraged dialogue between Muslim and non-
Muslim countries, but it has also raised points of contention between Islamic 
law and international law. 31  Problems of incompatibility can impact on 
maintaining international peace and security because Islamic law has been 
accepted by different Muslim countries that have different cultures and 
locations in the world.  
The legal system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relies on Sharí‘ah/Islamic 
law in accordance with Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance.32 This Article 
stipulates that ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic 
State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, the Holy 
Quran, and the Sunnah (Traditions) of the Prophet'. Article 7 also stipulates 
that the ‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from 
the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet, which are the ultimate 
sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the State'.33 The legal 
 
30
 The Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia, issued by Royal Order No. (A/91) 27 
Sha’ban 1412 H, 1 March 1992, published in Umm al-Qura Gazette No. 3397 2 Ramadan 
1412 H, 5 March 1992. Article 7 stipulates that ‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), which are 
the ultimate sources of reference for this law and the other laws of the State'. The Criminal 
Procedural Law is issued by Royal Decree Number (M/2) on 22/1/1435 H. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia's commitment to international agreements and obligations is governed by Article 
81 of the Basic Law because it reads 'The enforcement of this Law shall not prejudice 
whatever treaties and agreements with states and international organisations and agencies 
to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed'. This article provides that the provisions 
of the Basic Law of Governance should not affect any international treaties that the Saudi 
Government has ratified. This article is discussed later in chapter eight. 
31
 Rene David and John Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (London, Stevens 
and Sons 1978) 421. 
32
 Saudi Basic Law (n 30) Article 1. 
33
 Ibid Article 7.  
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system of government in Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, according to Article 5 
of the Basic Law of Governance.34 The Government in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia comprises three branches: the Judiciary, the Legislative Authority, and 
the Executive Branch, in accordance with Article 44 of the Basic Law of 
Governance.35 The nature of domestic legislation in Saudi Arabia poses some 
problems of compatibility in respect of the Rome Statute because some of the 
rules are not compatible with the provisions of the International Criminal Court. 
For instance, Saudi Arabian domestic laws deny any interference in judicial 
procedures. Article 46 of Saudi Basic Law and Article 1 of Saudi Criminal 
Procedure Law provide that the judicial system is independent, and no 
authority or power affect the judicial system.36 Any act or instruction, whether 
from an internal or external authority, is not acceptable at any level. This is 
intended to maintain respect for the rule of law but is inconsistent with Article 
17 of the Rome Statute with respect to the right of the Court to start an 
investigation where a state is unable or unwilling to do so.37 This situation may 
be classed as being at the prosecutorial discretion of the ICC, who can decide 
that the state is unable or unwilling.  
This conflict can be understood in the context of measuring the inability of 
domestic judiciary to deal with a case, or when the Court prosecutor wants to 
initiate an investigation by his or her powers but, at the same time, Saudi 
domestic authorities want to conduct the investigation. This may lead to a 
situation where the independence of the judiciary is compromised because 
conducting an investigation is one of the most important processes of 
exercising judicial power, even though the Court’s jurisdiction would be 
classed as a complementary jurisdiction.38 In addition, the Court’s provisions 
do not stipulate who or what component has the power to assess when 
domestic justice is not unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation. The 
issues regarding Saudi domestic laws are discussed in chapter eight in this 
study. 
 
34 This Article provides that ‘The system of governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall 
be monarchical'. 
35  This Article provides that ‘Authorities in the State shall consist of: Judicial Authority, 
Executive Authority, Regulatory Authority. These authorities shall cooperate in the discharge 
of their functions in accordance with this Law and other laws. The King shall be their final 
authority.’ 
36
 Saudi Basic Law Article 46, and Saudi Criminal Procedure Law (2013) Article 1. The latter 
was issued by Royal Decree No M/3 on 22/1/1435 H.  
37 See the Rome Statute Article 17. 
38
 Paragraph 10 of the Rome Statute provides that ‘the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. 
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Thus, this thesis addresses substantive laws that are the principles and 
jurisdiction of both the Rome Statute and Islamic law, as well as procedural 
issues of Saudi domestic laws. The procedural issues of Saudi domestic laws 
are: the right of the Court prosecutor to start the investigation by his or her 
appreciation, the extradition for prosecution of a Muslim accused by a non-
Muslim court or state, political asylum, the right of a victim's family to initiate a 
law case in accordance with Islamic law provisions, and women serving as 
judges. The choice of substantive laws has been taken in order to examine 
and uncover the compatibility and incompatibility between the principles of law 
and jurisdiction, namely prohibited crimes, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. The choice of procedural issues of Saudi domestic 
laws has been made in order to examine provisions that may conflict with the 
Rome Statute. Saudi domestic laws rely on and apply the principles and 
jurisdiction of Islamic law provisions; thus, if there is compatibility between the 
principles of law and jurisdiction of both legal systems, reforms can be 
suggested by the researcher concerning the procedural issues of Saudi 
domestic laws. Such suggestions may then be considered by the Saudi 
government. 
The principles of the Rome Statute and the principles of Islamic criminal law 
are discussed and analysed in this study. This approach requires thorough 
examination and analysis in order to identify compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between the principles of both legal systems. The reason is 
that looking at the compatibilities between Islamic criminal law and the Rome 
Statute can also elucidate the importance of Islamic law in the pursuit of 
international peace and security. In this thesis, important ideas of compatibility 
are addressed in relation to the general principles of law and the jurisdictions 
of both legal systems as part of an endeavour to prevent and prohibit 
international crimes such as war crimes, including crimes against humanity 
and genocide. Thus, this study undertakes a comparative approach between 
the jurisdictions of Islamic international law and international criminal law, 
namely the Rome Statute. This comparative approach helps the researcher 
to examine the provisions of both legal systems to extract the commonalities 
or differences. The researcher achieves this by discovering the functions of 
the legal systems in terms of applying the general principles of law and the 
prohibition of international crimes in order to preserve international peace and 
security.  
Such a comparative approach focuses mainly on the general principles of law 
and the jurisdictions of both legal systems. This is because the principles 
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reflect the real picture of human rights. Moreover, the principles and 
jurisdictions are considered to be at the top of the legal pyramid in the Rome 
Statute and Islamic law. In addition, the rest of the provisions fall under the 
principles/jurisdictions. It is important now to outline the research questions 
that this study attempts to answer. 
1.2 The Main Research Questions 
In order to tackle the subject matter of the thesis, the following main research 
questions are posed.  
a) To what extent are the general principles and jurisdiction of Islamic law 
compatible or incompatible with the general principles and jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute?  
b) To what extent are the provisions of Saudi Arabian domestic laws (The 
Basic Law and Criminal Procedures Law) compatible or incompatible with the 
provisions of the Rome Statute?  
1.3 The Themes, Objectives, and Limitations of the Study 
To answer the main research questions, the researcher has identified issues 
regarding substantive laws and procedural laws as mentioned earlier in order 
to limit the scope of the study.  
The issues regarding substantive laws cover two main areas as follows. a) To 
analyse the sources of Islamic law and the Rome Statute in order to 
understand common mechanisms for the interpretation of both legal systems 
in theory and in practice. b) To undertake a comparative approach between 
the principles and jurisdiction of Islamic law to establish whether they are 
compatible or incompatible with the Rome Statute. The aim of this approach 
is to discover whether or not both legal systems share some commonalities 
and differences. The aim of the thesis is also to explore how Islamic 
international law and the Rome Statute deal with international crimes in 
relation to the crimes' definitions, elements, and punishments, as well as their 
roles in protecting humanity from the most heinous crimes. 
The issues regarding procedural laws analyse the procedural issues of Saudi 
domestic laws and, in particular, those of the Basic Law of Governance and 
the Criminal Procedural Law. The purpose of this approach is to extract 
obstacles that Saudi Arabia may find in ratifying the Rome Statute. Moreover, 
in order to consider if the laws conflict with the provisions of the Rome Statute, 
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reforms are considered. The purpose here is to achieve compatibility between 
Saudi domestic laws and the Rome Statute provisions. The focus will be on 
Saudi Basic Law and Criminal Procedures Law. Basic Law is the most 
important state legislation in Saudi Arabia; all other domestic laws cannot 
conflict with it. Basic Law encapsulates the internal and external policies of 
Saudi Arabia. However, it will also be necessary to analyse domestic Criminal 
Procedures Law because this is the Saudi domestic equivalent of the Rome 
Statute. The Rome Statute is a comprehensive international criminal law that 
stipulates the main principles concerning the definition of crimes, their 
elements, punishments, and criminal responsibility.  
The objectives to be achieved by this study can be outlined as follows. 
a) To consider how both legal systems provide for and apply the general 
principles of law in order to achieve the basic values of human rights. In 
addition, to understand how both legal systems deal with international crimes, 
especially war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
  
b) To make recommendations that may be useful for those studying or working 
with the International Criminal Court and Islamic law. These recommendations 
may help to facilitate references to the perspective of Islamic law during a trial, 
where appropriate, according to Article 21 (1) (c ) of the Rome Statute.39  
1.4 The Significance and Originality of the Study 
Based on the main themes covered in this study, a contribution can be made 
from both a theoretical and practical perspective.  
With respect to the theoretical contribution, two main points can be made. a) 
The study seeks to contribute to research about Islamic law by illustrating 
ambiguities that may exist surrounding the rules of Islamic law. b) Since the 
study refers to Saudi Arabia with special reference, it may assist other 
researchers who wish to explore the importance of possible amendments to 
domestic rules operating in an Islamic system of law and possible 
amendments to the Rome Statute.  
 
With respect to practical matters, the following can be noted. a) The study 
should assist policymakers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia when they are 
 
39 This paragraph provides that ‘Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws 
of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards'. 
- 12 - 
looking to reform legal provisions for the ratification of the Rome Statute. b) It 
may encourage Muslim states that did not ratify the Rome Statute to become 
a state party to the Court. 
 
This study is not the first to explore the relationship between the ICC and Arab 
or Muslim States.40 However, it is the first study to undertake a comparative 
approach between Islamic law and the Rome Statute. Thus, the aim is to 
consider commonalities and differences between the compared legal 
systems, although a discussion about which laws are superior is not the aim 
of the study. This is because realising international peace and security is the 
goal of each legal system. 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Sources 
In order to conduct this study and answer the research questions, the 
researcher has relied on main and secondary sources. Four main types of 
main source were consulted. First, all the core treaty texts, for example the 
Rome Statute 1998 which entered into force in 2002, The Charter of the United 
Nations (UN) 1945, and the various United Nations Treaties specifically 
related to the research question.41 Second, the main sources of Islamic law 
(the Quran and Sunnah). Third, Saudi domestic laws, in particular The Basic 
 
40
 There are a plethora of studies covering the International Criminal Court. There are also 
many other studies that discuss the relationship between the Court and Arab and Muslim 
Countries, and the relationship between the provisions of the Rome Statute and Islamic 
international criminal law, including the following: Alobaidy, O ‘The International Criminal 
Court: An Arabic Perspective in View of Islamic Law and the 1998 Rome Statute’ (Washington 
University, School of Law 2000); Alharthi, M ‘The Legal and Security Dimensions to the 
Relationship between Arabic States and International Criminal Court’ (Naïf Arab University 
for Security Sciences 2011); William A Schabas, ‘The International Criminal Court and Non-
Party States’ (2010) 28 Windsor Y. B. Access Just. 1; Maged Adel, ‘Arab and Islamic Sharia 
Perspectives on the Current System of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 8 (3) 
International Criminal Review Brill, Volume 8: Issue 3, 477 ; Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Islamic 
Law (Sharia) and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (2011) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 411. 
41 For example, but not limited to: The Statute of The International Court of Justice (1945); 
The Geneva Conventions (1949); The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property (2004); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); The Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); The International 
Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006); The 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); The Geneva 
Convention (1949); The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907); The Charter of the Arab 
League (2004); and The Suppression of Terrorism Convention of Arab Countries (1998).   
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Law and The Criminal Procedures Law. Fourth, case laws and reports that 
are relevant to the study are examined. 
The secondary sources that are used in this study are monographs, journal 
articles, book chapters, and websites. 
 
1.5.2 Research Methods 
This study deals with three legal systems, namely international criminal law, 
especially the provisions of the Rome Statute; Islamic law; and Saudi 
domestic laws, especially the Basic Law of Governance and Criminal 
Procedural Law. Thus, it uses a comparative approach to see, to what extent, 
the provisions of Islamic law and the provisions of the Rome Statute, and 
Saudi domestic laws are compatible or incompatible.  
 
1.5.2.1 A Comparative Approach 
Divergent views exist among writers in that some claim there is no 
compatibility between international law and Islamic international law. It has 
been argued that ‘Islamic international law may be of great historical interest 
and Islamic sources of inspiration for Islamic militants, but it has no relevance 
whatsoever for contemporary international law'.42 Furthermore, others argue 
that ‘[Islamic international law] cannot be said to be genuinely compatible with 
modern international jurisprudence with respect to treaty principles, 
customary law, general principles of law'.43 On the other hand, some writers 
agree that there is compatibility between international law and Islamic 
international law in general. They have also gone further and argue that 
Islamic international law is part of the modern legal doctrine and philosophy 
that form international law. In other words, a harmonisation between 
international criminal law and Islamic international law may exist.44 Zawati 
notes that ‘the texts of international covenants may be compared to the texts 
of the Holy Quran and the true Prophetic hadiths. In many respects, the 
 
42 Berger (n 4) 107. 
43
 Christopher A Ford, ‘Siyar-ization and Its Discontents: International Law and Islam’s 
Constitutional Crisis’ (1995) 30 Texas International Law Journal 500. 
44 Sobhi Mahmassani, The Principles of International Law in Light of Islamic Doctrine (Brill, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1966) 117; J Rehman, Islamic States Practices, International Law 
and The Threat From Terrorism: A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the New World 
Order (Hart Publishing, Oregon 2005).  
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international agreements are equivalent to the treaties made by the Prophet 
Mohammad.’45   
With respect to the comparative law method, there is no consensus between 
scholars about the theory of comparative law; moreover, the discussion 
between them ‘has not yet exercised substantial influence on practical legal 
comparison'. 46  However, the comparative law approach is defined as an 
‘intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its process'.47 The 
comparative law approach aims to understand and obtain more knowledge 
about foreign laws that may be valuable if the latter is relevant to the importing 
country.48 It ‘can be a means to diverse ends at the domestic level'.49 This is 
because a state that operates a particular system of law can compare its 
existing domestic laws with foreign laws in order to find the most appropriate 
or common approach. 50  This means that a researcher must take into 
consideration the legal rules of the foreign laws in context in order to contribute 
to the development of existing and new laws. Such an approach is shown by 
providing a model of how imported laws work to address domestic problems. 
However, at international level, ‘legislators may use comparative law when 
they deal with questions of whether and how unification of the law can be 
achieved'. 51  Nonetheless, ‘a comparative approach could lead to the 
recommendation not to unify the law'.52 Even so, the underlying goal could 
improve international understanding, which may help the international 
community to preserve international peace and security.53 
There are three dimensions to comparative law as follows: a) width—concerns 
about commonalities and differences; b) height—concerns about different 
areas of law, such as company law for example; and c) depth—concerns that 
 
45 H M Zawati, Is Jihad A Just War? War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and Public 
International Law (Studies in Religion and Society 2001) 5. 
46  Ralf Michaels, ‘Comparative Law’ (2011) Duke Law Scholarship Repository 1 
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2388/> accessed 6 April 2019. 
According to Gutteridge, comparative law is impossible to apply because it does not compass 
the entire subject matter. See Harold Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research (Cambridge University Press 1949).   
47 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 1998) 2. 
48
 Mathisa Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 24. 
49
 Ibid. 
50 C F Pistor, ‘National Model, lowest common demonstrator or synthetic concept’ (2002), 
cited in Siems (n 48) 5. 
51 Siems (n 48) 4. 
52 Ibid 20. 
53
 Rahmatulla Khan and Sushil Kumar, An introduction to the study of comparative law (New 
Delhi, Bombay, N M Tripathi 1971). 
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‘address different approaches to legal knowledge'.54 Siems points out that 
explaining the variations between compared legal systems can be conducted 
using a comparative legal approach.55  
The objectives of comparative law, according to Glenn, are: the acquisition of 
information about the law from elsewhere; the evaluation of common changes 
among legal families; and the understatement of a compared legal system in 
an attempt ‘to improve it or for interpreting the constitution'.56 The comparative 
law approach aims to understand what can be compared and if/how the 
compared legal systems have commonalities or differences. 57  The target 
contribution can be ‘used as a means effecting sameness and [to explore] 
differences'.58 Indeed, the underlying objective of the study is to uncover the 
compatibility and incompatibility between the aforementioned legal systems. 
Thus, scholars have adopted two levels of comparative law: functionalism and 
transplant. Functionalism is an appropriate method to undertake and help the 
researcher to conduct the current study because it helps to look at the 
functions of the compared legal systems. Since the main questions of the 
study are to find compatibilities/incompatibilities between international 
criminal law, Islamic law, and Saudi domestic law through examination of the 
functions of each legal system, it is necessary to adopt functionalism. The 
nature of such an approach is briefly explained below.  
1.5.2.2 Functionalism  
Functionalism introduces the theory of the ‘legal family’ and was devised by 
scholars in order to find a response to the rise of comparative law.59 Since 
then, it has become a core element of comparative law.60 Zweigert and Kötz 
put forward the idea of functional comparison, claiming that law reflects the 
demands of society.61 According to Zweigert and Kötz, some legal systems 
are comparable if they hold the same objectives.62 Hohfold explains that when 
 




 H Patrick Glenn, ‘The Aims of Comparative Law’ in J M Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2006) 57. 
57
Jaakko Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’ (2003) 67 (3) The 
Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law 419. 
58  Ian Ward, 'The Limits of Comparativism: Lessons from UK-EC Integration' (1995) 2 
Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 23. 
59
 Zweigert and Kötz, (n 47) 63. See also René David & John E C Brierley, Major Legal 
Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (3rd edn, 
Stevens and Sons 1985) 21. 
60 Mathisa Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 25. 
61
 Zweigert and Kötz (n 47) 34. 
62 Ibid. 
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using functionalism with regard to comparative law, a researcher should 
distinguish the differences and commonalities between the compared legal 
systems.63 This is achieved through deep examination to discover the extent 
of convergence or difference between the two systems.64 According to Siems, 
the main purpose of the functionalist approach is ‘to provide the necessary 
link between the different rules that legal systems tends to employ'.65 The 
common denominators between the compared legal systems can then be 
explored.66 
The limitations of functionalism have been noted by scholars as follows. a) 
The ‘incomparable cannot be usefully compared and in law the only things 
which are comparable are those which fulfil the same function'.67  b) The 
compared legal systems should be at the same stage in terms of legal, 
political, and economic aspects.68 It has been argued that the consideration of 
political aspects may make the comparison fruitless.69 This is because the 
functionalist approach may be conducted by comparativists without 
considering the political aspects, since it ‘may make some separations 
fruitless'.70  
The functionalist method raises debate when it becomes the central focal point 
for comparative law. This is because ‘a) [it deals with] centres versus 
peripheries of research project interest; b) it can be the mainstream versus 
avant-garde; c) it [can be a] convergence versus pluralism.’ 71  Thus, 
functionalism is often described as ‘a modern paradigm'.72 Functionalism has 
become more popular in the last two decades.73 It is the ‘basic methodological 
principle of comparative law'. 74  However, it should be applied objectively 
because each society has its own issues that may be solved using its own 
 
63 A Frandberg, ‘Systematics of Legal Concepts’ (1987) Scandinavian Studies in Law 83-115. 








 Zweigert and Kötz (n 47) 34. 
68 Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, (3rd edn, Routledge, Cavendish 
London 1999) 226. 




 Günter Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 
Harvard International Law Journal 411. 
73 Mathias Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of 
the Twentieth Century’ (2002) 50 (4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 671. 
74 Zweigert and Kötz (n 47) 34. 
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legal systems, which are derived from different mechanisms and which would 
lead to similar results.75 The functionalist approach mostly aims to implement 
the demands of society.76 Thus, in this study, targeting legal systems by using 
the comparative approach aims to protect humanity from heinous crimes.  
Functionalism is more than just a methodological discipline.77 It has been 
criticised because it does not have a standard mode of evaluation and does 
not focus on cultural aspects.78 It also does not take into account the idea that 
not all societies face similar problems.79 The functionalist method has been 
described as a ‘bête noire’ by its proponents and a ‘mantra’ by those who 
oppose the idea.80 Supporters of the system view it as a reliable method for 
comparative law, but those who oppose the system say that it is bad for 
mainstream comparative law.81  
Esser describes functionalism as a ‘terium comparations’, which means that, 
‘function can serve to find similar solutions by different means'.82 He explains 
that there are universal principles of law that ‘can be formulated as a system 
with its own thermology'.83 Gordley presents a similar view to that of Esser, 
stating that there are universal problems that can be solved by different 
means, depending on the response of societies.84 An example is noted by 
Liszt, who points out that ‘when a state enacts punishments within its criminal 
law, it aims to maintain the legal order and its legal developments, then 
criminal punishments’. Liszt further says that states have ‘to be judged against 
their ability to maintain the legal order'.85 Thus, functionalism in comparative 
 
75 Ibid.  
76 Michele Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ (2003) in Pierre Legrand and Roderick 
Munday (eds) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University 
Press 2003) 100. 
77 Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law (The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law 2006) 340. 
78 Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period’ in 
France and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law’ (2000) 35 
Cornell International LJ 101. 
79  Adams M and Griffiths J, ‘Against ‘Comparative Method’: Explaining Similarities and 
Differences’ in M. Adams & J. Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 




82 Josef Esser, ‘Grundsatz und Norm in der Richterlichen Rechtsfortbildung’ (1956) in Mathias 
Reimann, Reinhard, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 346. 
83 Ibid.  
84
 James Gordley, ‘The Universalist Heritage’ (2003) in Legrand, Pierre, Comparative Legal 
Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, UK; New York, Cambridge University Press 
2003). 
85 Franz von Liszt, ‘Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht’ (1882) cited in Ralf Michaels, The 
Functional Method of Comparative Law (The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 2006). 
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law serves to clarify similar values shared between societies. These similar 
values create laws that have similar goals and results but are different in 
doctrine.86 
Hence, international criminal law and Islamic law may be comparable if both 
systems have the same functions for protecting humanity from heinous 
crimes. Thus, functionalism is an appropriate method to examine principles 
and jurisdiction to see the functions of both legal systems because the 
protection of society from serious and heinous international crimes is one of 
the most important demands of society. 
1.5.2.3 Transplant 
Since this study adopts the functionalist approach to deal with the compared 
legal systems of international criminal law and Islamic law, it is important to 
present a brief outline of the principles of legal transplant. This is another 
method that raises debate in legal circles.  
Watson and Freund first triggered the debate about legal transplant in respect 
of its successes and failures. 87  Their study discusses legal philosophical 
mechanisms to facilitate comparative law.88 According to Watson, transplant 
is ‘the moving of a rule or a system of laws from one country to another or 
from one people to another'.89 The process of legal transplant has spread 
widely, especially in the last few decades, because of ‘free trade in legal 
ideas'.90 This process can be viewed as part of the implementation of Roman 
Law processes in some European countries, and the impact of common law 
in other European countries. 91  Legal transplant's influence has been 
especially notable in democratic countries, especially in European societies 
where it has contributed towards the approach used by the European Union.92 
The popularity of the legal transplant approach has also coincided with the 
end of socialism in many European countries.93 
 
86 Pierre Lepaulle, ‘The Function of Comparative Law: With a Critique of Sociological 
Jurisprudence’ (1922) Harvard Law Review 838. 
87
 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4 (4) Electronic Journal 
of Comparative Law <http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html> accessed 13 April 2019. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh 1974) 21. 
90 Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 The Modern Law 
Review 1. 
91 Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (Hambledon Press 1991) 73. 
92  Jorg Fedtke, ‘Legal Transplants’ (2012) in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law (2nd edn, Cheltenham 2012) 550. 
93
 Ibid. 
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There is much academic debate surrounding the idea of legal transplant. This 
debate falls into two main divergent views. The first is presented by Watson 
when he explains that ‘[t]he development of civil law is the result of purely 
legal history, and can be explained without reference to social, political or 
economic factors'.94 Nichols elaborates on Watson’s idea, explaining that the 
most effective way to regulate or reform laws in a society is to use transplant 
because ‘laws exist in their contexts, and culture may not complicate their 
efficiency'.95 Thus, according to Watson, culture has an influence on modifying 
laws but not on enacting them because Members of Parliament or a King are 
responsible for the enactment of laws in society.96  
A divergent view is presented by Legrand who argues that ‘legal transplants 
are impossible [because] how could law travel if it was not segregated from 
society?'.97 He also claims that ‘the use of foreign law as a model for domestic 
law becomes abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which considers 
this connect of the law'.98 This is because, ‘law, like language or music, is a 
historically determined product of civilization and, as such, has its roots deep 
in the spirit of the people'.99 He argues that ‘[transplant] makes reception and 
assimilation of foreign ideas problematic, unless they have been 
considered'.100 Furthermore, Freund adds to Legrand’s argument to suggest 
that ‘some areas of law are more closely linked to society than others, and 
that the success of transplants of more organic areas of law depends primarily 
on the political system'.101 This view is supported in the argument that legal 
transplant could be impossible since culture plays a significant part in society 
and law is embodied in culture.102 In this sense, Williams argues that law 
should reflect culture and satisfy the demands of society and should be 
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 William Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) 43 
(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 489. 
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Transplanted Foreign Investment Code’ (1997) 18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
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Constitutional Law’ (1984) 59 Tulane Law Review 875. 
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considered in terms of ‘mirror theory'.103 Twinning also argues that ‘there 
might not be enormous laws and apparent similarities between laws 
worldwide'. 104  Hence, for transplant to be viable, the surrounding 
circumstances of the host country should be identical to those of the importing 
one.105 Teubner suggests that ‘there are some areas of law that may be 
transferable to another country.’106  
However, it is clear that for the objectives of the current study, the transplant 
method is not appropriate because the study deals with two international 
systems and does not seek to transplant one of the compared legal systems 
to the other. Instead, the main focus is to explore the compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between international criminal law and Islamic law.  
The doctrinal method is considered in this study with respect to analysing 
Saudi domestic laws, especially the provisions that may need reform. The 
doctrinal method is the (inductive) legal method used for case analysis and 
can be defined as ‘rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of 
connections between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands, and extracting 
general principles from an inchoate mass of case law'. 107  The doctrinal 
method can assess the extent to which Saudi laws conflict with the provisions 
of the ICC, and to what extent they require reform to be able to conform to the 
Rome Statute. 
1.6 The Structure of the Study 
This study comprises four parts. The first includes two chapters: chapter one 
is an introduction to the study and chapter two outlines brief historical 
background information relevant to the study. The second part consists of two 
chapters. Chapter three examines the sources of the Rome Statute and 
Islamic law, and explores commonalities and differences between the sources 
of both legal systems. Chapter four presents a macroscopic view of the 
compatibilities and incompatibilities between the principles of Islamic criminal 
law and the principles of the Rome Statute. The third part discusses 
international crimes using a comparative approach and includes three 
 
103
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Warwick Lectures General Jurisprudence 1. 
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- 21 - 
chapters: chapter five focuses on war crimes, chapter six discusses crimes 
against humanity, and chapter seven concentrates on genocide. The last part 
of the study, which is the fourth part, comprises two chapters: chapter eight 
focuses on a quest for compatibilities and incompatibilities namely the 
procedural issues between Saudi domestic law and the Rome Statute, and 
chapter nine concludes the study and makes recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
A Brief Historical Overview of the Development of International 
Criminal Law  
2.1 Introduction 
International criminal law is a body of law consisting of international provisions 
that deal with and categorise international crimes and its punishment of those 
who have committed such crimes.1 It is premised on the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility and authorises the international community to 
prosecute those who have been accused of committing international crimes.2 
The objectives of international criminal law are to protect humanity from 
serious international crimes and to maintain international peace and security.3 
These fundamental aims are associated with pursuing and prosecuting 
perpetrators who have committed international crimes as well as protecting 
victims and witnesses.4 
2.2 An Overview of the Development of International Criminal Law  
Delving into the history of international criminal law reveals that mankind 
commits atrocities such as holocausts, bloodshed, and violence. Atrocities 
were noted during the trial of Peter Von Hangbach in 1474 during the 
occupation of Breisach in Germany, when Von Hangbach was handed the 
death penalty by judges of the Holy Roman Empire.5 Serious violations of 
international criminal law were committed during World War I and World War 
II. International criminal law was developed because there was no 
international deterrent and no specific enforceable laws that punished 
criminals, and no international criminal court with universal jurisdiction. As a 
result, international criminal law developed in several phases that can be 
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2.2.1 The First Stage: The Most Significant International Conventions 
Designed to Protect Humanity 
2.2.1.1 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 
The idea of prosecuting war criminals appeared in the nineteenth century as 
a result of the efforts of Gustave Moynier.6 Moynier was one of the founders 
and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.7 His efforts 
resulted in a proposal for the prosecution and punishment of suspected 
individuals who breached humanitarian morals of 1864.8 After this, there were 
attempts to develop international law through the introduction of the Hague 
Convention of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907 in order to settle 
international conflicts via mediation or good offices. 9  These conventions 
comprise the codification of provisions under the Law of War. 10  The 
conventions aimed to impose obligations on states during armed conflict. They 
emphasised the protection of civilians, the importance of the lives of 
individuals, the protection of properties, and the protection of culture and 
religions. Belligerents were obliged to follow the provisions under the laws of 
war.11 The provisions of The Hague Conventions were used in connection 
with crimes committed in the Balkan war.12 However, the provisions do not 
mention the criminal liability of individuals and do not include sanctions.13 
2.2.1.2 The Versailles Convention (The Treaty of Peace) 1919  
Another important international convention that contributed to the 
development of international criminal law is the Versailles (Peace Treaty) of 
1919, which was devised after World War I.14 The victorious states of World 
 
6 William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 1, 2. 
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War I decided to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II and German individuals who 
were responsible for committing war crimes (as the authors of the war).15 
However, the German Empire voted not to apply the provisions of the Treaty.16 
Consequently, this resulted in the need to prepare a list of nine hundred 
accused by the victor states and try them under national courts of the German 
Empire. During the process, the number of those accused dropped to forty-
five, and some were charged in prison while others eventually were charged 
in disciplinary actions involving twelve trials.17  
 
2.2.1.3 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide 1948 
This Convention was enacted in order to develop international criminal law 
and human rights. Known as the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, Article 1 of the Convention 
prohibits acts of genocide towards persons. 18  The provisions of this 
Convention aim to protect humanity from genocide in times of war and peace. 
   
2.2.1.4 The Geneva Conventions of 1949  
The Geneva Conventions and their protocols were crucial for developing the 
idea of individual liability in a legal context. Article 66 deals with armed 
conflict.19 Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides significant protection 
to peoples who do not take any active part in hostilities, whether internal or 
international. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides the most significant 
protections for human beings during armed conflict. These protections provide 
that the parties of conflict must protect individuals who are not involved in 
conflict. 
 
15 The victorious states were The British Empire, The Russian Empire, and The French 
Republic. 
16 Schabas (n 6). 
17
 Ibid.  
18 UN Treaty Series, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
78 (1948) 951, entered into force on 12 January 1951. (Chapter seven of this study includes 
further discussion about genocide). 
19 The Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949), entered into force on 21 October 1950. See 
The International Committee of the Red Cross website. 
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2.2.1.5 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 198420 
This Convention entered into force in 26 June 1987 under Article 27.21 The 
Convention prohibits torture, any degrading treatment, and any inhuman or 
cruel acts.22 Article 1 provides the definition of torture and the clear description 
of acts that lead to torture. This definition may assist a State party that does 
not have a definition of torture in its domestic legislation and that chooses to 
adopt the definition proposed under this international Convention. Article 5 
gives rights to a domestic judicial authority of a State party to practise its 
jurisdiction over cases as follows: (i) when crimes under this Convention are 
committed in the territories of a State party, or on ships and planes, registered 
in that State; and (ii) when a suspected person or a victim is a citizen of the 
State party.  
2.2.2 The Second Stage: Establishing International Military Tribunals 
(Nuremberg and Tokyo) 
The Allied Powers (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) met 
in London on 8 August 1945 to discuss establishing an International Military 
Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT 1945).23 This Tribunal was set up on 15 March 
1951 and related to the Nuremberg situation. It sought to prosecute offenders 
who had committed war crimes in Nuremberg.24 Following this, the Allied 
Powers established another International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
Tokyo (IMTFE 1946), relating to the Japanese war.25 
 
20
  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984), entered into force on 26 June 1987. 
21
  Article 27 provided that this convention entered into force after 20 states ratified the 
Convention and on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with the Secretary General.  
22
 Ibid. Article 1 provides the meaning of torture as follows: ‘For the purposes of this 
Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’  
23 The Allied States signed an agreement on 8 August 1945 for punishing personnel who 
were responsible for war crimes; see International Committee of the Red Cross website < 
https://www.icrc.org/en>.  
24
 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal: Annex to the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, London 
Agreement, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/international-military-
tribunal-at-nuremberg> accessed 8 April 2019.  
25
 This Tribunal was established on 19 January 1946. 
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The continuous development of international criminal law was seen during 
1949—1950 when the International Law Commission of the United Nations 
received the draft code for a permanent international criminal court from the 
General Assembly. The International Law Commission was requested to 
codify the draft code for crimes against the ‘Peace and Security of Mankind’.26 
The General Assembly established a preliminary committee to revise the draft 
code with the participation of seventeen member states of the United Nations. 
The Preliminary Committee returned the draft code to the General Assembly 
with a consideration that the establishment of a permanent international 
criminal court is ‘feasible and desirable’.27 
 
2.2.3 The Third Stage: Establishing ad hoc International Tribunals 
(Yugoslavia and Rwanda) 
The third stage established the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY 1993) under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
827.28 This tribunal aimed to prosecute individuals who were responsible for 
crimes against humanity in Yugoslavia. Another ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal was established for Rwanda (ICTR 1994) by United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 955.29 This tribunal aimed to prosecute individuals who 
were responsible for crimes against humanity in Rwanda. However, despite 
the critique that previous international criminal tribunals have received—
including that they were established by Allied Powers, that they punished 
crimes retroactively, and that they were prompt and temporary tribunals—
these new developments were seen as making significant steps forward to 
deter criminals. Moreover, these tribunals affected the development of 
international criminal law in terms of defining international crimes and 
selecting their elements.30  
 
 
26 Bassiouni (n 5) 2, 5. 
27
 Ibid. 
28  The UN SC Resolution Doc 827 (1993) <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/ictr-milestones> 
accessed 9 March 2017. There are some hybrid tribunals such as The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and The Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In 2002, the United Nations requested that the 
Government of Sierra Leone establish a special court to prosecute serious crimes against 
civilians in its territories. On 30 May 2007, the Security Council set up resolution 1757 to 
establish a tribunal based on the request of the Lebanon Government regarding the terror 
attack resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. 
29
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by 
The UN SC Resolution Doc 955 (1994).  
30 M Cherif Bassiouni, Commentaries on the International Law Commission’s 1991 Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (19 Rue Gustave Couber, 
31400 Toulouse 1993) 6. 
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2.2.4 The Fourth Stage: Establishing the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) 
The fourth stage was the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 
1998.31 The Court Statute was adopted, and came into force, in 2002.32 The 
idea of establishing a permanent international criminal court was considered 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which moved the idea again 
to the International Law Commission in 1989.33 During its 44th session in 
1992, The International Law Commission established a draft code that aimed 
to prevent and criminalise international crimes against humanity and promote 
international peace and security. 34  The General Assembly released its 
Resolution 49/53 in 1994 to establish an ad hoc committee. This committee 
was open to all member states of the United Nations in order to review a draft 
that was prepared by the International Law Commission. Based on the report 
of the ad hoc committee, the General Assembly released its Resolution 50/46 
in 1995.35  This resolution aimed to establish a preparatory committee to 
discuss the draft further and to review the substantive observations arising 
from the International Law Commission and from the member states of the 
United Nations.36  
The commitment of the international community was also considered by the 
Preparatory Committee for establishing the International Criminal Court. Thus, 
it held meetings from February to August 1997 and from December 1997 to 
April 1998 to complete the final draft of the Statute in a deep consolidated 
text. 37  The Preparatory Committee suggested convening a diplomatic 
conference of plenipotentiaries to finalise and adopt an international treaty of 
an international criminal court.38 Meanwhile, the United Nations decided to 
 
31 'Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (15 June-17 July 1998), UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (14 April 1998), UN Doc A/CONF.183/2/Add 
1; ‘Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 




33 UNGA Resolution 44/39 GAOP, 44th Session, Sup. NO. 49 UNDOC A/44/49 (1989) 310 
<http://legal.un.org/unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/volumes/1989.pdf/> accessed 24 April 
2019. 
34
  The Report of the International Law Commission, GAOR 45th Session Sup. No. 10. 
UNDOC A/45/10, 36, 55. 
35
 T MacArthur Foundation, The International Criminal Court: Observations and Issues before 
the 1997-1998 Preparatory Committee and Administrative and Financial Implications 




 Ibid.  
38
 Ibid. 
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convene an international diplomatic conference from 15 June until 17 July 
1998 in Rome, Italy to finalise the Rome Statute after years of negotiations. 
At the end of the conference, 120 states voted in favour of the Treaty, seven 
states voted against, and twenty-one abstained.39 Based on Article 125 of the 
Statute and the fact that sixty-seven states ratified the Treaty, the Court was 
adopted and entered into force on 1 July 2002.40 After the establishment of 
the Court, some arguments surrounded some provisions of the ICC Statute. 
Thus, it is important to set the scene by briefly highlighting the most general 
contentious academic arguments regarding the International Criminal Court. 
2.3 The Contentious Academic Arguments Surrounding the Court 
The international community has made significant progress in undertaking its 
responsibility in the area of international criminal law.41 This can be seen by 
continuous efforts to prevent international crimes and protecting human 
rights. 42  This progress first emerged when the United Nations held a 
diplomatic conference in July 1998 in Rome, Italy to adopt the provisions of 
the Rome Statute for establishing a permanent international criminal court.43 
The Rome Statute is considered the most significant codification of 
international criminal law of this era.44 The Court obtained its international 
legal legitimacy through the Rome Statute, which was adopted through the 
desire of the international community.45 The Court was established to fulfil 
objectives to protect humanity from atrocious international crimes and to raise 
individual international criminal responsibility. 46  The Court has jurisdiction 
over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.47 The jurisdiction of 
the Court aims to end impunity and prosecute perpetrators who have 
committed international crimes and who have violated human rights, whether 
 





 Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Challenge to Impunity (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2002) 65. 
42
 The Rome Statute Preamble. 
43 The official website of the International Criminal Court <https://www.icc-cpi.int/> accessed 
19 November 2016. 
44
 ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’ (n 1); see also ‘Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court’. 
45 The Rome Statute Article 4, provides that the Court 'shall have legal personality and power 
to achieve its objectives by exercising its jurisdiction.’ The International Criminal Court, 
entered into force on 1 July 2002, pursuant to Article 125, which provides that 'accession, 
ratification, approval, and signature shall be open from 17 July 1998 until 31 December 2000. 
All states shall deposit instruments with the Secretary General of the United Nations.'  
46
 The Rome Statute Article 25. 
47
 Ibid Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, and 8 bis. 
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in wartime (when crimes have been committed during armed conflict) or in 
peacetime. 48  This approach is seen to maintain international peace and 
security.  
Since the Statute was opened on 17 July 1998 for signature, accession, and 
ratification, the Court has had 122 state parties.49 Most of these are European 
states (forty three) and African states (thirty-four).50 Only three Arab states 
(Jordan, Tunisia, and Palestine 51 ) became parties to the Court. 52  The 
ratification of the Rome Statute seems, according to some writers, to have 
been based on the membership of developed and developing countries.53. 
These writers argue that most developed states have ratified the Statute 
because they respect the role of law in their territories and want to protect their 
nationals and civilians from war crimes and crimes against humanity through 
co-operation with the Court.54 Developing states fear ratification of the Treaty 
because some have or have had internal conflicts in their territories. 55 
However, the United States, Russia, and China are all classed as developed 
states and still operate outside the Court, even though all are permanent 
members of the Security Council of the United Nations.56  
The main debates regarding the contentious points can be divided into two 
categories: the first covers theories associated with the Statute of the Court 
 
48
 Ibid Articles 27 and 28. 
49
 The official website of the International Criminal Court <https://www.icc-cpi.int/> accessed 
19 May 2017. Acceptance and approval means that a State expresses its consent by adopting 
the provisions of the Treaty pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 14(1) of The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, and accession means that a state accepts the Treaty to become a Party 
at the beginning of negotiation of the Treaty. Acceptance, approval, and accession have the 
same legal effects over a State Party pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 15 of the Vienna 
Convention. The ‘ratification defines as the international act whereby a State indicates its 
consent to be bound to a Treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act’ 
pursuant to Articles 2, 10, and 14(1) of The Vienna Convention. 
50 Both Eastern European and Western European. 
51
 There are some arguments about whether Palestine is a state or not, but it was agreed by 
the UN that Palestine has the rights of a state; see the UN website <https://www.un.org/en/> 
accessed 24 August 2017. Eight Arab States have signed the Treaty (Bahrain, Egypt, 
Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Sudan). The six Islamic States 
that have now ratified the Treaty are: Jordan, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Comoros, and 
Palestine. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) did not ratify nor sign and, hence, remains 
outside the Court. 
52
 The official website of the International Criminal Court <https://www.icc-cpi.int/#> 
accessed 17 July 2017. 
53 Terrence L Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin, ‘Ratification Patterns and the International 





56 The official website of the International Criminal Court. The other permanent countries of 
the Security Council, the United Kingdom and France, are members of the ICC. 
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(the Rome Statute) and the second is associated with the role of the Court in 
practice. 
 
2.3.1 The Rome Statute 
This category covers four main themes: a) arguments about the Court’s 
legitimacy; b) arguments about the relationship between the Security Council 
and the Court; c) arguments about the role of the Prosecutor of the Court 
relating to the initiation of investigations by himself or herself; and d) 
arguments about the sovereignty of states and the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The first theme is the Court’s legitimacy. Tolbert (the Deputy Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) notes a problem in 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.57 He explains that its jurisdiction does not cover 
states that are not parties to the ICC.58 The issue here is that this makes up 
more than half of the world’s population (the United States, China, India, 
Indonesia, and Russia), which means that the jurisdiction of the ICC is not 
universal.59 However, the Court was established by the willingness of some 
states60 as pursuant to Article 4 of the Rome Statute.61 It is authorised to 
prosecute individuals of state parties or those on whose territory international 
crimes have been committed and to punish them within its jurisdiction in order 
to stop impunity and to maintain international peace and security. 62 
Establishing the International Criminal Court was undertaken to maintain 
international peace and security and is considered an international entity.63 
This reinforces the ‘role of law’64 at a national level and at an international one, 
side by side.65 
 
57
 Cited in David Hoilc, Justice Denied: The Reality of the International Criminal Court (1st 
edn, The African Research Centre 2014) 22; Brunnée Jutta and Stephen John discuss the 
concept of legitimacy and legality in Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press 2010). This study adopts the legitimacy 
concept according to Antonio Cassese as outlined in his article ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International Criminal Justice’ 




 Ibid.  
60 One hundred and twenty-two states have ratified the Statute of the Court; see the official 
website of The ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp> accessed 17 September 2019. 
61 The Rome Statute.  
62
 The Rome Statute Article 12. 
63
 Stahn Carsten, The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford 
University Press 2015) 31. 
64
 Tomas Bingham, The Role of Law (Allen Lane first published 2010) 481. 
65 Flavia Lattanzi and William Schabas, Essays on The Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court (II Sieent 1999) 41. 
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The second theme of academic debate surrounds the relationship between 
the Security Council and the Court. Kochler notes that the role of the Security 
Council in referring situations in Article 13(b) or deferring cases in Article 16 
of the Rome Statute can be perceived as ‘political interference to the Court’s 
jurisdiction because this role is subject to the desires of the permanent 
members of the Security Council'.66 An example of this is the Darfur case. In 
addition, the Syrian case has not yet been referred to the ICC.67 Furthermore, 
during the European Parliament for Global Action Meeting, it was noted that 
the role of the Security Council can be challenging for the Court when 
permanent members of the Council want to subject another state to the 
Court’s jurisdiction when they are not party to the Court. 68  Moreover, 
Schwebel argues that it is not right for the Security Council to evaluate the 
crime of aggression.69 Akande argues that when the Security Council refers a 
case to the Court, it asks the Court to take an action within the Statute.70 
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Council has the right to 
refer a situation to the Court when the situation threatens the peace and 
security of the international community.71 It has been argued that this referral 
does not mean imposing a case to the Court but means moving a case to the 
Court.72 Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that the Security Council has 
the right to defer a case for twelve months. It is noticeable that this deferral 
may potentially result in a loss of evidence and put witnesses at risk. The role 
of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security is 
based on Charter V of the United Nations Articles 24 and 25, as approved by 
the Member States of the United Nations.73 These states have authorised the 
Council to take responsibility on behalf of the international community. 
Moreover, Article 39 Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides that the Security 
 
66
 Cited in Hoilc (n 57) 85. Article 13(b) provides that ‘A situation in which one or more of such 
crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations'. Article 16 stipulates that ‘No 
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions'. 
67
 The Darfur case was referred to the Court via UNSCR 1593 (2005) 31 March 2005.  
68
 Hoilc (n 57).  
69
 Cited in Hoilc (n 57) 86. 
70
 Dapo Akande, ‘The legal nature of Security Council referrals to The ICC and its impact on 
Al Bashir's immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 333. 
71
 The Rome Statute Article 13(b). 
72 Ibid Article 16. See Amal Alamuddin, ‘The Role of the Security Council in Starting and 
Stopping Cases at the International Criminal Court: Problem of Principle’ in Andraz Aidar 
(eds), Contemorary Challenges for the International Criminal Court (BIICL 2014) 106 
73
 The United Nations, Charter V, Articles 42 and 25. 
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Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security.74 This 
was evident when the Council established previous international tribunals, 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In this sense, the Security 
Council's work can be seen as an international mechanism operating with the 
Court to preserve international peace and security based on its duties. 75 
During the drafting of the Rome Statute, Saudi Arabia was not in favour of this 
role and joined a group of Arab states that issued a statement in which the 
reasons for this were explained as follows. 
The Security Council might be granted powers that could affect the role of 
the Court concerning any war criminal, regardless of country, religion, or 
nationality. The text adopted might increase the powers of the Council over 
and above those set out in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.76 
The third theme of debate surrounds the role of the Court’s Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation. Article 15 of the Rome Statute provides that the 
Prosecutor of the Court has the right to initiate an investigation proprio motu, 
namely by himself or herself.77 Tiemessen argues that the Prosecutor of the 
Court works within ‘a political environment’ when he or she receives a referral 
from a state party to the Court or from the Security Council.78 This may lead 
to unfair trials because these referrals reflect the interests of political leaders 
of the state parties to the Court/and or the political considerations of the 
permanent members of the Security Council;79 for instance, the self-referrals 
of the Central African Republic and Uganda.80 Schabas explains that the 
 
74
 Ibid Article 39 stipulates that ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security'.  
75
 Carsten (n 63) 62.  
76 The Group of Arab States declared their statement in the 9th Plenary Meeting on 17 July 
1998 A/CONF.183/SR.9; Report of the Credentials Committee, A/CONF. 183/7 and Corr. l 
and 2, paragraph 13, 126 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf> accessed 24 
August 2017. 
77
 The Rome Statute Article 15.  
78
 Alana Tiemessen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecution’ (2014) 




 The situation in the Central African Republic was referred to the ICC by the Government 
itself in December 2004 (ICC-01/05). See The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Bemba Case (ICC-01/05-01/08) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba>. The Uganda situation 
was referred to the ICC by the Government itself January 2004 (ICC-02/04). In Uganda, there 
was an armed conflict predominantly between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the national 
authorities, mainly in Northern Uganda. The Government of Uganda referred the situation to 
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prosecutorial system of the Court within the ‘political environment’ can be 
similar to the general framework in a domestic system of a state. 81 
Furthermore, the role of the Court’s Prosecutor is limited by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber pursuant to Article 53 of the Rome Statute.82 This article obliges the 
Prosecutor to consider the interests of justice and the reasonable basis for 
making an investigation. The crimes committed must fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction. In this sense, the Prosecutor is not, ‘a person who has a universal 
power'.83 Again, Saudi Arabia objected to giving the Prosecutor this power 
during the drafting of the ICC’s provisions. Saudi Arabia noted that ‘the 
Prosecutor should have the agreement of the state party which he or she 
wishes to visit'.84 
The fourth theme of debate surrounding the court is the significance of 
achieving a balance between the jurisdiction of the Court and the sovereignty 
of the states via the complementary principle.85 According to Article 10 of the 
Rome Statute 'nothing in this part [namely jurisdiction] shall be interpreted as 
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international 
law for purposes other than this Statute'. It has been internationally agreed 
that a State has the right to exercise its jurisdiction over individuals and crimes 
on its territories based on the sovereignty principle.86 However, the ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction over international crimes to fulfil its objectives to 
preserve the interests of the international community. Article 1 of the Rome 
Statute stipulates that the Court’s jurisdiction is complementary.87 Article 17 
provides that the Court shall apply its jurisdiction over a State that is genuinely 
unwilling or unable to conduct any investigations or prosecutions of 
international crimes. However, someone may ask who measures whether or 
not a state is ‘unwilling or unable’? Is this the state itself? Or does this decision 
 
the ICC with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army. See the official website of The ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda> 
accessed 24 August 2017. 
81 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court, A Commentary on The Rome Statute 
(Oxford Press 2010) 1117.  
82
 The Rome Statute Article 53. 
83 Carsten (n 63) 61.  
84
 Report of the Credentials Committee, A/CONF. 183/7 and Corr. l and 2, paragraphs 4 and 
6, 349 <http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf/> 
accessed 24 April 2019. 
85 The Preamble of The Rome Statute and Article 1 and Article 10; see also Daniel Nsereko 
‘The ICC and Complementary in Practice’ (2013) 26 (2) Leiden Journal of International Law 
427. 
86
 UN General Assembly Report of the Third Committee, A/50/635/Add 2, 27 February 1996, 
with respect to the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States in their electoral processes. 
87
 The Rome Statute Preamble and Article 1. 
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originate from other international organs such as the Security Council? Saudi 
Arabia asserted its sovereignty by completely refusing the Court’s jurisdiction 
by stating that ‘internal conflicts should be excluded, provided that a state is 
correctly meeting its obligations. The intervention of the Court would prejudice 
state sovereignty'.88 
2.3.2 The Role of the Court in Practice   
This category deals with two contentious points regarding the role of the Court 
in practice. The first is how the Court selects cases; the second is the lack of 
enforceable mechanisms to apply its decisions. 
With respect to selectivity, it has been argued that most of the cases brought 
before the Court concern African states.89 Libyan and Sudanese cases have 
been referred by the Security Council, while other African cases have been 
referred by the States themselves, for example the Central African Republic.90 
This has meant that the Court has tended to focus on certain African States. 
This led The African Union to adopt a strategy of withdrawal from the Court 
on 30 and 31 January 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.91  
In contrast, it has been argued that the Court has failed to investigate and 
prosecute crimes committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Palestine 
(Gaza).92 The second issue relates to the lack of enforceable mechanisms to 
apply Court decisions. Judge Sang Hyun Sons has noted that the Court does 
not have adequate mechanisms to enforce its orders.93 He has also argued 
that the ICC does not have the right police 94  or is able to use ‘coercive 
powers’95 to deal with its orders and arrest suspected individuals or gather 
 
88 A statement made by Mr Abdullah M Mohammed Ibrahim Al Sheikh on behalf of the Saudi 
Government on the drafting of the Statute, paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28 
at the 28th meeting on Wednesday 8 July 1998, 293; Consideration of the question 
concerning the finalisation and adoption of a convention on the establishment of an 
international criminal court in accordance with General Assembly Resolutions 51/207 of 17 
December 1996 and 52/16 of 15 December 1997, A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 and Corr. L, and 
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53. 
89
 Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez and Moritz Vormbaum, Africa and the International 
Criminal Court (International Criminal Justice Series 214) 181.  
90 Six African cases have been brought before The ICC; see the International Criminal Court 
website <https://www.icc-cpi.int/#> accessed 15 July 2017.  
91 The African Union adopt a strategy of withdrawal from the Court on 30 and 31 January 
2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For the African Union Strategy of Withdrawal, see 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._
2017.pdf/> accessed 15 July 2017.  
92 Carsten (n 63) 57.  
93
 Ibid 61. 
94
 Hyeran Jo and Simmons Beth A, ‘Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity’ 
(2016) International Organization 446.  
95
 Carsten (n 63) 57. 
- 35 - 
evidence. In this sense, the Court relies on co-operation with other states, 
whether these are member State parties or third parties, in order to gather 
evidence or to hear from witnesses.96  
During and after the Rome Conference and since then, the Arab States have 
clarified their views with regard to the Court’s provisions via the representative 
of Sudan on behalf of the League of the Arab States.97 Their views include the 
following four points. a) They argue that the role of the Security Council in the 
Court in referring cases to the Court or pausing an investigation should be 
reduced. b) They argue that the role of the Prosecutor of the Court shall be 
‘under reasonable and logical control and not be ex officio only’. c) They 
emphasise the importance of including the definition of the crime of 
aggression in the provisions of the Rome Statute because it is considered to 
be ‘the mother of all crimes’. d) They discuss embedding the crime of 
displacement of civilians within the Court’s jurisdiction by referring to the 
Geneva Convention 1949.98 However, the definition of the crime of aggression 
entered into force within ICC jurisdiction on 17 July 2018 according to the 
adopted Resolution of the State Parties of the Court No. RC/Res. 6 on 11 June 
2010. The displacement of civilians is included in Rome Statute Article 7(2)(d) 
within crimes against humanity, and Article 8(e)(viii) within war crimes. 
There were and remain some contentious points concerning why some Arab 
or Islamic States did not ratify the Statute. These arguments can be 
summarised in brief as follows: the Security Council’s role in the Court and the 
Prosecutor’s power to initiate investigations proprio motu (to initiate an 
investigation or prosecution by himself/herself). These elements are 
discussed briefly below. 
 
96
 See Part 9 of the Rome Statute. 
97
 The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court Rome (15 June-17 July 1998), Official Records Volume II 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf> accessed 26 
May 2017. 
98 The Arab Group’s statement by the representative of Sudan on behalf of the Arab States. 
The UN Diplomatic Conference concluded in Rome with a decision to issue an International 
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2.4 Issues Raised by Some Arab/Islamic States about the Ratification 
of the Rome Statute 
2.4.1 The Security Council’s Role in the ICC 
According to the Rome Statute's provisions, the relationship between the 
Security Council and the Court has three aspects as follows. a) Article 13(b) 
of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Security Council can refer a case to 
the Prosecutor of the Court when crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction have 
been committed, even when the case happened in a state that has not ratified 
the Rome Statute.99 This referral occurs by moving a referral case rather than 
imposing a prosecution. b) Article 16 of the Rome Statute stipulates that the 
Security Council can defer or pause investigations or a prosecution for twelve 
months when its resolution lies within the interests of international peace and 
security.100 c) Article 87 of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court can 
notify the Security Council when a state does not co-operate with the requests 
of the Court.101 
Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute stipulates that there is a significant relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council for maintaining international 
peace and security.102 It has been argued that the Security Council has a 
significant relationship with the Court in order to maintain international peace 
and security.103 It could be that rights have been given to the Security Council 
pursuant to Charter VII of the United Nations in order to maintain international 
peace and security.104 Thus, the Security Council should have a relationship 
with the ICC in order to fulfil its purpose. It may be that the United Nations 
does not want to lose its relationship with the Court. 105  Moreover, a 
relationship exists between the Security Council and previous international 
criminal tribunals, such as those of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Thus, the Court 
and the Security Council share the same purpose, which is to maintain 
international peace and security. However, the Court is not part of the organs 
of the United Nations.106 
 
99
 The Rome Statute Article 13(b). The Darfur case, for example. Sudan is not a member 
state of the ICC. 
100 Ibid Article 16. 
101 Ibid Article 87. 
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to the Court’s Prosecutor when the situation appears to be within the Court’s jurisdiction. 
103 Leila Nadya Sadat (eds), The International Criminal Court and The Transformation of 
International Law: Justice for The New Millennium (Transitional Publishers Inc. 2002) 79. 
104 The Rome Statute Article 13(2). 
105 Sadat (n 103). 
106 Ibid.  
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During the drafting of the Rome Statute, Arab States argued the following. 
The Security Council might be granted powers that could affect the role of 
the Court concerning any war criminal, regardless of country, religion, or 
nationality. The text adopted might increase the powers of the Council over 
and above those set out in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.107  
The Arab States, during the Rome Conference, attempted to reduce the 
powers of the Security Council by identifying acts where the Security Council 
should apply its power.108 However, this could lead to the use of vetoes among 
permanent members of the Security Council to prevent the investigation or 
prosecution of citizens of their states.109 The power of the Security Council to 
trigger cases to the Court can be criticised from several angles. First, the Court 
can only deal with international crimes based on its provisions without 
interference from the Security Council to behave independently.110 Second, 
the power of the Security Council could be considered political; hence, the 
politicisation of decisions may occur, which may result in an unfair referral 
because those decisions may be taken under political considerations.111 This 
has occurred in cases such as Darfur and Libya, where the Security Council 
referred the Darfur case to the Court under Resolution 1593/2005.112 In this 
instance, more than 300,000 people were displaced and more than 800 
people were killed at the beginning of the armed conflict in Darfur.113 Another 
case that was referred by the Security Council to the Court was Libya under 
Resolution 1970/2011.114 In this instance, hundreds of people were killed at 
 
107 The Group of Arab States declared their Statement at the 9th Plenary Meeting on 17 July 
1998 A/CONF.183/SR.9, ‘Report of the Credentials Committee (A/CONF. 183/7 and Corr. l 
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110
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the beginning of the event by Qaddafi’s forces.115  However, the Security 
Council did not refer the case in Syria when more than 250,000 people were 
killed, more than seven million were displaced, and more than four million 
were made into refugees.116 
Based on Articles 24 and 25 of Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations, 
all member States of the United Nations have authorised the Security Council 
to work on their behalf to safeguard international peace and security.117 This 
is regarded as the main purpose of the ICC and includes preventing 
international crimes in order to maintain international peace and security and 
to present criminals before the Court. Furthermore, Article 39 of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the right to decide whether or not 
a situation that is taking place is against international peace and security in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.118 It also gives the Security 
Council the right to take necessary measures to preserve international peace 
and security. Article 39 has been accepted by all member States of the United 
Nations. This Article is compatible with the Security Council’s work in its 
referral and deferral procedures. Article 39 provides that ‘The Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security'. 
The main goal of the Security Council has been to preserve international 
peace and security. This goal was realised when it established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The 
establishment of these international tribunals was on the basis of Chapter VII 
in order to maintain international peace and security in the world 119  
Furthermore, the Security Council’s process of referral and deferral may help 
 
115 The Prosecutor v Muammar Mohammed Abuminyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Case 
No ICC-01/11-01/11<https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya/gaddafi0> accessed 25 April 2019; see also 
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the Court to gain technical and financial support. 120  Technical support is 
needed to save time because international investigations may be complex and 
it may be necessary to provide connections between prosecutors of the Court 
and experts such as inspectors or doctors as well as victims. Financial support 
is important to provide the Court with resources and equipment such as rooms 
in a court in a country where a crime needs to be investigated.121 
 
2.4.2 The Prosecutor’s Power to Initiate Investigations (Propio Motu) 
The Prosecutor of the Court has the right to initiate investigations by himself 
or herself based on Article 15(1).122 It has been argued that the main aim of 
the Prosecutor’s right to start an investigation proprio motu is to reflect the 
independence of the Court as follows. 
a) Those who drafted the Rome Statute noted that giving this right may help 
some states who would usually hesitate to refer a situation to the Court, or 
who do not want to deal with it in their own territory.123 The Prosecutor can 
also receive information from victims or witnesses or non-governmental 
organisations.124 This opens up a direct path connecting the Court to victims 
who do not need to rely on individual governments. 125  Moreover, the 
Prosecutor may receive confidential information from victims who do not want 
their governments to have knowledge of that information.126 
b) According to Article 15(3), the Prosecutor can submit a request to the Pre-
Trial Chamber with supporting information or evidence, and when he or she 
obtains approval, an investigation can commence. Hence, the pre-trial 
examination may increase the independence of the Prosecutor, and the pre-
trial may scrutinize the information that has been submitted by the 
Prosecutor.127 
c) Article 53 provides that the investigation may not be admissible if it has no 
reasonable basis, or the crimes committed do not fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, and that the Prosecutor should consider the interests of justice. 
 
120 Rosa Aloisi, ‘A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the 




 The Rome Statute Article 15 provides that ‘the Prosecutor can commence an investigation 
by himself or herself when he can ensure that crimes fall within the Court’s jurisdiction'.  
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This may mean a consideration of the importance of the validity of the 
information submitted in order to commence an investigation by the judicial 
department of the Court.  
On the other hand, it has been argued that there cannot be complete 
independence of the Prosecutor's work.128 This is because he or she may 
receive the following. 
First, a referral from a state party to the Court according to Article 14(1). This 
Article provides that 'a State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in 
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have 
been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the 
purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be 
charged with the commission of such crimes'. This may lead to a referral 
depending on political considerations. However, the oversight by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber on the basis of Article 53 is to ensure that there are no political 
considerations. 
Second, a referral from the Security Council according to Article 16, which 
provides that the Security Council has a right to pause or defer an investigation 
or prosecution for twelve months by a resolution released under Charter VII 
of The United Nations.129 This Article may affect the independence of the 
Prosecutor's work as a referral may reflect political desires. In addition, the 
Security Council’s role here may lead to a loss of evidence of the case in 
question. However, it is more important to consider the principle of the 
sovereignty of a State, particularly when a State is willing to investigate a case 
and the Prosecutor wants to commence an investigation.130 In this regard, the 
Saudi delegations stated that ‘the Prosecutor should have the agreement of 
the state party which he or she wishes to visit'.131 
One may note that the requirements for the nomination of the Prosecutor as 
well as the measures for changing the Prosecutor may strengthen the 
prosecutor's status in terms of expertise and integrity. This can be seen as 
follows. 
 
128 Tiemessen (n 78) 
129 The Rome Statute Article 16. 
130 Quadri Kafayat, ‘The Proprio Motu Power of The ICC Prosecutor: The Reasons Some 
States Have Refused to Ratify the Rome Statute’ (2014) 2 (1) International Journal of 
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a) The secret approach used for nominating the Prosecutor by the Assembly 
of States is based on Articles 42/4.132 
b) The Prosecutor should have higher-level qualifications with practical 
experience in the field of criminal prosecution.133  
c) The State parties (by Assembly) can change the Prosecutor if there is 
misconduct in an investigation or if they are unable to achieve the required 
level of investigation based on Article 42(6).134 
d) The Security Council’s role may not be understood as one that compels the 
Prosecutor; rather, it may be understood as a notification. 
 
It is relevant now to highlight the importance of the International Criminal Court 
for the international community in respect of two key elements. First, it is of 
theoretical importance; second, it is significant practical importance as 
explained below. 
 
2.5 The Importance of the ICC 
2.5.1 Theoretical Importance 
2.5.1.1 The Importance of the Court at International Level 
The ICC was established by international statute. It promises independence, 
permanence, international legitimacy, international gravitas, and 
communication via international channels such as the Security Council.135 It 
was a voluntary act undertaken by member states to create international 
jurisdiction and relies on provisions that were adopted by state parties. Thus, 
it is considered the most important international judicial institution of its era. 
Its importance is also due to two main aspects. First, it raised international 
legal liability for individuals regardless of who they are and what their capacity 
is.136 Second, its main goal is to protect human rights and to protect future 
generations from atrocious crimes. Subsequently, in this regard, 
investigations and prosecutions are as complex as the nature of the crimes 
 
132 Ibid Article 42 (3). 
133 C K Hall, ‘The Powers and Role of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 
the Global Fight against Impunity’ (2004) Leiden Journal of International Law 125-126 
<http://0-search.proquest.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/docview/219601159?accountid=14664> 
accessed 15 May 2017.  
134
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135 The Rome Statute Article 4. 
136
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the ICC deals with. These crimes are usually committed by experienced and 
competent individuals. Furthermore, the Court does not exercise its 
jurisdiction retroactively.137 Previous international criminal tribunals and their 
instruments have also reflected the need for such a court. Thus, the 
establishment of the Court was considered a real development towards 
introducing human rights but decreasing ultimate sovereignty, immunities, and 
amnesties.138 
 
2.5.1.2 The Importance of the Court at a National Level 
The Court’s provisions act as a precautionary measure to prevent individuals, 
state leaders, and officials committing international crimes. This produces a 
positive political, legal, social, and economic impact. Political impact is 
attained by discouraging leaders from committing international crimes on their 
territories. This helps to maintain stability because leaders of states have to 
comply with the rules of international criminal law. Legal impact is obtained 
through improving domestic legislation, applying international rules, and 
seeking compatibility between domestic legislation and international rules. 
Other positive results may be an increase in the level of investigations and 
prosecutions when applying the principles of complementary law.139 Social 
impact can be seen in terms of the development of stability with respect to 
health and wealth. Economic impact is associated with social impact because 
a state may enjoy greater stability, increase its economic prosperity, and 
become attractive to external investors.  
 
2.5.2 Practical Importance 
Establishing a permanent international criminal court on the basis of the 
approval of state parties can help create powerful international legitimacy and 
equal justice, and enforce international criminal law.140 In terms of legitimacy, 
the Court’s provisions emphasise the legal status of the Court and Court 
powers pursuant to Article 4.141 Moreover, power is practised by the Court by 
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selecting judges and prosecutors in a confidential way pursuant to Articles 36 
and 42.142 
In terms of the equality of justice, criticisms of previous international tribunals 
have had an impact on the development of the ICC’s provisions in relation to 
the idea of equal justice. The goal of equal justice appears in the general 
principles of the Court, and in terms of the definition of international crimes 
and their elements.143 The application of the Court and the capacity of its 
officials are covered in Article 27.144 Provisions relating to the rights of the 
accused are covered in Article 67,145 and protecting victims and witnesses is 
covered in Article 68.146 Limitations and ending impunity are covered in Article 
29.147 These provisions help to provide justice and fair international trials.  
Since the First War World, the international community has enacted 
international treaties that aim to save humanity from atrocities and maintain 
international peace and security. These treaties have been designed to 
combat human trafficking, torture, and prevent chemical weapons attacks; but 
none, until now, have provided for the legal responsibility of individuals. The 
Rome Statute is classed as broader in scope than any international treaties 
that have preceded it because of its attempt to implement provisions 
internationally. The Rome Statute was designed to undertake the following.  
a) Apply international co-operation between member states with the Court 
(Article 86).148  
b) Empower the Court to enforce international criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
(Article 5).149 This is done based on its principle of ‘complementary’ law. This 
principle asserts that the Court will exercise its power over a state that is 
unable to prosecute suspected individuals or when domestic judicial 
authorities have been destroyed (such as in Rwanda and during the Pol Pot 
regime, which destroyed Cambodia’s domestic courts).150  
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c) To refer cases from the Security Council when it considers that the situation 
is under the Court’s jurisdiction and threatens international peace and security 
(Articles 13 and 16).  
d) Sustain the right of the Prosecutor of the Court to commence an 
investigation. 
e) Uphold the obligation of any state that is not a state party of the treaty to 
refrain from any act that may fail the purposes and objectives of the Rome 
Statute (see the Preamble of the Rome Statute).151  
In this climate, it is more important than ever to demonstrate the position of 
Saudi Arabia to the ICC. 
2.6 The Saudi Position with Regard to the ICC 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia exhibited its desire to participate in the 
establishment of the ICC, but its position at the end of the Rome Conference 
with respect to the Court was not clear. However, it could be argued that the 
vote of Saudi Arabia was in favour of the Statute, based on the statement 
presented by the Saudi Government representative. This appeared after the 
Rome Conference, when other statements of the representatives of Arab 
States (Qatar, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya) were presented against establishing 
the Court.152 It was reported that the representative of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Abdullah Al-Suliman, stated that the decision to establish a working 
group on the crime of aggression was a step in the right direction; he could 
not over-emphasize the importance of the definition of such a crime, and the 
absence of a proper definition could lead to different interpretations, with grave 
results. He said that the heinous crime of moving populations was still being 
committed by occupying powers, and an appropriate definition should be 
properly articulated.  
Saudi Arabia accorded great importance to the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, provided it would undertake its tasks properly. 
Saudi Arabia reiterated the importance of elaborating an acceptable definition 
of the crime of aggression and of the crime of the movement of populations. It 
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hoped that the Preparatory Committee would successfully complete its work 
on these subjects.’153  
However, the Rome Statute was further developed during conferences held 
in 2010, 2011, 2014, and 2017, especially in terms of defining crimes of 
aggression and selecting its elements.154 In addition, the Court’s member 
states increased to 122. 
Saudi Arabia is a member of the United Nations, which may mean that 
international obligations under the Charter of the UN shall be taken into 
account whether in internal or international aspects. This is because Article 
81 of the Basic Law of Governance in Saudi Arabia indicates that all provisions 
of the Basic Law should not hinder the international obligations of international 
treaties' provisions that Saudi Arabia has ratified. In addition, the provisions of 
the Basic Law of Governance shall not affect international commitment and 
implementation under international treaties ratified by the Saudi government. 
Thus, adherence to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations should 
be considered because Saudi Arabia should not evade international 
obligations by invoking its national laws. This is because one point relates to 
the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction over a non-state party, when the state 
is unwilling or unable to prosecute responsible individuals who have 
committed international crimes, and when the Security Council refers a case 
to the Court.155 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of Treaties 1969 provides 
that a state shall not invoke its domestic legislation to justify its failure in any 
international treaty. 156  Nevertheless, Article 12 of the Court’s provisions 
provide that the Court tacitly has the right to exercise its jurisdiction over a 
state that is not a party through a referral by the Security Council under 
Section VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This aims to ensure that 
international provisions prevail over domestic legislation.157  Moreover, not 
signing or ratifying the ICC Statute does not mean limited enforceability of 
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legal effects, nor assuming an act that may obstruct the purpose and function 
of the Court.158  
Saudi Arabia is a member of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation 
(OIC).159 This organisation is inter-governmental, and one of its purposes is 
to build a link between Muslim States and other non-Muslim states to achieve 
fair justice between peoples around the world. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is a 
member of the League of Arab States, which adopted The Arab Charter on 
Human Rights through its Council on 22 May 2004. The Charter consists of 
similar general criminal principles to the Rome Statute.160 
Saudi Arabia is at the centre of the Islamic States because it is home to two 
important Holy Mosques and has a fundamental relationship with most of 
states around the world. Hence, Saudi’s position in not ratifying the Rome 
Statute may be considered controversial. Ratification of the Rome Statute may 
promote Saudi’s ability to maintain international peace and security as well as 
to show it is well meaning with respect to the protection of human rights. 
Inclusion of the Court’s provisions within some of Saudi’s domestic legislation 
may provide a powerful legislative tool because it can combine principles of 
international criminal law and principles of Islamic criminal/international law as 
we will see in this study. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the most important discussions relating to the 
International Criminal Court, in particular the right of the Security Council to 
refer a case to the ICC or suspend an investigation for twelve months. It has 
also discussed arguments relating to the Prosecutor's right to initiate an 
investigation. All these points were considered when the Court was 
established but were not supported by Saudi Arabia. This chapter has 
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highlighted the evolution of international criminal law through the enactment 
of numerous international conventions and the establishment of international 
tribunals that have been set up to punish the perpetrators of the most heinous 
crimes against humanity. This chapter has also briefly explained the 
importance of the Court's theoretical and practical existence in contemporary 
times. It has also made clear Saudi Arabia's position in this regard. 
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Part Two 
An Insight into the Sources/Principles of International Criminal Law 
and Islamic Criminal Law 
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Chapter Three 




The main sources of Islamic law are deemed to be divine, while the sources 
of the Rome Statute comprise a set of international laws.
1 Even so, historically, 
international criminal law has been informed by a wide range of sources. 
These include the teachings of the Bible and the principles of classical Greek 
and Roman law, and, most notably, intellectuals connected to Christianity, 
among which are St Ambrose, St Augustine, St Thomas, Francisco de Vitoria, 
Francisco Sudrez, and Hugo Grotius, who all contributed, in one way or 
another, to imparting the rules of jus ad bellum (the laws of war), a principle 
which continues to influence international criminal law. 2  Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the modern source of 
international law. It aims to enable the, ‘consensual regulation of relations 
between co-equal sovereign states'.
3
 International criminal law contains 
principles and jurisdiction that govern international crimes and its punishments 
in order to seek international peace and security.
4
    
This chapter will partly comprise an examination of the roots and sources of 
Islamic law and of international criminal law (Rome Statute). It will examine 
the sources of Islamic law from a religious and legal perspective, and the 
sources of international criminal law from a historical legal perspective. It will 
cover the main sources and the other tiers of sources of both legal systems, 
and will refer to relevant academic material connected to the development of 
Islamic law and international criminal law. It will look at the development of 
treaties such as the Rome Statute and its relationship to the laws of different 
states and international customary law.
5 It will discuss these sources as well 
as provide elucidation of the sources of Islamic law. This will be done in order 
to prequel an exploration of commonalities and differences between 
international criminal law and Islamic law. This chapter also seeks to 
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undertake a comparative approach to discover commonalities and differences 
between the other tiers of sources of international criminal law and Islamic 
law. In this endeavour, the researcher will examine the other tiers of sources 
of both legal systems, as well as the views of scholars. 
International criminal law is a branch of international law, and the sources of 
the former relate to the sources of the latter.
6 Thirlway argues that the sources 
of international criminal law are sometimes ‘less visible'.
7
 However, 
international criminal law cannot be isolated from international law. The Rome 
Statute reflects the authority of international criminal law and is central to the 
current study, and in this respect, it is important to trace its development. 
Indeed, the sources of the Rome Statute are stipulated in its Article 21, under 
the heading ‘Applicable Laws'. Article 21 states the following. 
(1) The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of 
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second 
place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict; (c) Failing that, general principles of 
law derived by the Court from the national laws of legal systems of the 
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute, and with international 
law and internationally recognised norms and standards. 
(2) The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its 
previous decisions. 
(3) The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must 
be consistent with internationally recognised human rights and be 
without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as 
defined in Article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, and 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
This Article contains a hierarchy of sources of law. Paragraph 1(a) states that 
the Rome Statute, its Regulations of Elements of Crimes (Article 9), and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Article 51) comprise the main sources that 
judges shall resort to. Paragraphs (1) (b) and (c) refer to another tier of 
sources of the Court, which it has the right to rely on. This tier of sources 
comprises the sources of international law, including: international treaties, 
 
6 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2003) 9. 
7 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 8. 
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general principles, international customary law, judgments and decisions 
issued by previous international courts, as well as the opinions of specialists 
in the legal field. These sources are referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the ICJ.
8   
According to Article 21(1) (c ), the ICC can resort to general principles of law 
derived from national laws of legal systems of the world 'as appropriate'. This 
can be done if the national laws of states have jurisdiction over the crime, and 
those principles of law shall not be inconsistent with Court Statute provisions 
and with international law norms.  
Islamic international law is a branch of Islamic law.
9 The main sources of 
Islamic law are the Quran and Sunnah. Another tier of sources of Islamic law 
includes ijmá‘ (consensus), qiyás (analogy), istiḥsán (juristic preference), urf 
(custom), maslahah mursalah (public interest), and Siyra.
10
 Islamic law has 
been developed, particularly Islamic international law, by jurists who have 
made significant contributions, including Abo Hanifa (767), Abo Yusuf (731), 
Al-Shaybani (747), and al-Sarakhsi (1090). All have recognised the need to 
regulate the affairs of Muslim states with other non-Muslim states and the 
importance of international treaties.11 
In recent years, much debate has ensued about the question of compatibility 
between Islamic international law and international criminal law. For instance, 
it has been argued that ‘[Islamic international law] cannot be said to be 
genuinely compatible with modern international jurisprudence with respect to 
treaty principles, customary law, general principles of law, precedent, or even 
 
8
 The Statute of the ICJ (1945) Article 38 provides that ‘1. The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations; d. subject to 
the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. 
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bond, 
if the parties agree thereto.’ 
9 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar (John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore 1966) 6. 
10
 Noel J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (New Delhi, Universal Law Publishing 2013); Wael 
Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2009); M Cherif 
Bassiouni, The Sharia and Islamic Criminal Justice in Times of War and Peace (Cambridge 
University Press 2014); Christopher G Weeramanty, Islamic Jurisprudence an International 
Perspective (Macmillan Press 1980); Shaheen Sardar Ali, ‘Resurrecting Siyar through 
Fatwas? (Re) Constructing Islamic International Law in a Post-(Iraq) Invasion World’ 2009 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 115; Farhad Malekian, Principles of Islamic International 
Criminal Law: A Comparative Search (Brill 2011). 
11 Mohammad T Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western 
Approach (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1968) 35. 
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the teachings of eminent publicists'.
12
 Muslim academics have also presented 
different arguments, some of which comprise views in favour of seeking 
harmonisation between the two legal systems. For example, Mahmassani 
argues that ‘sufficient explanation of the basic principles of the international 
law of Islam is necessary in order to bring out its similarities with modern 
principles, and to demonstrate that universal principles, being based on the 




3.2 The Sources of the Rome Statute 
3.2.1 The Main Sources 
Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute names itself as the main source, together 
with The Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
Crimes. However, the Rome Statute is not the only source of international 
criminal law.14 Other sources of international criminal law comprise those 
mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, as well as other international 
rules and conventions, such as The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948.15 However, the Rome Statute 
is now viewed as the most important treaty of international criminal law 
because its provisions broadly define international crimes; its principles are 
derived from the domestic laws of states; and the writers of the Rome Statute 
acknowledge and endorse the provisions of the case law of the ICTY and 
ICTR tribunals.16 In this respect, the sources of the Rome Statute can be 
divided into main sources and another tier of sources. 
Article 21(1) (a) states that the Court shall apply, in the first place, ‘its 
Provisions, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
Crimes’, which are considered in equal value.17 It also provides for the legality 
 
12  Christopher A Ford, ‘Siyar-ization and Its Discontents: International Law and Islam’s 
Constitutional Crisis’ (1995) 30 Texas International Law Journal 500. 
13 Sobhi Mahmassani, The Principles of International Law in The Light of Islamic Doctrine 
(Brill, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1966) 205. 
14 Cassese (n 6). 
15
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which was 
approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly 
Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948, and entered into force on 12 January 1951, in 
accordance with article XIII  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx> accessed 24 
April 2019. 
16 Cassese (n 6). 
17
 The Rome Statute Article 21(1)(a) stipulates that ‘the Court shall apply: In the first place, 
this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence’; see also William 
Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 207. 
- 53 - 
of the decisions of the Court and fulfils obligations relating to the principles of 
human rights.18 These rules are based on decisions made by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of the ICC19 which state that the Court shall apply its Statute and 
The Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Crimes 
‘in the first place’; but only ‘in the second place’, and where appropriate, 
‘applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including 
the established principles of the international law of armed conflict'. 
Accordingly, the rules and practices of different jurisdictions, whether national 
or international, are not, as such, ‘applicable law’ before the Court. 
The mechanisms of the interpretation of the sources of the Rome Statute are 
mentioned in Article 21(3) of the Statute itself. Article 21(3) invites the Court 
to interpret and apply the principles of the Statute and its Elements of Crimes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Crimes, taking into account the 
principles of international human rights. Interpretation should fall within the 
scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, as well as the rights 
of the accused and the right of victims that correspond with Article 58 of The 
Rome Statute itself.20 This Article states that the Court shall interpret and 
apply international law according to ‘internationally recognised human rights 
conventions’ and according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.21 
Thus, the Court is required to reject any ‘adverse distinction’ that conflicts with 
recognised human rights conventions.22 If there is a contradiction between the 
provisions of the recognised human rights conventions and the provisions of 
the Rome Statute, the provisions of the latter shall prevail; thus, the hierarchy 
of the sources of the Rome Statute is presented.23 In cases where there is a 
lacuna in the provisions of the Rome Statute, the Court shall refer to the 
sources as mentioned in Articles 21(1) and (2).24  
 
3.2.2. Another Tier of Sources of the Rome Statute 
Article 21(1) paragraph (b) of the Rome Statute outlines another tier of 
sources that are relevant to the Treaty as follows: applicable international 
 
18 Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law’ in Leila Sadat The 
International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law (Translation 
Publisher Inc., Ardsley, New York 2002) 173.   
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 Prosecutor v Uganda, (ICC-02/04-01/05-2005), Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International 
Criminal Court (28 October 2005) (19). 
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 Pierre Saland ‘International Law Principles’ in Roy S Lee The International Criminal Court: 
The Making of The Rome Statute (Kluwer Law International 2002) 213-216. 
21 Schabas (n 17) 207. 
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 Cassese (n 6) 9. 
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 Schabas (n 17). 
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treaties, the general principles of law, the rules of customary international law, 
and the precedents of courts and scholars writing in the legal field. This 
paragraph refers to internationally applied treaties that have already been 
established by states, and where signature and ratification has been based 
on the important provisions and rules of other international treaties that 
preserve international peace and security.25  
Applicable international treaties that can be used in the Court include The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and their protocols, and humanitarian 
law.
26
 In this respect, the Treaty uses the words ‘where appropriate’. The 
paragraph also refers to the general principles of international law that relate 
to international human rights. General principles of international law are 
distributed among many different international conventions; for example, the 
responsibilities of commanders are outlined in the Geneva Conventions.27 
These general principles of international law can be used when the rules of 
the Treaty do not contain or do not explicitly cover the case in question; thus, 
the general principles of international law can be drawn into consideration.28 
General principles can be inferred when an international convention and/or 
customary law does not stipulate rules in connection with the case in 
question.29 This principle is outlined in Article 21(1)(c) of the ICC Treaty. The 
results of this kind of sharing help to build common ground with other laws, 




 Farhad Malekian, Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Search 
(2nd edn, Brill 2011) 149. 
26
 Cassese (n 6) 11. 
27
 The Vienna Conventions (1969), entered into force in 1980. Article 29 provides that ‘The 
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28 Cassese (n 6) 15. 
29 Ibid.  
30 The Rome Statute Article 21(1)(c) states: ‘Failing that, general principles of law derived by 
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to national laws that exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes, if these national laws contradict 
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3.2.2.1 International Treaties 
Applicable international treaties are included under the umbrella of the Rome 
Statute, according to its Article 21(1)(b), which refers to, ‘in the second place, 
where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict'. Hence, relevant international treaties are relevant to the 
provisions of the Rome Statute. There are two types of international treaty; 
namely, the multilateral treaty and the bilateral treaty.
31 Multilateral treaties are 
signed by a number of states or between a number of states and international 
organisations.
32
 They are designed to ‘have effect generally, not restrictively, 
and they shall not to be contrasted with those treaties which merely regulate 
limited issues between a few states'.
33  
Treaties such as the Rome Statute and The Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment exist to prevent 
the occurrence of international crimes against groups of people. The 
provisions of multilateral treaties are binding on the signatory parties.
34
 
Bilateral treaties are signed between two or more states, and relate to a 
specific subject area; for example, a treaty between two states in relation to 
extradition. This kind of treaty has a binding effect on the parties, but not on 
other states that have not ratified the treaty.  
The meaning of the word ‘treaty’, according to international law, is defined in 
Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 as ‘an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation'.
35 
Janis describes this as the ‘plainest source of international law'.
36
 International 
treaties are often made by, and concluded between, sovereign states and 
international organisations as written forms of agreement.  
The provisions of The Vienna Convention of 1969 require legal obligation as 
well as legal capacity between parties to an international treaty, according to 
Article 2(1). Danilenko explains that parties to international treaties can be 
 
31 Treaty Handbook, prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, United 
Nations Publications (2012). 
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33 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP, Cambridge 2008) 95. 
34 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, (3rd edn, The Law Book Exchange 
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35 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), entered into force in 1980. 
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sovereign states and international organisations, and treaties can be between 
states, international organisations, and/or international organisations that 
exist within states.
37  The expressions used in The Vienna Convention in 
Article 2(1)(b) include ‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’, and ‘accession’. 
This means ‘a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be 
bound by a treaty'.
38
 These expressions reflect the legal obligations of the 
parties concerned.  
The legal effect of the provisions of treaties commences only after there is 
approval by states to ratify the international convention in question.
39
 This 
meaning can be understood from Article 2 of The Vienna Convention 1969, 
which explains that when a state presents its approval or starts ratifying the 
agreement concerned, it is obliged to be bound within the provisions of the 
agreement. In this respect, a treaty is a manifestation of customary 
international law, and all party states are bound by the treaty provisions they 
sign up to, and the treaty becomes a part of customary international law.
40
 
However, even if some international treaties are not ratified by some 
countries, these countries can still be bound not to breach the provisions of 
these treaties. This principle can be inferred from Article 2(6) of the UN 
Charter, which indicates that countries that are not members of its Charter 
should act in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, including 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Previous international tribunals are a source of the ICC. This can also be 
understood in accordance with Article 4 of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), which states that it is possible to ‘grant jurisdiction over a 
violation of Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions in respect of non-
international armed conflict'.
41
 The provisions of international treaties may 
‘also be taken into account, wherever this is legally admissible, as evidence 
of the crystallisation of customary international law rules'.
42
 In this respect, the 
international treaties most relevant to the Rome Statute are the Hague 
 
37 Gennadii Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Marinus Nijhoff Publisher, 
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Convention of 1907, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 
and the Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948.
43
 It could also be argued that the previously mentioned 
international treaties are sources of the Rome Statute, since the latter derives 
its jurisdiction from the aforementioned treaties. 
3.2.2.2 General Principles of Law
44
 
General principles of law can be classed as a source of international law, as 
stipulated in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ, which talks about ‘the 
general principles of law recognised by civilized nations'.
45
 The Rome Statute, 
Article 21(1)(c), also states that general principles of law are derived from 
national systems and comprise one of the sources of the Rome Statute. The 
Article describes general principles of law as follows.  
General principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States 
that would normally exercise jurisprudence over the crime, provided that 
those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international 
law and internationally recognised norms and standards.’
46  
It can be observed that, according to Article 21(1)(c ), these principles can 
only be applied if they comply with four conditions: (i) the national laws must 
have jurisdiction over a crime; (ii) the derived principles shall not contradict 
the provisions of the Rome Statute; (iii) the derived principles shall not 
contradict international law and international norms that have been recognised 
by the international community; and (iv) these general principles are used ‘as 
appropriate'. 
The phrase ‘recognised by civilized nations’ is mentioned in Article 38(1)(c) of 
the ICJ Statute. According to Bassiouni, this refers to all members of the 
United Nations.47 The term ‘general principles’ may be interpreted in different 
ways, but Bassiouni explains it as follows.  
 
43
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45 The Statute of the ICJ (1945), Article 38(1)(c). 
46 The Rome Statute Article 21(1)(c). 
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General principles are, first, expressions of national legal systems, and, 
second, expressions of other unperfected sources of international law 
enumerated in the statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and ICJ; namely, conventions, customs, writings of scholars, and decisions 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice and ICJ. It is obvious that 
if these legal sources are perfected, they are ipso facto creative of 
international legal obligations. They are not perfected, however, such as 
when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or consistent practise, or 
when States express opinio juris without any supportive practice.
48
 
General principles of law are formed from different legal institutions that work 
with the other tiers of sources such as the writings of scholars and/or the 
decisions of courts. Dixon suggests that general principles of law may not be 
enough to establish international law but are the pure sum of rights that 
constitute part of international law.
49 However, debate surrounds what laws 
should be classed as the ‘general principles of law’. Are general principles of 
law those laws derived from various domestic laws? Or are they those laws 
that have been accepted by states in international law?
50 Clark suggests that 
the general principles of law refer to those laws that have been accepted by 
states as being applicable to international law because they relate to the idea 
of pacta sunt servanda in international law.
51 Furthermore, Brownlie suggests 
that the general principles of law are ‘general principles of municipal 
jurisprudence'.
52 However, Malanczuk argues that ‘there is no reason why it 
should not mean both [domestic principles and international principles]; the 
greater the number of meanings which the phrase possesses, the greater the 
chance of finding something to fill gaps in treaty law and customary law'.
53
 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that two classes of law comprise ‘the general 
principles of law’. First, laws created in the international field that form the 
general approved principles written in international treaties. For example, the 
Vienna Convention has a strong place in international law, and pacta sunt 
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servanda is a significant principle in the international field.
54 Second, general 
principles of law as derived from different legal systems of the world such as 
the principles stipulated in the Rome Statute, including the principle of ne bis 
in idem referred to in Article 20, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
referred to in Article 22, the principle of nulla poena sine lege referred to in 
Article 23, and the principle of non-retroactivity ratione personae referred to in 
Article 24. To conclude, ‘general principles of law’ are rules contained in the 




3.2.2.3 Customary International Law 
Within the international stratum, the customs derived from different 
civilizations have played a significant role in generating legally accepted rights 
and obligations.
56  However, debate exists among writers as to whether 
customary international law is a source of international law in general. It has 
been argued that customary international law cannot be described as a source 
of international law because it is ‘too clumsy and slow-moving'.
57
 However, 
customary international law is a source of international law because it is 
affirmed in the Preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
1961: ‘… the rules of customary international law should continue to govern 
questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present 
Convention.’ Thus ‘[it] is one of the primary components of law in the 
international legal process'. 58  Customary international law encompasses 
many universal principles that are practised by many states: thus, it informs 
the codification of international law.
59 In this respect, there are two significant 
elements in relation to customary international law: a) the practices of a state 
and b) opinio juris.
60 A relationship between these elements was identified in 
the Judgment of the ICJ in the case of the North Sea Continental Shelf. In this 
case, the ICJ stated the following. 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they 
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
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belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of 
law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion opinio juris necessitates.’
61   
Thus, the actual practices of states and their beliefs and opinions constitute 
the materials of customary international law.
62  
 
3.2.2.3.1 The Practices of States 
The practices of states form part of the relationship between states in relation 
to international law. The practices of a state stem ‘from the nature of the 
process whereby custom grows up from action by one subject of law and the 
reaction of other subjects of law concerned: acceptance, rejection, or 
toleration'.
63
 In the words of D’Amato, the 'physical conduct of states' should 
be classed as state practices, but it may not be necessary to consider issued 
statements of intent relating to the practices of states.
64
 In this sense, Brownlie 
notes that opinions expressed by the delegates of states in the enactment of 
international conventions, as well as declarations by Heads of State, may be 
considered state practice in relation to customary international law.
65 
Furthermore, to be classed as a state practice, principles need to be 
consistently repeated by the states.
66
 However, the practices need not be 
universal, according to the ICJ Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case, which stated that ‘the passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessary'.
67 Thus, the practices of states are relevant when establishing 
customary international law.  
According to Thirlway, customary rules of international law can be deduced 
by looking at the permanent practices of states, even if these practices have 
been repeated less than a dozen times.
68
 He adds that the practices of states 
should be continuous to constitute customary international law, even if there 
are no numerous incidents of the practices, and the practices do not need to 
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be undertaken over a specific period of time.
69
 According to Weisburd, some 
international customs practised by states may not need to be practised by all, 
but only recognised and accepted as the international norm in customary 
international law.
70 In addition, Tunkin notes that international customs need 
only be practised by states just one time in some cases, and may be rare, but 
undertaking the practice may constitute customary international law.
71
 He 
adds that the element of repetition need not occur continuously by a single 
state for the practice to be accepted as customary international law.
72 
Furthermore, Guzman suggests that even if the practices of one state are not 
classed as customary international norms, this does not diminish the 
importance of the rights of other states to adopt and exercise these rules.
73 
Thus, the actions of one state may not be sufficient for these actions to be 
classed as customary international law.
74 In this respect, it would appear that 
customary international law comes into being via positive interaction between 
states and, in these cases, the rejection or acceptance of certain actions could 






Francois Geny coined the term opinio juris in connection with customary 
international law. He suggests that customary international law comprises 
actions practised by states that fall within the remit of acceptable beliefs.
76
 
Thus, the shared general international practices of states can be regarded as 
customary international law.
77
 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the 
ICJ talks about subjective elements that should be considered when 
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evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence 
of a rule requiring it'.
78
 
Opinio juris is an essential factor for establishing customary international law. 
According to Brownlie, opinio juris applies to behaviours that have been 
accepted and which result in methodical conduct at an international level.
79 
There should be equal belief between states and an implicit acceptance of the 
rule in question by states. However, as previously noted, the practices of one 
state may not create international obligations within the rules of customary 
international law.
80 Thirlway points out that, ‘the opinio juris would be lacking 
and one state could not suddenly insist that the custom be followed, if another 
state chose to take a different course in a particular case'.
81
 Thus, state 
practices and juris opinio both play a vital role in establishing customary 
international law. 
International criminal law is a branch of international public law and its sources 
are derived from the latter.
82
 Customary international law provides necessary 
clarification of the context of written international provisions in order ‘to fill the 
gap in these provisions'.
83 Resorting to customary international law proves 
that written international rules may not always be adequate.
84
 Customary 
International law is derived from the decisions of courts with different 
backgrounds. Civil law courts rely more on written law than on the decisions 
made by previous courts, while common law courts usually rely on the 
decisions made by previous courts.
85 In Islamic law, judges rely on the main 
sources of Islamic law, namely the Quran and Sunnah, before resorting to the 
decisions made by previous courts. The latter are only sought when existing 
sources do not provide an appropriate answer.
86 The decisions of national 
courts may be taken into account when establishing customary international 
law. In addition, customary international law can be derived from existing 
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3.2.2.4 Judicial Decisions and Scholars’ Opinions  
Judicial decisions made in previous international tribunals have been applied 
in international criminal courts. This means that previous judicial decisions 
have been leveraged in the process of establishing international rules. The 
Statute of the ICJ states that ‘judicial decisions … and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, [qualify] as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law'.
88
 This is because the rule of star 
decisis is excluded by Article 59 of the Statute.
89 Article 38(1)(d) refers to 
Article 59 of the Statute, which provides that ‘the decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case'. 
In this respect, Bing explains that previous judicial decisions, namely 
precedents, should be ‘persuasive' rather than a 'binding authority' for the 
Court.
90
 Shahabuddeen argues that Article 59 means that the precedents of 
courts should not be binding on judges of the ICJ, but they may be construed 
and cited.
91  Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute formally refers to previous 
decisions made in international courts and provides that ‘[the ICC] may apply 
principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions'. Thus, the 
doctrine of star decisis can be rejected.
92
 Additionally, Lauterpacht argues that 
‘respect for decisions given in the past makes for certainty and stability, which 
are of the essence of the orderly administration of justice'.
93
 
As discussed above, advisory opinions that are issued by ICJ judges are 
classed as a ‘subsidiary means’ for determining international rules.
94 Thus, in 
the application of precedents, the ICJ seeks to ‘apply the law and not to make 
the law'.
95
 However, Thirlway explains that ‘no decision can simply be applied 
 
87 Malekian (n 25) 149. 
88 The Statute of the ICJ Article 38(1)(d). 
89 Star decisis is the legal principle of determining points in litigation according to precedent; 
see the Oxford Dictionary of Law.  
90 Jia Bing ‘Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Law and the Defence of Duress in 
Murder or Other Cases Arising from Armed Conflict’, in Wang Tieya and Sienho Yee (eds), 
International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays In Memory of Li Haopei (Routledge, 
New York 2001) 83. 
91  Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (University of Cambridge, 
Research Centre for International Law 1996) 99. 
92 Cassese (n 6) 18. 
93 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by International Court (CUP, 
Cambridge 1996) 14. 
94 Cassese (n 6) 18. 
95 Rebecca Wallace, International Law (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, London 2002) 23. 
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automatically to another case … even if one or both of the parties are the 
same'.
96 Thus, ICJ judges look to interpretations for appropriate guidelines in 
certain cases.  
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ states that ‘the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations [provide] subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law'. In this respect, Shabtal explains that written 
documents produced by scholars have influenced decisions made in previous 
international tribunals.
97
 However, even if there are divergent views among 
writers, this does not lighten the value of these views.
98
 Even so, Malekian 
argues that ‘the views of publicists have not the effect of law-making power 
and cannot be regarded as a definite legal interpretation in the system of 
international criminal law'.
99 This may be because of the different cultures, and 
political, social, and economic backgrounds, of the writers.
100
 However, it is 
undeniable that the writings of legal scholars have influenced views on certain 
issues/cases. Their writings may also continue to have a long-term impact, 
especially on subsequent writers. 
 
3.3 The Sources of Islamic Law 
Looking at the sources of Islamic law necessitates providing background 
information about the concept of Sharí‘ah and Islamic law. Historically, Islam 
emerged in the Peninsula of Arabia, where it passed through different stages 
as follows: the period before the emergence of Islam, the period of the Prophet 
Mohammed (peace be upon him), and the period of transformation and 
development of the sources of Islamic law.101 These main stages comprise 
three significant phases: the creation of Islam; the period of the formation of 
Islam during the life of the Prophet Mohammed; and the enlightenment stage, 
when Islam expanded and became understandable and open to other 
civilisations and other cultures.102 These phases have also contributed to 
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3.3.1 A Brief Historical Background to Islam 
In the Arabian Peninsula before Islam, there was no specific religion.103 Tribes 
followed different customs that governed their lives, the relationships between 
peoples, and violations of laws and crimes.104 Each tribe possessed its own 
traditional customs and was usually ruled by a wise man or a superior man (a 
Sheikh), who had executive authority to solve disputes between individuals 
and who ruled on decisions made according to tribal customs.105 Although 
there was no criminal law, the wise man would implement punishments such 
as deportations, and award compensation to a victim, and if the victim was not 
satisfied with the sanctions given to the offender, then the victim would take 
revenge on the offender himself, or this act would be undertaken by a relative 
or cousin.106  
The second stage is the formation of Islam, which is the period of the Prophet 
Mohammed, between 610 to 623 CE. The Prophet received a revelation from 
Allah, and began teaching and interpreting the verses of the Quran to the 
people. 107  The Prophet practised deeds and passed on sayings to his 
companions.108 The Prophet moved from Mecca, where he had been a key 
member of the Quraysh tribe (the biggest Arabic tribe in the Arabian Peninsula 
at that time) to Medina, where he established his authority and the Sahefat Al-
Medina, which was the first constitution in Islam.109 The Sahefat Al-Medina 
regulated the rights and duties of people in Medina. In this constitution, the 
Prophet considered the diversity of religions in Medina, because some people 
were Christians and others Jewish.110 He also tried to implement peace and 
security in Medina. Moreover, in 628 CE, the Prophet enacted an agreement 
between the tribes of Mecca and the Muslim community in Medina. This 
agreement was the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, which is classed as the first treaty 
in Islam between the Muslim community and the non-Muslim community.111 
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The agreement alluded to the importance of cohabitation and the importance 
of avoiding war. Furthermore, it aimed to protect communities from murder, 
protect properties, and allow Muslims to undertake ḥajj (the pilgrimage). 
According to Bassiouni, at this time the Prophet Mohammed believed that 
religious obligations could not change political decisions.112 
The third stage is the enlightenment stage of Islam, which lasted from the 
eighth to the twelfth century CE.113 This period was called the ‘Golden Age’ 
because it was characterised by the phenomenal development of knowledge 
in Islam, and because the Muslim community embraced new learning and 
science from different cultures and civilizations, including from Roman, Indian, 
Greek, and Persian cultures. 114  At this time, Muslim scholars acquired 
knowledge about science, philosophy, medicine, education, and legal 
systems, such as the Roman legal system.115  
Muslim scholars, whether they were Arab or non-Arab, implemented acquired 
knowledge that was consistent with the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah, 
and which was taken from the work of several civilizations.116 At the same 
time, scholars taught the Islamic religion to peoples, and translated the main 
sources into Hebrew, Italian, Indian, and Persian. Some work was undertaken 
by non-Arab Muslims who had converted to Islam. An example of this 
exchange is exemplified in the work of Ali Ibin Sina (Avicenna) who wrote 
about 200 works relating to medicine.117 Other examples included the work of 
Mohammed Al-Farabi who was influenced by Aristotle, and who wrote about 
politics and philosophy, and Mohammed Al-Shiybani, who devised the Islamic 
concept of siyar for nations in war and peace, during 749-805 CE.118 
According to Bassiouni, numerous factors contributed to this new exchange 
of knowledge between Muslim scholars and non-Muslim scholars, including 
the following.  
a) The expansion of Islam to other regions by Arab and non-Arab Muslims, 
who traded commodities in places such as India, Africa, and from west to east. 
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They spread tolerance of Islam and dealt with people from different cultures 
and civilizations. 
b) Muslim scholars acquired new knowledge about science and legal systems 
from other civilizations. 
c) The emergence of new discoveries led to new questions and issues that 
had to be interpreted in the context of the Quran and Sunnah. 
d) Some verses of the Quran, the Hadiths, and the Sunnah, were subjected 
to interpretation within the context of the needs of Muslim communities.119  
Thus, on the one hand, Muslim scholars acquired and exchanged knowledge 
of the sciences with other cultures and established their own schools of 
thought as follows: Ḥanafí, Málikí, Sháfiʻí, and Hanibali. All were dedicated to 
the worship of Islam and Islamic law. The perspectives held by these schools 
are classed as supplementary sources in Islamic law and encapsulate the 
principles of ijmá‘ (consensus), qiyás (analogy), istiḥsán (juristic preference), 
maslahah mursalah (public interest), and siyar.120 In addition, scholars helped 
to stabilise methods of legal reasoning known as úṣúl al-fiqh.121  
Invasions in the twelfth century, led by Mongols and Seljuks, destroyed many 
documents written by Muslims.122 This led to fears from traditional jurists that 
the philosophies of Socrates and Plato, as derived from Greek and Roman 
culture, would be lost, resulting in a closing of the door of ijtihád (legal 
reasoning). 123 At the time, political leaders from the Muslim regions became 
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more influential than the jurists.124 Thereafter, in the seventeenth century, 
Muslim communities, especially Sunni scholars, dedicated themselves to 
retrieving the knowledge of the ‘Golden Age’ and again opened up the 
acquisition of new knowledge from different cultures.125 
 
3.3.2 The Concept of Sharí‘ah and Islamic Law 
Sharí‘ah is the religion of Islam.126 It includes the precepts of Islam and applies 
fairness as well as sanctions.127  It literally means ‘the right path’.128  It is 
thought of as a ‘divine law’ that remains valid over time, and includes rights, 
responsibilities, and values.129 It is also used to regulate relationships relating 
to public and private conduct between a person and Allah; relationships 
between people (women, men, and children); and relationships between 
states, whether these are Muslim or non-Muslim.130 Sharí‘ah has been defined 
as an ‘umbrella of rules, regulations, values and normative framework 
covering all aspects and spheres of life for Muslims'.131 
For Muslims, Sharí‘ah rules in all aspects of life, whether moral, legal, 
economic, social, or political.132 Indeed, Sharí‘ah contains prescriptions and 
proscriptions and explains what is legitimate and what is illegitimate.’ 133 
Islamic law is a term that refers to wider sources as well as Sharí‘ah, but 
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Sharí‘ah itself derives from two main sources, the Quran and Sunnah.134 
Baderin explains that ‘Islamic law covers the entire system of law and 
jurisprudence associated with the religion of Islam.’135 Islamic law is also 
derived from ijmá‘, qiyás, istiḥsán, urf, maslahah mursalah, and siyar. These 
terms will be explained briefly below.136   
 
3.3.3 The Main Sources of Islamic Law 
3.3.3.1 The Quran 
The Quran is, ‘the revelation and words of Allah'.137 The Quran was revealed 
from Allah to the Prophet Mohammed through Gabriel over a twenty-two year 
period from 610 to 632 CE.138 It was written in the Arabic language in Mecca 
and Medinah in Arabia. It is a collection of 6,239 verses, divided into 114 
chapters.139 Allah says, ‘Verily, We have sent it down as an Arabic Quran in 
order that you may understand'.140 
The verses of the Quran were uttered by the Prophet Mohammed to his 
companions. The companions then communicated the verses to others.141 
The Prophet’s companions kept the verses in their memories, while others 
inscribed them on leaves, pieces of wood, and pieces of palm.142 After the 
Prophet’s death, his companions started to collect the verses into one 
document. They completed the first document during the administration of the 
first Khalifa (Caliph) Abo Baker. The Quran was then transmitted frequently 
over generations. It regulates the life of mankind and contains principles and 
rules relating to two major subjects: the worship of Allah; and transactions and 
relationships between people: personal, political, economic, legal, and 
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social.143 Thus, the Quran is the original and bedrock source of Sharí‘ah for 
all Muslims worldwide. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is an Arab and a Muslim 
state, which has adopted the Quran and Sunnah as the basis for constitutional 
law.144 
 
3.3.3.2 The Sunnah  
The Sunnah is the second source of Sharí‘ah.145 It records the ‘deeds and 
words’ of the Prophet Mohammed and the Hadiths.146 The Sunnah explains 
and interprets the main source of Islam, the Quran, and deals with a wide 
range of subjects and issues that the Quran is silent on, or where no detail is 
given. For instance, prayer is obligatory according to the Quran, but no 
instructions are given about how to pray and how many times a day one must 
pray. The Sunnah elaborates on methods of prayer and the number of times 
a Muslim must pray, which is five times a day.147 It also describes words, 
practices, and approvals on matters as they were recorded by the Prophet’s 
companions, who then passed this information to others over time to teach 
people about Islam’s precepts and injunctions, as well as to expand the 
Islamic religion.148 From the era of the Prophet until the current day, the two 
main sources of Islam remain the Quran and Sunnah. These texts govern the 
life of all Muslims and Muslim states in all aspects. Sarwar notes that ‘Islamic 
law is complete and perfect and covers all aspects of human life ... Sharí‘ah 
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3.3.4 Another Tier of Sources of Islamic Law 
After the death of the Prophet Mohammed, the main sources of Sharí‘ah, 
namely the Quran and Sunnah, were complete. 150  Then, religious men 
(jurists) began to apply ijtihád (legal reasoning) and fiqh (jurisprudence). 
Ijtihád is described by Kamali as the main tool of independent interpretation 
of the main sources of Sharí‘ah.151 fiqh means ‘the theory or philosophy of 
Islamic law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of the 
Prophet.’ 152 This happened from the eighth century with the expansion of 
Islam to many different parts of the world and because there were newly 
discovered incidents, matters, and cases that were not covered explicitly in 
the former sources. Consequently, such sources needed to be interpreted.153 
The result of this was the establishment of another tier sources of Islamic law, 
 
150
 See the Quranic verse 5:3, Allah says 'This day I have perfected for you your religion and 
completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion'. See also John 
Burton, The Collection of the Quran (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1977) 139. 
151 Kamali (n127) 118. These interpretations relate to the changing needs of the Muslim 
community for achieving justice. This approach obtains its validity from the Quran and 
Sunnah. It aims to ‘correct understanding of the words and sentences of legal texts as well 
as to discover answers to new matters and ascertain the attention of the law giver with what 
has been left unexpressed as a matter of necessary inference from the surrounding 
circumstances’ in Kamali (n 127) 468. Moreover, ijtihád is defined by Hallaq as ‘the processes 
of reasoning that the jurist employs in order to arrive at the best guess of what he thinks might 
be the law pertaining to a particular case’ in Hallaq (n 10) 27; see also Frank Vogel, Islamic 
Law and Legal Systems; Studies of Saudi Arabia, (Brill 2000) 33. It could be argued that ijtihád 
is changeable and evolves over time based on the requirements of the Muslim community 
and is considered as ongoing and practised by linguistic jurists because the language of the 
Quran is sometimes not clear to everyone. 
152 The Oxford Dictionary <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fiqh/> accessed 24 
April 2018. 
153
 Baderin (n 135) 38. 
- 72 - 
namely: ijmá‘, qiyás, istiḥsán, urf, maslahah mursalah, and siyar by the jurists 
of the Islamic schools of Ḥanafí,154 Málikí, 155 Sháfiʻí,156 and Ḥanbalí.157 
Jurists of the Islamic schools use this tier of sources and their legal reasoning 
by approval of the Prophet, who appointed one of his companions, Muad ibn 
Jabal, as the Judge of Yemen. Muad was asked by the Prophet what sources 
should be used for judging cases, and Muad replied the Quran and Sunnah. 
The Prophet then asked him what he would do if he did not find an answer in 
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‘Overview of Islamic Law’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 707. 
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these sources and Muad replied, ‘I will use my own legal reasoning'. The 
Prophet was satisfied with his answers.158    
Five major factors contributed to the establishment of the Islamic schools 
(madhhab).159 First, in formulating the language of the Quran and Sunnah, 
some grey areas were left that became subject to interpretation by the highest 
qualified scholars, whether judges or muftis (scholars).160 Second, new legal 
issues arose, and new discoveries of knowledge made, in science and in 
many other aspects of life in the Muslim community.161 Third, Islamic law is 
obliged to consider these new incidents, cases, and situations that arise from 
time to time.162 Fourth, there was an expansion of Islam into many areas and 
into different cultures.163 Fifth, the texts of the Quran and Sunnah are mostly 
subject to interpretation. 164  Thus, grey areas, the new discoveries of 
knowledge, social needs, and moral norms must be interpreted within the 
general context to be compatible with the main sources of Sharí‘ah.165 
The main Islamic schools and their methodologies were established by 
religious authority and not by political rulers.166 Thus, the jurists of Islamic 
schools aimed to maintain the noble sources of Islamic law as well as to assist 
posterity by building up information about Islamic law.167 Moreover, rules were 
studied carefully by jurists relating to particular cases and taking into account 
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the ‘boundaries of conceptual jurists’.168 They might agree on one view on any 
case, but they might also disagree on other matters. Thus, when a view was 
issued by one of the schools, it would not be considered to be a collective view 
unless the others agreed to it.169  
As noted by Baderin, two important stages of legal reasoning emerged in the 
tenth century and in the thirteenth century. In the tenth century, the idea 
circulated that the established schools of Islamic law had fully exhausted most 
or all aspects of Islamic law. This led to the fear of closing the door to ijtihad 
(legal reasoning). By the thirteenth century, legal reasoning in the established 
schools had gradually diminished. This led to the opening of a door to Taqlid 
(legal confirmation). Thus, Islamic law has been restricted by the views of 
previous jurists. Jurists of Taqlid found themselves bound to follow previous 
recorded interpretations and, as such, they found ‘a reduction in the dynamics’ 
and injection into Islamic law.170 
By the seventh century, no one main methodology of legal reasoning was 
applied, but jurists at the time considered the importance of adopting an 
appropriate methodology. Thus, the methodology adopted was úṣúl al-fiqh, 
which can be defined as ‘the science of the rules through which to ascertain 
the prescriptions of Sharí‘ah'.171 The chosen methodology considers siyasat 
a-Sharí‘ah (the policies of Sharí‘ah) and maqasid a-Sharí‘ah (the purposes of 
the Sharí‘ah). It is based on systematic deduction from the sacred revealed 
text.172  
Because Sharí‘ah has some grey areas, it was ruled that Sharí‘ah should be 
subject to interpretation by the highest qualified scholars, whether these be 
judges or muftis.173 Their knowledge improved many aspects of life in Muslim 
communities. 174  Social needs and moral norms are also subject to 
interpretation within the general context of the main sources of Sharí‘ah. Thus, 
Islamic law must consider new incidents, cases, and situations arising from 
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time to time.175 The result of this was the establishment of supplementary 
sources in Islamic law as follows.  
 
3.3.4.1 Ijmá‘ (Consensus) 
Ijmá‘ refers to the agreed decisions that have been issued by Muslim jurists.176 
These jurists may be Imams of the previous schools of Islamic law, their 
pupils, new independent scholars, or researchers working at the Organisation 
of Islamic Co-operation (OIC).177 Consensus has been reached upon certain 
matters, issues, and cases, whether religious or legal, in order to apply legal 
reasoning for the Muslim community.178 This is the cornerstone of ijtihád in 
Islamic law, since it is based on inference from the objectives of Sharí‘ah. 
There is no specific matter or specific time limit for making consensus 
decisions.179 Moreover, these agreements could be an approval of a decision 
based upon a given question. There is a legal basis for the approach of 
consensus in Islamic law as follows. First, Allah says ‘and who (conduct) their 
affairs by mutual consultation … we have bestowed on them'.180 Second, after 
the Prophet Mohammed’s demise, his companions did not know who the 
Caliph would be; subsequently, his companions took a decision consensually 
to give the succession to Abo Baker.181  
The method used to reach consensus is úṣúl al-fiqh. It depends on inference 
from the main sources of Sharí‘ah. Using this method results in achieving 
important objectives of consensus, which then work as supplementary 
sources in Islamic law. The consultation principle and the unity principle 
consider the needs of Muslim society182 as well as the significant role of 






 A Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Mansoor Book House, Lahore 1995) 97. 
177 The Organisation of Islamic Co-operation is an inter-governmental organisation of the 
United Nations. It comprises fifty-seven Muslim countries around the world. It was established 
in 1969. More information is available on the official website <https://www.oic-
oci.org/home/?lan=en/> accessed 24 April 2018. 
178 Hallaq (n 113) 20. 
179
 N J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1994) 230. 
180 The Quran 42:38. 
181
 Abdullah Alarefi, ‘Overview of Islamic Law’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 
707.  
182
 Hallaq (n 113) 19.  
183 Rafat Y Alwazna, ‘Islamic Law: Its Sources, Interpretation and the Translation of it into 
Laws Written in English’ (2016) Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht 251.  
- 76 - 
3.3.4.2 Qiyás (Analogy) 
Qiyás is described as ‘comparison, with a view to suggesting equality or 
similarity between two things'. 184  In Islamic law, judges and scholars use 
qiyás in an attempt to find legal reasoning in a particular case when there is 
nothing explicit to be found in the Quran or the Sunnah or ijmá‘. Thus, it is 
used to scrutinise previous cases and new cases, and to explore similarities 
in order to establish rules for the new case. This seems similar to jus dem 
generis in common law, which is used as an extension for seeking legal 
reasoning.185 qiyás literally means 'analogical deduction'.186 
The basis of using qiyás in Islamic law as a fourth source derives from a letter 
from Caliph Omar Ibn al-Khattab to a judge upon his succession, stating that 
he is ‘seeking the ruling of the precedents and seeking the ruling that you 
consider to be closest to truth and most likely to earn the good-pleasure of 
Allah'.187 There are four elements that are needed to use qiyás as a form of 
legal reasoning in Islamic law: first, it should be based on the existence of an 
original case, namely there must be a previous case that has been ruled on; 
second, the new case should have a cause or effect that is similar to the 
original case; third, a nexus should exist between the cause and the result of 
the original case that is similar to the new case; and fourth, the legal norm of 
the original case should be similar to the new case.188 Thus, the importance 
of qiyás lies in the fact that it provides scope to address and rule on new cases 
that are not mentioned in the main sources.189  
One example of qiyás in Islamic law relates to drinking wine, which is explicitly 
prohibited in Islamic law. The prohibition here focuses on intoxication but not 
on the type of wine. Thus, jurists used qiyás to prohibit all wines because the 
reason for prohibition, namely intoxication, is prohibited in Islamic law. Hallaq 
states that the principle of qiyás relates to suitability for the needs of society 
and is relevant to the law because it offers a form of reasoning that is in the 
public interest.190 Malekian also notes that hypotheses are not acceptable in 
qiyás, which must rely on facts. Thus, qiyás is based on an individual’s 
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interpretation of a jurist’s decision, a jurist being someone who applies the 
general principles of Islamic law on a case-by-case basis using legal 
reasoning. Hence, qiyás aims to explore the law.191  
3.3.4.3 Istiḥsán (Juristic Preference) 
Istiḥsán (juristic preference) is described as ‘an exemption that is justified by 
sacred text'.192 it relies on the necessity principle to reach an appropriate 
interpretation from jurists by using inference from the main text. The term is 
derivative of the verb hasan, which means good.193 Literally istiḥsán is defined 
as ̀ to approve, or to deem something preferable'.194 Kamali describes istiḥsán 
as a significant branch of ijtihád that jurists adopt in Islamic law in order to 
consider the changing needs of Muslim society. In this regard, istiḥsán reflects 
the flexibility and growth of Islamic law.195 Kamali adds that istiḥsán aims to 
avoid any rigidity of the spirit of Islamic law. Another aim is '[to find] an 
alternative ruling which serves the ideals of justice'.196 Istiḥsán can be 'a 
departure from qiyás in favour of a ruling which dispels hardship and brings 
about ease to the people'.197 It can be stated that Muslim jurists seek to find a 
solution for a specific matter faced by Muslim society by using their view of 
Islamic jurisprudence. The legitimacy of istiḥsán in Islamic law derives from 
the action of the second Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, who decided not to 
implement the ḥudúd punishment for cutting off the hand of a thief in the time 
of famine.198 It can be stated that the example of istiḥsán at the present time 
is the approval of using alcohol to treat wounds and in some medical 
operations. 
The main difference between qiyás and preference may lie in the fact that 
while the reasoning behind qiyás falls chiefly within the large body of the 
law with no exception allowed, the reasoning underpinning preference, on 
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the other hand, is to find a particular exception through the jurist’s selection 
of a revealed text that allows this very exception.199 
 
3.3.4.4 Urf (Customs) 
Urf is an idea accepted by people in society as a moral or legal rule, whether 
this is a saying or an actual act.200 A custom is something that is agreed on by 
people living in a society. Such customs may vary from society to society. In 
Islamic law, there are four types of urf: a public custom that is generally 
accepted by most people in society; a private custom that is approved by a 
tribe or family; a positive custom agreed on by society; and an evil custom that 
constitutes abuse.201  
The legal basis of using ‘customs’ as a source in Islamic law is a saying of the 
Prophet Mohammed: ‘whatever that is seen as well in a Muslim society, it will 
be well with Allah'.202 Before Islamic law was created, some customs existed 
that became accepted in Islamic law; for instance, the custom of ‘blood 
money'. 203  However, some customs were not approved such as slavery 
(arguably). Evidence for this is when Allah says in the Quran, ‘O mankind we 
have created you from male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, 
that you may know one another … verily, Allah is all-knowing, well-acquainted 
(with all things)'.204 The most important conditions of using ‘custom’ as the fifth 
source of Islamic law are: a) it must not contradict with anything written in the 
main sources and b) it must be established before the case in question.205 
 
3.3.4.5 Maslahah Mursalah (Public Interest) 
This was identified as a means of interpretation of the ijtihád by jurists who 
sought to provide a proportionate interpretation in order to maintain public 
interest based on the needs of a community.206 It is described by Hallaq as ‘a 
rational’ principle that examines the public interest by protecting society from 
what is harmful and promoting to society what is appropriate. The method of 
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using this means is to interpret the suitability of public interest, and ‘to conform 
to the spirit of the law’.207 Moreover, it is associated with a necessary status 
that is not explicitly mentioned in the main sources of Islamic law. 208 
Furthermore, it can be used to reform legal texts and international treaties in 
order to maintain international peace and security between Muslim countries 
and other Muslim states.209 The application of this means aims to consider 
changes over time and requires two conditions: it must bring benefits and it 
must protect from harm.210 
 
3.3.5 Siyar 
Siyar refers to Islamic international law. It covers the rules and justifications 
for resorting to war and regulates operations and conduct in war.
211
 It also 
governs international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide, which are prohibited and punishable. Historically, the 
expansion of Islamic territories across the world has been based on the 
importance of interrelationships with other states, namely between Muslim 
and non-Muslim states. Jurists who specialise in Islamic international law have 
made significant contributions in this field. They include Abo Hanifa (767), Abo 
Yusuf (731), Al-Shaybani (747), and al-Sarakhsi (1090). All of them have 
recognised the need to regulate the affairs of Muslim states with other non-
Muslim states. 212  Jurists began to record legal incidents, especially in 
international relations. This sparked an endeavour to try to regulate the 
domestic and international affairs of Muslim states. This process was called 
siyar.213 Siyar is commonly known as ‘Islamic international law’ or ‘The Islamic 
Law of Nations’.214 It literately means ‘path’, ‘way’,215 or ‘conduct’.216 It is also 
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defined as the path of the Prophet Mohammed and his four Caliphs in times 
of peace and war.217 This term also refers to legal incidents.218  
The concept of siyar was introduced by the leader of the Ḥanafí School, Abo 
Ḥanafí, and later rolled out by his student Abo Yusuf, who continued Abo 
Ḥanafí’s work. Later on, Al-Shaybani and al-Sarakhsi developed the work of 
these two jurists further.219 Khadduri defines siyar as meaning the significant 
part of Sharí‘ah that governs the law of Muslim nations with others and binds 
all Muslim states and societies to protect the interests of Islam.220 Hamidullah 
defines this as ‘part of the law and custom of the land and treaty obligations 
which a Muslim de facto or de jure state observes in its dealings with other de 
facto or de jure states'.221 Furthermore, Badr observes the following.  
[The] Islamic law of nations is part of the corpus of Islamic law just as the 
original jus gentium was a branch of municipal Roman law. Islamic law is 
a religious law only in the sense that its basic ethical grounds and some of 
its general principles are to be found in the Quran and the pronouncements 
of the Prophet Mohammad. Beyond that, the corpus of Islamic law as it 
developed over the ages is ‘man-made’ in the sense that it resulted from 
the efforts of the jurists of the various schools of law.222 
The modern scholar, Ali, defines siyar as ‘a legal system based on the 
Sharí‘ah intended to apply universally to all people in every time and place'.223 
In relation to siyar, Al Ghunaimi suggests a framework to cover the 
relationship of Muslim states with non-Muslim states and other Muslim 
states.224 Bsoul suggests the following. 
The concept of siyar evolved from its lexicographical meaning in particular; 
from its connotation of behaviour or conduct [which was] used by 
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chroniclers in their narrative accounts to mean life or biography, i.e. the 
conduct of an individual.225  
Furthermore, Bsoul argues that siyar refers to the rules governing international 
relations and Muslim states.226 According to Khadduri, siyar ‘was not based 
essentially on reciprocity or mutual consent, but was a self-imposed system 
of law, the sanctions of which were moral or religious and binding on its 
adherents, even though the rules might run counter to their interests'.227 Thus, 
it can be said that siyar means following the rules of the Prophet and his 
successors in international affairs, in times of war and peace. 
Islamic international law is a part of Islamic law. Its main sources are the 
Quran and Sunnah. The other tier of sources includes the ijmá‘ (consensus), 
qiyás (analogy), istiḥsán (juristic preference), urf (customs), and maslahah 
mursalah ( public interest). Islamic international law is known as siyar, which 
has additional sources according to Hamidullah. These additional sources are 
arbitration, treaties/conventions, official instructions, and internal 
legislation.228 Accordingly, all the other sources of Islamic law are clearly 
devised by human knowledge and endeavour. This inference, however, does 
not appear to be as obvious as it should have been, leading some scholars to 
argue that Islamic law is divine law and hence unchangeable.’229  




—and their entities, namely Muslim and non-
Muslim states. The law provides legal rights and bears legal obligations.232 It 
is also part of Sharí‘ah, which regulates individual behaviour and conduct in 
times of peace and war.233 The general concept of siyar divides the world into 
a) dár al-ḥarb (the land of war); b) dar-al-Islam (the land of peace); and c) dar-
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al-ahd (the land of truce).234 However, the contemporary practices of Muslim 
states as members of the United Nations indicate that new contributions need 
to be added to the international norms of siyar, mainly because the practices 
of Muslim states are sources of siyar.235  
 
 
3.4 Mechanisms of Interpretation: Commonalities and Differences 
The main source of Sharí‘ah is considered to be divine law, but another tier of 
sources of Islamic law, namely consensus, qiyás, custom, public interest, and 
siyar, are subject to the interpretation of human beings. The latter approach is 
similar to the use of another tier of sources in international criminal law, which 
are subject to the thoughts of human beings.236  
A form of consensus is adopted and practised in both legal systems. This has 
appeared during ICC meetings and discussions of The Assembly of State 
Parties, and described as ‘the Court's management oversight and legislative 
body and is composed of representatives of the States which have ratified or 
acceded to the Rome Statute'.237 Moreover, in the international community, 
consensus often appears in discussions for establishing an international 
treaty; for instance, in discussions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations or International Law Commission of the United Nations. This 
approach is similar to the concept of consensus in Islamic law as practised at 
the Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC).238 The former often requires 
attendance at meetings and the participation of delegations of states, and 
requires a number of states to adopt agreed views to establish an international 
treaty.239 However, the concept of consensus in Islamic law may not require 
attendance at meetings in general, but operates on the unity principle of 
Muslim states, because the OIC promotes the principle of solidarity among 
Islamic states and aims to unite the views of Muslim scholars with respect to 
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the needs of Muslim societies.240  This approach corresponds with Article 
21(1)(c) of the ICC, which relates to the sources of the Treaty, and the results 
of reference to international principles, which can promote shared common 
values between common, civilian, and Islamic law. 241  However, the 
problematic question raised in this regard is, why not? In both legal systems, 
scholars should be representative members of delegations when establishing 
or amending an international treaty. They should not be simply an official 
delegation that may consider the interests of their states or take into account 
political considerations, whether they are acting for the ICC or the OIC.   
The general principles of international criminal law are distributed across 
many international conventions, such as international treaties of human rights 
and the Geneva Conventions.242 Thus, these general principles of law can be 
taken and used when the rules of the treaty do not contain or do not explicitly 
refer to the case in question. Consequently, the general principles of law can 
be taken into consideration.243 These general principles can be inferred when 
an international convention and customary law does not indicate an answer 
to the case in question.244  
Furthermore, compatibility could be understood in terms of the general 
principles as stipulated in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. This Article 
provides that general principles that have been accepted and applied by 
civilised nations should be recognised as sources of international law. Since 
Islamic law is one of the major legal systems of the world, it could ‘harmonise 
with and accommodate international rules'. 245 Islamic law represents Muslim 
civilised nations worldwide, and compatibility should be viewed in terms of the 
legality principle that is applied and accepted among the major legal systems 
in the world. The general principles of Islamic law are discussed in the next 
chapter in terms of a compatibility approach between both legal systems. 
Customs are classed as one of the oldest sources of international law 
according to Article 38(1)(b) of the International Court of Justice Statute.  
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The Statute [of the ICJ] constitutes an integral part of the UN Charter and 
the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Customary 
rules cannot, as a matter of principle, be a direct basis of incrimination by 
an international criminal judge ... [but] can nevertheless be a model or test 
when drafting future statutes of international criminal tribunals.246  
Customary rules are defined by the ICJ as follows. 
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it 
sufficient that the conduct of States should in general be consistent with 
such a rule; and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given 
rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as 
indications of the recognition of a new rule.247 
In Islamic law, jurists resort to custom if the Quran, the Sunnah, ijmá‘, and 
qiyás do not cover the case in question. In contrast, the ICJ Statute's Article 
38(1)(b) explains that ‘customary international law derived from the practice 
of States’ is considered as a source of international law. In this regard, Article 
38 is a source of the Rome Statute according to Article 21(1)(b). 248 
Consequently, using custom as a source in both legal systems is 
indispensable. This is for two reasons. First, as Malekian states, ‘the 
provisions of international criminal law may easily be accepted within the 
Islamic system due to the fact that it would not have been ratified by Islamic 
nations if its purpose had been against the principles of Islamic law'.249 This 
view is consistent with the view of Schabas who argues that there is an 
international obligation upon states to prevent international crimes in its 
territories or in another territory, according to the Geneva Conventions and 
the Genocide Convention. 250  Second, new criminal terminologies have 
emerged in international law that are not explicitly defined in Islamic law; thus, 
it is important to use custom as a source to prevent international crimes and 
to adhere to international obligations.  
Moreover, as it has been previously provided that customary international law 
is one of the sources of international law, Islamic law recognises that a 
custom, whether domestic or international, can be the source of law if it does 
not contradict its provisions, namely the Quran and the Sunnah. Such an 
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identified custom relates to the reciprocity rule in international law: when the 
custom has been practised and accepted, then it shall be fulfilled. This rule 
has been embedded in both legal systems, especially in diplomatic 
international law. The reciprocity rule is described in international law as a 
guide rule and has significant power.251 A similar notion exists in Islamic law 
according to the Quranic verse, ‘And if they incline to peace, then incline to it 
[also] and rely upon Allah’.252 It would seem that if another party that fights 
you wants peace or settlement, Muslims should seek such peace or 
settlement. Another Quranic verse is as follows: ‘and if you punish [an enemy, 
O believers], punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed. 
But if you are patient - it is better for those who are patient.’253 
Compatibility could be understood in terms of the international treaties since 
Islamic law requires the commitment and implementation of contracts 
between parties whoever they are, whether states or individuals, Muslim or 
non-Muslim. The significant point here seems to be that the provisions and 
terms of the contracts must be followed and fulfilled by the parties.254 Thus, 
Muslims are obliged to obey and implement the provisions of the contracts. 
This approach is based on the Quranic verse, ‘O you who have believed, fulfil 
[all] contracts'.255 In international law, there is a similar principle known as 
pacta sunt servanda. This principle provides that the parties of the contracts 
must be committed to the provisions and terms of the contracts.256 
Thus, the provisions and terms of contracts in both legal systems must be 
respected and implemented as provided for in the contracts. The focal point 
here could be that in Islamic law there are no requirements that mention that 
the parties must be Muslim states. This opens the door to contracts if contracts 
serve the Muslim interest. There is a similar idea about the significance of the 
implementation of a contract that exists in the international maxim. Hence, 
according to the Hanfi, Málikí, and Hanabli schools, if there is a permanent 
peace treaty between a Muslim state and non-Muslim state, then the treaty 
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can be for an indefinite time.257 In this regard, one may observe that the Rome 
Statute can be a peace treaty that serves and protect humanity.   
In light of the above, it is important now to clarify the nature of Islamic criminal 
law. 
 
3.5 The Nature of Islamic Criminal Law258 
Criminal laws—for instance, civil law, Roman law, common law, Hindu law, 
German law, and Islamic law—originate or rely on religion, customs, codified 
law in order to operate and may share some elements in common.259 These 
shared elements deal with procedural rules, proof of evidence, the rights of 
the accused, and imposing punishments upon guilty people. 260  Islamic 
criminal law has roots that are grounded in the concept of human rights and 
social justice.261 It is derived from the Quran and Sunnah, and from another 
tier of sources. Thus, it stands beside contemporary legal systems; for 
instance, common law and civil law.262 Islamic criminal law has been defined 
as ‘the control of commission of the crimes so as to protect the rights and 
interests of the public and ensure peace in the society'.263 Schacht describes 
Islamic criminal law as ‘sacred law … it contains Allah commands’ and is 
based on the rights and duties of the Islamic religion upon individuals.264 
The concept of Islamic law, according to the International Union for Muslim 
scholars, is based on the maqáṣid al-Sharí‘ah (Objectives of the Sharí‘ah), 
which comprises direct and indirect components.265 The direct components 
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are the preservation of the life of individuals by criminalising the murder of 
other people; the preservation of people’s money and public money from theft; 
the preservation of religion from apostasy; the preservation of people’ minds 
from alcohol; and preserving posterity by criminalising adultery and sodomy. 
The indirect components relate to punishments in Sharí‘ah, which applies 
punishments equally and in proportion to the harm caused by a crime. As 
such, its punishments aim to show mercy to people. Since Sharí‘ah is 
preventive and acts as a deterrent, its punishments are not the goal of 
Sharí‘ah itself because Allah does not benefit from increasing or decreasing 
punishments given to criminals.266  
Islamic criminal law derives its sources and its legitimacy from Sharí‘ah, 
namely the Quran and Sunnah and other Islamic sources such as ijmá‘ 
(consensus) and qiyás (analogy). For instance, Allah says, ‘Judge thou 
between them by what Allah hath revealed'.267 He also says, ‘And when you 
judge between people that ye judge with justice'.268 Furthermore, Allah says, 
‘Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and liberty to kith and kin, and he 
forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion ... He instructs you that 
ye may receive admonition on the day-of-judgement, those in sin'.269 
In the Sunnah, the Prophet says, ‘A true believer does not backbite, curse, 
practise lewdness, or utter obscene words … He who believes in Allah and 
the Last Day shall honour his neighbour and he who believes in God and the 
Last Day shall speak well of others or keep quiet.’270 The Prophet himself 
practised judgment between people. 271  He also appointed some of his 
companions to be judges in Yemen and Iraq. In Yemen he sent Mu’d ibn Jabal, 
who reported the following.  
 (When) Allah’s Messenger sent him to Yemen, he asked him how he 
would judge (decide cases). He said, 'I will judge in accordance with Allah's 
Book (the Qur’an).' The Prophet asked, ‘What, if it is not found in the Book 
of Allah?' He said, 'Then according to the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger.' 
The Prophet asked, 'And if it is not in the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger?' 
He said, 'I will make ijtihád through my Judgement.' The Prophet said, 
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'Praise belongs to Allah who has made the messenger of the Messenger 
of Allah consistent with what pleases him.'272  
 
3.5.1 Islamic Criminal Law in Practice 
273
 
The modern concept of criminal procedures, including investigations, arrests, 
prosecutions, and detentions, were not, at the beginning of Islam, recognised 
in Islamic criminal law. Sharí‘ah leaves these procedures for individual states 
to establish and implement in accordance with the needs of society. 274 
Bassiouni states that the jurists of Islamic criminal law consider the important 
role of criminal procedures in the law for protecting human beings in all 
spheres. 275  They have developed Islamic criminal law throughout the 
centuries, passing it on through the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid (750-
1258) dynasties until the emergence of Al-Majalla, which was the first 
codification of criminal and civil law during the Ottoman Empire (1299-
1923).276  
Al-Majalla considered the views of jurists and the precedents of judges.277 
Bassiouni also points out that although Islamic criminal law imposes itself 
upon Muslim societies in order to bind the religion of Islam, there are different 
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applications of this system across Muslim countries. These differences are 
based on various procedures of trial, procedures of proof, and stages of 
prosecution. This situation arose because all procedures have roots in their 
own cultures and societies; for instance, Indonesia in the East, Morocco in the 
West, Pakistan in the Indian subcontinent, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle 
East.278  
Bassiouni evaluates the application of Islamic criminal law currently as a 
‘fragmented system’ that is used across Muslim countries. 279  This 
fragmentation is based on political influence and the diversity of cultures.280 
Political influence can affect the work of judges if they are appointed by certain 
political authorities. In such a circumstance, judges may lose their objectivity 
and independence.281 The diversity of cultures may place pressures upon 
judges, which may lead to obstacles when applying laws equally. The different 
approaches taken in Islamic criminal law can be understood by exploring three 
factors. First, some Muslim countries were colonised by Great Britain. These 
countries tend to use common law as well as Sharí‘ah; for instance, Pakistan 
and Sudan. Second, other Muslim countries were colonised by France. These 
countries tend to use civil law as well as Sharí‘ah law; for instance, Lebanon 
and Algeria. Third, other Muslim countries just use Sharí‘ah law without using 
a mixed approach, such as the Maldives, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.282 
Lippman notes some features of Islamic criminal law that distinguish it from 
other legal and criminal systems.283 One feature is that Islamic criminal law 
and its legitimacy are derived from divine law. A second feature is that its 
provisions are fixed and immutable; thus, its principles are specific legal 
principles rather than ‘elastic principles’. Another feature is that the 
punishments of Islamic criminal law are based on religious duty rather fear of 
the power of secular law.284 Furthermore, Islamic criminal law aims to achieve 
justice by protecting the rights of the oppressed.285 
However, another view of Islamic criminal law is that it takes a sociological 
approach to the analysis and punishment of crimes because its rules are a 
means to an end rather than a philosophical means for addressing 
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behaviours.286 However, Hakeem points out that this perspective examines 
Islamic punishments from a purely social angle.287 He argues that the main 
objective of Islamic criminal law is to regulate present life, and the afterlife, by 
clarifying the duties and rights of individuals as they are found in the main 
sources, in terms of their relationship with each other, as well as their 
relationship with Allah.288 Furthermore, Lippmann argues that Islamic criminal 
law considers ethical standards and legal rules at the same time. Ethical 
standards are seen in the context of conscience rather than the imposition of 
legal rules. 289  Islamic criminal law preserves the right to life, reputation, 
religion, family, and properties.290 These rights are based on the classification 
of crimes in Islamic criminal law, namely ḥudúd, qiṣáṣ, and ta‘zír, which are 
discussed below.291  
The application of Islamic criminal law creates a safe and stable society 
because it places emphasis on the moral aspects of life derived from the 
Islamic religion, as well as giving a warning that there are severe punishments 
for committing crimes. This approach provides a deterrent to crime.292 It also 
goes further in terms of preventing crimes by prohibiting intoxicants connected 
to a criminal environment.293 It aims to protect the family by prohibiting sexual 
activity such as adultery and sodomy, and imposes punishments for these 
activities, thereby offering a framework of stability because the family is 
considered to be a cornerstone of life. Second, it maintains the stability of 
public order and life by protecting individuals from criminal acts or humiliation. 
Third, it protects properties, whether public or private, from theft or destruction. 
Fourth, it protects religion by prohibiting Muslims from apostasy and insulting 
other religions.294  
The above objectives are achieved by using certain mechanisms. Hathout 
explains that a Muslim state is required to establish a competent authority that 
operates to protect the objectives of Islamic criminal law. The conscience of a 
Muslim person is an important mechanism used to prevent the committing of 
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criminal acts because conscience binds us to Allah’s commands. 295 
Moreover, for instance, community reform through the equal opportunities of 
economic means in society is maintained by applying zakáh (an obligatory tax 
that every Muslim must pay every year).296 This helps a state work to reduce 
crime by meeting the needs of individuals. The nature of the concept of 
punishment in Islamic criminal law is considered a deterrent because serious 
conditions are applied to criminals who have committed crimes.297 
 
3.5.2 Categories of Crimes in Islamic Criminal Law 
In Islamic criminal law, crimes are categorised according to the punishment 
administered. This approach reflects the law's objectives and its effectiveness 
to combat crimes.298 In Islamic criminal law, crimes are categorised into three 
types, ḥudúd, qiṣáṣ, and ta‘zír, and are defined as the ‘prevention, hindrance, 
restraint, prohibition, and hence a restrictive ordinance or statute of Allah, 
respecting things lawful and unlawful'.299 They are also defined as a ‘legal 
prohibition that [is] prescribed by God and carries definitive legal deterrents of 
ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ punishments. In the case of an accusation, a state of 
purification is required by religious dictates, and, when proved and found 
correct, a state of execution is obligated by the legal commandments.’300 
Awda defines these crimes as ‘forbidden acts against Allah’s commands, 
which prevents and punishes those acts in ḥudúd crimes, qiṣáṣ crimes … 
those forbidden acts either committing prohibited acts or disregarding 
mandatory acts.’301 
Hudúd crimes are classed as crimes against Allah, and qiṣáṣ crimes are 
classed as crimes against the individual and properties.302 Crimes against 
Allah relate to the rights of Allah, and it is the responsibility of a state to apply 
them. Crimes against individuals and properties relate to the rights of 
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individuals.303 Although punishments for ḥudúd crimes are specified in the 
Holy Book of Islam (the Quran), they will not be applied if there are grounds 
for doubt. The Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed explains this: ‘Avoid applying 
legal punishment upon the Muslims if you are capable. If the criminal has a 
way out, then leave him to his way. Verily, it is better for the leader to make a 
mistake forgiving the criminal than it is for him to make a mistake punishing 
the innocent.'304 When the evidence and required conditions of ḥudúd crimes 
are proven before a judge, the judge has no discretionary powers to increase 
or decrease the punishment because it is a fixed punishment and a crime 
against Allah, the Prophet, as well as against public justice.305 
 
3.5.2.1 Hudúd Crimes 
 Hudúd crimes are sariqa (theft), ḥirábah (armed robbery), ziná’ (adultery), 
qadhf (defamation), sharb al-khamr (drinking/intoxication), bugháh (rebellion), 
and ridda (apostasy).
306 The punishments for ḥudúd crimes are mentioned 
explicitly in the Quran and Sunnah. Judges have no discretionary power for 
applying punishments when the crimes are proven.307 This is because the 
evidential rules are strict and required in accordance with the Quran. If doubt 
arises in relation to evidence against the accused, then a judgment is ruled in 
favour of the accused.308  
 
3.5.2.1.1 Sariqah 
Theft is prohibited and criminalised in Islamic criminal law. It is defined as the 
‘taking of property belonging to another [secretly with intention]'. 309  The 
relevant Quranic verse says, ‘As to thief, male or female, cut off his or her 
hands. It is reward of their deeds, an exemplary punishment from Allah. Allah 
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3.5.2.1.2 Hirábah 
Armed robbery, or ‘highway robbery’, refers to ‘... waiting by the wayside (or 
highway) to steal travellers’ property by force, and by this means obstructing 
travel on the road'.311 The distinction between theft and armed robbery is that 
the latter crime is committed using force on a highway or in a public place, 
while the former takes place in secret and uses no force.312 An example of 
armed robbery is when the armed robber steals with the intention of killing 
passers-by. The Quran states the following. 
The only recompense for those who make war upon Allah and His 
Messengers and strive after corruption in the land will be that they will be 
killed, or crucified, or have their hands and feet cut off on alternate side or 
will be expelled from the land. Such will be their recompense in this world, 
and in the Hereafter, theirs will be an awful punishment, except those who 
repent before you overpower them, for know that Allah is Forgiving, 




Ziná’ is comprehensively defined by the Ḥanafí as ‘sexual intercourse 
between a man and a woman without legal right or without the semblance of 
legal right'.314 There are two types of punishments for adultery, both of which 
are based on the ‘culprit’s marital status'. The first type of punishment is 
stoning to death for committing adultery.315 The punishment of stoning to 
death is prescribed by the Prophet for some guilty people.316 The second type 
of punishment is a hundred lashes for committing fornication, which means, 
‘sexual relations between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman'.317The 
punishment of this crime is mentioned in the following Quranic verse: ‘The 
committers of ziná’, male and female, flog each of them with a hundred stripes, 
and do not let pities for the two withhold you from obedience to Allah, if you 
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Defamation refers to ‘the defamation of an individual’s chastity or improper 
accusation of adultery [or sodomy]'.319 A false accusation in order to prove 
adultery or sodomy receives a punishment of eighty lashes.320 This action is 
criminalised in order to protect the honour and the freedom of people. The 
relevant Quranic verse says, ‘And those who launch a charge against a chaste 
woman, and produce not four witnesses to support their allegations, flog them 
with eighty stripes, and reject their evidence ever after: for such men are 
wicked transgressors'. 321  Most jurists of the Islamic schools of Ḥanafí, 
Ḥanbalí, and Sháfiʻí believe that the words used to accuse the defendant must 
not be ambiguous, and clear words must be used, such as ‘adulterer’ or 
‘fornicator’ to accuse the defendant. Thus, if the crime is ambiguous, then it is 
not a crime of qadhf.322 
 
 
3.5.2.1.5 Sharb al-khamr 
 
Drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islam. The relevant Quranic verse says, ‘O 
you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] stone 
altars [to other than Allah ], and divining arrows are but defilement from the 
work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful.’323 This verse does not 
explicitly include reference to the whip punishment for drinking alcohol, but in 
the Sunnah, the Prophet says, ‘Every intoxicant is Khamr and every intoxicant 
is forbidden'. 324  The Ḥanafí, Málikí, and Ḥanbalí schools believe that the 
punishment for drinking alcohol should be eighty whips, but the Sháfiʻí believe 
the punishment should be forty whips.325 This is because a Hadith exists that 
states the Prophet ordered a person who had drunk alcohol to receive forty 
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lashes. 326  Moreover, taking drugs is also explicitly forbidden by qiyás 
(analogy) because drugs have the same effects as drinking alcohol in terms 





The Quran deems that society must be protected from civil wars and so remain 
safe and peaceful. This is because civil wars in society can lead to the killing 
of innocent people and the destruction of public properties. Islamic criminal 
law prohibits rebellion against a leader. 328  Rebellion is defined as an 
intentional and armed act that leads to the overthrow of the legitimate ruler.329 
There is no agreement on the definition of rebellion among jurists of the 
Islamic schools, but they describe some conditions that meet the criteria for 
this crime: first, there must be a group of rebels; second, the rebels must be 
armed; third, the group must use force when revolting against a leader; and 
fourth, the group must have enough power to attempt to overthrow the 
leader.330 The leader will consider the demands of the group first, and if there 
is no reasonable basis for their demands, or they lack merit, then the group 
must desist from the rebellion.331  
 
Punishments for this crime vary according to the specific acts of the rebels. 
The leader must ask the group to stop the rebellion first, but if they do not stop, 
the leader has the right to invoke the Quran to fight them until they cease the 
rebellion.332 Rebels who commit murder during the revolt are guilty of rebellion 
under the rule of ḥudúd. This crime carries the death penalty.333 Rebels who 
are arrested without committing murder receive ta‘zír punishments (which are 
discussed later in this chapter).334 The relevant Quranic verse explains both 
the crime and its punishment: ‘If two parties are fighting, then make peace 
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331
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other, then fight ye all against the one that transgresses until it complies with 
the command of Allah'.335 
 
 
3.5.2.1.7 Riddah  
 
Apostasy can be defined as the voluntary renunciation of Islam.’336 Islamic 
criminal law criminalises and punishes those who convert from Islam to 
another faith. This is because the person who converts to another faith 
violates his obligation with Allah.337 According to jurists of Islamic law, the 
punishment of this offence is assessed using three steps. First, the person 
giving up Islam must receive advice from jurists to return to Islam. Second, 
the person must be given enough time to make this decision. Most jurists give 
three days, but others give until the person is repentant and returns to Islam, 
while others rule that punishment is subject to the discretionary power of the 
ruler. Last, the person must face trial, and if found guilty, is punished with the 
death penalty.338 This punishment is not applied when the apostate does not 
know or understand the penalty of an act of apostasy.339 
 
The prohibition of apostasy is cited in the relevant Quranic verse as follows: 
‘And if any of you, turn back from their faith and die in unbelief, their works will 
bear no fruit in this life and in the Hereafter.’340 This verse prohibits apostasy, 
but the punishment stated is in the afterlife. However, another punishment is 
mentioned in the Hadith of the Prophet, when he says, ‘whom-ever changes 
his religion, kill him'.341  
Jurists of Islamic law always try to avoid the death penalty for this offence 
since there may be doubt about the law of proof.342 Some jurists argue that 
the Prophet himself did not apply the death penalty to people who converted 
from Islam during his life, and so the punishment for apostasy should not be 
the death penalty.343 During the time of the Prophet, there was one case 
where a person committed apostasy and the Prophet asked him to leave 
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Medina.344 Some companions of the Prophet al-Nakh’i also argue that the 
punishment for apostasy is not the death penalty. The Málikí school believes 
that an apostate should not be sentenced to the death penalty because 
apostasy is a sin that will be punished in the afterlife.345 Ibn Taymiyya argues 
that the punishment of this offence is categorised under ta‘zír punishment.346 
On the other hand, the Ḥanafí and Sháfiʻí schools believe that this offence is 




3.5.2.2 Qiṣáṣ Crimes  
 
The word qiṣáṣ originates from the Quran when Allah says, ‘O you who 
believe! qiṣáṣ (the law of equality in punishment) is prescribed for you in cases 
of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the 
female'. 348  Qiṣáṣ crimes refer to ‘the equivalent infliction of bodily harm 
against the individual who has committed the [criminal] act by the victim or his 
family'.349 It may also mean that punishment can be equivalent to the criminal 
act. Thus, if a criminal act harms an individual physically, it is categorised as 
a qiṣáṣ crime because it is a violation against an individual’s rights.350 In this 
sense, the offender must be punished in an equivalent way. The relevant 
Quranic verse stipulates that ‘We ordained for them, a life for a life and an eye 
for an eye and a nose for a nose … but he who shall forgo it out of charity will 
atone thereby for some of his past sins.’351 In this Quranic verse, if the right of 
an individual has been violated, he or she may waive the infliction of an 
injurious punishment on the offender.352 Another right of the victim relating to 
qiṣáṣ crimes is to receive compensation from the offender before filing a suit 
in court.353 Compensation can result in breaking the cycle of violation and lead 
to reconciliation with recognition of the act and responsibility, and the 
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Qiṣáṣ crimes can be divided into two categories. The first includes the crimes 
of murder, intentional homicide, unintentional homicide, and homicide by 
mistake. The second category includes physical injury or maiming, both 
intentional and unintentional, or injury by mistake.
355  
3.5.2.3 Ta‘zír Crimes 
 
Jurists of the Islamic schools define ta‘zír offences using the general principles 
and objectives of the Quran, Sunnah, and ijmá‘ (consensus).356 Thus, ta‘zír 
offences lie within what Sharí‘ah forbids. For instance, trafficking in human 
beings is prohibited in Islamic criminal law, but there is no specific punishment 
mentioned in the main sources. The evidence of the prohibition is the Hadith 
Al-Quadis (sacred words) where Allah said, ‘I will be an opponent to three 
types of people on the Day of Resurrection: 1. One who makes a covenant in 
My Name, but proves treacherous; 2. One who sells a free person and eats 
his price; and 3. One who employs a labourer and takes full work from him but 
does not pay him for his labour.’
357
 
Benmelha describes how a ta‘zír crime can be applied to the concept of a 
ta‘zír punishment as follows. a) If the criminal act does not meet the conditions 
and requirements of ḥudúd or qiṣáṣ punishments. For example, if someone 
does not repay a contracted loan to the owner within the specific time frame 
set, this cannot be classed as theft but is classed as a ta‘zír crime. b) In cases 
of the failure to prove ḥudúd or qiṣáṣ during the judicial procedure, and the 
trial is in doubt. c) When the condemned act is prohibited whether in the Quran 
or Sunnah but no punishment is mentioned, such as the case of trafficking 
human beings or bribery crimes. d) When acts violate the security and welfare 
of a society, or breach moral norms in it, such as preventing children from 
going to school to obtain knowledge.358 However, punishments given out for 
ta‘zír crimes must not contradict rulings in the main sources, or the general 
principles and objectives of Islamic law.359  
Even though these crimes and punishments are legislated by legislative 
authority or leaders, they are subject to the discretionary powers of a judge to 
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protect society from criminal acts and to reform the criminals. Thus, ta‘zír 
punishments can be either lighter punishments or more severe punishments 
depending on the criminal act, the elements of the crime, and the behaviour 
of the criminal. They also take into account the protection of society. Lighter 
punishments can comprise admonition or a reprimand or threat. Severe 
punishments can be enforced public disclosure and fines and seizure, or 
imprisonment, flogging, and even death.360  
Ibn Bayyah defines ta‘zír as the punishment of a sin or offence that is not 
described or specified in Sharí‘ah sources but is a sin or offence that becomes 
punishable because it violates the rights of Allah, the rights of individuals or 
society, or the rights of the state.361 Violation against the rights of Allah, for 
example, may be breakfasting during Ramadan without a legitimate excuse. 
An example of the violation of individuals’ rights may be an insult or abuse, 
and violations against a state may be the use of guns in a public place, 
shooting into the air without committing a crime, and counterfeiting. Ta‘zír 
crimes are defined by the state, which estimates and legislates for them in 
accordance with Islamic criminal law and its authority to preserve stability, 
peace, and security in society.362 Hence, ta‘zír crimes are judged based on 
the needs of a society; thus, the state is responsible for implementing or 
amending them based on the needs of society with regard to bringing benefit 
and avoiding harm.363  
Ta‘zír punishments are defined as ‘a form of discretionary punishment that 
was to be delivered for transgression against Allah, or against an individual, 
for which neither fixed punishment, nor penance, was prescribed'. 364  The 
Quran and Sunnah do not use the word ‘ta‘zír’, but the term was established 
by jurists who left regulation to the leader of a state or another judge.365 It was 
their objective to administer deterrent punishments and disciplinary action.366 
Bassiouni argues that because ta‘zír crimes and punishments are not defined 
by Islamic criminal law, judges hold absolute discretional powers, a situation 
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that breaches the principles of legality.367 However, he adds that there is no 
hurdle present in the Quran and Sunnah that prevents the establishment and 
definition of ta‘zír crimes and punishments. On the other hand, if the 
enactment and codification of ta‘zír crimes and punishments are entrusted to 
the power of the state by a competent authority, this power cannot be absolute 
but must be within the general principles of Islamic criminal law and its 
objectives, taking into consideration the needs of society.368 The power of the 
judge is limited to what is legislated by the state; thus, the power of the judge 
works as an assessment of the case in question.369 In this regard, Ibin Bayyah 
explains that Sharí‘ah leaves the definition of ta‘zír crimes and punishments 
to the authority of the state and the judge; this reflects the flexibility of Islamic 
criminal law, which has been developed and adopted in accordance with the 
needs of the public, taking into consideration different environments in society 
and cultures. In addition, this works to enhance the needs of society by 
allowing competent authorities to establish and implement what society 
needs.370 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
To conclude, this chapter has discussed whether there is compatibility 
between the tier of other sources of both legal systems under analysis. 
Compatibility is seen in the fundamentally held notions of both legal systems. 
Harmonisation is sought in order to facilitate compliance with international 
treaties, which are, increasingly, playing an important part in the international 
arena. The general principles of law reflect a balance between the interests of 
individuals, through the principle of legality, and the interests of society, 
through the imposition of sanctions on the people who commit crimes. 
Consensus is also used in both legal systems. Indeed, exploring the opinions 
of scholars and jurists has worked to achieve justice in the public interest of 
societies around the world. As we have seen, precedent is commonly used to 
reach justice if something is not covered in the main sources. There is no 
doubt that customs are an important source of law for both legal systems and 
act as a protective shield in cases of unlawful attack by others. It is also 
important to recognise the importance of respect and equitability between 
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states for ensuring international peace and security. Thus, it is clear that there 
is common ground between both legal systems under analysis. 
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Chapter Four  
A Macroscopic View of the Compatibilities and Incompatibilities 
between the Principles of Islamic Criminal Law and the Principles of 
the Rome Statute 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The general principles of law are codified in chapter three of the Rome Statute 
as follows. a) Nullum crimen sine lege. The principle of ‘no crime without law’.1 
b) Nulla poena sine lege. ‘No punishment without law’.2 c) Non-retroactivity. 
‘No punishment will be applied before the law was enacted and entered into 
force.’3 The principle of individual criminal responsibility is mentioned in Article 
25. Other principles are indicated in different parts of the Statute such as non-
bis in idem, namely a person shall not be tried twice for the same criminal 
conduct. Further principles are the principle of the presumption of innocence 
and the principle of equality before the law.
4  
It is valid to say that the 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute is based on certain universal principles5 that 
derive from international conventions and different national legislation.6 
Most state delegations who attended the Rome meeting recognised the 
importance of legally codifying certain main principles and, in doing so, the 
international community made a great leap forward towards establishing an 
international treaty that sought to embody these principles of law in the arena 
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of international justice.
7 Ambos explains that the adoption of these principles 
‘was an attempt to merge the criminal justice systems of more than 150 States 
into one legal instrument that was more or less acceptable to every delegation 
present in Rome'.
8 These main principles were also agreed on during the 
negotiation stage by Muslim and Arab countries.
9  This was done on the 
grounds that the main general principles of law embodied in the Rome Statute 
are also found in Islamic criminal law.
10 Parallel principles found in Islamic 
criminal law are: a) no crime and no punishment without law; b) the principle 
of non-retroactivity; c) the principle that a person shall not be tried twice for 
the same criminal conduct (non-bis in idem); d) the principle of the 
presumption of innocence; e) the principle of equality before the law; and f) 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. Some of these principles are 
codified in the Rome Statute, such as the principle of the presumption of 




Although these general principles of law are assumed to be universal, some 
academics argue that Islamic criminal law may not be compatible with modern 
international law. One such argument focuses on the view that Islamic criminal 
law does not follow a comprehensive criminal legal system because it derives 
its rules from God’s commands and prohibitions.12  Another suggests that 
‘[Islamic criminal law is] the result of a speculative attempt by pious scholars 
working during the first three centuries of Islam, to define the will of Allah. In 
self-imposed isolation from practical needs and circumstances they produced 
a comprehensive system of rules, largely in opposition to existing legal 
practice which expressed the religious ideal.’13 Furthermore, as noted by the 
General Assembly of the UN's Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
 
7
 Kai Ambos, ‘General Principles of Criminal Law in The Rome Statute’ (1999) 10 Criminal 
Law Forum 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9
 ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal’, (n 
5) 192. 
10
 M Cherif Bassiouni, The Shari'a and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace (1st 
ed, Cambridge University Press 2013) 125. 
11 The Rome Statute Article 66.  
12 Max Rodenbeck, ‘Islam Confronts its Demons’ in The New York Review of Books (April 
2004) <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/04/29/islam-confronts-its-demons/> 
accessed 14 May 2019; Steven C Roach, ‘Arab States and the Role of Islam in the 
International Criminal Court’ (2005) 53 Political Studies Association 143; Kaltner, J, What 
Non-Muslims Should Know, Revised and Expanded (Augsburg Fortress, Publishers 
2016)16.. 
13  J Coulson, ‘The State and the Individual in Islamic Law’ (1857) 6 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 49, 57. 
- 104 - 
Review, in its seventeenth session in 2013, Sharí‘ah is not codified in order to 
regulate the rights of individuals.14  
Kelly claims there are many issues that play a role in preventing the 
harmonisation of Islamic criminal law with international criminal law. 15  He 
interfaces these issues with the application of Sharí‘ah in the Muslim world. 
One issue cited is that there are different levels of applying punishments in 
Sharí‘ah. These issues depend on the concept of culture that is accepted in 
different Muslim countries and the different approaches of the Islamic schools 
of jurisprudence. In addition, Kelly adds that the provisions of international 
criminal law are derived from common and civil law, while Islamic criminal law 
is derived from and based on the Islamic religion.16 Thus, difficulties arise in 
accepting Islamic criminal law at international tribunals. These views have 
developed because of the prevalence of the following ideas. a) The severe 
ḥudúd punishments of Sharí‘ah are not consistent with Human Rights laws.17 
b) There are differences in the practices of Islamic countries in the application 
of Sharí‘ah. For instance, some authorities of those countries do not explicitly 
include human rights principles in their legislation and exercise unlawful 
practices against some groups/individuals in their territories. c) There is a rigid 
interpretation of human rights in Islamic law.18  
It has been argued that controversy still surrounds the work of the United 
Nations Council of Human Rights in addressing and tackling distressing 
conflicts that are currently occurring in some areas of the world, and that this 
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Baderin argues that these views have obliged Muslim scholars to adopt a 
defensive position about the application of Sharí‘ah as it relates to 
international obligations.20 Nevertheless, The Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam was formed by some Muslim/Arab countries that are parties of 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).21  
Kamali argues that the application of Sharí‘ah in different ways by Muslim 
jurists reflects its flexibility and the extent to which it is accepted by the diverse 
cultures of the Muslim world.22 Moreover, Breiner argues that the different 
views of Muslim jurists can be a blessing for the Muslim community.23 This is 
because judges can choose the most appropriate view of jurists working on 
the case in question using ‘eclectic choice’.24  
Baderin contends that the growing influence of Muslim nations who adopt 
different schools of Islamic jurisprudence has led to agreement, ijmá‘, on the 
general principles of law that meet the demands of Muslim communities, 
especially in relation to international considerations.25 Elewa Badar outlines 
some reasons for misconceptions among some Western writers about Islamic 
criminal law, noting that a lack of available literature about Islamic law for 
Westerners has meant that Western writers may not be able to grasp Islamic 
criminal law in detail.26 However, Badar illustrates two points of similarities 
between the two legal systems: Islamic criminal law shares the same general 
principles that exist in international criminal law; and just as international 
criminal law owns its general rules, Islamic criminal law also has its own 
objectives called Maqased a-Sharí‘ah (the objectives of Sharí‘ah).27 Malekian 
suggests that there is no reason not to address compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between the two systems. 28  Malekian also notes a 
convergence between the two legal systems and argues that international 
criminal law should not ignore Islamic criminal law in its international 
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conventions. He also explains that both legal systems share international 
concepts, such as the prohibition of international crimes and seeking peace in 
the world, even though there are some contentious points.29 Islamic criminal 
law can be understood as an effective legal system containing ‘moral and 
religious principles’.30  
In this regard, one may say that even if there is a different application of 
Islamic criminal law among Muslim countries, this does not mean that Islamic 
criminal law should be seen as an inconsistent legal system. This is because 
the different applications of Sharí‘ah reflect Muslims’ understanding of 
Sharí‘ah in different cultures. For example, Indonesia’s culture is different to 
that of Pakistan or Arabic culture, for instance. Thus, Islamic law per se should 
not be assessed according to its application but according to its 
understanding, since a rigid application may not reflect the real essence of 
Sharí‘ah. 
Thus, for the purposes of the current study, examining the general criminal 
principles of law that exist between the two legal systems using Western-
based methods can lead to a detailed understating of the potential 
compatibilities between Islamic criminal law and international criminal law. 
This endeavour seeks to open up dialogue for finding consistencies at an 
international level in order to promote stability and peace in the world, and 
achieve the tenets of human rights. Consequently, this chapter aims to 
examine the compatibilities and incompatibilities between the general criminal 
principles of law of the Islamic and international systems from a macroscopic 
viewpoint. 
 
4.2 The Principles of ‘No Crime without Law’ and ‘No Punishment 
without Law’  
4.2.1 The Rome Statute 
These principles are more commonly known as nullum crimen sine lege and 
nulla poena sine lege and appear in Part Three of the General Principles of 
the Rome Statute, Articles 22 and 23.31 Article 22(1) provides that there is no 
criminal responsibility for an act or conduct unless it has already been defined 
‘at the time it takes place’ within the jurisdiction of the Court as a criminal act. 
These principles do not only protect individuals’ rights but are against unlawful 
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intervention by the state, which works to reinforce the legitimacy of the state.32 
Broomhall explains that ‘the Statute’s articulation of legality principles not only 
protects the accused from a possible overreaching by the Court’s judges, but 
provides certainty to states as to the extent of their obligations under the 
Statute’s provisions'.33 
These principles not only protect individual rights but also constitute the 
fundamental constitutional foundation of the separation of three powers, 
executive, judicial, and legislative, at both national and international level.34 At 
international level, the ICC Statute provides ‘a constitutional directive to the 
Court’s organs’ whether this is executive or judicial and it respects legality 
principles within the practice of roles’.35 However, the idea of restricting the 
powers of judges to resort to judicial analogy in order to seek the definition of 
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction (as stated in Article 22, Paragraph 2)
36 is 
opposed in Islamic criminal law.37 This is because this rule minimises the 
power of the Court’s judges to use analogy in order to reach justice. Moreover, 
this idea may not be absolute because Paragraph 3 of Article 22 stipulates 
that ‘this Article i.e. 22 shall not affect the characterisation of any conduct as 
criminal under international law independently of this Statute'.38  
Bassiouni notes that the principle of no crime without law was accepted in the 
Roman legal system and is accepted in most civil legal systems worldwide, 
but that it prevents a reliance on judicial analogy. Islamic law and common law 
can rely on judicial analogy if there is ambiguity of law in the case in question.39 
Akendy argues that judicial analogy can be used in the Syrian crisis to define 
the use of chemical weapons by the Head of the Syrian Government against 
the Syrian population, although the definition of the crime in the Statute refers 
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 The Rome Statute Article 22. 
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to ‘poisonous weapons'. 40  Moreover, it has been argued that the most 
significant principle in international criminal law is to provide individuals with 
sufficient notice of their unlawful conduct, even though the crimes are not 
strictly defined. This is because individuals must be made aware of the nature 
of their international criminal conduct.41 The Pre-Trial Chamber at the ICC in 
Prosecutor v. Katanga used this principle (i.e. nullum crimen sine lege) in its 
broader interpretation when it interpreted the crimes committed in this case, 
and characterised them as crimes that fell within the jurisdiction of the ICC (as 
‘other inhumane acts’) according to Article 7(1)(k), ‘as a violation of 
international customary law and against human rights'.42 
These principles have been confirmed in many international instruments such 
as Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 15 
of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The significance 
of these principles has been respected and adopted into international 
conventions and national laws.43 In addition, these principles are embodied in 
the Arab Charter of Human Rights in Article 15, which emphasises that there 
is no crime and no punishment without law.44  
 
4.2.2 Islamic Criminal Law 
‘No crime without law’ and ‘no punishment without law’ mean that no crime or 
punishment can exist without a law that has been issued and is applied.45 
Islamic sources of law stipulate these principles specifically in order to 
preserve individual rights. These principles are considered inherent in 
Sharí‘ah law because they establish legal principles connected with 
criminalisation and punishment.46 They also embrace the idea that criminal 
acts must be prohibited in Sharí‘ah (the Quran and Sunnah or by Islamic law, 
which has been issued and is applied). In other words, a statement of 
prohibition must be known to the individual; this gives him or her knowledge 
 
40
 D Akendy, EJIT Talk <https://www.ejiltalk.org/self-determination-and-the-syrian-conflict-
recognition-of-syrian-opposition-as-sole-legitimate-representative-of-the-syrian-peopl/> 
accessed 9 December 2017. 
41 Neha Jain, ‘Judicial Law Making and General Principles of Law in International Criminal 
Law’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 111,147. 
42 Prosecutor v Katanga et al. (Judgment 2008) (ICC-01/04-01/07-717) (30) <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF> accessed 18 December 2017. 
43
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 11(2) and The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), entered into force in 1976, Article 15. 
44
 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990). 
45 Bassiouni (n 10) 126. 
46 Badar (n 26).  
- 109 - 
that the act has been criminalised and will be punished.47 The result of these 
principles is the assertion that a person is free to act unless certain acts have 
been prohibited. Moreover, the enforcement of this principle embodies respect 
for human rights and achieving justice.48  
The legal basis for this principle in Islamic criminal law can be found in the 
main sources of Islamic criminal law. Some verses in the Quran and other 
sources of Sharí‘ah indicate the legal principle outlined above. For example, 
in the Quran, Allah says, ‘And never do we punish any people until we send a 
Messenger'.49 In the Sunnah, the Prophet Mohammed is reported as saying 
the following in his Farewell Sermon.  
O People, just as you regard this month, this day, this city, as sacred, so 
regard the life and property of every Muslim as a sacred trust. Return the 
goods entrusted to you to their rightful owners. Hurt no one so that no one 
may hurt you. Remember that you will indeed meet your Lord, and that He 
will indeed reckon your deeds. Allah has forbidden you to take usury 
(interest); therefore, all interest obligations shall henceforth be waived. 
Your capital, however, is yours to keep. You will neither inflict nor suffer 
any inequity. Allah has judged that there shall be no interest and that all 
the interest due to Abbas ibn Abdul Muttalib (the Prophet’s uncle) shall 
henceforth be waived.50  
The Arab Charter of Human Rights emphasises that these principles should 
be applied and respected. In this Charter, Article 6 stipulates that 'There shall 
be no crime or punishment except as provided by law and there shall be no 
punishment in respect of an act preceding the promulgation of that provision. 
The accused shall benefit from subsequent legislation if it is in his favour.’  
These principles are included in the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, Article 38, 
which also emphasises and embodies the provisions of Sharí‘ah law, and 
indicates that there is no crime and punishment without a law that has already 
been issued and applied.51 
 
47
 Ibrahim Saeed Hasan, ‘Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure under Islamic Sharia’ in 
Muhammad Abdul Haleem, Adel Omar Sherif and Kate Daniels, Criminal Justice in Islam and 
Judicial Procedures in the Sharia (I B Tauris 2003) 17. 
48 Bassiouni (n 10) 35.  
49
 The Quran 17:15. 
50
  The Sunnah website <https://sunnah.com/muslim> accessed 9 December 2017. This 
website consists of most of the Hadiths of the Prophet Mohammed collected from reliable 
Arabic sources. 
51
 The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia (1992), Article 38. 
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Islamic criminal law contains the principle and confirms this in its main 
sources, since Allah will not punish anyone for an act unless he sends his 
messenger to tell people about the prohibited deeds and permissible deeds. 
This is by way of a revelation to His Messenger, as Allah revealed to the 
Prophet Mohammad, and includes the crimes of ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ. 
 
4.2.3 Compatibilities and Incompatibilities 
In Islamic criminal law, crimes listed under ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ have been 
established by Allah; thus, they are established from divine power. Crimes 
listed under ta‘zír have been deemed by legislative authorities using the 
concepts of Islamic law. Since the emergence of Islam, the former have been 
classed as fixed, whilst the latter fall under the discretional power of 
component authorities of a state. In this respect, a state will consider the 
principles of legality within its laws to protect individuals’ rights and to respect 
the rule of law. Some compatibility can be found between Islamic criminal law 
and the ICC Statute in that both legal systems confirm and embody the legality 
of the same principles in their sources in respect of their protection of 
individuals’ rights and the rule of law. This indicates that both legal systems 
respect the human rights of freedom and innocence in that no one shall be 
prosecuted and punished without recourse to provisions that have been 
issued within the law. In addition, in terms of their application: a) legislative 
authorities in both legal systems are responsible for issuing legal principles, 
and are concerned with codifying these legal principles; b) judges in both legal 
systems cannot proceed with the trial of a person if the law does not include 
the definition of a crime and its punishment, or invoke legal principles; and c) 
the prosecution authorities in both legal systems are prohibited to carry out 
the pursuit of individuals without identifying legal principles.  
 
 
4.3 The Principle of Non-Retroactivity 
4.3.1 The Rome Statute 
This principle is considered in the Rome Statute under Article 24(1), which 
provides that criminal responsibility within the Statute will not be applied 
retroactively to prior conduct.52 Saland, who was the Chairman during the 
negotiations for adopting the criminal principles of the Rome Statute, states 
that when the International Law Commission drafted their principles in 1994 
 
52 The Rome Statute Article 24(1). 
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they adopted the term ‘act’ and ‘omission’ in Article 21(1).53 But these terms 
may refer to ‘contentious crimes’, namely war crimes, crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and crimes of enforced disappearance, which are 
continuing.54 All these crimes and their elements were established before the 
ICC Statute was established. Thus, there remained the crucial question of how 
the ICC could comply with the principle of non-retroactivity while crimes were 
still being enacted, namely crimes that began before the establishment of the 
ICC Statute. Some delegations rejected the terms after they were translated 
into their own languages. Saland suggested the term ‘conduct’ be used, 
because the term ‘conduct’ may be employed to refer to crimes outside the 
Court’s jurisdiction until the Court's provisions enter into force. He also 
suggested that matters can be settled by the Court’s judges.55 
It is significant to note that Paragraph 1 of Article 24
56
 has a strong relationship 
with Paragraph 1 of Article 11. 57  Both assert the application of non-
retroactivity for ICC jurisdiction. The latter paragraph provides that the 
meaning relates to ‘crimes committed’, while the former paragraph, namely 
Article 24(1), provides that individuals shall not be criminally responsible for 
conduct committed prior to the ICC Statute entering into force. This relates to 
‘criminal conduct’ and Article 11(1).58  
Paragraph 2 of Article 24 also provides exceptions for applying the non-
retroactivity principle.
59
 One exception can be when the law of the ICC is 
changed or amended before the release of a final judgment during an 
investigation or during prosecution from the Court. If the law changed is in 
favour of the accused, the latter law shall be applied.60 Roosevelt points out 
that this exception ‘is an extension of the general rule that it is impermissible 
 
53 Per Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The Intewrnational 
Criminal Court The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues Negotiations Results (Kluwer Law 




 The Rome Statute Article 24 1) provides that ‘No person shall be criminally responsible 
under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute'. 
57 The Rome Statute Article 11(1) stipulates that ‘The Court has jurisdiction only with respect 
to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute'. 
58 Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law’ in Leila Sadat (ed) 
The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law (Translation 
Publisher Inc., Ardsley, New York 2002) 185.  
59
 The Rome Statute Article 24(2) provides that ‘in the event of a change in the law applicable 
to a given case prior to a final Judgment, the law more favourable to the person being 
investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply'. 
60 The Rome Statute Article 24(2). 
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to adopt legislation either criminalizing acts which were legal when committed 
or aggravating the crime or punishment therefore'.61  
Another exception is articulated in Article 17(2), which provides that when 
domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute criminals or exercise their 
jurisdiction over crimes (within the ICC jurisdiction), the ICC will exercise its 
jurisdiction even though a state is not a state party of the Court.62 This is 
evident in the Burundi case. In this case, the Pre-Trial in Chamber III of the 
ICC stated the following. 
In this regard, the Chamber considers that a national investigation merely 
aimed at the gathering of evidence does not lead, in principle, to the 
inadmissibility of any cases before the Court, considering that, for the 
purposes of complementarity, an investigation must be carried out with a 
view to conducting criminal prosecutions. According to Article 1 of the 
Statute, the fundamental purpose of the Court is to prosecute those 
responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern in a manner 
‘complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’. 63  
Thus, on the basis of this wording, national investigations that are not 
designed to result in criminal prosecutions do not meet the admissibility 
requirements under article 17(1) of the Statute. 
The non-retroactivity principle is framed by several international instruments, 
including Article 11(2) of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
provides the following. 
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed.64  
Another international instrument designed to ensure the application of the 
principle is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 15 
of this Convention (1) notes this point.65  
 
 
61 Roosevelt (n 58). 
62
 When the Security Council refers the situation to the Court. See Kai Ambos, ‘General 
Principles of Criminal Law in The Rome Statute’ (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 1.  
63 The Pre-Trial Chamber III (Judgment 9 November 2017) ICC-01/17-X (152). 
64 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 11(2). 
65
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), entered into force in 1976, 
Article 15(1). 
- 113 - 
4.3.2 Islamic Criminal Law 
The non-retroactivity principle is an inherent principle in Islamic criminal law. 
It means that the conduct being criminalised, and the punishment 
administered according to Islamic criminal law, cannot be applied 
retroactively.66 This refers to provisions issued in the Quran and Sunnah and 
laws already made using concepts contained therein. It also means that no 
one shall be punished for any act that is not already covered by Islamic 
provisions.67  
This principle in Islamic criminal law aims to, first of all, achieve justice and 
fairness. This is done by announcing criminal acts and punishments so that 
people know what these acts are and the general punishments administered 
for committing these acts. This relates to a general rule in Islamic law that 
provides that deeds, acts, and speech are permissible unless they have 
otherwise been prohibited under the provisions of Sharí‘ah and Islamic law.68 
Second, the rejection of retroactivity in Islamic criminal law ensures important 
protection of human rights.69 The laws of Saudi Arabia are based on Islamic 
law, and Article 38 of its Basic Law provides the following.  
Punishment shall be restricted to the actual offender. No crime shall be 
established as such and no punishment shall be imposed except under a 
judicial or law provision. No punishment shall be imposed except for acts 
that take place after en-action of the law provision governing them.70 
However, there is one exception to the application of this principle in Islamic 
criminal law that relates to the rights of the accused. This means that if the 
accused benefits from previous laws, then his or her punishment will remain 
unchanged.71  An example of this is when the accused has committed a 
criminal act that has been punished by Law X (the previous law) but after 
arrest and trial a new Law XX is issued that has a higher level of punishment 
than the previous law.72 There is a good example of how this principle works 
in the Quran. Prior to the introduction of Islam, men were allowed to marry two 
sisters at the same time, but when Islam was introduced this became 
 
66 Muhammed Abo Zahra, al-Jārima wa al-uqubā fi al-Islam (Dar al-fikr al-arabi, Egypt, 1998) 
133 (Arabic source). 
67
 Ibid. 




 The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia (1992) Article 38. 
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 Abo Zahra (n 66) 362.  
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prohibited. However, the Quran says, ‘And two sisters in wedlock at the same 
time, except for what has already passed. Allah is oft forgiving, most 
merciful.’73 Thus, if a man had already married two sisters before he converted 
to Islam, then he was allowed to continue with this state of affairs and was not 
subject to the new law retrospectively.74 
The legal basis of this principle in Islamic criminal law exists in the Quran when 
Allah says, ‘Messenger who gave good news as well as warning that mankind, 
after (the coming) of the messenger, should have no plea against Allah, for 
Allah is exalted in power, wise.’75 Another Quranic verse says, ‘Allah has 
pardoned what is past; but whoever returns [to violation], then Allah will take 
retribution from him. And Allah is Exalted in Might and Owner of Retribution.’76 
In the Sunnah, the Prophet Mohammed is asked by those who used to drink 
alcohol before they converted to Islam whether or not they will be punished, 
but the Prophet replies that Islam eliminates all that has preceded.77 
 
4.3.3 Compatibilities and Incompatibilities   
The non-retroactivity principle is adopted in both legal systems and is inherent 
for protecting the rights of the accused. Both legal systems seem to meet on 
exceptions relating to non-retroactivity when the principle relates to the rights 
of the accused. The rights of the accused in Islamic criminal law are not 
codified but are referred to in separate sources of Islamic law, while the rights 
of accused in the Rome Statute are articulated in Article 67.78  
The non-retroactivity principle cannot be applied to ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ crimes in 
Islamic criminal law with regard to Muslims who have committed such crimes. 
This is because the definition and penalties for both crimes have been fixed 
since the birth of Islam and are considered stable because they are regulated 
by the Quran and are considered to be sacred provisions given by Allah. Both 
types of crimes are punished in life and in the hereafter. The former carries 
punishments relating to the violation of Allah and are outlined in the Quran; 
the latter aims to ensure victims’ rights in order to maintain peace and prevent 
crime. 
 
73 The Quran 4:23. 
74 Bassiouni (n 10). 
75 The Quran 4:165. 
76
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Furthermore, the punishment of crimes in Islamic criminal law is independent. 
This means that the crimes of qiṣáṣ and ḥudúd do not need acceptance or 
ratification from states and there is no time limit of the termination of 
punishments, while the crimes and punishments in international criminal law 
need the support of a number of states to be applicable within an international 
treaty and, moreover, need co-operation between states to enforce the treaty 
provisions in question.79 
 
4.4 A Person Shall Not be Tried Twice for the Same Criminal Conduct 
(ne bis in idem)80 
4.4.1 The Rome Statute  
This principle is classed as a general rule in the Rome Statute.81 It is known 
as ne bis in idem and is articulated in Article 20, which stipulates in Paragraph 
1 that ‘except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the 
Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the 
person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court'. 82  This paragraph 
prevents the ICC from putting a person on trial who has been tried before. 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article83 prevents other courts from doing the same, 
whether national or international.84 In this sense, it should be noted that the 
courts described in this Article are the national courts of ICC member states 
and all national courts, whether they are member states or non-member 
states. Paragraph 3 of the same Article 20 provides exceptions to this 
principle: where the procedures of courts intend to protect the accused from 
criminal responsibility within the ICC jurisdiction, and where the procedures of 
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the previous court have raised doubts about its ability to operate 
independently or impartially with respect to the norms recognised by 
international law.  
Bassiouni and Wise also note that ne bis in idem cannot be applied as an 
absolute approach because a state may take its own interests into 
consideration rather than the interests of the international community. 85 
Moreover, Conway states that ‘[it] in turn may reflect a belief that recognition 
of an international ne bis in idem principle would adversely affect the 
sovereignty of states'. 86  Thus, the state can prosecute and start judicial 
proceedings before its national courts if the crime constitutes a serious 
violation of its national security. Violations of this principle may raise 
controversy over what crimes constitute a threat to national security.  
The Rome Statute aims to punish the criminal conduct of high-status people, 
whether these people work in an official, military, or civilian capacity. Thus, 
the Statute deems that national courts must operate independently and fairly 
because high-level people may be able to influence court decisions and avoid 
punishment.
87  
This principle has also been articulated in previous international instruments. 
Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that a person shall not be tried again for the same offence that he or 
she has already been tried for ‘in accordance with the law’ in a court of a 
state.88 Article 16 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights indicates that it is not 
acceptable to put a person back on trial who has already been prosecuted and 
convicted or acquitted before a court for the same act.89 Moreover, Article 
10(2) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Article 9 of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda cites the same intentions as those 
given in Paragraph 3 of Article 20 of the Rome Statute: both focus on the 
proceedings and procedures of previous courts where they did not operate 
 
85 M Bassiouni and E M Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute 
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fairly or independently within the international norms of the law. Any variation 
of the formula may not change the goal itself, which is that criminals should 
not escape punishment.90 This same concept is regulated in the Arab Charter 
on Human Rights in Article 16, which recognises that all member states of the 
Charter must agree that a person should not be tried more than once for the 
same crime. This Article goes further to provide rights to challenge the legality 
of a second trial and demand the defendant’s release.91 
 
4.4.2 Islamic Criminal Law 
The principle of ne bis in idem as it works in Islamic criminal law means that 
when a person is prosecuted, tried, and then convicted or acquitted before a 
court for the same conduct, they must not again be prosecuted and tried for 
the same criminal conduct.92 This principle is an inherent principle in Islamic 
criminal law. Its aim is to protect the human rights of individuals and so ensure 
that they are ‘free from double jeopardy within criminal law'.93 However, there 
are exceptions to the application of this principle in Islamic criminal law: a) if a 
verdict is based on false witnesses or counterfeit documents; and b) when 
important documents/evidence come to light after the event of the verdict, and 
when these documents/evidence are crucial to the case (such as new facts or 
new evidence). These rules are designed to achieve justice and prevent 
criminals from escaping their deserved punishment, and to compensate the 
victim.94 
The legal basis of this principle in Islamic law is seen in the following Quranic 
verse: ‘And no bearer of burdens shall bear another’s burden; and if one 
heavily laden calls another to bear his load, nothing of it will be lifted even 
though he be near kin.’95 The interpretation of this verse, according to Al-
Qurtibi, is that no one shall be punished twice for one crime.96  
 
 
90 Conway (n 80) 217, 244. 
91 This Article states that ‘Anyone against whom such proceedings are brought shall have the 
right to challenge their legality and to demand his release. Anyone who is the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to compensation.’  
92 Muṣṭafā al-Zulmī, al-Masʾūliyyah al-Jināʾiyyah fī al-Sharīʿah al-ʾislāmiyah (Dār al-Nashr al-
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4.4.3 Compatibilities and Incompatibilities   
The principle that a person shall not be tried twice for the same crime is 
formulated in the Rome Statute and in Islamic criminal law. However, in the 
Rome Statute, it is a provision that does not belong to general criminal 
principles mentioned in Part Three of the ICC Statute but only to the rules of 
international criminal law. The exception to this principle in Islamic criminal 
law focuses on procedures, documents, and witnesses for the case, whilst 
Article 20 of The Rome Statute focuses on the work of the Court, meaning that 
if there is doubt about the fairness of the previous trial, in respect of 
independence and impartially, then this principle shall be applied. Thus, does 
Article 20(3)(a) mean that the Court can interfere with the intent of previous 
judges? Further, does the Court have the right under international law to 
evaluate the previous rulings of national courts? Article 84 of the Rome Statute 
partially corresponds to Islamic criminal law in terms of its focus on new facts 
and new evidence, rather than focusing on the procedures of the previous 
trial, as mentioned in Article 20.97 
 
4.5 The Presumption of Innocence 
4.5.1 The Rome Statute  
During the drafting of the Rome Statute it was proposed that the principle of 
the presumption of innocence should fall within Part 3 of the General 
Principles of the ICC, but instead it was placed in Part 6 in Article 66. This is 
because the presumption of innocence deals with criminal accountability.98 
Friman explains that this principle was placed in Part 6 because it was 
 
97 The Rome Statute Article 84 stipulates that ‘The convicted person or, after death, spouses, 
children, parents or one person alive at the time of the death of the accused who has been 
given express written instructions from the accused to bring such a claim, or the Prosecutor 
on the person's behalf, may apply to the Appeals Chamber to revise the final Judgment of 
conviction or sentence on the grounds that: a) New evidence has been discovered that: i) 
Was not available at the time of trial, and such unavailability was not wholly or partially 
attributable to the party making application; and ii) Is sufficiently important that had it been 
proved at trial it would have been likely to have resulted in a different verdict; b) It has been 
newly discovered that decisive evidence, taken into account at trial and upon which the 
conviction depends, was false, forged or falsified; c) One or more of the judges who 
participated in conviction or confirmation of the charges has committed, in that case, an act 
of serious misconduct or serious breach of duty of sufficient gravity to justify the removal of 
that judge or those judges from office under article 46. 2. The Appeals Chamber shall reject 
the application if it considers it to be unfounded. If it determines that the application is 
meritorious, it may, as appropriate: a) Reconvene the original Trial Chamber; b) Constitute a 
new Trial Chamber; or c) Retain jurisdiction over the matter, with a view to, after hearing the 
parties in the manner set forth in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, arriving at a 
determination on whether the Judgment should be revised.’ 
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included in previous international criminal tribunals under their Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence,99 and in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights in Article 14(2).100  
The principle as it is outlined in the Rome Statute, Article 66, is articulated in 
three paragraphs. Paragraph 1 provides that a person is presumed innocent 
until he or she has been proved guilty in front of the Court within its applicable 
law.101 This paragraph outlines the rights of the accused as follows. 
a) The accused can make a statement before the Court, and he or she can 
present evidence, but the oath cannot be sworn. (The principle of an ‘oath’ is 
used in Islamic law and in common law jurisdiction, but it is not used in civil 
law jurisdiction.) The oath is not used in ICC Court trials.102  
 
b) The accused can request temporary release subject to special 
circumstances under the estimation of the Court’s judges.103  
 
c) The accused is allowed to be detained in a place apart from convicted 
criminals.  
 
d) The accused has the right to remain silent during the investigation stage 
and during the trial stages. 
 
e) The burden of proof shall be upon the Prosecution of the Court, and it must 
prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This rule was 
asserted in The Pre-Trial Chamber II in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba.104  
 
The presumption of innocence is, in the ICC Statute, a general principle used 
during all stages of criminal procedures, up until a defendant is judged guilty 
or innocent by the Court. It is articulated in Articles 66 and Articles 67 of the 
Rome Statute, which outline the rights of the accused. Paragraph 2 of Article 
66 provides that ‘the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the 
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accused'. This outlines the duties of the Court Prosecutor to disclose 
evidence; thus, the accused has the right to know what this evidence is so that 
he or she can begin a defence.105 Consequently, this paragraph should be 
read in accordance with Article 16 paragraph(1), which notes that when the 
Prosecutor wants to start an investigation, he or she should understand that 
the burden of proof is upon him or her. The Lubanga Judgment of 2012 notes 
there must be no interpretation of the presumption of innocence, as outlined 
in Article 66.106 
The idea of the presumption of innocence has been adopted from various 
national criminal laws into international law; thus, international organisations 
such as the Security Council, the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
and the Human Rights Council may work as one to achieve justice at 
international level.107 Schabas argues that the presumption of innocence must 
be agreed ‘unanimously by the judges’ decision in the court because of the 
seriousness of the charges and the available sentences'.108 He adds that the 
decisions made by Court judges on the presumption of innocence shall 
exclude any reasonable doubt, because if there is reasonable doubt this may 
be enough to presume the defendant innocent according to the context of 
Paragraph 3, Article 66 109  The presumption of innocence was given 
consideration in international treaties before the establishment of the Rome 
Statute. The European Court of Human Rights articulated this principle in their 
commentary on Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v. Spain in 1988.110 This 
principle is also regulated in many international instruments; for instance, in 
Article 14(2) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights111 
and in Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
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Rights.112 In the Arab world it is also regulated in Article 33 of the Arab Charter 
on Human Rights.113 
 
4.5.2 Islamic Criminal Law 
The presumption of innocence in Islamic criminal law means that ‘[an 
accused] is innocent until a court ruling against him'.114 It is also defined as 
‘the original certainty that means a person is innocent of any charges against 
him/her until proven otherwise in a court'.
115
 The origin of certainty is that a 
person is born without sin, crime, and obligations from others, or any 
established punishment on his or her conscience.116 Kamali refers to this as 
one of the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence. Maxim means ‘non-liability’ (al-
aslu bar'at al-dhimma).117 This principle also means that a person is innocent 
of a crime until a court rules his or her guilt using lawful evidence and without 
any doubt.118 Thus, doubt is interpreted as being in favour of the accused.119  
Questions may arise as to why the presumption of innocence is considered a 
basic principle but not a rule in penal legislation in Islamic law. A scholar 
argues that it is one of the fundamental rights of individuals in criminal law 
legislation. Moreover, because an accusation against a person touches their 
freedom, integrity, and reputation, then the accusation must be constrained 
by lawful evidence, which is ruled on by a fair and just court, without any 
doubt.120 Bassiouni states that if individuals are prosecuted and punished 
without law, then individuals should be presumed innocent.121 
The application of the presumption of innocence in Islamic criminal law 
belongs also to the rights of the accused. This principle is divided into three 
categories in its application in Islamic criminal law. The first category relates 
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 Ibrahim Al-Qatawneh, ‘The Presumption of Innocence: Between Theory and Practice’ 
(2015) 44 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 46. 
115
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to the fencing-in of the rights of the accused. The purpose of this fence can 
be as follows.  
a) To protect the freedom, integrity, and reputation of the accused from any 
violation, and to ensure that no authority or other individuals interfere with the 
rights of the accused. 
b) So that the accused is not required to present ‘positivity of proof’ of his or 
her innocence.122  
The second category relates to the rights of the plaintiff to consider whether 
the accused is innocent using litigation. Thus, the accuser must prove by 
litigation of lawful evidence. The third category relates to judicial procedures. 
Procedures and processes are embedded in the rights of the accused, and 
the first of these is the presumption of innocence, according to legislation.123 
This is an inherent principle of the rights of the accused, which may serve to 
limit judicial errors and prevent the abuse of authority.124 It is emphasised that 
no person can be convicted without lawful evidence presented in a fair and at 
a just court, and if there is doubt, then this is interpreted in favour of the 
accused.125  
Under Islamic criminal law the presumption of innocence is applicable in 
‘criminal procedure, civil litigation and it extends to religious matters'. 126 
Nevertheless, under Islamic law, at pre-trial or when under investigation, the 
accused cannot be placed in detention because the accused is still presumed 
innocent. The detention system was not recognised at the beginning of Islam 
because an accusation cannot be sufficient to place the accused in 
detention.127 A recent application of the presumption of innocence in a modern 
Islamic state was seen when the Supreme Court of the United Arab Emirates 
ruled that in cases of doubt or where there is insufficient evidence, it could not 
apply the punishment of ḥudúd. This was an opportunity for judges and 
scholars of Islamic criminal law to deliver sound legal judgments.128   
The legal basis of this principle in Islamic criminal law is found in the second 
source of Islamic law, the Sunnah. It is said that the Prophet Mohammed said, 
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‘Had Men been believed only according to their allegations, some persons 
would have claimed the blood and properties belonging to others, but the 
accuser is bound to present positive proof.’129 The Prophet Mohammed also 
said, ‘Your lives, properties and honour are sacred trust upon you until you 
meet your Lord on the Day of Resurrection.’130 The Prophet notes that if there 
is doubt about evidence, a judge must ‘Avoid condemning the Muslim to 
ḥudúd whenever you can, and when you can find a way out for the Muslim 
then release him for it. If the Imam errs, it is better that he errs in favour of 
innocence (pardon) than in favour of guilt (punishment).’131 In respect of the 
burden of proof, the Prophet says, ‘The burden of proof is on him who makes 
the claim, whereas the oath [denying the charge] is on him who denies'.132 
In addition, the Arab Charter on Human Rights Article 7 stipulates the right of 
persons to be presumed innocent. It provides that ‘The accused shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty at a lawful trial in which he has enjoyed 
the guarantees necessary for his defence.’ 
 
4.5.3 Compatibilities and Incompatibilities 
The presumption of innocence is an inherent principle of Islamic criminal law 
and reflects human rights as set out in the ICC Statute. Article 66(3) of the 
Rome Statute does not give judges of the Court the right to cancel an 
accusation during a trial, but it does give judges the assurance that reasonable 
doubt can bring down the accusation. In this respect, Islamic criminal law goes 
further because it gives the accused the right to go back to an accuser who 
has used counterfeit documents or false witnesses so that he or she can claim 
compensation and move to stop false suits.  
The presumption of innocence is a basic principle of Islamic criminal law, and 
is deemed a rule in the Rome Statute, and can be compatible in both legal 
systems as follows. 
a) Both legal systems agree on the presumption of innocence at all stages of 
investigation and trial until a verdict is given in a case.  
 
b) Both legal systems affirm that the accused is not required to present 
‘positive proof’ to resist the accusation.  
 
 
129 Ahmad al-Bahigi, The 40 Hadiths of Imam Al-Nawwi, quoted from Bassiouni (n 10). 
130
 Ibid. 
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c) Reasonable doubt is not a base of conviction to prosecute and convict the 
accused; thus, reasonable doubt is interpreted in favour of the accused. 
 
d) Both legal systems reject assumptions that may include the idea that an 
accused committed a crime.  
 
e) The burden of proof in both legal systems is placed upon the accuser or the 
prosecuting authority.  
 




4.6 The Principle of Equality Before the Law 
4.6.1 International Crimminal Law 
The principle of equality before the law is enacted in numerous international 
conventions and is accepted and respected by many civilizations worldwide. 
In the West, this principle originated from the work of Aristotle, who described 
it as a ‘corrective of the law'.
133 The basic idea advocated by Aristotle is that a 
legal regulator has the right to formulate laws, but that these laws might breach 
their purpose of enactment if the principle of equality before the law is not also 
applied.
134
 Aristotle's idea of equality before the law began to be widely used, 
and is now internationally recognised and regulated in international treaties 
and in public international law.
135 After the First War World in 1919, a proposal 
was presented by the Japanese delegation at the Paris Conference to discuss 
and codify the principle of equality before the law in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, but the proposal was rejected by some delegations after 
the President of the United States, Wilson, announced that the terms of 
codification of the right of equality had not been accepted.
136
 
The idea to codify the principle of equality emerged again later, at an 
international level, during many international conferences and, specifically, 
when the Charter of the United Nations was established. Human rights 
organisations began to emphasise the principle of equality, and the second 
and third paragraphs of the UN Charter read as follows.  
 




 Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial 
Discrimination (2nd edn, Boulder/Oxford, Westview Press 1996) 99. 
136 See ‘Professional Training Series No. 9 in Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: 
A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers' 634 United Nations 2003.  
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ii) to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, and; 
iii) to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 




The term 'equality' in the West implies the same treatment of people, even 
though differences between these people may exist.
138
 Some describe this 
principle as seeking to attain the ‘absence of discrimination’.
139
 Discrimination 
can be defined as 'any act or conduct which denies to certain individuals 
equality of treatment with other individuals because they belong to particular 
groups in society'.
140
 In this respect, Dworkin differentiates the right to equal 
treatment from the right to be treated as an equal. The former means rights 
that seek to enable the distribution of opportunities, rules, and respect, 
etcetera equally among individuals and/or imposing equal burdens on 
individuals, while the latter draws attention to inequalities relating to money, 
education, job status, etcetera that emerge in societies.
141  
The principle of equality before the law is affirmed in various international 
instruments including the following.  
a) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 1.
142  
b) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948).
143  
c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Article 26.
144  
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e) The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1984).
146  
It can be noted that The Universal Declaration of Human Rights comprises 
provisions emphasising the equality principle as follows. 
a) Article 2 talks about the prevention of discrimination between individuals in 
all aspects, stipulating that ‘everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be 
made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, 
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.’ 
b) Article 8 refers explicitly to the right of equality between individuals to resort 
to the competent national courts in cases of a violation of rights granted by the 
constitution or by law. It stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted him by the constitution or by law'. 
c) Article 10 refers to the right to a fair trial, stipulating that ‘everyone is entitled 
in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him'. 
Article 14 of The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides for the right of individuals to 
receive fair compensation in the event that they become victims of torture by 
the authorities of the respective States. The Article per se obliges states to 
implement this international obligation. It stipulates that ‘each State Party shall 
 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.’ 
145 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 2(2) 
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status'. 
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ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress 
and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the 
means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the 




The Arab Charter on Human Rights affirms this principle in Article 32 as 
follows: 'the State shall ensure that its citizens enjoy equality of opportunity in 
regard to work, as well as a fair wage and equal remuneration for work of 
equal value.' 
This celebration of the principle of equality before the law in international 
conventions reveals a desire to apply justice to all individuals without 
discrimination. The principle of equality before the law is one of the elements 
of international justice; thus, states are obliged to implement it. If there is any 
defect in the implementation of this principle, it creates a defect in the 
fundamental rights of individuals. The principle of equality before the law is 
also dealt with by scholars, who note that there are differences in its adoption 
and application among different societies. However, the principle denotes 
these main elements: a) it is a common human and moral principle; b) it aims 
to achieve the absence of discrimination between people; and, c) it aims to 
reach justice.  
 
4.6.2 Islamic Criminal Law 
The principle of equality before the law in Islamic criminal law is an inherent 
principle, since its legal basis is derived from the main sources. The Quran 
states, ‘O mankind, indeed we have created you from male and female and 
made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the 
most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, 
Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.’ The Sunnah includes the Hadith of the 
Prophet Mohammed, which says the following.  
'All mankind is from Adam and Eve. An Arab has no superiority over a non-
Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; white has 
no superiority over black, nor does a black have any superiority over white; 
[none have superiority over another] except by piety and good action. 
Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the Muslims 
constitute one brotherhood. Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which 
 
147
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belongs to a fellow Muslim unless it was given freely and willingly. Do not, 
therefore, do injustice to yourselves. Remember, one day you will appear 
before God and answer for your deeds. So beware, do not stray from the 
path of righteousness after I am gone.’
148
 
Another example in the Sunnah concerns Aisha (the Prophet’s wife) who 
reports that the Quraish had become anxious about a Makhzumi woman who 
had committed theft. The passage reads as follows. 
Who will speak to Allah's Messenger about her? They said: Who dare it, 
but Usama, the loved one of Allah's Messenger. So Usama spoke to him. 
Thereupon Allah's Messenger said: Do you intercede regarding one of the 
punishments prescribed by Allah? He then stood up and addressed 
(people) saying: O people, those who have gone before you were 
destroyed, because if any one of high rank committed theft amongst them, 
they spared him, and it anyone of low rank committed theft, they inflicted 
the prescribed punishment upon him. By Allah, if Fatima, daughter of 
Mohammad, were to steal, I would have her hand cut off.  
The same Hadith transmitted on the authority of Ibn Rumh, uses the words 
‘Verily those before you perished'.149 
According to Al-Gelah and Abdul-Wahb, there are disparities between 
individuals in society with regard to ability, capability, and resources; thus, 
Islamic criminal law emphasises that the principle of equality before the law is 
applicable to all individuals, regardless of differences of wealth among 
individuals. Islamic criminal law affirms de facto the equality of rights and 




The principle of equality in Islamic criminal law applies in all political, 
economic, social, and legal fields. Furthermore, the adoption of this principle 
in Islamic criminal law must be applied to all individuals equally, without any 
discrimination. The Quran and Sunnah are directed to all humanity without 
any discrimination, regardless of religion, race, colour, or gender. In this 
aspect, it is clear that Islamic criminal law does not discriminate between 
individuals before the law, and that all individuals must be treated equally 
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April 2019. 
149
 The Sunnah website, 1688, Book 29, Hadith 13 <https://sunnah.com/muslim/29/13> 
accessed 25 April 2019. 
150 Aseem al-Ghallah and Mohamed Abdul-wahab, an nūzum a-siyásiyāh (5th edn, Dar- al-
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before its law. This applies in order to achieve principles of justice brought 
about by Islam itself, to promote social harmony in Muslim societies, and to 
achieve political stability. 
The principle of equality before the law is established in the main sources of 
Islamic criminal law and has a spiritual meaning that states that people are 
equal in their rights and duties. Thus, Islamic criminal law alludes to the idea 
of equality, which leads to the principle of equality before the law. This 
principle has legitimacy because it is derived from the main sources of Islamic 
law. It is applied in procedural aspects as well as in substantial ones to prevent 
discrimination and is applied in practice by states. It is a legal right for all 
individuals and groups under Islamic law.  
 
4.6.3 Compatibilities and Incompatibilities  
Although both legal systems have adopted and regulated the principle of 
equality before the law, there are some notable differences, namely in Islamic 
criminal law, the sources of law and some laws are different from those 
practised in international criminal law. Islamic laws are classed as divine laws, 
while international criminal laws are classed as secular laws, agreed on 
between states. In Islamic criminal law, the adoption of this principle stands, 
even if Muslim states have not regulated it into their domestic laws, or if it is 
not ratified within certain international conventions. It can be noted that both 
legal systems have the same factual meaning of the principle of equality 
before the law, which means providing rights and opportunities as well as 
imposing duties equally to all individuals of society, not the distribution of 
wealth, jobs, and education equally among individuals. 
 
4.7 The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals 
The idea of criminal responsibility in international criminal law is mainly 
derived from the jurisprudence of former international courts, such as the 
International Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, as well as the work of 
various legal scholars. This section examines the source of the idea as it 
appears in Islamic criminal law and discusses the idea in relation to Islamic 
international law. This is undertaken by looking at definitions of personal 
criminal responsibility, different forms of criminal responsibility, and how 
criminal responsibility is enshrined in the laws of both legal systems. The 
discussion begins by looking at Islamic law's provisions and then the Rome 
Statute's provisions. This is because some theories in international criminal 
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law are not mentioned in Islamic law such as control over crime and joint 
enterprise responsibility.   
 
4.7.1 The Principles of Personal Responsibility  
4.7.1.1 Islamic Criminal Law 
The concept of criminal responsibility in Islamic criminal law is primarily 
individual.151 It is based on the principle of personal responsibility.152 This 
principle is regulated in the following Quranic verse: ‘No soul shall bear 
another’s burden.’153 In Islamic criminal law, there is no confusion between 
the principle of personal criminal responsibility and responsibility for a criminal 
act committed by others.154 An individual must be responsible for both the 
physical element of the crime and the element of intent to commit the crime. 
The physical element must be established for his or her unlawful conduct, and 
the element of intent must be established in relation to the offender’s will to 
commit the unlawful conduct. For instance, if someone who runs a gun shop 
sells weapons to others who intend to commit a crime, and these weapons 
are used to commit crimes, the salesman will be responsible for providing 
weapons for the crime, if intent to supply for the purposes of crime can be 
proven; then the salesman becomes an indirect participant.  
Another example is when a person who is responsible for feeding another, a 
prisoner for instance, prevents the prisoner from having access to food and 
leaves him or her for dead. Then the person who is responsible for feeding is 
responsible for an omission of duty.
155 This means that individuals must bear 
the consequences of any unlawful conduct committed, whether this is 
intentional or unintentional, depending on the awareness they have of the 
crime they are accused of.156 Thus, no one can be responsible for a crime if 
they have not been directly or indirectly involved in unlawful conduct, either as 
the principal perpetrator or as an accessory.157 This approach is based on the 
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following Quranic verse: ‘whoever killed a human being should be looked upon 
as though he had killed all mankind.’158 In another Quranic verse, Allah says, 
‘Each soul earneth on its own account.’ 159  Furthermore, Allah says, ‘No 
burdened soul can bear another’s burden.’160 In the Sunnah, the Prophet 
says, ‘the reward of deeds depends upon the intentions and every person will 
get the reward according to what he has intended.’ 161  
Criminal conduct (actus reus) and criminal intent (mens rea) form the main 
components of the principle of criminal responsibility in Islamic criminal law. 
Special emphasis is placed on the former because no crime can be committed 
without exerting a material element (whether this is physical or uttered).162 
The latter (criminal intent) has been discussed extensively by researchers, 
who have surmised that it ‘encapsulates elements including, but not limited to, 
a state of evil in the mind of a person who conducts unlawful acts for a 
wrongful purpose, causing harm knowingly and willingly to another’s body, 
causing psychological harm, or harm against property belonging to 
another.’163  
 
Criminal conduct in Islamic criminal law is defined in accordance with the 
consequences of the unlawful conduct of an individual, undertaken with 
knowledge of what is forbidden or criminalised.164 It also encapsulates the 
omission of conduct that is obligated by Islamic criminal law when there is a 
specific duty, such the work of a policeman, for instance.165 With regard to 
omission, the Ḥanbalí and Sháfiʻí schools believe that the principle of omission 
can be used in order to establish criminal responsibility; for example, when 
the leader of an army decides not to rescue injured soldiers during a war.166 
The Malki school argues that when a person is obliged to undertake certain 
acts stipulated in the teachings of Islamic criminal law, the accused can be 
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held liable for his or her actions because failure to perform obligatory acts is 
subject to the principle of the criminal responsibility of individuals.167 
The causal nexus between criminal conduct and the results of unlawful 
conduct or omission can be the main criterion that distinguishes between 
direct perpetration and indirect perpetration, and can define the link between 
the results of the conduct.168 It can also be the measure that tracks the results 
of the crime back to conduct or omission attributed to the perpetrator.169 Thus, 
these conditions must exist to give rise to criminal responsibility.  
Jurists of Islamic criminal law distinguish between the concept of will and 
intent. Establishing ‘intent’ concerns assessing whether the offender has 
aimed to achieve a certain result from his or her conduct, while ‘will’ means 
the tendency to carry out unlawful physical conduct.170 In Islamic criminal law, 
the former implies intentional crimes, but the latter can include unintentional 
crimes.171 For example, if a person starts to fight someone else with a knife, 
and the recipient of the attack tries to stop the attack, but the original 
perpetrator dies.  
4.7.1.2 The Rome Statute  
The principle of personal responsibility is covered in the Rome Statute in 
Article 25 paragraphs (1) and (2) as follows. 
1) The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the 
Statute. 
2) A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with 
the Statute. 
Paragraph (1) of the Statute demonstrates that the jurisdiction of the Court 
regarding the principle is individual and shall be over natural persons. 
Paragraph 2 of the Statute confirms that individual criminal responsibility shall 
be over natural persons who have committed criminal conduct within the 
Treaty provisions. It clarifies two types of individual criminal responsibility: a) 
the criminal responsibility of the criminal conduct committed by the direct doer, 
and (b) the criminal liability of the omission. This can be understood by the 
wording of 'responsible' and 'liable'. Furthermore, Paragraph (3)(a) of Article 
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25 covers both a person who directly commits the physical conduct and the 
person who acts on a request to commit a prohibited crime.
172
 This can be 
understood in accordance with Article 30(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, which 
provides that criminal intent requires both intent and knowledge on the part of 
the accused, and both must lead to the carrying out or involvement in criminal 
conduct, or committing a crime via another person. The term ‘knowledge’ is 
identified by the Statute itself in Article 30(3) to mean that ‘awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed accordingly.’
173
 The intent 
of the accused is also defined as the recognition of the accused of the risk 
relating to the actions he or she carries out, and being satisfied with the results 
of his or her conduct.174 
4.7.2 Forms of Criminal Responsibility
175
 
4.7.2.1 Islamic Criminal Law 
In Islamic criminal law, participation in the undertaking of a crime can refer to 
the role of a group of persons who share a purpose, even though each 
member of the group may have his or her individual reasons for undertaking 
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criminal conduct. 176  Thus, the idea of criminal responsibility here 
encapsulates crimes that are committed by more than one person, where 
each person shares a common purpose with the others, and where they also 
possess individual reasons for undertaking crime. An example of this is when 
three persons agree to participate in carrying out a crime: one brings the victim 
to the crime scene, another puts the victim in a secure place, and another kills 
the victim. In this scenario, criminal conduct is carried out in three main 
phases, and criminal intent would be measured by the court according to the 
role each person plays in undertaking the crime. 177  The elements for 
measuring criminal intent in the group of persons are: a) knowledge held by 
the accused of the crime and an awareness of the final aims of the crime; b) 
the will of the accused in carrying out his or her role in facilitating the crime; 
and c) the means used to undertake the crime.178  
Jurists of Islamic criminal law distinguish between Al-Fail Al-Asli (the principal 
offender) and Al-Muan (the accessory). The former refers to the main person 
who undertakes the physical criminal act.179 The latter refers to the role played 
by a person in facilitating, instigating, ordering, soliciting, inducing, and 
planning to commit the crime.180 The principal is responsible for his or her 
conduct, whether moral or physical, and the accessory is responsible for his 
or her criminal acts. The basis of this is found in the Hadith of the Prophet 
Mohammed, who says, ‘There is no obedience to a created being if it is 
disobedience to Allah the Exalted.’181 This means that an order from one 
person to another to kill is considered a prohibited crime stipulated in the 
Quran by Allah. 
Jurists of Islamic criminal law consider various criteria in order to establish 
criminal liability in participation crimes. The first criterion is that there must be 
a group of people, namely more than one person.182 The second is that the 
group must commit the same crime with shared intent existing between the 
principal and the accessories to carry out the criminal conduct. For example, 
if one person gives a gun to another, and the latter kills a victim, both people 
are accountable, providing shared intent can be established.
183
 The person 
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who commits the physical act is classed as the principal and the person who 
gives the gun is the accessory.184 The third criterion is that there must be a 
causal nexus that binds the acts of everyone in the group who participates in 
carrying out the crime.185 If one member of the group does not complete his 
or her role/act, and the crime is not completed, then that person is not classed 
as a participant in the crime. The causal nexus requires prior agreement, 
namely an agreement of intent by the group to carry out the criminal conduct. 
Differences between the participants’ conduct do not affect the role each has 
as a fundamental participant if they share the intent to commit the crime.186 
For example, if two persons attack another person, and one attacker holds the 
victim while the other kills the victim, then if the holder knows the intent of their 
accomplice to kill the victim, he or she is classed as a participant in carrying 
out the crime. However, if the catcher does not know the intent of his or her 
accomplice, the catcher is classed as an accessory to the crime. Thus, jurists 
divide participation into categories: the first is direct participation and the 
second is indirect participation in undertaking the crime.  
Direct participation refers to a crime directly undertaken by the offender using 
his or her will.187 Indirect participation refers to when a crime is mediated by 
another person’s will.188 For instance, when a person holds the victim and the 
other person murders the victim using a knife. In this scenario both are 
responsible.189 However, jurists of Islamic criminal law class some acts as 
being the complete responsibility of the doer, as follows. 
a) If the means used is the means that kills.190 
b) Murder by suffocation.191 
c) Murder by fire.192 
d) Murder by withholding food, drink, or medication.193  
e) Murder by incitement.194 
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The Malki, Ḥanbalí, and Sháfiʻí schools deem that an indirect participant can 
be classed as being a directly liable participant if he or she participates in any 
of the above criminal acts. The Hanfi school places extra conditions upon 
indirect participation: if the indirect participant intentionally undertakes the 
crime with his or her knowledge and capacity, being aware of the potential 
consequences of the crime, then he or she can be held responsible as a direct 
participant.195 If a participant is classed as an aide or facilitator, or acts with 
sedition or as an instigator, all these are classed as indirect participation in 
undertaking a crime because the participants have not actually physically 
executed the criminal conduct; however, they share intent with the direct 
perpetrator of the crime.196 If an aide convinces a victim to come to the crime 
scene and another person is waiting for the victim, ready to kill him, both are 
responsible because they share intent, even though one person aided and the 
other executed the crime.197  
Facilitator can refer to a person who provides a direct offender with the means 
to commit the crime, whether the means are intangible such as an idea or a 
plan, or tangible such as weapons. The facilitator differs from the seditious 
inducer because the former may exercise a degree of power or will over the 
main perpetrator, while a seditious inducer may or may not hold that kind of 
power.198 Inducing a crime means that a person in a group creates the idea of 
undertaking a crime in another person’s mind.199  Incitement refers to the 
experienced influence one person has over another person that persuades 
that person to commit a crime, whether this incitement was practised using a 
promise or by offering temptation.200 There can be both positive and negative 
incitements made to undertake crime: positive incitements include offering 
money; negative incitements include using threat or force to control the 
offender’s will.201 
All these categories of participation, according to Abo Zahra, require a shared 
mental element between group members to carry out criminal conduct, even 
though the goals of the crime may not actually be completed. Second, each 
person must have a role to play, and must play this role when undertaking the 
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crime. Third, all the persons must be aware and have knowledge of the 
wrongful criminal conduct and its subsequent results.202 
Abo Zahra also mentions that the Sháfiʻí, Málikí, and Ḥanbalí schools believe 
that if a group of people kills a person, then all are subject to be punished 
based on each one’s conduct/role in committing the crime. An example of 
such a scenario is when two people act together. For instance, if one selects 
a civilian house and the other places a bomb in the house. In this case, both 
are responsible for the crime. The first person is classed as an indirect 
participant and the other is classed as a direct doer in carrying out the crime.203 
This concept of Islamic criminal law can be seen in the Rome Statute,204 
specifically in Article 25(3)(d).205 This Article deals with the notion of individual 
criminal responsibility, using the term ‘commit’ to distinguish between the 
direct doer (the principal) within paragraph (3) sub-paragraph (a) and the 
indirect doer (accessory) within paragraph (3) sub-paragraphs (b) and (d).206 
The latter is subject to the theory of control over the crime,207 which requires 
criminal conduct and criminal intent. Criminal conduct refers to control over 
the crime by the indirect doer, and criminal intent refers to the intent of the 
indirect doer in conducting the criminal act with knowledge and awareness. 208 
 
4.7.2.2 The Rome Statute 
The forms of criminal responsibility are covered in the same Article, namely 
25 in paragraph (3) as follows. 
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In accordance with the Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if 
that person: 
a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another 
or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible; 
b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in 
fact occurs or is attempted; 
c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission; 
d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution is intentional and shall either: 
i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime. 
e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others 
to commit genocide; 
f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. 
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for 
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that 
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. 
4) No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility 
shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.209 
The term ‘commit’ is used in the ICC Statute instead of the term ‘perpetration’ 
and as interpreted by the Court’s judges in the Lubanga case.210 Article 25(3) 
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includes the idea of the forms of criminal responsibility, omission of liability, 
and attempted responsibility, whether incitement, aiding, or inducing. 211 
Indirect commission is stipulated in Article 25(3)(a) as occurring when ‘[a 
person can be held responsible if he/she] commits a crime [within the Statute’s 
jurisdiction], whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another 
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible'.212 
This Article, namely 25(3)(a), covers indirect commission jointly; for example 
abetting and aiding, which requires a common purpose to carry out the crime. 
Other forms of indirect persuasion, such as ordering or instigating, do not 
require a common purpose to carry out the crime.213   
Article 25(3)(b) provides that if a person orders, induces, or solicits another 
person or a group of persons to commit or attempt to commit a crime, then he 
or she can be held responsible, since soliciting and inducing are classed as 
forms of commission in criminal behaviour according to the provisions of the 
Rome Statute. 214  Soliciting or inducing constitutes more than private 
inducement. It can include public inducement such as a hate speech that 
supports criminal conduct. This principle is illustrated in the judgment of the 
Trial Chamber II of the ICC in The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun 
case.215 Thus, the physical element (actus reus) of the inducer can be seen 
through agitator speech.216 Ordering is identified in Article 25(3)(b) as a form 
of criminal responsibility. Ambos explains that whoever orders someone to 
commit a crime that falls under the provision of the ICC Statute is classed as 
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an indirect offender because orders to carry out a crime can be derived from 
others who hold higher positions of authority than the person who undertakes 
the crime.217 These persons will be held responsible under sub-paragraph (b) 
of Article 25(3). 
Facilitating, aiding, assisting, and abetting are forms of criminal responsibility 
according to the Rome Statute under Article 25(3)(c), whether they are 
practised in an attempt to undertake criminal behaviour physically, provide 
tangible material or abstract means, or transmit evil ideas to the offender.218 
Ambos and Goy suggest that ‘facilitating’ should mean any degree of 
assistance provided, whether substantial or not.219 However, Werle argues 
that the conditions for aiding or assisting a crime should be classed as 
‘substantial’ in relation to the crime committed.220 Sliedregt talks about the 
‘mental dynamics’ of being an accessory, and argues that some acts used to 
facilitate a crime do not require the knowledge of the offender.221 Sliedregt 
refers to the case of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga to highlight who can be classified as a direct 
offender or not. The judges in this case ruled that some orders differ in relation 
to direct participation because some may not only originate from high-level 
persons but also from those who control the army, for example.222  
Schabas argues that inducing, soliciting, ordering, and instigating should all 
be classed as overlapping forms of criminal responsibility, as derived from 
national laws.223 Goy agrees with Ambos to class the person who passes the 
order as an indirect perpetrator (accessory) within sub-paragraph (b) because 
knowledge and will are required from someone who commits/attempts to 
commit a criminal act. Thus, orders that originate from high-level persons 
constitute a violation of two responsibilities: first, he or she (the person who 
orders) violates his duties to prevent his subordinates from committing crimes; 
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and second, the person who orders abuses his or her power by requesting 
others to commit crimes.224 
Another concept dealt within the ICC’s jurisdiction is that of control over a 
crime, namely ‘a division of the essential tasks for the purpose of committing 
a crime between two or more persons in a concerted matter'.225 The concept 
of control over a crime requires an agreed common plan by each participant 
in the crime.226 For example, these elements include supplying the means or 
mechanisms that assist in committing crimes, such as weapons, leading 
subordinates to the crime scene, moving the tools of crime to the crime scene, 
controlling subordinates' activities, and coordinating the roles of 
subordinates.227 The ICC looks at the theory of control over the crime and 
distinguishes between the crimes of the direct offender, namely the principal, 
and those of the indirect offender, namely the accessory. Criminal conduct 
can appear via the capacity and control of the indirect offender, and criminal 
intent can appear via the intentions and awareness of the indirect offender. 228  
Moreover, Article 25(3)(c) includes indirect commission using another person. 
Thus, if a person who is subordinate does not know the true nature of the 
criminal conduct they have undertaken because he or she is under eighteen 
years old, for example, the principal is responsible for acts or omissions that 
may have prevented criminal conduct.229 
Furthermore, under the ICC Statute, individual criminal responsibility arises in 
cases where there is a group of persons who undertake a common purpose, 
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as outlined in Article 25(3)(d).230 In these cases, some conditions are required, 
as follows: a) a common purpose emphasis on the physical element of the 
group activities when they work with one or more purpose to commit or attempt 
to commit international crimes, as noted in the Rome Statute; b) an emphasis 
on the mental element of the purpose, namely the group possesses 
knowledge and awareness about undertaking criminal activity or furthering 
criminal activity. Moreover, every member of the group must know and 
understand that the act they aim to commit is criminalised, and must also show 
they have knowledge of the sequence of the crime, which indicates that the 
group is aware about the aimed-for results of the criminal act.231  
Sub-paragraph (e) explains that this is whoever, ‘In respect of the crime of 
genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide'. Sub-
paragraph (f) talks about the following. 
Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. 
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for 
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that 
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
232
 
Werle explains that these sub-paragraphs refer to the incitement to genocide, 
which may be classed as ‘perverting the course of justice’,  'because neither 
incitement to genocide nor attempt can be classified as modes of participation, 
but should rather be classified as inchoate crimes'.
233 He argues that if there 
is a lack of intent to commit genocide in order to destroy a group of people, 
the co-perpetrator may not be held responsible for genocide since genocide 
crime requires a specific intent to commit the crime.
234
 
To summarise, in terms of the forms of criminal responsibility, both Islamic 
criminal law and the provisions of the Rome Statute distinguish between the 
direct undertaker and indirect undertaker of criminal acts. The Court’s Treaty 
considers the part played by control over an indirect participant in a crime. 
According to Article 25(3), it is not necessary for there to be a shared common 
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purpose between the direct offender and the indirect offender; however, 
Islamic criminal law requires a common purpose to establish the criminal 
responsibility of the indirect offender. Moreover, although there is a 
divergence of views concerning forms of individual responsibility in both legal 
systems, all forms of criminal behaviour noted in the Rome Statute Article 25 
can also be dealt with as forms of individual responsibility in Islamic criminal 
law.235 
 
4.7.3 Command Responsibility  
4.7.3.1 Islamic International Law 
Commanders’ responsibilities arise in cases of war or in armed conflict, and 
their actions are covered by Islamic international law. Commanders must 
follow the rules governing a war situation; however, they may sometimes 
breach their duties. Islamic international law, in general, prohibits the waging 
of war236 except in cases of defence.237 It provides the means to settle matters 
in order to solve a conflict situation; for instance, negotiation, mediation, and 
arbitration.238 However, the desire of parties in a war to achieve victory can 
lead to the parties committing crimes.239 Islamic international law deems that 
commanders are responsible if they violate its rules.  
Islamic international law places obligations upon commanders, whether 
military or non-military, to fulfil the rules of war as well as the rules contained 
in agreements made between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 240  The 
following Quranic verse places emphasis on complying with concluded 
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agreements (because Islamic international law considers Allah to be party to 
any concluded agreements) as follows.  
Verily those who swear allegiance to thee swear allegiance really to Allah, 
the hand of Allah is above their hands, so whoever does not break faith to 
those who fulfil what they have pledged to God, He will one day give a 
mighty reward.241  
In Islamic international law, command responsibility is usually established 
during times of war or conflict.
242
 In this respect, Muslim scholars view 
concluded agreements to be both religious and legal obligations under Islamic 
international law.243 In addition, Islamic international law binds Muslims to their 
contracts and prohibits them from breaking these agreements according to 
the Quranic verse, as follows: ‘O you, who believe, fulfil your[all] contracts.’244 
Another Quranic verse urges the faithful to ‘Be faithful to your pledge to God, 
when you enter into a pact.’245 The Prophet also says, ‘All Muslims are bound 
by their obligations except an obligation that renders lawful the unlawful and 
the unlawful lawful.’246 Thus, commanders are also held responsible to the 
following Quranic instructions.  
Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands clear from error; 
whoever rejects Evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy 
handhold that never breaks, and God hears and knows all things.247 
Muslim commanders who find themselves in a situation of warfare or armed 
conflict must comply with the following obligations.  
a) To respect human rights as stipulated under Islamic international law 
(siyar).248  
b) To commit to legal duties.  
 
241 The Quran 48:10; see also A Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East (Oxford 
University Press 1987). 
242
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243 Ibid 40. 
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245 The Quran 2:229. 
246 Abu Dawood Suliman a-sājistāni, Sunan Abī Dāwūd (Dar al-Risālah 1430 H) Hadith No 
799; see also M Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law (Cambridge 
University Press 1980) 74. 
247 The Quran 2:256. 
248 The principles of Siyra are explained in chapter three of this study. 
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c) Not to claim that they do not know what to do either by ignorance or 
omission in violation of Islamic international law.249  
The Prophet said, ‘Move forward in the Name of God, by God, and on the 
religion of God’s Prophet. Do not kill an elderly, or a child or a woman, do not 
misappropriate booty, gather your spoils, and do good for God loves good 
doers.’250 In 633, the Caliph Abo Baker, who was the ruler of the Islamic state 
in Madinah, ordered the commanders of Muslim armies, and their 
subordinates who were responsible for repelling attack from the Byzantines, 
as follows.  
Be just, break not your plighted faith, mutilate none, slay neither children, 
old men, nor women, injure not the date-palm nor burn it with fire, nor cut 
down any fruit-bearing tree: slay neither flocks nor herds nor camels 
except for food: perchance you may come across men who have retired 
into monasteries, leave them and their work in peace.251  
Thus, ignorance of legal obligations of Islamic international law whether by 
commanders or subordinates in a situation of war does not preclude 
establishing criminal responsibly and judicial prosecution in relation to 
prescribed punishments.252 Islamic international law imposes certain rules 
upon commanders. The rules that apply before a war are listed as follows.  
a) There shall be notification to the enemy asking them to surrender; if 
this request is rejected then commanders shall notify the enemy about 
the war.253  
b) Commanders are also responsible for notifying and warning their 
subordinates about conduct that is prohibited during the war, such as 
mass killing or the demolition of public buildings.254  
Thus, commanders are responsible for preventing and repressing cruelty, 
torture, and starvation because the Prophet said, ‘fairness is prescribed by 
God in every matter, so if you kill, kill in a fair way.’255  
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In Islamic international law commanders have a commitment to keeping public 
buildings intact, as well as trees, farms, and places of worship. 256 
Furthermore, pretending to surrender is not allowed, neither is committing 
treason before the enemy, whether or not this is designed to defeat or to 
deceive the enemy. 257  Commanders and subordinates are both also 
responsible for distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants.258 
This aims to avoid the killing of innocent people and civilians who do not 
participate in war, and is based on the Quranic verse which says, ‘If one of 
your enemies asks for asylum, grant it to him.’259 Islamic international law also 
requires Muslim commanders to treat wounded civilians or combatants.260 
The Prophet said, ‘Do not kill any old people, children, women, monks, or 
people who are in places of worship.’261 The First Caliph, Abo Baker, who 
ruled after the death of the Prophet, ordered commanders and soldiers to do 
the following.  
Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for guidance on the battlefield. 
Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not 
mutilate dead bodies; do not kill a woman, a child, or an aged man; do not 
cut down fruitful trees; do not destroy inhabited areas; do not slaughter any 
of the enemies’ sheep, cow or camel except for food; do not burn date 
palms, nor inundate them; do not embezzle (e.g. no misappropriation of 
booty or spoils of war) nor be guilty of cowardliness … you are likely to 
pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave 
them alone.262  
At the end of a war, commanders must show respect to dead bodies whether 
or not they are those of the enemy or those of the Islamic army.263 This 
concept is also expressed in Articles 120 and 121 of the Second Geneva 
Convention 1949, which deals with the laws and rules of war.264 
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Islamic international law gives rights to soldiers or subordinates to refuse 
orders from commanders who violate its rules of war. The basis of this 
approach comes from the Prophet’s words that said, ‘There is no obedience 
to a created being if it is disobedience to Allah the exalted.’265 This means that 
commanders must be held accountable if they want to violate the rules of war, 
and subordinates may have to follow legal duties in rejecting commands from 
their commanders. This concept may be found in Article 33(2) of the Rome 
Statute, which stipulates that ‘For the purposes of this article, orders to commit 
genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.’ However, 
Article 28(b)(i) of the Rome Statute assumes that commanders know about 
prohibited conduct and places criminal responsibility on a superior if he or she 
‘either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated 
that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes'.266 
Islamic international law requires its commanders to know the rules before 
involving themselves in cases of war. This includes knowledge of what is 
prohibited and what is permitted in cases of war.267 In Islamic international 
law, there is no scenario in which commanders can ignore its rules in relation 
to committing mass killing or violating the rules of war. Islamic international 
law requires actors to repress violators and to start judicial procedures before 
a court after the end of the war.268 In addition, commanders must know of the 
rules of war as mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah. Before the Rome Statute 
came into force, The Geneva Convention Protocol I 1977 Article 87 was used 
by the international community to make commanders responsible for 
repressing serious violations of conduct during war.269  
4.7.3.2 The Rome Statute 
The responsibility of commanders and other superiors is covered in Article 
28 of the ICC Treaty as follows.  
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a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may 
be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
forces, where: 
i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and  
ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.  
b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described 
above, a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her 
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates, where:  
i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; 
ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and  
iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution. 
The Rome Statute deals with a commander’s duty not to violate the rules of 
war. Article 28(a)(i) provides a narrow concept relating to the responsibility of 
commanders. Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph (i) of this Article provides that 
commanders have to know the violations included in the Statute’s 
provisions.270  Article 28(a)(ii) of The Rome Statute goes further to oblige 
commanders to take necessary measures to repress subordinates from 
committing crimes, but it is not clear whether this refers to actions taken during 
 
270 The Rome Statute Article 28(a)(i) . 
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the war, at the end of the war, or after the war.271 Furthermore, the sub-
paragraph of this article includes crimes committed by subordinates within its 
jurisdiction. This differs from Islamic international law, which deems that if 
there are no results of criminal acts, there shall be no punishment.272 These 
rules also correspond with Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.273 There is also a Quranic verse that 
does not allow the killing of those who surrender, are wounded, sick, prisoners 
of war, or people who lay down their weapons. The verse says, ‘And if they 
incline to peace, incline thou also to it and trust God.’274 
Saland explains that Article 28(b) outlines the responsibilities placed on both 
military commanders and civil politicians.275 However, the responsibilities of 
military commanders assume that they have to know if their subordinates are 
about to commit international crimes. Moreover, the Rome Statute places 
responsibility on commanders to take necessary measures in order to prevent 
crimes. The responsibilities of civil politicians assume that they must know 
about the violations committed by subordinates and that they ignored their 
legal duty in repressing such crimes.276 This provides a broad domain of 
commander responsibility, but obliges commanders to be responsible for the 
crimes committed by their subordinates, whether they are/were committed in 
places of fighting or not committed in places of fighting.  
The jurisdiction of ICC Article 28(b) places responsibility on commanders, 
whether military or political. It holds them liable if they do not exercise their 
duties; for example, to maintain control over subordinates.277 Cassese argues 
that commanders or superiors must be under legal obligation, must possess 
powers to prevent crimes, and are responsible for the omission.278  
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It can be concluded that Islamic international law and the Rome Statute both 
place a burden of criminal responsibility upon commanders who violate rules 
of war. However, criminal responsibility for commanders under Islamic 
international law is subject to religious duties as well as legal, social, and 
political commitments. Religious duty is emphasised in the Quranic verse that 
stipulates the following. 
And do not kill anyone whose killing Allah has forbidden, except for a just 
cause. And whoever is killed wrongfully (Mazluman) intentionally with 
hostility and oppression and not by mistake, we have given the authority 
to demand qiṣáṣ (the law of equality in punishment) or to forgive, or to take 
diyah (blood money).279  
In Islamic international law, there is a legal and political commitment to adhere 
to the words and actions of the Prophet in cases of war. These duties 
encapsulate the idea that the Quran cannot contradict itself when it commands 
Muslims not to initiate war and to seek peace, except when Muslim territory is 
attacked according to the Quranic verse that states, ‘there is the law of equality 
i.e. qiṣáṣ. Then whoever transgresses prohibitions against you, you 
transgress likewise against him.’ 280  Social duty refers to maintaining the 
reputation of Islam by complying with certain provisions. In the Rome Statute, 
the criminal acts of commanders are narrowly described and, in this respect, 
Islamic international law needs to be codified. 
 
4.7.4 Exclusion from Individual Criminal Responsibility  
Islamic criminal law and international criminal law recognise some instances 
that may preclude the establishment of criminal responsibility for individuals. 
These instances are infancy, insanity, intoxication, duress, necessity, and self-
defence.281 Such instances work in defence of the individual in the absence 
of capacity or knowledge.282 Capacity refers to the ability of the accused to 
carry out criminal conduct with an awareness of the consequences. 
Knowledge refers to the understanding an individual has of the criminal 
conduct and its consequences. In some cases, an individual knows that 
criminal conduct is prohibited but has committed a crime without will.283 The 
discussion below will examine the grounds for excluding an individual from 
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criminal responsibility, and the commonalities and non-commonalities 
between Islamic criminal law and international criminal law (particularly the 
Rome Statute) in this respect. 
 
4.7.4.1 Infancy 
Islamic criminal law precludes infants from being criminally liable. It also 
precludes juveniles from being punished with stricter punishments, such as 
those prescribed for qiṣáṣ and ḥudúd crimes.284 This means that a child/infant 
cannot be criminally liable for his conduct.285 A juvenile, however, is defined 
as ‘a person who has not attained the age of maturity as specified by Islamic 
jurisprudence’. This alludes to physical maturity and mental maturity. 286 
Jurists of Islamic schools have different views regarding the selection of a 
specific age to establish criminal responsibility, but they all agree that an infant 
under the age of seven must not bear criminally liability because he or she 
has a lack of criminal capacity, conscience, and mental maturity; thus, (mens 
rea) mental capacity is absent.287 However, while an infant who is above 
seven years old to the onset of puberty is not deemed to be completely 
responsible, he or she can bear partial responsibility but not for ḥudúd and 
qiṣáṣ crimes.288 The Hanfi, Sháfiʻí, and Ḥanbalí schools argue that a juvenile 
who is aged fifteen can be found criminally responsible because he has 
reached puberty and can differentiate between good and bad. The Málikí 
school states that a juvenile under the age of eighteen cannot be criminally 
responsible because placing criminal responsibility upon a juvenile aged 
under eighteen does not meet the main conditions for establishing criminal 
responsibility, which are: a sound mind, conscience, and puberty. Thus, the 
juvenile lacks these conditions.289  
The basis of excluding persons who are under the age of eighteen from 
criminal responsibility has precedent in the following Quranic verse: ‘But when 
the children among you come of age, let them (also) ask for permission, as do 
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those senior to them (in age): thus, does Allah make clear His Signs to you: 
for Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom.’ 290  The Hadith of the Prophet 
Mohammed also states that ‘There are three categories of people who are not 
responsible: a child until he reaches the age of puberty, a sleeper until he 
awakes, and insane until he become sane.’291 
Different views exist among Islamic schools about the age of puberty in 
Islamic countries at a domestic level. However, some of these countries have 
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and have reformed their 
domestic legislation to be consistent with the Convention. For instance, the 
Saudi Arabian Government has reformed its laws to fall within the provisions 
of the Convention and has established a juvenile court and juvenile custody 
for those who have committed crimes and are under eighteen years old.292 
There could be compatibility between Islamic criminal law and the Rome 
Statute regarding exclusions to criminal responsibility for all persons aged 
under eighteen, as stipulated in Article 26 of the ICC Treaty. This Article 
specifies that the Court has no jurisdiction over persons who were under 
eighteen at the time they committed criminal conduct.293 During discussions 
at The Rome Conference, Saland understood that different views existed 
among participating states regarding the specific age of criminal responsibility. 
Some state delegations wanted to set criminal responsibility at the time of a 
person’s maturity, and others wanted to set the age at fifteen, in accordance 
with their domestic laws because in some countries men aged fifteen can 
serve in military conscription. Also, some delegations argued that juveniles 
who participate in committing criminal acts should be responsible according 
to the jurisdiction of the Court.294 
It should be noted that although international conventions acted as sources of 
the ICC Treaty during negotiations for adopting the Rome Statute, there was 
no discussion during negotiations about Article 37 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. In addition, there were no discussions about Article 6 of 
 
290
 The Quran 24:59. 
291
 Ahmed ibn Hānbal, Musnad Ahmad ibn Hānbal, tāhqeeq Abdullah a-turkyal (Risālah 
2001). 
292
 See the official website of the Ministry of Justice in Saudi Arabia 
<https://www.moj.gov.sa/Documents/Regulations/pdf/77.pdf> accessed 22 September 2019; 
see also M Munir, ‘Rights of the Child: An Islamic Perspective on Preventing Violence, Abuse, 
and Exploitation of Children and Pakistani Law’ (2014) XXXVIII Hamdard Islamicus 33 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2538104> accessed 16 May 2019.  
293
 The Rome Statute Article 16 provides that ‘The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any 
person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.' 
294
 Saland (n 275). 
- 153 - 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These Articles provide 
that capital punishment must not apply for persons under eighteen. 295 
However, the Rome Statute states that persons aged eighteen can be 
criminally responsible.  
 
4.7.4.2 Insanity 
In Islamic criminal law insanity excludes someone from being criminally 
responsible, but the person must be suffering from insanity at the time they 
commit their crimes.296 The basis of excluding persons who are insane from 
criminal responsibility originates from the Hadith of the Prophet when he says, 
‘There are three categories of people who are not responsible: a child until he 
reaches the age of puberty, a sleeper until he awakes, and the insane until he 
becomes sane.’297 Two main principles are applied in this respect. First, there 
must be an absence of ability to discriminate between lawful conduct and 
unlawful conduct by the doer. Second, insanity prevents a person from being 
aware of his cognition and his abilities.298 
Jurists in Islamic criminal law differentiate between prolonged insanity and 
short-term interrupted insanity. Prolonged insanity excludes criminal 
responsibility, since a person’s cognition and ability to control conscious 
thought and conduct is in a state of collapse.299 In instances of sporadic 
insanity, if the criminal act was committed when a person was insane, then 
criminal responsibility cannot be established.300 In cases where the offence 
was committed when the person was sane, criminal responsibility can be 
established even if he or she becomes insane after committing the criminal 
act.301 
The Ḥanbalí and Sháfiʻí schools believe that insanity that sets in after a 
criminal act has been committed does not affect criminal responsibility; thus, 
the trial cannot be suspended. The Málikí and Hanfi schools believe that 
insanity that sets in after a crime has been committed is grounds for 
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suspending a trial until the defendant becomes well in mind and capacity.302 
It can be stated that in the Rome Statute, insanity is not explicitly discussed 
as grounds for excluding criminal responsibility under the provisions of Article 
31(1)(a); there is also no discussion about whether insanity affects the 
commencement or halting of a trial.303 However, the ICC Treaty discusses the 
impact of insanity on criminal responsibility and a trial. It states that the 
defendant is not criminally responsible if a) a person was not aware and did 
not know how to discriminate criminal conduct, and/or b) if there is a lack of 
ability to exercise capacity to control criminal conduct.304  
Article 31(1)(a) of the ICC Treaty stipulates that mental disease can exclude 
criminal responsibility if two conditions are met.305 The first is that the mental 
illness must have destroyed a person’s mind; the second is that the mental 
illness must have destroyed the person’s capacity.306 Van Sliedregt notes that 
this provision covers two concepts: the first being the ‘optional criterion’ and 
the second the ‘cognitive criterion’. The former means that the mental disease 
must affect a person’s mind and ability to discriminate between legal conduct 
and illegal conduct. The latter means that a person’s capacity to control his or 
her conduct must fall within ‘the requirements of law’. 307  Although Article 
31(1)(a) of the ICC Treaty does not explicitly mention insanity, the treaty per 
se covers the issue of insanity. However, the provisions provide a broader 
interpretation of mental illness that covers issues concerning mental illness 
and the accused.  
The ICC Treaty stipulates that the accused must provide evidence to prove 
mental illness,308 but in Islamic criminal law, the burden of proof is placed on 
the prosecution authority to prove insanity.309 Placing the burden of proof upon 
the accused in international criminal law is deemed acceptable because it is 
recommended that a defence attorney works on behalf of the accused during 
the trial stage according to Article 67(1)(d).310 However, in Islamic criminal 
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law, it is not necessary for a defence attorney to be hired during the trial stage, 
because the judge and prosecutor are responsible for providing the truth. In 
addition, the ICC Treaty does not explore the issue of mental illness that 
occurs after a crime has been committed. However, both legal systems agree 
that insanity and mental illness can destroy a person’s ability and capacity to 
control his or her conduct and to discriminate between lawful and unlawful 
conduct. Moreover, in both legal systems, illnesses such as epilepsy, 
neurological illness, or retardation exclude criminal responsibility.311 
 
4.7.4.3 Intoxication 
In Islamic criminal law, cases of intoxication are dealt with according to 
whether they fall into the category of voluntary intoxication or involuntary 
intoxication. In other words, Islamic jurists differentiate between those whose 
become intoxicated because of free choice and free will, and those who 
become intoxicated by coercion or by force. An intoxicated person is defined 
as ‘a person who cannot distinguish between the sky and the earth and is not 
able to identify a man from woman'.312 Substances that cause intoxication are 
defined as all substances that veil the human mind, control his or her 
behaviour, or make a person lose his or her will and choice. Substances that 
cause intoxication are forbidden in the Islamic religion and include alcohol and 
narcotics.313 
Jurists from the Sháfiʻí and Ḥanafí schools state that individuals who are 
intoxicated and have committed crimes are not responsible for their criminal 
conduct because they lack capacity and are not able to control their behaviour 
and actions. This applies whether the individual becomes intoxicated 
according to free will or was coerced.314 Jurists from the Málikí and Ḥanbalí 
schools argue that voluntary intoxication constitutes complete responsibility 
for all foreseeable crimes. 315  In other words, if a voluntarily intoxicated 
individual commits criminal conduct or omission, he or she will be responsible 
for his or her conduct and actions. However, jurists from this group 
differentiate between voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication in the 
context of three scenarios.316 These scenarios are as follows: if a person was 
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coerced into being intoxicated, if a person consumed an intoxicant mistakenly, 
and in cases where a person has taken an intoxicant as a prescribed 
medication.317 Bahnasi differentiates between incidents of intoxication and 
mental illness as follows: the latter requires that the burden of proof of insanity 
is placed upon the prosecutor or the plaintiff, because the accused is unable 
to defend himself or herself due to losing their mind, whilst the former requires 
that the burden of proof is placed upon the accused to justify that intoxication 
was forcible or involuntarily.318 
In light of the above discussion, it appears there may be some compatibility 
between Islamic criminal law and the Rome Statute with regard to the issue 
of voluntary intoxication, which is classed as not excluding criminal 
responsibility. Article 31(1)(b) of the Rome Statute stipulates that voluntary 
intoxication does not provide a defence.319 The latter is dealt with similarly in 
Islamic criminal law. In the Rome Statute, involuntary intoxication provides ‘a 
complete defence’ of the criminal responsibility of the accused.320 Sliedregt 
explains that the status of intoxication of the accused must have a noxious 
effect on the mind and capacity, even relating to the use of drugs.321 This 
means that if the accused knows the effects of the substance he or she takes, 
then he or she will be criminally responsible. Second, a person must lose 
control and capacity. In this case, intoxication does not lead to mitigation and 
is a ‘complete defence’ of criminal responsibility in the Rome Statute. Third, 
the act of taking intoxication shall not be voluntary because voluntary 
intoxication establishes complete criminal responsibility.322 It should be noted 
that the Rome Statute does not recognise cases of taking intoxication by 
coercion or by force, while Islamic law considers these situations as cases for 
excluding criminal responsibility. 
 
4.7.4.4 Duress and Necessity 
In Islamic criminal law, duress means the use of violent coercion to change a 
person’s will and abilities. This is practised by a perpetrator on a victim and 
results in the victim committing unlawful conduct.323 Hence, the victim’s will 
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absent.324 The basis for considering duress as a reason to exclude criminal 
responsibility is found in the following Quranic verse: ‘Allah does not burden 
any human being with more that he is well able to bear.’325 
Bahnasi distinguishes between physical duress and moral duress. Physical 
coercion means that the person under duress is threatened by (physical) force 
by another to commit unlawful conduct, and the person under coercion is 
unable to avoid the threat.326 Moral duress means a threat is issued using 
violent words to oblige a person to commit unlawful conduct in accordance 
with the whim of the person issuing the threat. Bahnasi also states that 
offending under duress can be a case for the exclusion of criminal 
responsibility in the following conditions.  
a) Physical coercion must be conducted by another person who is in a position 
to enforce that person to commit unlawful conduct, namely the coercion of a 
person who has less physical power. 
b) The unlawful conduct avoids imminent death or serious harm. 
c) The unlawful conduct of the person under duress avoids ḥudúd or qiṣáṣ 
crimes; for instance, using duress to ask for money cannot originate from 
being in a position of duress.327 
Islamic criminal law distinguishes between duress and necessity. In cases of 
necessity, unlawful conduct may be undertaken in order to avoid greater 
harm.328 Necessity requires four conditions to exclude criminal responsibility. 
First, the defendant must prove the greater harm he or she intended to avoid 
and whether this involves another person or circumstances beyond the will of 
the defendant. Second, the defendant must prove that he or she could not use 
any other reasonable alternative conduct to avoid the greater harm. Third, the 
defendant must prove that his or her unlawful conduct was practised out of 
necessity.329 Fourth, the defendant must prove that he or she has committed 
the unlawful conduct in good faith to avoid greater harm.330 The difference 
between duress cases and necessity cases is that duress causes a person to 
lose their will and ability, while in necessity cases a person does not lose their 
will or ability but must commit the unlawful conduct to avert a greater harm or 
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a greater crime.331 Moreover, unlawful conduct committed by a person out of 
necessity is committed without physical coercion from another person. Thus, 
necessity is used to avoid a greater harm or a greater crime.332 
Islamic jurisprudence requires certain conditions for the consideration of 
necessity cases. First, there should be two evils that the defendant must 
choose between, and the defendant must have chosen the action that resulted 
in the least damage.333 Second, the defendant must prove that the unlawful 
conduct committed aimed to prevent greater harm or a greater crime from 
being committed.334 For example, if a person is in the process of killing a group 
of people using a pistol and the defendant kills the person wielding the pistol, 
this is done out of necessity to avoid the greater harm, which would be all the 
people being killed.335 
Duress and necessity in the Rome Statute are dealt with in Article 31(1)(d).336 
This Article provides that unlawful conduct undertaken under duress or 
necessity is within the jurisdiction of the Court. This suggests that both cases 
would also be dealt with under ICC jurisdiction. Article 31(1)(d) outlines criteria 
under which duress and necessity can be classed as grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility. The first criterion relating to the conduct of threat is as 
follows. 
a) A threat must be issued by force. 
b) The threat must aim to inflict ‘imminent death or of continuing or imminent 
serious bodily harm against a person [himself] or another person'.337   
c) The threat shall result in the person not being able to control his or her will. 
Thus, the measure of the unlawful reaction may be subject to the interpretation 
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of the Court’s judges, who must assess the reaction of the defendant in 
relation to the offensive act.338  
The second criterion is that the unlawful conduct of the defendant must be 
reasonable and necessary to avoid a greater harm. This means that the 
conduct must be as follows.  
a) Reasonable. The meaning of ‘reasonable’ is described in the sub-
paragraph as avoiding the threat of imminent death or imminent harm.339 
b) Not done out of vengeance. The conduct must be to avoid a greater harm. 
In other words, the person’s conduct should be less or parallel to the act that 
he or she intended to avert.340 
According to Ambos, the concept of ‘threat’ belongs to both concepts, namely 
duress and necessity, but ‘reasonable reaction’ belongs to necessity. Thus, 
the ICC Treaty deals with both concepts. 341  Duress denotes that the 
defendant was unable to confront the threat because of the prevention of will. 
Necessity relies on ‘a choice of evils’.342 Duress may be considered an excuse 
since the defendant cannot be resistant, while necessity is classed as 
justification since the defendant faces a scenario of two bad situations.343 
However, duress can be classed as justification in two scenarios. First, when 
it avoids major or greater harm than the act sought to be averted; second, if 
the act of the defendant was reasonable.344  
Sliedregt considers two factors concerning the status of duress and necessity 
in the ICC Treaty. The first has an interpretive element that requires the 
following: a) the unlawful conduct of the defendant to be reasonable; and b) 
the unlawful conduct of the defendant must not aim to inflict greater harm than 
that sought to be averted. The second factor is ‘a volitional element’ that is 
bound to the mental and physical elements.345  
Article 31(1)(d) illustrates mechanisms that can be used for exercising duress 
or necessity. The first mechanism is that duress or necessity involves a third 
person or others. The second is that it is ‘constituted by other circumstances 
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beyond that person's control'. Thus, circumstances determine whether the 
person was under threat (duress) or he or she committed the crime because 
of necessity.   
Both the Rome Statute and Islamic criminal law indicate that duress and 
necessity are cases for excluding criminal responsibility. For duress, both 
legal systems emphasize that a loss of will under duress is the most significant 
requirement to diminish liability for criminal conduct. Moreover, in cases of 
duress, duress must be practised by a third party, by human beings or by 
animals, or be due to circumstances beyond the defendant’s will. In the case 
of necessity, both legal systems agree that a person must face two evils and 
that unlawful conduct should be reasonable to avoid greater harm.  
 
4.7.4.5 Self-Defence 
In Islamic criminal law, there are two types of self-defence: self-defence 
undertaken by individuals and the right of self-defence of a Muslim state.346 
Because this section deals with exclusions to criminal responsibility for 
individuals, it does not cover the right of self-defence of a Muslim state.347 
Self-defence undertaken by an individual is the inherent legal right of a person 
to save his own life or to save another person’s life, honour, and property when 
under threat. The defender’s conduct is given legitimacy as lawful conduct.348 
The basis of considering self-defence as a legal right of individuals is the 
Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed when He says, ‘Those of you who see vice 
should change it with their hands; if they were unable then with their tongue; 
and if they were also unable, then with their heart; and this is the lowest 
manner of belief.’349  
Islamic criminal law distinguishes between conditions relating to the offensive 
act and conditions relating to the reaction of the defender (in self-defence). 
Conditions relating to an offensive attack from an assailant are as follows. 
First, there must be an unlawful attack on the personal life, honour, and 
property of the defendant, or against another's life, honour, and property.350 
Second, the attack must be imminent. Third, the attacker must use force to 
commit the unlawful conduct, namely the attack must not be easy to resist 
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except by using force, namely using self-defence.351  This is because the 
attacker loses the right of protection of his life because of his unlawful attack 
against the person.352  
Conditions relating to the reaction of the defender are as follows. First, the 
attack must not be simple to avoid, namely the defender cannot resist the 
attack except by killing the attacker or injuring him.353 Second, the defender’s 
conduct must be within the principle of proportionately, namely the user of 
self-defence must not overstate his conduct against the attacker. Moreover, 
the defender must use a proportionate degree of reaction (force). Self-defence 
was dealt with by the Prophet Mohammed when a man came up to the 
Prophet asking him what to do ‘if a person comes to me wanting to take my 
money'. The Prophet replies, ‘Try to remind him of Allah.’ The man then asked, 
‘What if he does not respond?’ The Prophet then said, ‘Ask the nearby 
Muslims to help you.’ The man then asked, ‘What if there are no Muslims close 
to me?’ The Prophet then said, ‘Rely on the Imam (authority).’ Then the man 
asked, ‘What if the Imam (authority) is far away from me?’ The Prophet then 
said, ‘Fight him until you protect your money and then you become martyr in 
thereafter.’354 In addition, the defender’s reaction must be commensurate with 
the needs of the defender to avoid risk; namely, the defender can use the 
same means that the attacker uses.355 
Jurists of the Ḥanafí, Málikí, and Sháfiʻí schools believe that self-defence is 
an absolute right of the defender to save his own life or another person’s life.356 
The jurists rely on the Hadith of the Prophet when he said, ‘The one who is 
killed defending his wealth is a martyr, the one who is killed defending his 
family is a martyr, the one who is killed defending his religion is a martyr, and 
the one who is killed defending his life is a martyr.’357 The Ḥanbalí School 
believes that self-defence is not an absolute right because the offender is 
required to provide evidence that he or she acted in self-defence. In other 
words, the burden is upon the defender to provide evidence that unlawful 
conduct became lawful conduct within the principles of self-defence. 358 
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the Rome Statute outlines a similar idea of self-defence in terms of explaining 
the requirements of the reaction of the defender, and the requirements of the 
attacker’s conduct, with regard to the means used by the defender to prevent 
the attack. Self-defence is regulated in the Rome Statute in Article 31(1)(C) 
as follows. 
The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person 
or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of 
the person or another person or property which is essential for 
accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of 
force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or 
the other person or property protected. The fact that the person was 
involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself 
constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this 
subparagraph.’359 
This article encapsulates two criteria. The first criterion concerns the 
offender’s acts against the attack. The offender’s conduct must be reasonable. 
This is interpreted in terms of the reactions of the defender that are necessary 
to repulse the attack; moreover, these acts must be proportionate to avoid the 
risk.360 The meaning of ‘reasonable’ can comprise a subjective element and 
an objective element, and considers what another cautious person would do 
in the same circumstances.361 The subjective element may be applied to 
examine the offender’s reaction; thus, was it justifiable conduct within the 
notion of self-defence?362  
The second criterion concerns the means used by the defender to repulse the 
attack: the offender’s conduct must be proportionate to the attacker’s conduct. 
Proportionality limits the right of self-defence to the following criteria.  
a) The means used by the defender must not result in extreme conduct.  
b) The means used by the defender must be equivalent to the offensive 
conduct of the attacker, namely the means must lead to repulsing the risk and 
not cause an atrocious crime. Keijzer and Sliedregt note that the right of self-
defence in the Rome Statute should encompass crimes of genocide and 
crimes against humanity because the element of acknowledgement and the 
element of intent can exist in self-defence cases. Moreover, there is not 
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evident reason for excluding these crimes from the concept of self-defence in 
the Rome Statute, taking into consideration that the defender can commit 
these crimes to avoid genocide and crimes against humanity.363  
c) The offensive act must be i) imminent, ii) undertaken with force, and iii) 
unlawful conduct. Moreover, (iv) the attack cannot be avoided except by the 
defender using force.364 
Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute regulates self-defence cases to 
encapsulate these rights as follows.  
a) The right of a person to defend his life. 
b) The right of a person to defend in the protection of his or her property. 
c) The right of a person to defend another person’s life. 
d) The right of a person to defend another person’s property or defend other 
property under two conditions: first, when that property is necessary to save a 
person’s life or other people’s lives; and second, when the property ‘is 
essential for accomplishing a military mission'.365 The latter can be extended 
to maintaining the peace and security of a state in a war situation.366 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that both legal systems include human rights 
principles, which seek to protect the interests of humanity for the achievement 
of justice and stability in societies. In this respect, compatibility exists between 
the aforementioned principles. Thus, certain principles apparent in both aim 
to protect human rights from forms of injustice. Indeed, both legal systems 
place emphasis on human rights rather than political considerations, 
regardless of culture, religion, ethnic origin, and language. This means that 
both legal systems embody certain universal principles that serve the same 
objectives. As Bassiouni mentions, ‘[it is] necessary to conclude that Islamic 
criminal law is fully compatible with international criminal law.’ 
367
  
Islamic criminal law establishes certain fixed principles. These principles such 
as no crime and no punishment without law, non-retroactivity, the presumption 
of innocence, and ne bis in idem must be respected and applied. They are 
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Statute. The Rome Statute deems these principles to be international rules 
that must be respected and not breached. Thus, both legal systems share a 
podium of commonalities that promote and ensnare these principles to be 
universally accepted. 
In sum, both legal systems present features that make the principles universal. 
These features are as follows. a) The principles have been adopted in different 
areas of the world, although the peoples of each area may have different 
cultures, ethnic backgrounds, and interests; thus, these areas have adopted 
the principles on the international stage. b) The acceptance of the principles 
in the international phase promotes uniformity not just between states, but 
also between peoples. 
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Part Three 
Comparative Approach  
  




In international law, the main distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum 
is that the former aims to protect the fundamental rights of victims and 
wounded and sick people during armed conflict, whether the conflict is 
international or internal. Jus in bello governs the way war is conducted. For 
example, it prohibits attacks on medical units, and other methods of conflict 
such as ‘no quarter’.1 The protection of victims and the wounded and sick in 
war is regulated in the first Geneva Convention of 1864 and then in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols 1977. 2  Jus ad 
bellum seeks to limit the conditions under which war can take place between 
states.3 The UN Charter deems that states must commit to the provisions of 
the Charter in accordance with Article 2(4), which provides that ‘All Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’  
Jus in bello ‘addresses the reality of a conflict without considering the reason 
for legality of resorting to force'.4 In other words, it refers to the laws of warfare 
or the laws of armed conflict, one example of which is The Hague Treaty of 
1899. It is a branch of international law that governs the rules of war between 
states in armed conflict.5 It also governs situations of internal armed conflict.6 
Indeed, international armed conflict law places obligations on individuals and 
military soldiers who are involved in armed conflict, and stipulates how military 
leaders and soldiers deal with and conduct fighting. However, domestic 
internal disturbances that lead to violent conduct are not covered by 
international law of armed conflict.7 
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International criminal law is also a branch of international law8 that governs 
international crimes committed by perpetrators and which seeks to prosecute 
these crimes before the ICC. The ICC seeks to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators who have violated the provisions of the ICC Statute as outlined 
in Article 8(2)(b)9 and related provisions of international or internal conflicts as 
mentioned in the Geneva Conventions.10 
The protection of people and property from violence and destruction in armed 
conflict is covered in international criminal law and in Islamic international law. 
Historically, at the level of international law, the first steps were taken in the 
fifth century to address these issues by the formation of the Theodosian 
Code.11 Further attempts to legislate to ensure civilian protections were made 
in 697 when the Abbot of Iona, Adomnán, proposed a code known as the Law 
of the Innocents. Moreover, in 857 Charles took initiatives to protect people 
and property in warfare.12 By the fourteenth century, the idea of protecting 
civilians and property from violence and destruction had evolved, especially 
because of the work of scholars such as Hugo Grotius, Balthazar, and Francis 
Lieber. 13  In 1907, these ideas were codified in law via the Convention 
Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land (The Hague Convention).14 
After World War I, the definition of war crimes became regulated 
internationally by the Military International Tribunals (Nuremberg) in Article 
6(b).15 Further steps were taken by the international community to establish 
the Geneva Convention 1949 and Additional Protocols in 1977.16 After this, 
the international instruments of the International Criminal Tribunals 
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ICTY/ICTR and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court were 
established.17 In Islamic international law, international crimes are prohibited 
and punishable. The expansion of Islamic territories across the world has 
been based on the importance of interrelationships with other states, namely 
between Muslim and non-Muslim states.18 Jurists who specialise in Islamic 
international law have made significant contributions in this field, including Abo 
Hanifa 767, Abo Yusuf 798, Al-Shaybani 805, and al-Sarakhsi 1096. All have 
recognised the need to regulate the affairs of Muslim states with other non-
Muslim states.19 Indeed, jurists began to record legal incidents, especially in 
international relations. This has helped to promote the regulation of the 
domestic and international affairs of Muslim states. Such a process has been 
undertaken as part of siyar (as outlined in chapter three).  
The international community has continued to place emphasis on the subject 
of the protection of people and property in armed conflict by setting out 
provisions in the Rome Statute.20 Article 8 of the ICC’s jurisdiction covers war 
crimes as noted in the Hague Convention 1907. The ICC has jurisdiction over 
war crimes, whether they are committed in internal conflict or in international 
armed warfare, according to Article 8(2). 21  In addition, the ‘isolated acts 
committed by individuals, and soldiers acting without direction or guidance 
from higher up [may not constitute war crimes]'.22 This differentiates between 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide because war crimes can 
be committed if there is no armed conflict.23 War crimes require ‘a nexus’ 
between the act perpetrated and the conflict.24  
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The Rome Statute covers war crimes mentioned in other international treaties. 
These crimes constitute a) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 1949, 
b) serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, c) serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions 1949, and d) other violations of the laws of war that apply in non-
international armed conflicts.  
Whether regarding international or non-international armed conflicts, Islamic 
international law deals with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.25 The former 
refers to the ‘justifications for resorting to war’, while the latter governs ‘the 
rules regulating the conduct of war'. 26  The latter provides protection to 
specified people, for example women, children, medics, and the clergy. It also 
prohibits attacks against certain buildings such as medical units and religious 
places. In such a context, this section now focuses on the provisions of the 
Rome Statute and a consideration of how Islamic international law deals with 
the jus in bello concept.   
Algase maintains that Islamic international law ‘strikes a balance between 
military necessity and respect for human life in a manner which gives a higher 
priority to saving the lives of non-combatants'.27 The protection of civilians and 
property in Islamic international law began when the Prophet Mohammed 
received the revelation from Allah, and when the progress of the Prophet’s life 
was recorded from 610 to 623, after which time accounts were also made by 
The Prophet’s companions.28  Later on, jurists of Islamic international law 
developed these laws, placing emphasis on the protection of civilians and 
property from violence and destruction during war and in peacetime. Islamic 
international law deems that solving issues should be undertaken using 
peaceful means such as negotiations, dialogue, and arbitration.29  
Kamali notes that Islamic international law says that a ‘Muslim army shall 
respect the proportionality principle when the war is necessary as self-
defence'.30  Algase argues that ‘In cases of war, Islamic international law 
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considers the balance of humanitarian aspects and the necessary military 
actions with regard to the proportionality principle as it prohibits acts against 
civilians'.31 Thus, Islamic international law considers war as a last resort when 
there is no alternative to the resolution of issues. This is according to the 
following Quranic verse: ‘Fighting is prescribed for you, and you dislike it. But 
it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and that you love 
a thing which is bad for you. God knows and you know not.’32 Another Quranic 
verse encourages peace and not to resort to war: ‘And if they incline to peace, 
incline thou also to it, and trust God.’33   
Both international criminal law and Islamic international law prohibit war 
crimes by providing protection for civilians and prisoners of war, preventing 
the use of prohibited weapons, preventing the destruction of property, 
protecting humanitarian assistance workers and their facilities, protecting the 
environment, and preventing the use of human shields in warfare. Both laws 
also address the declaration of war in warfare. This means that the two legal 
systems deal with the provisions and rules governing jus in bello (rules 
governing the conduct of war) in order to prevent war crimes.  
This chapter aims to undertake a comparative approach between international 
criminal law and Islamic international law, and to consider the extent to which 
Islamic international law is compatible with international criminal law for the 
prevention of war crimes. In other words, do both legal systems share some 
commonalities for prohibiting war crimes? If so, how and what are the 
provisions of Islamic international law in this respect? The main purpose of 
undertaking this approach is to discover how the jurisdictions of both legal 
systems deal with international crimes, and to learn how both legal systems 
aim to prevent heinous international crimes. Such a purpose should find the 
answer to the research question in terms of examining the compatibility and 
incompatibility between the two jurisdictions. 
 
5.2 The Protection of Civilians  
The Rome Statute stipulates provisions that grant protection for civilians from 
serious violations during international conflict and non-international conflict. 
Under the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of war crimes covers grave breaches 
and serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and the customary laws of 
 
regard because Allah says ‘Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. 
Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.' The Quran 2:190. 
31
 Algase (27). 
32 The Quran 2:216. 
33 The Quran 8:61. 
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war, whether international or non-international. 34  Grave breaches and 
violations involving war crimes are stipulated in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, 
and the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. The features of these 
provisions encompass violations already mentioned in several international 
conventions as follows. 
a) Article 8(1) provides that ‘the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war 
crimes, in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes'. 
b) Article 8(2)(a) covers grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 1949. 
c) Article 8(2)(b) covers others serious violations of laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict. 
d) Article 8(2)(c) covers serious violations of common Article 3 of the Four 
Geneva Conventions in non-international armed conflict. 
e) Article 8(2)(d) covers international armed conflicts, excluding situations 
such as internal disturbances or tensions. 
f) Article 8(2)(e) covers other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts. 
It is important to examine these protections in detail. This examination is 
undertaken as shown below. 
 
5.2.1 Protection from Killing and Torture 
The Rome Statute stipulates provisions to protect civilians during hostilities in 
international and non-international conflicts when these violations are against 
civilians and conducted by soldiers of an army ‘as part of a plan or policy or 
as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’ or by individuals of the 
detaining state.35 The aim is to protect civilians because civilians may be killed 
in armed conflict as a result of war and military actions.36 Thus, the killing of 
civilians must be considered according to the means and methods used in 
armed conflict in order to achieve the aims of the provisions for protecting 
civilians. The protections granted to civilians in the Rome Statute are given 
because civilians are not part of hostilities and are non-combatants.37 Article 
 
34 Robert Cryer (ed), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Cambridge 2007) 242. 
35
 The Rome Statute Article 8(1).   
36 Cryer (ed), (n 34) 247. 
37
 Ibid. The term ‘non-combatants’ is defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) as follows: ‘Rule 3. All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are 
combatants, except medical and religious personnel.’ See the International Database 
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3(1)(a) of the Geneva Convention IV provides the prohibition of torture in non-
international conflict. Article 32 of the Geneva Convention IV prohibits torture 
in international conflict, stating that 'The High Contracting Parties specifically 
agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a 
character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected 
persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, 
corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not 
necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any 
other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.' 
Thus, civilians are protected from ‘wilful killing’ in international conflict; 
moreover, killing civilians in non-international conflict is referred to as 
‘murder’.38 Civilians are also protected from torture. This is prohibited within 
the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.39 Torture is classed as a war crime in 
the Rome Statute in Article 8(2)(a)(ii).40 Torture against civilians constitutes 
inhuman treatment, whatever the purpose of committing this violation.41 The 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute also prohibits the starvation of civilians 
because this is classed as a war crime during international conflict according 
to Article 8(2)(b)(xxv).42 
Islamic international law provides protection for civilians during war situations. 
Civilians are non-combatants if they do not participate or take part in a war, 
whether by actions, opinions, or transporting supplies.43 Islamic international 
law distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants, such as women, 
children, the elderly, and the clergy; these people receive protection during 
the hostilities of war and at the end of a war.44 This idea is considered in the 
words of the Hadith of the Prophet Mohammad, which says Muslim armies 
 
Customary International Hamartian Law ICRC (n 1). The Committee also provides that the 
term ‘combatants’ does not apply in non-international armed conflict. 
38 Cryer (ed),(n 34). 
39 Article 27(1) of The United Nations Convention against Torture 10 December 1984, 
entered into force on 26 June 1987.,  
40 The Rome Statute Article 8(2)(a)(ii) stipulates that ‘torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments [is a war crime]'. 
41 The Rome Statute Article 8(2)(a)(ii) defines this as follows: ‘torture or inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments'. 
42
 The Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) says that ‘intentionally using the starvation of civilians 
as a method of warfare [is a war crime] by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
Conventions'. 
43 Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (Muhammed Ashraf Kashmir Bazar, 
Lahore 1954) 207. 
44 Mohammed E Badar ‘Jus in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) International 
Criminal Law Review Brill 13. 593-625. 
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must not ‘kill any old person, any child, or any woman, or monks'.45 The 
second Caliph Abo Baker also guided Muslim soldiers in war by deeming the 
following. 
Be just, break not your plighted faith, mutilate none, slay neither children, 
old men, nor women; injure not the date-palm with fire, not cut down any 
fruit bearing tree; slay neither flocks nor camels except for food; perchance 
you may come across men who have retired into monasteries, leave them 
and their work in peace.46  
Islamic international law also stipulates how to treat dead bodies when a war 
ends. These rules are as follows.  
a) The bodies of dead individuals must be buried whether they belong to the 
Muslim army or to the enemies.47 
 
b) Dead Muslim soldiers are considered martyrs and must be buried with their 
clothes and blood without washing their bodies. 
 
c) Dead bodies shall not be cut or put on show, and they shall be delivered to 
their relatives if there is a request without any charge or demand.48  
 
Elderly people must not be killed. However, some jurists argue that if elderly 
people are involved in warfare situations, in that they plan a war, then they 
may be killed. 49  However, this rule was not condoned by the Prophet 
Mohammed when a 100-year-old man was found to be planning the 
operations of the battle of Hunayn.50 Other jurists believe there is nothing in 
Islamic texts that allows the killing of an aged person, even if they are planning 
a war.51 
Islamic international law distinguishes between combatants and non-
combatants. It protects civilians during war and those who are old, women, 
children, farmers, sick people, the disabled, the insane, and the clergy.52 The 
reason given for these categories of immunity is that these people are 
 
45
 The Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed in Islam: Question and Answer Website; No. 3015 
<https://islamqa.info/en/248850/> accessed 25 October 2018. 
46 Shaukat Hussain, Human Rights in Islam (Kitab Bhavan1994) 92. 
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generally regarded as not being able to fight,53 or they are physically unable 
to fight because of a lack of capacity.54 The Málikí school argues that if women 
and children or sick people take part in a war by giving advice or by 
participating in the conflict, they are still protected.55 However, Mahmassani 
notes that the immunity of women and children, and even sick people can be 
confiscated if they take part in fighting a Muslim army, or if they give advice 
against a Muslim army.56 According to Al-Shaybani, in these cases if women, 
children, or sick people try to kill a Muslim solider, the soldier is allowed to kill 
the attacker in self-defence; but if that person is captured alive, he or she 
should not be killed.57 If the woman is a Queen or a child is a King of the 
enemy state, and if they are involved in the hostilities, they may also be 
killed.58  
Other people who are protected include religious persons, namely the clergy. 
The Prophet also prohibits the killing of hermits.59 In addition, protection is 
offered to traders and farmers. This rule is based on the words of the second 
Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Katab: ‘Do not steal from the booty; do not betray; do not 
kill a child; and fear God in the way of the enemy farmers and do not kill them 
unless they wage war against you.’ 60  In this regard Hamidullah and Al-
Dawoody observe that targeting non-combatants is prohibited in the doctrine 
of Islamic international law because it violates jus in bello.61 
 
5.2.2 Protection from Medical Experiments 
Conducting medical experiments against civilians constitutes ‘serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict’ 
under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute in accordance with Article 8(2)(b)(x). 
Such conduct also constitutes ‘serious violations’ of the laws and customs 
applicable in non-international armed conflict in accordance with the same 
Article under paragraph (2)(e)(xi), whether these experiments involve physical 
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or mental health, or personal integrity. 62  The prohibition of medical 
experiments against civilians is justified by medical reasons and the person’s 
interest.63 The rules of Islamic international law were mostly regulated during 
the life of the Prophet in the seventh century. At the time there were no 
advanced medicines, but it was deemed that sick people, whether civilians or 
prisoners of war, should be given basic available care.64 They should not be 
killed or tortured or forced to interfere in the war.65  
 
5.2.3 Protection from Sexual Violence  
The jurisdiction of the Rome Statute stipulates that sexual violence, rape, 
enforced prostitution, and enforced sterilisation against civilians all constitute 
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.66 This jurisdiction also considers 
further steps to prevent the inhumane treatment of civilians as stipulated in 
Article 27 of the Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocols I and II, which 
prohibits rape and sexual violence against women. However, Article 27 does 
not explicitly mention these acts as war crimes.67  
Sexual violence, adultery, and fornication are forbidden in Islamic criminal law, 
and punishments for these crimes are set out in divine law. Islamic criminal 
law does not distinguish between committing adultery and fornication against 
women who are captive, are civilians of a state in conflict, or citizens of a 
Muslim state. The prescribed punishment is death for the married person and 
whipping for a non-married person.68 The female victim shall also receive 
‘bride-money’ that is similar in amount to any received by her nearest female 
relatives. 69  The acts of sexual violence, adultery, and fornication are 
prohibited and punishable in Islamic international law whether in international 
or non-international armed conflict.  
 
62  The Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(iii) and 8(2)(b)(x). The latter Article talks about not 
‘subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to 
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental 
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5.2.4 The Prohibition of Targeted Attacks Against Civilians  
The jurisdiction of the Rome Statute prohibits targeted attacks against civilians 
by military action in both international and non-international conflict.70 The 
parties of the armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and military 
personnel during hostilities. The former are those who do not take part in or 
conduct military actions. Attacking and targeting civilians is criminalised 
according to Articles 48 and 51 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Convention IV.71 Targeting civilians includes civilian populations, individuals, 
locations, and properties such as undefended cities, civilian buildings, 
hospitals, farms, and transportation services that are not military objectives.72 
Moreover, in international armed conflict, targeting civilians—whether 
religious individuals, doctors, the wounded, or sick people—is criminalised 
under the provisions of the Rome Statute. This meets the principles of 
proportionality that are established as part of customary law.73 In other words, 
it is important to distinguish between military objectives and non-military 
objectives. Thus, targeting civilians or civilian buildings constitutes a war 
crime, even if this results in incidental damage.74 Some scholars argue that 
the evaluation of disproportionate targeting should be examined if civilian 
damage or injury happens as a result of direct request and with knowledge. In 
these cases, the proportionality principle cannot be used, and targeting may 
constitute prohibited acts against civilians.75   
The main source of Islamic international law offers provisions that prohibit 
attacks against and fighting with non-combatants because Allah says, ‘And 
fight in the way of God those who fight against you.’76 Hamidullah notes that 
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anyone who does not directly participate in a war should be protected by the 
rules governing Islamic international law. 77  This is because Islamic 
international law gives people who are not able to fight the right to refuse to 
enter into fighting or into a war situation.78 Furthermore, these people do not 
constitute a direct threat as soldiers of war do. Participation in war is prohibited 
for children who have not yet reached puberty or who are under fifteen years 
old.79 This age was deemed fit by Muslim jurists during the time of the Prophet. 
The Prophet did not accept children under fourteen as soldiers in the battle of 
Badr in 624.80 This age seems to be consistent with the age of children as 
mentioned in Article 26 of the Rome Statute and Article 77 of the Geneva 
Convention in its Additional Protocol I.81 For Muslim jurists, the age limit is 
based on the following Quranic verse: ‘And fight in the way of God those who 
fight against you.’82  Ibin Qudamah and al-Gazali argue that children and 
women are immune because they are not able to fight because of their 
inability, whether physical or psychological, to engage in hostilities.83 Other 
Muslim jurists argue that giving protection to children and women during times 
of war alludes to the principle of public interest, whereby enemies cannot 
revenge themselves on Muslim women and children by enslaving them.84 
People who are unable to fight because they are sick or insane are protected 
from violence or hostilities in war.85 However, if they constitute a danger to a 
Muslim army, or they become involved in the fighting, they lose their 
 
77 Hamidullah (n 43). 
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immunity.86 In this regard, Al-Dawoody notes that although Muslim jurists are 
concerned with elaborating the moral aspects of Islamic international law, they 
still place focus on the rules governing war, as follows.  
The jurists were mainly concerned with giving Islamic rulings in order to 
regulate the conduct of Muslims, rather than explaining the moral or the 
philosophical rationale of these laws. However, the granted immunity for 
women and children can be absent if they play a role in fighting a Muslim 
army in actual battle, but if they are captured alive, they must not be 
killed.87   
Thus, according to al-Shaybani, if a woman or child murders or fights against 
a Muslim solider, the woman or child cannot be immune because the Muslim 
solider can use self-defence.88  
 
5.2.5 Protection from Deportation for Civilians and Victims 
Transferring, deporting, or confining civilians or victims ‘as part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large-scale commission’ constitutes a war crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. 89  The displacement of civilians is 
prohibited if this does not relate to preventing harm due to international 
conflict, since international humanitarian law permits the displacement of 
victims or civilians under certain conditions.90 Under Islamic international law, 
civilians must not be transferred or deported from their own state. Civilians 
must be treated and respected under the rules of Islamic international law in 
all times of conflict.91 These rules also prohibit forced conversion to Islam, and 
provide for the rights of civilians as follows.  
a) They have the right to be free to practice their own religion according to the 
following Quranic verse: ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion, truth stands 
clear from error, whoever rejects evil and believes in God has grasped the 
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b) Their families, dignity, and customs must be respected.93  
 
c) There shall be no threat, discrimination, or violence against civilians or their 
families.94  
 
d) Civilians have the right to contact their relatives or families, unless the 
connection may cause danger to the Muslim community.95  
 
e) Civilians have the right to subject their affairs to their own courts and 
legislation, unless there is a threat against security and peace to a Muslim 
community. If this is the case, then the Muslim army can prosecute them.96 
 
f) They have the right to obtain basic knowledge, and a Muslim community is 
responsible for providing them with the materials to obtain this.97   
 
5.2.6 Protection from Being Taken Hostage  
Taking hostages was recognised at international level as an international 
crime when the international community established The Convention against 
the Taking of Hostages in 1979.98 Taking hostages is prohibited in Article 34 
of the Geneva Convention IV. It is a war crime under the jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute, which prohibits taking civilians as hostages according to Article 
8(2)(c)(iii). This Article develops the principles noted in the Hostages 
Convention 1979. The Rome Statute provides a more detailed definition and 
prohibits the taking of hostages in international conflict and non-international 
conflict as follows.  
[it is a war crime when] the perpetrator intended to compel a state, an 
international organisation, a natural or legal person or a group of persons 
to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety 
or the release of [the detained persons].99 
Islamic international law recognises that taking hostages constitutes a crime 
against innocent people, whether this act is committed in international conflict, 
internal conflict, or peacetime. This is because taking hostages goes against 
the rights of personal dignity. 100  Furthermore, it is not permissible to kill 
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hostages even if the enemy has killed Muslim hostages. Hamidullah states 
that ‘if hostages are exchanged, and the rebels murder the loyal hostages, the 
rebel hostages may not be punished even when that had been agreed upon, 
for the guilt is not theirs personally but of their government'.101  
Al-Sayih also explains that kidnapping or taking hostages is prohibited in 
Islamic law because the Quran prohibits holding anyone in order to take 
advantage or exert pressure on a party in conflict as follows: ‘No one shall 
bear the load of another … each soul is reckoned with only on its own 
account.’102 Al-Sayih also states that ‘Kidnapping foreign nationals, whether 
Muslim or non-Muslim and holding them hostage is contrary to the tenets of 
Islam and has no support in the Quran or the Hadith.’103 In support of this 
argument, he cites the following Quranic verse: ‘We have honoured the 
children of Adam.’104 
 
5.2.7 The Right of Civilians to a Fair Trial 
Conducting an unfair trial and imposing punishments in times of international 
conflict against civilians is a war crime under the jurisdiction of the Rome 
Statute, according to Article 8(2)(a)(iv): ‘Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or 
other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial.’ Another Article in 
the ICC Statute that governs the right of fair trial is 8(2)(c), which talks about 
‘the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial 
guarantees which are generally recognised as indispensable'. This Article 
affirms the provisions of the Geneva Convention I Article 49 paragraph four, 
Article 50 paragraph four of the Geneva Convention II, the Geneva 
Convention III Article 130, and the common Article of the Geneva Conventions 
3(d). 105  In addition, Article 75(4) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
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Convention stipulates that ‘No sentence may be passed and no penalty may 
be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed 
conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and 
regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of 
regular judicial procedure ...'. 
Islamic international law provides for the rights of civilians of the enemy to use 
their own laws, even when Muslim armies have achieved victory in their 
territories, and for the rights of non-Muslim persons living in Muslim states.106 
Thus, a Muslim state allows civilians to practice their own laws via their own 
courts with regard to personal status. The Muslim state is also responsible for 
the protection of lives, properties, and the supervision of the means of 
applying justice.107 Thus, it can be observed that a fair trial may be achieved 
through the monitoring of the Muslim state over those courts that apply justice. 
Moreover, if there is a suspicion about the ability to achieve justice, a person 
can appeal to a leader of the Muslim state or its competent authority. 
However, non-Muslims living in a Muslim state must pay an annual tax of 
between 12 and 48 drachmas. Men who are in receipt of charity, the blind, the 
disabled, women, and minors are exempt from this tax.108 The Prophet said 
that ‘whoever oppresseth a non-Muslim subject or taxeth him beyond his 
capacity, then I shall be party to him'.109  
 
5.2.8 Protection from Making Civilians Fight Against their Government  
The jurisdiction of the Rome Statute states that compelling civilians to fight 
and/or serve against their own army or state is a war crime. This is in 
accordance with Article 8(2)(b)(xiv). 110  Compelling civilians to serve in 
hostilities is also a crime according to Article 8(2)(a)(v).111 
Under Islamic international law, forcing civilians and enemy soldiers to fight 
against their own countries in warfare, or using civilians or soldiers of the 
enemy to serve for a Muslim state or for a private Muslim person, is not 
permitted because the first Caliph Abo Baker prevented it. Hamidullah 
explains that ‘[it is not permitted] to force civilians or soldiers of the … enemy, 
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hostile party'. 
111 The Rome Statute Article 8(2)(a)(v) stipulates that it is a war crime to compel ‘a prisoner 
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and sending [them] to higher Muslim authorities is regarded as improper and 
has been disliked since the first Caliph Abo Baker forbade it'.112  
 
5.2.9 Protection from Enslavement and Forced Labour 
Enslavement and forced labour constitute war crimes if committed by parties 
of an international armed conflict. This has been a crime since the 
International Tribunal of Yugoslavia noted it in the Naletelic case.113  The 
instruments of previous international Tribunals act as sources for the Rome 
Statute in accordance with Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute.114  
In the beginnings of Islam, enslavement was permitted under certain 
circumstances in order to prevent bloodshed.115 However, in general, Islam 
promotes the abolition of slavery.116 Islamic law deems that mankind is equal 
in all aspects; thus, it may prohibit any actions that degrade human dignity.117 
Consequently, enslavement, whether or not it is practised during international 
armed conflict or non-international armed conflict can be unlawful in Islamic 
international law.118 Al-Ghunaimi notes the following. 
It is noteworthy that the divine injunctions deal only with the means of 
emancipation, and do not provide that slavery is an imperative system … 
this is due to the fact that Islam tries to solve the problem of slavery on a 
pragmatic basis … Islam restricts the cause of slavery and widens the 
possibilities of freeing the slave.119  
He also adds that Islamic international law commands a Muslim army to 
release prisoners of war after the end of the war, as well as to release 
slaves. 120  (There are more details about the perspective of Islamic law 
regarding slavery in the next chapter.) 
In today’s world, slavery was abolished under The Convention on Slavery of 
the United Nations in 1926.121 The Rome Statute places emphasis on the 
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criminalisation of slavery as a war crime; but in Islamic international law, 
discussions still abound regarding what was reported in the early days of Islam 
and what is considered suitable in the modern world. 
 
5.3 The Protection of Prisoners of War 
In ancient times, prisoners of war were enslaved or killed and treated as the 
booty of the victorious party.122 The Münster Treaty in 1648 was the first 
international treaty to address the rights of prisoners at an international 
level.123 The 1864 Geneva Convention also treats the subject of prisoners of 
war. In 1929, the international community established the Geneva 
Conventions; however, these conventions were not respected by the parties 
in the Second World War.124 The common articles of the Geneva Conventions 
provide that prisoners should not be killed and that they have the right to be 
treated humanely.125 In this regard, Esgain and Solf argue that Article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention provides protections for people, whether they are 
prisoners or civilians, as follows,  
At any time and in any place whatsoever ... a) Violence to life and person, 
in particular, murder ..., mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) Taking 
of hostages, c) Outrages upon personal dignity ...; d) The passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
by a regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees which are 
recognised as indispensable by civilised people.126 
The same protections are provided in the Rome Statute, which considers the 
violation of the right of prisoners to be a war crime according to Article 8(2)(a). 
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- 184 - 
The rights of prisoners also apply in international conflicts.127 Moreover, Article 
8(2)(a) describes acts that violate the provisions of the Geneva Convention 
1949 and covers provisions that refer to the protection of prisoners as outlined 
in the Geneva Convention 1949.128 The Geneva Convention 1864 and The 
Hague Convention 1899 provide that prisoners shall not be killed. However, 
these international conventions do not detail punishments to be administered 
when the provisions are violated.129 They do, however, detail the rights of 
prisoners not to be killed, especially prisoners who surrender and are 
wounded.130  
The Third Geneva Convention 1949 and its Protocol I of 1977 details the 
meaning of ‘prisoners of war’, recognising them as ‘combatants’ of an armed 
conflict of international character.131 Islamic international law recognises the 
status of prisoners of war as those who are combatants fighting against a 
Muslim army, namely combatants, as well as their rights not to be killed and 
how they must be treated.132 
 
5.3.1 Protections for Prisoners from Killing and Inhumane Treatment  
 Articles 2 and 13 of the Geneva Convention and its Protocol I (1977) prevent 
reprisals against prisoners of war, as well as protected peoples. In Islamic 
international law, prisoners of war are protected from being killed, even if 
Muslim prisoners have been killed by the enemy.133 This is based on the 
following Quranic verse: ‘It is not for a prophet to have captives [of war] until 
he inflicts a massacre [upon the enemies of Allah] in the land. Some Muslims 
desire the commodities of this world, but Allah desires [for you] the hereafter, 
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and Allah is exalted in might and wisdom.’134 In respect of this verse, Al-
Dawoody explains that it precludes the execution and enslavement of 
prisoners of war.135 
Islamic international law prohibits killing prisoners of war. Ibin Rushd explains 
that there is a consensus of Muslim jurists who agree that it is not permissible 
to kill prisoners of war, except in cases where there is a necessity to protect a 
Muslim nation.136 One scholar of Islamic international law explains that if a 
prisoner constitutes a danger to the Islamic community, and if there are clear 
public interests relating to a Muslim community, the leaders of Islamic states 
have the right to kill a dangerous prisoner. 137  Administering inhumane 
treatment or inflicting degradation on prisoners of war is prohibited under 
Islamic international law. This is based on a story in the Sunnah, when the 
Prophet ordered goodwill and good treatment for prisoners taken in the Battle 
of Badr, which was the first battle of Islam.138 According to the Prophet, the 
dignity of prisoners of war must be respected when he says, ‘Pay respect to 
the dignity of a nation who is brought low.’139 Moreover, prisoners of war 
should not serve against their government and are not to be questioned to 
provide security information about their government. 140  The latter is 
comparable to Article 7(2)(a)(v) of the Rome Statute, which stipulates that ‘[it 
is a war crime if the hostile power] compels a prisoner of war or other protected 
person to serve in the forces of a hostile power'. 
There are other general international rules providing protection to prisoners of 
war that align with Islamic international law as stipulated below. 
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5.3.2 Respecting the Dignity of Prisoners 
Islamic international law obliges Muslim soldiers to respect the human dignity 
of prisoners of war, whether this is mental or physical.141 This is based on the 
following Quranic verse: ‘We honoured the children of Adam.’142 This verse 
deems that dignity and the life of mankind must be respected; moreover, 
honour here has a broad meaning that covers all aspects of life and in all 
circumstances.143 Under Islamic international law, prisoners of war must be 
classed as guests, and no man can be enslaved.144 This is consistent with 
Article 12 of the Geneva Convention III, which recognises that prisoners of 
war shall not be enslaved by those who have captured them.145 This principle 
can also be seen in Article 13 of the Geneva Conventions Protocol I, which 
provides that prisoners of war must be humanely treated; moreover, acts 
committed against them that cause serious mental or physical harm are 
prohibited.146 Under Islamic international law, prisoners of war should not be 
compelled to convert to Islam or change their religion.  
The Quran states the following: ‘O Prophet! Say to those who are captives in 
your hands; if Allah finds any good in your heart, He will give you something 
better that what has been taken from you and He will forgive you. Allah is 
forgiving, most merciful.’147 Islamic international law deems that if prisoners of 
war are captured with their families, they shall be kept together with their 
husbands and children. 148  This is based on the Hadith of the Prophet 
Mohammed when he says, ‘Whoever separates a child from his mother, will 
be separated from his own loved ones on the Day of Judgement.’149 Obtaining 
information from prisoners is prohibited under Article 17 of the Geneva 
Convention III, which provides that ‘Every prisoner of war, when questioned 
on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date 
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of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, 
equivalent information.’ 
 
5.3.3 Rules Governing the Provision of Pressing Needs 
Prisoners of war have the right to have their pressing needs met, such as 
receiving food, water, and shelter, and must be transferred to a location that 
is safe and far from warfare, according to Article 23(1) of the Geneva 
Convention III. The Convention also requires detaining powers to provide 
sufficient daily food, water, clothes, medical treatment, and camps, which 
must be the same standard as those lived in by the civilian population.150 
Thus, violation of these provisions constitutes serious violations of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
Islamic international law recognises rules that govern the status of prisoners 
with regard to meeting their necessary needs. This includes accommodation 
for prisoners of war, including at mosques or in Muslim houses.151 Islamic 
international law obliges Muslims, whether soldiers of the Muslim army or 
private individuals, to provide prisoners of war with pressing needs such as 
food, water, medicines, clothes, and shelter. 152  This is considered in the 
Quranic verse that says, ‘and the righteous feed from the food that they most 
love, the needy, the orphan and the captive.’153 According to Abu Yusef, who 
is a jurist of the Hanfi school, those who look after prisoners of war and meet 
their pressing needs will not be charged, because these expenses must be 
met by the detaining Muslim state. 154  These rules are derived from the 
following Quranic verse: ‘Thereafter is the time for either generosity or ransom 
until the war lays down its burdens.’155 During the Battle of Badr, in the time 
of the Prophet, a prisoner was brought before the Prophet without clothes. 
The Prophet asserted that prisoners must be fed and provided with clothes. 
The relevant Quranic verse says, ‘Feed for the love of God, the indigent, the 
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5.3.4 The Treatment of Prisoners 
The treatment of prisoners of war is mentioned in Articles 13 and 26 of the 
Geneva Convention III, which provides that all prisoners of war ‘shall be 
humanely treated'. According to some writers, the meaning of ‘humanely 
treated’ could refer to treatment in the wider sense, namely, to save the life of 
prisoners, and that prisoners should not have to encounter dangerous 
situations that may affect their physical or mental health.157 
In Islamic international law, prisoners of war have the right to obtain medical 
care for treatment of their injuries, and should be granted a safe place for this 
to happen. This is comparable to an act of charity.158 The Quran says, ‘And 
they feed, for the love of Allah, the indigent, the orphan and the captive.’159 
The Prophet also says, ‘Take heed of the recommendation to treat the 
prisoners fairly.’160 Equal treatment is required for prisoners of war under 
Islamic international law, namely any type of discrimination against prisoners 
is prohibited, whether religious, ethnic, or national.161 The basis of this is the 
Hadith of the Prophet that says, ‘O people your Lord is only one: your Father 
is only one, all of you emanated from Adam and Adam emanated from earth. 
It is only piety, which distinguishes Arab from non-Arab and a red complexion 
from a white complexion.’162  
Article 16 of the Geneva Convention III covers discrimination against prisoners 
of war. It can be stated that this Article requires that prisoners are treated 
equally to other prisoners, while Islamic international law requires the 
treatment of prisoners to be equal with other people among the population of 
the detaining power. The Article includes the term ‘shall be equal with other 
prisoners’, while the Quran talks about the treatment of prisoners of war, 
whether they are connected to the detaining power or not.163 
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5.3.5 Releasing Prisoners of War 
Releasing prisoners of war is covered under provision 21(3) of the Geneva 
Convention III, which states that prisoners can obtain release on parole. This 
article provides for the release of prisoners on three conditions. (a) If prisoners 
suffer illnesses or health conditions, they shall be released. (b) They may be 
released based on agreement between the parties of war. (c) Prisoners of war 
cannot be released if the domestic laws of the detaining power prevent the 
release of prisoners on parole.164 Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides 
that it is not acceptable to promise release to prisoners of war if they comply 
with conditions to achieve liberty. Wounded and sick prisoners must be 
repatriated to their countries without waiting for the end of war.165  
Repatriated prisoners must not seek ‘active military service’ in the war again 
in accordance with Article 17 of the Geneva Convention III. This concept is 
similar to rules for releasing prisoners of war under Islamic international law. 
Islamic rules are based on the story of the Prophet releasing prisoners with a 
condition that they must not fight against the Muslim army in the same war 
again.166  Article 82 of the Geneva Convention III provides that releasing 
prisoners of war can be undertaken during hostilities or at the end of the war.  
In Islamic international law, the leader of a Muslim state has the right to choose 
between three scenarios when considering the release of prisoners of war, 
based on the interests of the Muslim nation.167 These scenarios are as follows. 
a) Releasing prisoners as a gratuity, without an exchange for Muslim prisoners 
and without accepting a ransom. This is based on the following Quranic verse: 
‘set them [i.e. prisoners of war] free either graciously or by ransom.’168 
 
b) Releasing prisoners of war by exchange with Muslim prisoners, based on 
the reciprocity principle.169 
 
c) Releasing prisoners of war by accepting a ransom, either from the prisoners 
or from their government. The ransom must be put in the treasury of the 
Muslim state. If the ransom is not paid, then prisoners who have knowledge 
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should teach Muslim children.170 This principle was reported by the Prophet 
Mohammed, who confirmed that the released prisoner must not then fight 
again against a Muslim army. In this way the Prophet released four thousand 
prisoners taken during the Battle of Badr in 624.171  
 
The Quran states that ‘It is not for a prophet to have captives [of war] until he 
inflicts a massacre [upon the enemies of Allah] in the land. Some Muslims 
desire the commodities of this world, but Allah desires [for you] the hereafter, 
and Allah is exalted in might and is wise.’172 Al-Tabri confirms that Allah 
commends his messenger not to confine disbelievers who are captured for 
manna or ransom.173 He adds that Allah knew what the Prophet had done in 
the Battle of Badr when he asked for ransom and released prisoners; thus, 
because of this, Allah deems it right to release prisoners without asking for a 
ransom.174 Later on, the Prophet released six thousand prisoners after the 
Battle of Hunyin in 629.175 
 
5.4 The Destruction of Property  
The destruction of property is classed as a war crime under the jurisdiction of 
the Rome Statute, according to Article 8. Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction 
provides protection to property from destruction in international conflict as 
noted in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.176 Article 8 
of the Rome Statute (2)(b)(ii) provides that deliberately directed attacks 
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necessity. 177  However, if there is military necessity, 178  the attack will be 
examined under the provisions of Article 8(2)(a)(iv) 179  or under Article 
8(2)(b)(xii).180 Civilian objects mean all objects that do not constitute military 
objectives, namely ‘those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or 
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.’181 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Statute provides that a disproportionate attack against 
protected property is a war crime within its jurisdiction, stipulating as follows. 
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.182  
This Article provides that the rights of property must be protected from 
extensive attack; consequently, the destruction of property cannot be justified 
by military necessity. If there is a military necessity, the destruction of property 
must be examined according to whether it was taken in the course of urgent 
military action that aims to attain a known military purpose. The purpose 
should be consistent with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols.183  
It has been argued that Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may limit the Court’s jurisdiction in 
relation to the damage caused in a non-human environment that is enough to 
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constitute a war crime. 184  Other writers have questioned whether the 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) covers a ‘non-human 
environment’ and whether this requires individual responsibility for damage; 
namely, the Court may allow acts that do not constitute a non-extensive attack 
but that result in damage to property.185 Islamic international law provides 
protections for property during warfare.  
According to Islamic international law and the Quran, all land is owned by 
Allah: ‘Seek help through Allah and be patient. Indeed, the earth belongs to 
Allah. He causes to inherit whom He wills of his servants. And the [best] 
outcome is for the righteous.’186 However, under the laws of Islam, property 
can be and is owned by private persons or by the state. Formal property is 
subject to the territorial jurisdiction of a state.187 Thus, Islamic law deems that 
the ruler is responsible for the protection of property because the ruler is an 
agent of Allah. Hamidullah notes that ‘the legal dictum is that all the parts of a 
Muslim territory lie under the authority of the Muslim ruler'.188 
Islamic international law prohibits the destruction of civilian property and the 
targeting of it as an objective of war in international conflict and in non-
international conflict. 189  This is because Islamic international law places 
emphasis on the rights of people to own private property and the right to 
sanctity their property and protect it from destruction, even in peacetime.190 
This can be evidenced in the following Quranic verse: ‘do not consume each 
other’s wealth in vain, nor offer it to men in authority with the intent of usurping 
unlawfully and knowingly a part of the wealth of others.’191 The destruction of 
property in warfare can cause a significant amount of mischief.192 The Quran 
says, 'And do not act corruptly, making mischief in the earth.’193 Moreover, the 
protection granted for property does not distinguish between properties that 
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belong to the enemy state or those that belong to a private person.194 This 
rule is derived from the Prophet’s command to the Muslim army when they 
entered enemy territories. He commanded them not to destroy public buildings 
and facilities and not to pillage or plunder private property. The Prophet said, 
‘Do not destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil the cultivated fields and 
gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle.’195 This is different from collecting 
the booty of war, which is acquired from materials captured on a battlefield.196 
The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) provides protection 
for the property of individuals, and reads as follows. 
Everyone shall have the right to own property acquired in a legitimate way 
and shall be entitled to the rights of ownership, without prejudice to oneself, 
others or to society in general. Expropriation is not permissible except for 
the requirements of public interest and upon payment of immediate and fair 
compensation … confiscation and seizure of property is prohibited except 
for a necessity dictated by law.197   
It can be noted that this Article emphasises the sanctity of property to be 
protected from confiscation, unless there is public interest in its destruction, 
with fair payment and adequate compensation. Thus, in general, property is 
protected from destruction during peacetime and war. 
The jurists of Islamic international law hold divergent views on the protection 
of an enemy’s property during warfare. Al-Awzai, Abo Thawr, Al-Layth Ibin 
Saad, and Al-Thawri argue that it is prohibited to destroy the property of an 
enemy. This view is based on the Hadith of the Prophet which says, ‘Do not 
destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, 
and do not slaughter the cattle.’ 198  Alternatively, Ahmad Ibin Malik, Abo 
Hanifah, and Al-Shaybani argue that destruction is sometimes permissible if 
there is a military necessity or in cases of reciprocity.199  
This view is based on an incident overseen by the Prophet during a siege for 
six nights in 625 upon the Banu Al-Nadir tribe when the Muslim army cut down 
some trees to encourage surrender. This act was classed as military 
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necessity200 because the property constituted a direct barrier to the Muslim 
army.201 Such a view considers the principle of reciprocity, which is derived 
from the following Quranic verse: ‘And for the prohibited things, there is the 
Law of Equality (qiṣáṣ). Then whoever transgresses the prohibition against 
you, you transgress likewise against him.’202 However, the first group of jurists 
often respond to the second group by arguing that these circumstances are 
exceptional and abrogated by the Hadith of the Prophet in subsequent 
battles.203 Additionally, the second Caliph Abo Baker commanded his soldiers 
as follows.  
Stop, O’ people, that I may give you ten rules for guidance on the 
battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You 
must not mutilate dead bodies, do not kill a woman, a child, or an aged 
man, do not cut down fruitful trees, do not destroy inhabited areas, do not 
slaughter any of the enemies' sheep, cows or camel except for food, do 
not burn date palms, nor inundate them, do not embezzle (e.g. no 
misappropriation of booty or spoils of war) nor be guilty of cowardliness.204 
Islamic international law provides for the protection of property from 
destruction committed in warfare or during times of peace. 205  This is 
recognised by the Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed which reads, ‘Do not 
destroy the village and town, do not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, 
and do not slaughter the cattle.’206  
 
5.5 The Protection of Humanitarian Assistance 
The Rome Statute emphasises the protection of relief workers who work in 
international conflicts and non-international conflicts. The relevant provisions 
of the protection are Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii), which provide for the 
protection of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions. The 
former covers protections in international conflict, while the latter covers 
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protections during non-international conflict. These Articles, and their sub-
paragraphs, provide the same protections for peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance. Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) stipulate the following. 
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, 
units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as 
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under 
the international law of armed conflict.  
The given protections are based on the United Nations Charter and the 
customary international laws of armed conflict.207 The United Nations Charter 
gives rights to the Security Council to establish relief work and give 
humanitarian assistance in conflicts that threaten international peace and 
security. Thus, intentional direct attacks against personnel nominated by the 
United Nations constitute war crimes. Other personnel who are members of 
the armed conflict and providing humanitarian assistance are not covered 
under the Rome Statute.208 For example, the Security Council established 
its Resolution 1744 in February 2007 in relation to Somalia. This Resolution 
ensures the protection of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping 
missions by the United Nations as long as the people involved are entitled to 
undertake them to protect civilians. Humanitarian assistance should be used 
to provide necessary needs and facilities, and governments must ‘ensure 
complete and unhindered humanitarian access, as well as providing 
guarantees for the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers [in 
Somalia]'.209 It was also ruled by the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
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(ICTY) that humanitarian assistants shall be given protections from violence 
or breaches in the laws of war.210  
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions provides for the protection of 
aid to assist wounded and sick people caught up in armed international 
conflict. Articles 12 and 13 of Protocol I give protections to those providing 
humanitarian assistance in the same manner as protections offered to civilians 
‘unless they are used to committing, outside of their humanitarian function, 
acts that are harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after 
a warning has been given, setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-
limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded.’ 211  The 
abovementioned Articles of the Rome Statute offer a broad analytical context 
for the following reasons. 
a) The meaning of ‘humanitarian assistance’ covers all those who work in 
assistance teams, whether or not these teams have been established by the 
United Nations and/or by citizens of the parties in conflict, and who work 
voluntarily, or are third-party teams such as the Committee of the Red Cross, 
the wider Red Cross, and the Red Crescent Movement, and who do not take 
part in the conflict.212 
 
b) The protections granted for humanitarian assistance cover properties and 
facilities, such as hospitals and medical camps.  
 
c) Humanitarian assistants are not obliged to involve themselves in the armed 
conflict or in military actions.  
 
d) The jurisdiction of the Rome Statute for protecting aid workers and the 
facilities they use is not limited to providing medical care, food or shelter to 
people who are in need, but extends to considering the idea that preventing 
access to aid or to aid workers is classed as a war crime. 
 
The role of humanitarian assistance whether in international or non-
international conflict must meet the following conditions.  
a) Humanitarian assistance must be neutral, namely it must provide balanced 
assistance to both sides in the conflict, according to the duties of the Red 
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Cross as described in Article 3 of The Geneva Conventions as 'an 
independent'213 and 'impartial humanitarian body'.214  
 
b) It must not be involved in the conflict.215 
 
The protection of humanitarian assistance is also recognised in Islamic 
international law. Granting protection to humanitarian assistance derives from 
the protection of civilians, since humanitarian assistants do not fight and do 
not take military action in the war.216 The Quran states the following. 
O’ you who have believed, do not violate the rights of Allah or [the sanctity 
of] the sacred month or [neglect the marking of] the sacrificial animals and 
garlanding [them] or [violate the safety of] those coming to the Sacred 
House seeking bounty from their Lord and [His] approval. But when you 
come out of ihram, then [you may] hunt. And do not let the hatred of a 
people for having obstructed you from al-Masjid al-Haram, lead you to 
transgress. And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not 
cooperate in sin and aggression. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in 
penalty.217  
This verse was interpreted by Al-Mawardi to mean that righteousness and 
piety are favoured by Allah.218 Humanitarian assistance was practised by the 
Prophet himself in the Battle of Uhud in 625 between Muslims in Madinah and 
the Quraysh (a tribe of the Prophet) in Mecca. When starvation affected the 
people in Mecca, the Prophet sent ripe dates and 500 dinars.219 Thus, Islamic 
international law accepts humanitarian assistance as a neutral third party, and 
grants protections if they are not involved in the conflict.   
There are two conditions under which relief workers are accepted under 
Islamic international law. The first condition is that relief workers must be 
neutral; the second is that they shall not take any action in the war.220 Thus, 
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under Islamic international law, humanitarian assistants should a) be neutral; 
b) serve all people who are in need without any prejudice between the 
wounded and sick soldiers of the parties of the war and civilians who are in 
need on all sides; and c) not take action in the conflict.221 These conditions 
are based on the objectives of Sharí‘ah for protecting the five essential 
elements of life, which are: a) life itself; b) religion; c) honour; d) the mind; and 
e) property. These principles are also regulated by the Rome Statute, the 
Geneva Conventions, and the Red Cross Statute.  
Both legal systems offer protections for humanitarian relief teams from 
violence and to protect their properties and facilities from destruction. 
However, both legal systems place conditions on workers to be independent 
and neutral, and to provide balanced assistance for all people. Moreover, both 
legal systems prohibit humanitarian workers from involving themselves in the 
conflict, but neither system discusses the use of aid workers as human 
shields, or what happens if humanitarian workers violate their commitments 
and involve themselves in the conflict. Are they then still granted protection or 
not? 
 
5.6 Using Prohibited Weapons  
Article 8 of the Rome Statute discusses types of prohibited weapons. 
However, this discussion does not distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants, or when these weapons cause devastation to mankind after a 
war ends.222  According to Article 8(2)(b), all weapons that cause severe 
injuries or wounds, whether mental or physical, or death to humans, including 
toxic gases that have the same effect, are forbidden. The following items are 
prohibited. 
a) Poison or poisoned weapons. 
 
b) Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials, or devices. 
 
c) Bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with 
a hard envelope that does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with 
incisions. 
 
d) Weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare that are of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are 
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inherently indiscriminate in the violation of the international law of armed 
conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles, and material and methods 
of warfare are the subject of comprehensive prohibition and are included in an 
annex to the Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant 
provisions set forth in Articles 121 and 123.223 
 
e) Analogous liquids whether devices or materials.  
 
f) Toxic weapons, and chemical and biological weapons.224 
 
Although the jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 8 covers most war crimes 
included in the Geneva Conventions in its Additional Protocol II, the ICC also 
has jurisdiction over war crimes in armed conflict whether international or non-
international. According to the Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of the ICC No. 22 A/51/22 (1996), there was discussion about 
listing nuclear weapons within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Most Arab countries, and 
Pakistan, India, Latin America, and some African countries support the 
inclusion of nuclear weapons in the ICC’s jurisdiction.225 This is based on the 
idea that customary law is the blanket umbrella for prohibiting such 
weapons.226 However, the Committee deemed that nuclear weapons are not 
prohibited under international law, but their use is prohibited. The Committee 
did not want to establish a substantial law in this respect, but rather include 
prevented crimes within international law.227 The advisory opinion, July 1996, 
of The International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat of use of 
nuclear weapons provides that ' A threat or use of force by means of nuclear 
weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations 
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful.'228 
Even though the jurisdiction of the ICC does not explicitly prohibit chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons, it is understood that their use in international 
armed conflict should be prohibited under customary international law.229 This 
may mean that certain types of weapons are not prohibited per se, but their 
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use in international conflict can constitute war crimes under customary 
international law.230 The advisory opinion of The International Court of Justice 
ICJ 226 in 1996 explains that ‘in most conceivable circumstances, the use of 
nuclear weapons would contravene rules of international humanitarian law … 
but it does not rule out the possibility of legal use'.231  
In the battles undertaken by the Prophet and his successors in the early days 
of Islam, no modern weapons existed that would now constitute serious 
violations of the rules of war under modern Islamic international law. 232 
Available weapons for use in the days of the Prophet were typically swords 
and arrows (except for poisoned ones), and these would not have constituted 
serious violations of The Hague 1907, The Geneva Convention, and The 
Rome Statute. 233  Furthermore, not much discussion has taken place by 
Muslim scholars regarding the use of prohibited weapons against the 
enemy.234 However, Al-Shaybani, a member of the Ḥanafí School, and other 
jurists of the Málikí School allow the use of ‘poison-tipped arrows’ against the 
enemy, as an effective way to achieve victory.235 However, Weeramantry talks 
about the prohibition of poisoned arrows as follows: ‘[there] seems to have 
been no restrictions on the degree of force that could be used and when the 
Emperor Babur used artillery for the first time … it does not seem to have been 
the subject of juristic discussion.’236 However, under Islamic international law, 
the use of such weapons may be prohibited. This approach is based on the 
prohibition of fire stones and mangonel catapults in wars during the time of 
the Prophet because burning is prohibited. According to the Hadith of the 
Prophet: ‘Do not punish the creature of God with the punishment of God.’237  
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According to one writer, Islamic international law prohibits the use of 
mangonel catapults in battle and using fire to cause mass destruction. This is 
because Islamic international law must promote the principles of 
proportionality.238 Hamidullah claims that ‘the deliberate burning of persons, 
either to overcome them in the midst of battle is forbidden'.239 
Under Islamic international law, if the enemy uses weapons of mass 
destruction, it is permissible to attack the enemy using the same weapons 
they have employed. This is based on the following Quranic verse: ‘Who so 
commits aggression against you then respond within the same degree of 
aggression waged against you.’240 Dayem and Ayub claim that this is deemed 
under the principle of reciprocity.241  
Another weapon that is prohibited under Islamic international law is flooding. 
This is because innocent people may be affected.242 However, Al-Shaybani 
and Ibin Qudamah permit flooding if there is a ‘military necessity’. Al-Shaybani 
explains that putting poison into the water supply of the enemy is prohibited, 
but preventing water supplies reaching the enemy is allowed to encourage 
them to surrender.243 However, these views are not consistent with the Rome 
Statute, according to Article 8(e)(i) 244  and the Genocide Convention. 245 
Furthermore, if the Prophet prevents punishment by fire because only God 
can use this as punishment, it follows that only God can punish by withholding 
water. Also, using this kind of mass destruction may affect innocent civilians 
who receive immunity under the rules of Islamic international criminal law. 
The meaning of the term ‘military necessity’ has not been explicitly explained 
by Islamic international law and the Rome Statute and its regulations, neither 
have the elements of related crimes thereto. However, Article 8(2)(a)(iv) of the 
ICC mentions the ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
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justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly'. Islamic 
international law prohibits discretional attacks on enemy cities and towns, 
even when there is military necessity, and is based on the words of the 
Prophet when he said, ‘Do not destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil the 
cultivated fields and gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle.’246 However, 
Islamic international law considers the principle of reciprocity when an enemy 
attacks. If a Muslim army or city is destroyed in military operations, a Muslim 
army is allowed to respond by enacting the same type of attack. This is based 
on the following verse: ‘Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do 
not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.’247 At international 
level, military necessity may be identified as the urgent measures needed to 
achieve a specific military purpose, but these should be undertaken bearing 
in mind international humanitarian law.248 
Some questions have also been raised in relation to the meaning of the term 
‘in particular’ in Article 8(1), which provides the following: ‘The Court shall have 
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’ The 
terms ‘in particular’ and ‘a plan or policy’ may limit the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
war crimes that have been committed without plan or policy, namely war 
crimes committed in ways that are not systematic. This situation sometimes 
relates to the use of poisonous weapons in war crimes; for example, in the 
Syrian crisis, when the Syrian regime allegedly released explosive drums and 
chemical weapons on civilians. Akande feels that ‘analogical liquid materials’ 
can be classed as prohibited weapons; thus, the crimes can be prosecuted 
before the ICC.249 Heller explains that ‘the requirements of the principle of 
legality in international criminal law would warrant against the application of 
the broad and ultimately discretionary rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Conventions of Treaties'.250 He adds that ignoring the intended meaning is 
simply a way for human rights activists to create the Rome Statute they want, 
and not the Rome Statute that was drafted and accepted by member states.251 
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However, some writers argue that using the term ‘in particular’ is classed as 
guidance for the Court and does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction.252   
 
5.7 Human Shields 
Using innocent people, whether civilians or non-combatants, as ‘human 
shields’ is classed as a war crime in the Rome Statute. This is based on Article 
8(2)(b)(xxiii), which defines the crime as ‘utilising the presence of a civilian or 
other protected persons to render certain points, areas or military forces 
immune from military operations'.253  Such an idea is compatible with the 
notion of the ‘adversary’s respect’ in International Humanitarian Law and 
consistent with the principle of proportionality.254 The jurisdiction of the ICC 
recognises the use of human shields as a war crime in international and non-
international conflict, according to Article 8(2)(c) as follows.  
In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. 255 
In addition, sub-paragraph (i) of Article 8(2)(c) states the following 
circumstances: ‘Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.’256 
Islamic international law also deals with using human shields in a war context 
or during hostilities in relation to people who are non-combatants and those 
protected from attack under its rules of war.257 In this respect, Muslim jurists 
take the following into account.  
 
a) If the human shield comprises women or children. 
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b) If it is used in cases of war with another Muslim army. 
c) Whether or not the human shield comprises people of a state that has a 
peace agreement with a Muslim state. 
d) If the human shield is made up of Muslim prisoners. 
 
The first group of jurists258 argue that it is permissible to attack an enemy if 
the human shield consists of Muslim prisoners or dhimmi (those people who 
are tolerated within Islam) or if it comprises citizens of a state that have a 
peace agreement with the Muslim state.259 However, the jurists restrict this 
conduct by two conditions: a) if there is military necessity, including preventing 
the defeat of the Muslim army and destruction of the Muslim community; and 
b) if attacking the shield can be avoided. In this respect, they rely on the 
following Quranic verse: ‘Had they [any believing Muslim men and women] 
been separated, we would have inflicted a sever chastisement on those who 
disbelieved from among them [the Meccans].’260  
The second group of jurists deem it permissible to attack the enemy when 
they are using a human shield of non-combatants if there is a military 
necessity, as long as they avoid deliberately targeting the human shield.261 
They assess military necessity based on whether the human shield has been 
used to prevent a Muslim army from fighting or to stop a war that results in the 
defeat of the Muslim army.  
Al-Dawoody discusses relevant issues in respect of the revaluation of the 
views of some Muslim jurists working in this area. He considers the 
development of rules covering war and the materials and mechanisms of war, 
and the idea that Muslim countries are not separate from other non-Muslim 
countries in the world. He notes the following. 
The best approach in the discussion of these Islamic legal issues is to 
relate such rulings to the jurists who advocated them. Concerning the 
application of these rulings, it would be left to the Muslims in question to 
decide which rulings to endorse. The main point to be concluded from the 
discussion of this issue is that most of the jurists override the Quranic 
injunction on the basis of the principle of Muslim public interest, judging 
that it would be in the interest of the Muslims to attack the enemy even 
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though this might lead to casualties among innocent non-combatants, 
Muslim captives, dhimmi, or any individuals who belong to a country with 
which Muslims have a peace accord, despite the fact that the Qurān gives 
a different ruling in a similar situation.262 
In addition, Islamic international law provides protection for non-combatants. 
However, some reasons are offered by jurists to explain why an attack on a 
human shield may be allowed. If the enemy constitutes a danger to a Muslim 
nation, some jurists use public interest and/or the potential defeat of the 
Muslim army as a reason to allow an attack. Thus, it seems that Muslim jurists 
tend to focus on the subjective status of the human shield, for example the 
people that constitute the shield, rather than the effects of attacking the shield. 
Thus, the focus is on victory rather that applying the rules of war. This is 
because a war in Islamic international law can be considered self-defence. 
Consequently, this stance raises the following question: do the means justify 
the ends? 
 
5.8 The Declaration of ‘No Quarter’ in War 
In war, ‘no quarter’ (or taking no prisoners) can be defined as when the victor 
declares no clemency or mercy and refuses to spare the life of the losing 
opponent, unless the opposition offers complete unconditional surrender.263 
The Rome Statute states that the declaration of ‘no quarter’ is a war crime, 
according to Articles 8(2)(b)(xii) and (e)(x).264 The declaration of ‘no quarter’ 
violates the rights of people who are non-combatants.265 The elements of this 
crime are stipulated in The Elements of the Crimes of the Rome Statute, which 
states the following.  
a) The perpetrator has declared or ordered that there shall be no survivors. 
 
b) Such a declaration or order was given to threaten an adversary or to 
conduct continued hostilities on the basis that there shall be no survivors. 
 
c) The perpetrator was in a position of effective command or control over the 
subordinate armies to which the declaration or order was directed. 
 
 
262 Al-Dawoody (n 26) 118. 
263
 For a detailed definition of ‘no quarter’, see Rule 46 of Humanitarian Law, which deems 
that ‘no quarter’ is prohibited, as is threatening an adversary therewith or conducting hostilities 
on this basis; see the International Humanitarian Law Database. 
264 The Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(9)(xii) stipulates that ‘declaring that no quarter will be 
given’ is a war crime; the Rome Statute Article 8(92)(e)(x) also stipulates the same prohibition 
in non-international conflict.  
265 Cryer (ed) (n 34) 257. 
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d) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
 
e) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of the armed conflict.266 
 
Thus, the declaration of ‘no quarter’ must be given publicly or in private to be 
classed as a war crime. 267  The former can be done via speeches or 
statements that threaten an enemy, while the latter can be undertaken by 
committing hostilities during warfare ‘on the basis that there be no 
survivors'.268 The declaration of ‘no quarter’ is also dealt with in Article 41 of 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. This Article defines the 
status of hors de combat and stipulates that individuals who do not take part 
in warfare are protected from violations and hostilities.269 
Islamic international law recognises the declaration of ‘no quarter’ and 
prohibits this because it constitutes hostilities in warfare against protected 
persons. This can be deduced from the following Quranic verse: ‘And if they 
incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it is He 
who is the Hearing, the Knowing.’270 This verse was interpreted by Al-Tabri, 
who said that if the enemy wants to stop or surrender, convert to Islam, or pay 
jizyah (tax), Muslims should incline towards peace and stop fighting.271 Islamic 
international law also uses the concept of Aman, which literally means ‘safety 
and protection’ for protected persons in warfare. In order to prevent bloodshed 
in warfare situations, it also applies to persons who are dhimmi (not Muslims) 
and who live in a Muslim state, and to non-Muslims who live in a non-Muslim 
state, as long as they do not take action in warfare against other Muslims.272  
Aman can be defined as ‘a contract for the protection of persons and property 
of the enemy belligerents, or any other citizens of an enemy state'.273 Aman 
is compatible with the idea of hors de combat, as mentioned in Article 41 of 
the Geneva Conventions.274 Peters argues that ‘safe conduct’ is encapsulated 
 
266 The Elements of the Crimes of the Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xii). 
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in the meaning of Aman in Islamic international law.275 He also adds that 
Aman is a contract of protection for non-Muslims, whether they live in a Muslim 
state or a non-Muslim state. 276  Wansbrough explains that, in Islamic 
international law, Aman covers people who want to live in or enter a Muslim 
state for trade, business, or education.277 Thus, these people are protected 
under the meaning of Aman.278 
 
5.9 Protection of the Environment  
In an international legal context, Rule 43 of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law details the meaning of the protection of the natural 
environment in armed conflict, whether of an international or non-international 
character, as follows. 
a) No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military 
objective. 
b) Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless 
required by imperative military necessity. 
c) Launching an attack against a military objective that may be expected to 
cause incidental damage to the environment and would be excessive in 
relation to anticipated concrete and direct military advantage is prohibited.279 
In addition, Jensen and Halle offer a definition of the protection of the 
environment as follows. 
The sum of all external conditions affecting life, development, and the 
survival of an organism; in the context of this report, environment refers to 
the physical conditions that affect natural resources (climate, geology, 
hazards) and the ecosystem services that sustain them (e.g. carbons, 
nutrients and hydrological cycles.280  
The environment is given protection under international humanitarian law, 
according to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. Article 35(3) 
 
275
 Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (Mouton, 
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prohibits the destruction of the environment by any method or means by 
parties engaging in conflict. It prohibits parties from employing ‘methods or 
means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment'.281 
However, the natural environment per se does not appear on the list of ‘grave 
breaches’; thus, it is not subject to individual criminal liability in the Geneva 
Conventions.282  
According to Article 47 of the Geneva Conventions IV, the extensive 
destruction of the environment cannot be justified by military necessity. Article 
85(3)(b) prohibits the launch of attacks that cause excessive loss of life to a 
population and excessive loss of property or objects owned by civilians.283 
During the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the judge 
in the Tadic ruled that violations of international humanitarian law committed 
in non-international conflict must be prosecuted. 284  The protection of the 
environment is also affirmed in the Rome Statute, which imposes punishments 
for the destruction of the environment because such destruction constitutes a 
war crime in international conflict. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute states 
the following. 
[It is a war crime] to (iv) intentionally launch an attack in the knowledge that 
such an attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage 
to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 
Furthermore, Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute outlines a test of military 
necessity when violations are committed as ‘widespread, long-term and 
severe'. 285  Thus, damage to the environment is a war crime under the 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. However, this carries a requirement of intent 
and physical conduct that relates to the intent and knowledge of the doer. The 
context is an attack constituting environmental damage that results in a 
physical element of criminal conduct.286 Thus, the Rome Statute considers 
damage to the environment to be criminal conduct, which is subject to 
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individual responsibility. The protection of the environment in the Rome 
Statute also goes further in providing protection ‘for cultural goods and enemy 
property’. 
Islamic international law provides for the protection of the environment. 
Nonetheless, there are divergent views among Muslim jurists about the 
circumstances in which protecting the environment in warfare situations is 
valid. The first group of jurists, Al-Awzai, Al-Thwari, and Abo Thawr, argue that 
the environment (such as trees and crops) must be protected from destruction 
and damage.287 This view is based on the ten rules given by the first caliph 
Abo Baker, who said that, during warfare, it was wrong to destroy trees or 
farms, and to kill animals, except for food. A second group of Muslim jurists, 
Abo Hanifa, the Sháfiʻí school, Ibin Hazm, and Al-Shaybani, argue that it is 
permissible to destroy the environment of the enemy in warfare if there is 
military necessity, such as attacking the soldiers of the enemy who are in 
fortresses.288   
Kamili and Munir argue that the destruction of the environment constitutes 
‘mischief and corruption’ on earth according to the following Quranic verse. 
And to [the people of] Madyan [we sent] their brother Shu'ayb. He said, ‘O 
my people, worship Allah; you have no deity other than Him. There has 
come to you clear evidence from your Lord. So fulfil the measure and 
weight and do not deprive people of their dues and cause not corruption 
upon the earth after its reformation. That is better for you, if you should be 
believers.’289  
The protection of the environment in Islamic international law is conditional on 
military necessity, which is assessed by the leader of the Muslim army. In the 
Rome Statute, the destruction of the environment is not justified by military 
necessity if this is done on a large scale or is widespread. Thus, the Rome 
Statute prohibits the destruction of the environment as part of any objectives 
to achieve victory. In Islamic international law, environmental destruction may 
be permissible to achieve victory, but the Muslim army must not exploit the 
concept of military necessity in order to destroy or damage the environment 
because this is classed as causing ‘mischief' on earth. The Muslim leader 
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The protection of civilians is affirmed in both of the analysed legal systems. 
According to the Rome Statute, military necessity does not justify the killing of 
civilians. However, killing protected civilians does not constitute a war crime 
unless the actions are committed using a plan or targeted policy, or 
undertaken on a large scale.290 In the main sources of Islamic international 
law, there is no divine text that allows the killing of non-combatants in a war 
context. It must also be noted that in Islamic international law, there is no focus 
on the means leading to the killing of civilians, although emphasis is placed 
on the prohibition of criminal conduct and the crime per se. According to the 
Rome Statute, targeting civilians during war is prohibited. However, if this 
happens, the incident must be assessed using the principle of proportionality, 
which requires the following.  
 
a) There was no request made to target civilians. 
b) The damage was not excessive. 
 
In Islamic international law, there is no agreement between Muslim jurists in 
this respect. Some prohibit the targeting of civilians because civilians are not 
combatants in a war context, but others allow the targeting of civilians if there 
is a public interest and in the interests of protecting a Muslim community from 
destruction.   
With regard to the rights of civilians to receive a fair trial, the Rome Statute 
provides for this right in the detaining state, but Islamic international law 
provides for this right under its own laws. Islamic international law may not 
allow a Muslim person to be tried in a non-Muslim court if there is no 
agreement or contract to allow this between the parties of conflict. The United 
Nations Charter has been ratified by most Muslim and Arab countries, thereby 
underlining the concept of sovereignty. Muslim countries must abide by this 
Charter in accordance with the following Quranic verse: ‘O you who have 
believed, fulfil [all] contracts.’291 
In relation to prisoners of war, the Rome Statute states that the killing of 
prisoners of war amounts to criminal conduct and is punishable. Islamic 
 
290 Questions have been raised about what the writers of the Rome Statute mean by the 
term ‘large scale’. Does this term mean ‘a large number of persons’ or does it mean ‘the 
ways or means used’ in the war crime?  
291 The Quran 5:1. 
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international law uses a comparable concept to prevent the killing of prisoners 
of war. This can be found within its main sources. However, Islamic 
international law is administered in accordance with the choices of the leader 
of an Islamic state based on certain criteria, such as releasing prisoners in 
exchange for a ransom, an exchange with Muslim prisoners, or as a gratuity. 
In some cases, Muslim jurists permit the killing of prisoners of war if they 
constitute a danger to a Muslim community; for example, if they are working 
as spies against their own country or pose a risk to a Muslim community. 
However, in these circumstances, questions are usually raised about whether 
actions have been taken in the public interest or because of criminal conduct 
per se. However, these permissions may enable political leaders to control the 
rules governing war rather than controlling military leadership. With regard to 
the treatment of prisoners of war, the jurisdiction of the Geneva Conventions 
and the Rome Statute provide that prisoners of war must receive the same 
treatment as imprisoned counterparts. Islamic international law provides that 
prisoners of war must receive the same treatment as civilians, namely other 
Muslim people.  
The Rome Statute criminalises the destruction of property unless there is a 
military necessity not to protect a property. In Islamic international law, Muslim 
jurists hold divergent views in respect of the destruction of property in a war 
context. Some Muslim jurists prohibit the destruction of property during war, 
while others allow destruction if there is a ‘military necessity’. ‘Military 
necessity’ is now defined under Islamic international law in the context of 
modern warfare because most Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, have 
ratified the Geneva Conventions. In terms of the protection of humanitarian 
assistance, both legal systems assert the protection of humanitarian workers 
and their facilities as long as the workers are not combatants, do not take 
action in a war context, and are neutral. However, both legal systems fail to 
outline provisions for when aid workers violate their status of neutrality and 
become involved in a conflict. 
The use of certain kinds of weapons is prohibited and is punishable under the 
Rome Statute, whether this use takes place during international or non-
international conflict. However, nuclear weapons are not explicitly prohibited 
in the Rome Statute. In Islamic international law, there is no agreement 
between Muslim jurists in relation to the use of certain kinds of weapons. 
Some Muslim jurists prohibit the use of certain weapons, but other jurists allow 
the use of these weapons if the enemy uses them and when there is a ‘military 
necessity’ to protect a Muslim community from destruction.   
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Using civilians as a human shield is prohibited under the jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute because it constitutes a war crime against protected persons. 
In Islamic international law, Muslim jurists agree that attacking the enemy 
when they are using a human shield is only permitted if there is a ‘military 
necessity’; however, generally, attacks on protected people should be 
avoided. This means that Muslim jurists may allow an attack, but will not allow 
the killing of protected people because Islamic international law seeks to avoid 
the targeting of such people.  
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Chapter Six 
Crimes Against Humanity 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the field of international criminal law, the concept of crimes against 
humanity was formulated many years ago. In 1915, Great Britain, France, and 
Russia established a declaration that defined crimes against humanity in 
relation to the mass killing of Armenians by the Turkish Empire.1 Furthermore, 
a Special Commission of the Versailles Conference decided to create an 
international military criminal tribunal in order to deal with crimes against 
humanity committed during World War I.2  
In 1945, the international community, especially the Allied Powers, namely 
America, Great Britain, and Russia, established the London Agreement in 
order to bring Nazi perpetrators of crimes against humanity during World War 
II to justice.3 In later years, the United Nations Assembly adopted a resolution 
for establishing ad hoc tribunals for crimes committed in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. Then, over time, crimes against humanity ‘became part of customary 
international law’.4 Other international laws have also been passed that deal 
with crimes against humanity, namely the Control Council Law No. 10 (1948),5 
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity (1968),6 the Apartheid Convention (1973),7 and 
 
1 Dispatch of the United States Ambassador in France to Secretary of State Bryan on 28 May 
1915 (Washington, US Government Printing Office 1928) 881, quoted from Antonio Cassese 
and Paola Gaeta, International Criminal Law (3rd edn, Oxford 2013) 84. 
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Responsibility of the Authors of War and on the Enforcement of Penalties (1919) 14(1) The 
American Journal of International Law  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2187841?origin=crossref&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents/
> accessed 16 November 2018. 
3 The Allied Powers (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) met in London on 
8 August 1945 to establish the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (1945). This 
Tribunal was set up on 15 March 1951 and sought to prosecute offenders who had committed 
war crimes during WWII. Following this, the Allied Powers established another international 
military tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo (1946) that dealt with Japanese war crimes.  
4
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against Humanity, GA Res 2391 (XXIII), 26 November 1968 entered into force on 11 
November 1970. 
7
 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
GA Res 3068 (XXVIII), 28 UN GAOR Supp (Number 30) at 75, UN Doc A/9030 (1974) 1015 
UNTS 243, entered into force on 18 July 1976 (the Apartheid Convention). 
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the Rome Statute (1998). All this legislation has been designed to prohibit 
crimes against humanity in times of war and peace. The definition of 'crimes 
against humanity' evolved because the international community realised the 
seriousness of such crimes against international peace and security. This led 
to the establishment of international conventions and international tribunals by 
judges and scholars in order to prevent crimes against humanity.  
Article 7 of The Rome Statute covers crimes against humanity that are 
committed against any civilian population.8 It covers crimes against humanity 
that are committed against ‘any’ civilians and includes crimes committed 
against civilians by their own state or by an organised policy of persecution.9 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute outlines the reasons for prosecuting crimes 
against humanity in order to prevent inhumane acts that may happen in 
peacetime or during armed conflict. This Article stipulates that ‘crimes against 
humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack'. It is important to examine the terms of the Article to 
discover the legal definition of crimes against humanity so as to reach an 
interpretation of the Article. Terms used include the following: attack, policy, 
widespread, and systematic attack. An examination of inhumane acts as they 
are covered in this Article will be compared here with Islamic international law. 
According to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity are 
covered as follows.  
 
a) All inhumane acts that result in death or that cause harm against the 
integrity or the body of persons. 
 
b) These acts should not be isolated, namely they should not be committed at 
intervals. 
 
c) Crimes against humanity must be committed systematically or on a 
widespread scale. 
 
d) Crimes must be committed by a state or organisation pursuant to or in 
furtherance of state or organisational policy. 
 
e) Crimes must be committed against the civilian population with intent and 




 The Rome Statute, Article 7(2).  
9 Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta, International Criminal Law, (3rd edn, Oxford University 
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f) These crimes are criminalised and punishable during times of war and 
peace.10 
 
Islamic international law also prohibits and criminalises certain acts that are 
against an individual’s rights and aims to protect these rights. The rights of 
individuals are mentioned in the main sources of Islamic criminal law as 
rudimental rights; thus, these rights must be protected. 11  The rights are 
discussed later in this chapter.12  
The main sources of Islamic criminal law provide equal protection for the rights 
of individuals. Islamic criminal law goes further by prohibiting any act that goes 
against these rights.13 In order to maintain protection and prevent criminal acts 
against the rights of individuals, Muslim jurists have developed Islamic 
jurisprudence to explore and explain these rights. With regard to this 
endeavour, they have set up four Muslim Sunni schools.14 Furthermore, the 
main criterion of the prohibition of crimes against the rights of individuals in 
Islamic international law is permanent.15 This is because the legitimacy of the 
law is derived from divine law and is not based on time, place, and interests.16 
However, currently, crimes against humanity are being committed against 
people in some Muslim countries, such as in Sudan, Syria, and Iraq, where 
Islamic law is the main or part source of law and/or where Islamic law is a 
source of domestic legislation. 17  These crimes constitute a danger to 
humanity. Thus, studying crimes against humanity from an Islamic perspective 
and an international criminal law perspective can be valuable for undertaking 




10 The Rome Statute, Article 7: The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute. 
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6.2 The Conditions for Crimes against Humanity as Stipulated in the 
Rome Statute  
Crimes against humanity have not, historically, been codified in international 
conventions in the same way as war crimes and genocide.18 Thus, a gap has 
evolved in legislation that does not cover systematic and widespread 
inhumane acts of murder, rape, torture, sexual slavery, and persecution.19 
The Rome Statute goes some way to address this gap, but according to Article 
7 these crimes must be committed in ‘a widespread or systematic’ way against 
civilian populations in order to be classed as crimes against humanity. 20 
Subsequently, criminal acts may constitute a breach of human rights as 
mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,21 as well as 
in other international conventions relating to human rights.  
The insistence of the international community for prohibiting crimes against 
humanity has led to attempts to distinguish these crimes from war crimes, but 
there is some overlap. The overlap in defining crimes against humanity and 
war crimes, such as mass killing and torture during armed conflict, needs to 
be explained. In this regard, scholars argue that there are differences as 
follows.  
a) It is not required that crimes against humanity are committed in armed 
conflict, whether international or internal.  
 
b) Crimes against humanity need to be committed in a widespread or 
systematic way.  
 
c) Crimes against humanity are prohibited and criminalised, whether there is 
armed conflict or not.22  
 
6.2.1 The Terms ‘Attack’ and ‘Policy’ 
The term ‘attack’ as it is used in Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute requires 
multiple victims and multiple inhumane acts to be considered in relation to 
crimes against humanity.23 ‘Attack’ is identified as ‘[an] attack directed against 
any civilian population … a course of conduct involving the multiple 
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- 217 - 
commission of acts referred to in Paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such 
attack.’ This term suggests that, under the Court’s jurisdiction, inhumane acts 
can in some situations be committed by non-state actors.24 The reason is that, 
historically, crimes against humanity require the ‘implementation of a state 
policy’. This requirement has produced legal evolution that has ‘paralleled the 
expansion of war crimes into the area of non-international armed conflict'.25 
However, Bassiouni raises important questions about the definition of crimes 
against humanity to cover non-state actors, and presents the examples of the 
Mafia and Al-Qaeda as two groups that do not qualify for inclusion under the 
terms of the Rome Statute Article 7. Article 7(2) explicitly refers to the ‘policy 
of state’ and the ‘organisation’ of policy.26 It has been argued that the inclusion 
of the word ‘policy’ places additional burden on the Court to prove that the 
policy has been sanctioned by a state or an organisation.27 Thus, political 
anarchy, natural disaster, and random criminal acts committed by individuals 
may not always constitute crimes against humanity, as stipulated under the 
terms of the Rome Statute.28  
Cassese argues that ‘if a state or an organisation tolerated or conducted 
inhumane acts within the Rome Statute, jurisdiction may constitute crimes 
against humanity, this is because the Elements of Crimes in the ICC requires 
encouragement or promoting, practised by a state or an organisation 
actively.29 Therefore, proof is required that crimes against humanity have 
been committed by individuals who are/were officials of a state or who officially 
represent a state, so that crimes against humanity can be considered by the 
Prosecutor of the Court.'30 Cupido argues that it is not necessary for ‘the 
theoretical characterisation of the policy requirement’ to be ‘either an element 
of crime or an evidentiary relevant circumstance for crimes against humanity 
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[since it] is deficient'. This affects the underlying meaning of crimes against 
humanity.31 
One may notice that the term ‘any’ may refer to any inhumane act that 
constitutes a crime against humanity, even though the act may not be 
specifically codified in the Rome Statute. This is because the authors of the 
Rome Statute use the term ‘any of the following acts’ and not ‘the following 
acts’ because the latter may work to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction. In addition, 
the term ‘attack’ may refer to a widespread and systematic attack, but not refer 
to an ‘act’ because the latter would also restrict the scope of the Rome Statute. 
On the other hand, the term ‘attack’ aims to cover the attempt to commit 
crimes against humanity. Thus, the Rome Statute covers general conduct 
encapsulated in the term ‘attack’. For instance, if a state wanted to carry out 
a non-systematic or non-widespread attack against civilians without any 
discrimination, but the person in charge of the attack undertakes a widespread 
attack and is a representative of a state, then the Rome Statute offers 
provision to prosecute the perpetrator. Hence, this means that the state did 
not commit a systematic or widespread attack; instead, its official personnel 
committed it. The Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Situation of the Central African 
Republic in The Case of the Prosecutor v. Pierre Gombo ruled the following.  
The requirement of ‘a State or organisational policy’ implies that the attack 
follows a regular pattern. Such a policy may be made by groups of persons 
who govern a specific territory or by any organisation with the capability to 
commit a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 
The policy need not be formalised. 32 
One reason for using the word ‘policy’ is as follows: if crimes against humanity 
are committed that are not codified in the Rome Statute, the Court will have 
jurisdiction for those crimes against humanity.33 In addition, Schabas states 
that crimes against humanity could be committed through or by groups that 
exercise ‘de facto control’ upon some areas without international 
acknowledgement or without acknowledgement from the state where the 
crimes are committed.34 
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6.2.2 The Term ‘Widespread or Systematic’  
The term ‘widespread’ is defined in the ICTR Akayesu case as ‘[a] massive, 
frequent, large scale action carried out collectively with considerable 
seriousness and directed against multiple victims'.35 The term ‘systematic’ is 
defined as a ‘completely planned action within a common policy and involving 
substantial public or private resources'.36 Ambos and Wirth argue that the 
terms used in the Rome Statute may indicate a threshold, but that non-
widespread and non-systematic crimes do not constitute crimes against 
humanity.37 However, one may suggest that the term ‘whether or not’ be 
added before the term ‘widespread or systematic’. This addition would serve 
to include inhumane acts committed without systematic or widespread attack. 
In addition, if crimes against humanity are committed without systematic or 
widespread attack, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction. Furthermore, to 
avoid the embarrassment of the Court not punishing criminals who have 
committed crimes against humanity, a reform is suggested to the Article that 
reads, ‘crimes against humanity means any of the following acts committed 
‘whether or not’ as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack'.38  
Islamic international law does not require that crimes against humanity be 
committed in a widespread or systematic way since its provisions provide a 
broad deterrent for prohibiting crimes against humanity with the general 
protection of individuals’ rights.39 
 
 
6.3 Inhumane Acts that Fall within the Jurisdiction of the Rome Statute 
and Islamic International Law 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute refers to prohibited acts recognised under 
previous international tribunals. Inhumane acts as defined within the scope of 
the Rome Statute are murder, discrimination, torture, enslavement and 
imprisonment, the severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of the 
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fundamental rules of international law, rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity, persecution, the enforced 
disappearance of persons, and apartheid. These crimes, as well as other 
inhumane acts of a similar character that are intentionally enacted to cause 
great suffering or serious injury to the body or to mental or physical health, are 
examined below within the scope of Islamic international law and the Rome 
Statute. 
 
6.3.1 Murder and Extermination 
Murder sits at the top of the pyramid of prohibited crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute. It refers to unlawful killing with the intention of 
causing the death of an innocent person.40 According to the judgment made 
in the Kupreskic case, the prohibition of murder as a crime against humanity 
is classed as ‘lex specialis in relation to the prohibition of murder as a war 
crime'.41 Cassese explains that ‘it is sufficient for a perpetrator to cause the 
victim serious injury with reckless disregard for human life'.42  
The second prohibited crime on the pyramid of the Rome Statute is 
extermination. In the Rome Statute, the crime of extermination connects to the 
crime of murder but may not involve killing on a large scale.43 The Rome 
Statute provides that ‘extermination includes the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population'. 44  The 
differences between murder and extermination can be outlined as follows.  
a) Extermination requires the knowledge of the perpetrator about the 
circumstances that have caused the mass killing of innocent people.   
 
b) Extermination can include the use of indirect mechanisms that cause the 
death of innocent people.45  
 
Article 7(2)(b) stipulates that ‘extermination includes the intentional infliction 
of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine 
[or pressing needs], calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population'. However, in this respect, it is valid to ask that if the state denies 
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42 Prosecutor v Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) (Judgment, 25 September 1998) (580).  
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access to food or water to part of its civilian population and if this does not 
cause death, would this still be classed as ‘extermination’ in the context of 
crimes against humanity? The conceivable answer would be ‘yes’, because 
the term ‘includes’ is used rather than ‘means’, and the latter would restrict the 
scope of the Statute. Furthermore, the term 'inter alia' could include any 
conduct that causes or inflicts the life conditions stated as crimes against 
humanity, such as the restriction of oxygen. Thus, actual proof of 
extermination is not required when assessing crimes against humanity.46 
In Islamic international law, the crime of murder is prohibited and punishable 
because it constitutes a criminal act against an innocent person or a group of 
innocent persons. Thus, legal attention here is paid to prohibiting this crime 
because committing the crime of murder goes against the right to life. 47 
Furthermore, committing the crime of murder also goes against principles of 
the equality of life.48 In Islamic criminal law, the punishment for murder falls 
under the terms of qiṣáṣ. 49  In addition, punishment in the thereafter is 
undertaken in hell. Murder is criminalised and punished in Islamic international 
law, whether or not the crime is committed against a Muslim or a non-Muslim 
dhimmi, or whether in a Muslim or non-Muslim state. 
The prohibition of the murder of a Muslim is outlined in the Quran: ‘But 
whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, wherein he will 
abide eternally, and Allah has become angry with him and has cursed him and 
has prepared for him a great punishment.’50 This verse encapsulates two 
ideas as follows: first, that a Muslim person is prohibited from, and will be 
punished for, murdering another Muslim person or more than one Muslim 
person; and second, that the official authorities of a Muslim state are 
responsible for protecting the state's people from this criminal act without any 
discrimination, whether this is based on ethnicity, religion, nationality, colour, 
language, or gender.51 This is because it is the function of Islamic criminal law 
to protect all people from being killed or destroyed on earth.  
Murder is prohibited in the main sources of Islamic criminal law, whether or 
not this is committed against Muslims or non-Muslims. This is stated in the 
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Quran as follows: ‘Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption in 
the land, it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one, it is 
as if he has saved mankind entirely. And our messengers have certainly come 
to them with clear proof. Then indeed many of them, after that, throughout the 
land, were transgressors.’52 The criminalisation of the crime of extermination 
has been codified in international conventions. Such codification has resulted 
from the international community facing the crime of extermination in many 
areas in the world, thereby leading to the enactment of the term. Thus, 
although Islamic criminal law may not use the term ‘extermination’, it considers 
that, in accordance with the main sources of Islamic law, killing a person or a 
group of people constitutes a crime against the whole of mankind. However, 
killing is lawful under Islamic criminal law when it is based on a verdict issued 
by an impartial court at a public hearing. In other words, if there is no judicial 
justification, killing is unlawful.53 This is based on the following Quranic verse: 
‘Do not take a soul which Allah has forbidden, except through the due process 
of law.’54  
The prohibition of murder and extermination under the Rome Statute is the 
same in Islamic international law. However, Islamic criminal law goes further 
by criminalising murder if it is undertaken by official individuals of state and/or 
private individuals, while the Rome Statute requires that crimes against 
humanity must be committed by a state or an organisation and that these 
crimes should be undertaken by systematic and widespread attack.55   
 
6.3.2 Enslavement   
The crime of enslavement is defined in the International Convention on 
Slavery (1926) and in the Supplementary Slavery Convention (1956) as 
‘exercising the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person, or 
more than one person'.56 This definition has been adopted in Article 7(2)(c) of 
the Rome Statute. However, the Rome Statute goes further by including the 
trafficking of human beings. Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute defines 
enslavement as ‘the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
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of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the 
course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children'. The 
Elements of Crimes in the Rome Statute gives examples of enslavement, 
including the sale, disposal, exchange, capture, purchase, lending, bartering, 
and exploitation of children.57 The criminalisation of slavery has been a norm 
of customary international law since Article 8 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights asserted the rights of individuals not to be exploited 
in degrading acts of slavery.58  
Islamic international law, as part of Islamic law, insists on the principle of 
equality between people. This can be understood from the following Quranic 
verse: ‘O you mankind, surely we created you of a male and a female, and we 
have made you races and tribes that you may get mutually acquainted. Surely 
the most honourable among you in the Providence of Allah are the most pious; 
surely Allah is ever-knowing, ever-cognizant.’59 According to Malekian, this 
verse indicates the following: a) that there is no discrimination between female 
and male; and b) that there is no discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, or colour, meaning that all mankind are equal in dignity.60 
Thus, the equality principle is not limited to Muslim people but covers all 
mankind. This Quranic verse does not place any weight on specific places or 
locations, and does not place specific weight on certain nationalities.61  
In the beginnings of Islam, enslavement was not prohibited and was fairly 
commonplace in the Peninsula.62 At this time, Islamic law did not prohibit 
enslavement but neither did any other region in the world because, during 
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these times, slavery was an economic tool widely used by many different 
cultures and religions.63 However, as time went by, Islamic jurists began to 
promote the teachings of the Prophet in the context of the principles of equality 
and freedom for enslaved people.64 An enslaved man or woman was treated 
as equal to non-slaves in terms of their rights to receive food, shelter, and 
clothes, and was equal to non-slaves under early Islamic law. 65  In early 
Islamic law and in early international law, no agreements or treaties existed 
that prevented enslavement. Indeed, the first international convention to do 
this was the Convention on Slavery in 1926.66  
The Quran and Sunnah do not give any direct teachings that permit slavery, 
but there is also no specific advice about abolishing it. However, the sources 
of Islamic law encourage manumission. This approach is outlined in the 
Quranic verse that includes ‘It is the freeing of a slave.’67 Furthermore, freeing 
slaves has been recommended by successive jurists of Islamic law.68 Current 
Muslim scholars such as Malekian and An-Nam have discussed Quranic 
verses that relate to slavery and the recommended practices of the 
companions of the Prophet. It is the view of some jurists of Islamic law that 
abolishing slavery is indeed alluded to in Islamic law.69 However, scholars also 
explain that attitudes to slavery cannot be ‘solved radically in isolation of the 
prevailing social circumstances of that period'.70 The ratification of the Slavery 
Convention by some Muslim countries could also be classed as a consensus, 
ijmá‘, to prevent slavery. Some Muslim countries also prohibit slavery in their 
domestic laws and in their commitment to international law.71 
Enslavement is recognised in the Declaration of Human Rights (1948) in 
Article 4, which reads, ‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery 
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first established, some Muslims decided to release enslaved people. 73 
Moreover, The Prophet said, ‘There are three categories of people against 
whom I shall myself be a Plaintiff on the Day of Judgement … a man who sold 
a free person as a slave and appropriated his price, and a man who employed 
a worker and had him do the assigned work then failed to pay him his 
wages.’74 The Prophet also commended Muslim soldiers who fought in the 
battle of Badr for releasing those who had been captured during the battle 
without taking any ransom. In the context of Islamic law, these actions are 
generally read as grounds for abolishing slavery.75  
Fifteen Muslim states have ratified the Convention on Slavery. Thus, they 
must comply with the provisions of the Convention according to the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, which is an inherent principle in Islamic international 
law and is implied in the Quran as follows: ‘O you who have believed, fulfil [all] 
contracts.’76 
 
6.3.3 Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Individuals and a Population  
Deportation is described by the Rome Statute as the ‘forced displacement of 
the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in 
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international 
law'.77 This happened in 1995 when more than 20,000 Muslim civilians in 
Bosnia were transferred from their home. 78  The criminal conduct of 
deportation must be practised forcibly in order to be within the Court’s 
jurisdiction of crimes against humanity. According to Article 7(1)(d) of the 
Elements of Crimes, this criminal conduct may include threats, coercion, 
oppression, and physical force against persons. If those who are subjugated 
to violence in their own country decide to leave their own country voluntary, 
this may not constitute enforced displacement. 79  The transfer of persons 
forcibly or by coercion, without any grounds laid out in international law, to 
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another area, whether this is to another state or to another location, 
constitutes a crime against humanity.80 Thus, international law is designed to 
prevent states from transferring persons by force or by expulsion.  
There are some exceptional circumstances mentioned in Article 49 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention in this regard. This Article provides that it is 
permissible to evacuate persons in whole or in part for ‘the security of the 
civilians involved or [if] imperative military reasons so demand.’81 Ambos and 
Wirth talk about these circumstances in relation to crimes against humanity 
and enforced transfer or deportation.82  The main aim of using the terms 
‘deportation’ and ‘forcible transfer’ is to prevent the enforced displacement of 
persons from their land, or from an area in which a population are lawfully 
present, on the grounds of ethnic cleansing.83  
In Islamic international law, one of the most significant rights of an individual 
is the right to live in the place where that person was born, or where they 
prefer to live, and this right is connected to the right to freedom of movement.84 
Thus, placing restrictions upon a person or enforcing them to leave the place 
they lawfully live in, or belong to, goes against the right to freedom of 
movement. Islamic international law places these rights in a global context. 
Moreover, they must be applied at all times, whether in times of war or peace, 
and apply to Muslims and non-Muslims.85  
Islamic schools of thought deem that ‘the non-Muslim citizen of the State shall 
have, according to the law, complete freedom of religion and worship, mode 
of life, culture and religious education … [and] they shall be entitled to have 
all their matters concerning personal law administered in accordance with their 
own religious codes, usages and customs'.86 The main aim behind this rule is 
to maintain security and peace in communities, which affects international 
peace and security. In Islamic international law, this rule is based on the 
prohibition of deportation and/or enforced transfer. This is because the 
inhumane act of deportation or the transfer of individuals violates the rights of 
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persons to live and their freedom of movement according to the following 
Quranic verse: ‘It is He who made the earth tame for you - so walk among its 
slopes and eat of His provision - and to Him is the resurrection.’87 This rule is 
also in place because practising these inhumane acts specifically violates the 
duty of a Muslim state to protect its population, and since the state is 
responsible for the security and peace of individuals, this cannot be achieved 
by means of deportation and enforced transfer. According to Al-Maududi: ‘the 
citizen [within a state] shall be assured within the limits of the law, of full 
security of life, property and honour, freedom of religion … freedom of 
movement, freedom of association, freedom of occupation, equality of 
opportunity and the right to benefit from public services.’88  
Although the terms of deportation or the enforced transfer of individuals are 
not explicitly mentioned in Islamic international law, they can be implicitly 
understood as constituting inhumane acts that violate the rights of life and the 
freedom of movement. However, Islamic international law outlines exceptional 
circumstances where deportation or enforced transfer can be applied. If the 
right of an individual or individuals to live or their freedom of movement in a 
certain manner is threatened, a state is allowed to deport or transfer an 
individual or individuals to a safe place to protect its population.89 These 
exceptional circumstances in Islamic international law are similar to the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention (IV) Article 49, which reads, ‘The 
Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to 
the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to 
receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory 
conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the 
same family are not separated.’ 
 
6.3.4 Enforced Disappearance, Unlawful Imprisonment, and Persecution  
Enforced disappearance is classed as a crime against humanity in the Rome 
Statute. It is also prohibited and criminalised in the Convention on the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992).90 Article 6 of 
this convention outlines the situations under which enforced disappearance 
can happen as follows.   
 
87
 The Quran 67:15. 
88
 Abul A’la Maududi (n 86).  
89 Malekian (n 39) 113. 
90 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992) 
Proclaimed by the General Assembly, Resolution 47/133, A/RES/47/133, 18 December 1992. 
- 228 - 
a) No order or instruction of any public authority, civilian, military, or other, 
may be invoked to justify an enforced disappearance. Any person receiving 
such an order or instruction shall have the right and duty not to obey it. 
 
b) Each state shall ensure that orders or instructions directing, authorising, or 
encouraging any enforced disappearance are prohibited. 
 
c) The training of law enforcement officials shall emphasise the provisions in 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article. 
 
Enforced disappearance refers to ‘arresting, abducting, detaining a person 
with knowledge that a refusal to knowledge or give information would be likely 
to follow in the ordinary course of events'.91  
Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute prohibits and punishes the enforced 
disappearance of individuals and includes the following. 
The detention or arrest or abduction of individuals by, or with the 
authorisation, support or acquiescence of a state or public organisation, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom, or to give 
information on the fate or whereabouts of those individuals, with the 
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged 
period of time.92  
According to Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute, unlawful imprisonment or 
other severe deprivation of physical liberty is in violation of the fundamental 
rules of international law and so constitutes a crime against humanity. Article 
9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that every 
person must enjoy his liberty and security and that 'no one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established 
by law.’93 This may provide that states shall take into account this right and 
enact domestic laws to be compatible with the mentioned Article. Moreover, it 
may provide the meaning of deprived liberty, which includes confinement, 
detention, or other severe deprivation. Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights provides an explanation of the meaning of lawful detention 
as follows. 
(a) The lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court. 
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(b) The lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law. 
(c) The lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of 
having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary 
to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so. 
(d) The detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority. 
(e) The lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, 
or vagrants. 
(f) The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
Thus, the lawful arrest, or lawful confinement or extradition, of a person does 
not constitute a crime against humanity. 94  Consequently, according to 
scholars, ‘it is clear that only the liberty of physical movement is covered’ as 
follows. 95  
a) Committed intentionally with the knowledge of the perpetrator. 
b) Committed together with another crime against humanity that ‘serves the 
sole purpose of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to forms of persecution which 
are of an elevated objective dangerousness'.96  
c) To constitute a breach of fundamental rights as stipulated in international 
law.  
d) To cause severe deprivation.  
e) Involve the discrimination of identifiable people collectively.97   
f) Discrimination must be based on politics, religion, culture, ethnicity, 
nationality, or gender.98  
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g) Conduct must be committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population'.99  
 
Persecution is defined under the Rome Statute in Article 7(2)(g) as ‘the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectively'. 
However, some scholars argue that it is wrong to imply that persecution can 
only be committed against a civilian population because military personnel 
can also be persecuted during internal and external conflict, especially 
combatants who lay down their arms.100   
In Islamic international law, unlawful imprisonment and enforced 
disappearance of individuals are classed as crimes against mankind because 
these crimes work against the rights of individuals as outlined in Islamic law. 
Islamic criminal law outlines the principle of freedom for individuals, and 
unlawful imprisonment and the enforced disappearance of individuals goes 
against such rights of freedom. 101  This principle is not limited to Muslim 
persons but is applied to all people, without discrimination, whatever their 
ethnicity, religion, race, nationality, or colour.102 The Quran states, ‘There shall 
be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become 
clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah 
has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is 
Hearing and Knowing.’103 This principle is also emphasised by the Prophet in 
his Farewell Sermon, when he asserts that all mankind are equal and no 
wrongful acts against people's rights can be acceptable.104  
Another important principle in Islamic international law relating to the unlawful 
imprisonment and disappearance of individuals is the principle of integrity. The 
principle of integrity must be applied and respected by people in society and 
the authorities of a state in all aspects of law, whether civil or criminal.105 The 
violation of this principle from any perspective, namely social or state, 
constitutes a crime against the right of integrity. Furthermore, unlawful 
imprisonment and the enforced disappearance of individuals work against the 
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principles of the legal process to protect lives and the freedom of individuals. 
This principle prohibits unlawful imprisonment carried out without a legal 
presence, which can result in an unfair trial. This is understood from the 
Quranic verse which reads, ‘And do not kill the soul which Allah has forbidden 
[to be killed] except by [legal] right. This has He instructed you that you may 
use reason.’106  
In addition, based on the principle of equality before the law, Islamic criminal 
jurisdiction aims for everyone to enjoy similar protections from abuse and 
arbitrary confinement. This confirms the principles of the rule of law, which 
states that any act that works against the law, such as placing an individual 
into, or removing him from, society for a long period of time, or keeping him in 
a place that prevents him from practising his freedoms, is a prohibited and 
criminalised act. 107  The Prophet speaks about the matter of placing an 
innocent person in prison without legal process when he says, ‘no obedience 
[shall be done] to any creature in disobedience to the Creator.’ 108  This 
principle deems that an official person who works in state authority can refuse 
the demands of its authority if such demands contradict the sources of Islamic 
law. Thus, in Islamic criminal law, individuals enjoy protections in connection 
with justice and a public trial.109 Islamic jurisdiction goes further to administer 
a judicial procedures approach by a competent court because ‘a legal order 
[is] imposed on individuals and courts to take accurate decisions concerning 
legal remedies and not to violate the principle of justice'.110 Thus, no one can 
be deprived, be made to disappear, or can be punished by any charge except 
by the law, which gives him or her full opportunity for a defence.111 Islamic 
jurisprudence recognises persecution, whether this is religious, social, moral, 
gendered, cultural, economic, or political, as a crime against the rights of a 
person to life in a save environment without any discrimination. Such 
jurisprudence offers the right of freedom, the right of integrity, the right of 
equality, and the right to justice. These rights are mentioned in the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights, Part II, which reads as follows. 
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Each State Party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its Jurisdiction the right to enjoy 
all the rights and freedoms recognised herein, without any distinction on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status and without any 
discrimination between men and women.  
The Charter emphasises that ‘each state party’ and ‘all individuals’ and ‘all 
rights’ are inherent in Islamic law, which shall be applied for all individuals 
without any discrimination. The term ‘each state’ indicates that any Muslim or 
Arab country that is a party to the Charter must comply with the rights 
mentioned in the Charter, including all rights inherent in Islamic law. This also 
indicates that a state party must provide protection for these rights, and if the 
state violates these rights, it will be responsible for the breach. The term ‘all 
rights’ could mean that all rights mentioned in the preamble/provisions of the 
Charter are obligatory and must be protected by state parties. The term ‘all 
individuals’ indicates that all individuals should enjoy their rights without any 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, race, nationality, language, 
colour, or gender. This may confirm that the persecution could be committed 
by a competent person representing the state or by state authorities.  
Article 20 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) prohibits 
any physical or psychological humiliation of individuals. The Article reads as 
follows. 
It is not permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or 
restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish him. It is not permitted to subject 
him to physical or psychological torture or to any form of maltreatment, 
cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an individual to medical or 
scientific experiments without his consent or at the risk of his health or of 
his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would 
provide executive authority for such action. 
Bassiouni notes that prohibition of the persecution of human beings is 
mentioned in the main sources of Islamic law and in 299 Quranic verses.112 
However, some practices conducted by some Muslim states violate this 
principle of Islamic law, and so constitute crimes against individuals, because 
these actions violate human rights. These practices should not reflect and 
should not create a general antithesis to the main principles of Islamic law that 
maintain the rights of individuals. This is affirmed by The International 
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Commission of Jurists when it states that ‘It is unfair to judge Islamic law 
(Sharí‘ah) by the political systems which prevailed in various periods of Islamic 
history. It ought to be judged by the general principles which are derived from 
its sources.’113 
6.3.5 Torture 
Torture, whether mental or physical, is prohibited under many international 
conventions.114 These conventions include The Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishment (1984).115 
This Convention states that torture must be committed by ‘a person acting in 
an official capacity to extract information or confession'. 116  Furthermore, 
Article 16 of this Convention prohibits states from committing torture or any 
type of inhumane act. This could mean that states must establish domestic 
laws to prevent torture or make sure that its domestic criminal legal system 
prohibits torture by using other effective measures.117  
Bassiouni and Daniel maintain that ‘no political system in any part of the globe 
is necessarily immune from the practice of torture, because overall 
circumstances may change, and the adoption of torture is based on perceived 
expedience'. 118  However, Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute states that 
official capacity in torture is not required in order for torture to qualify as a 
crime against humanity.119 Broadly, it requires the victim to be under the 
control of the perpetrator and in custody, which is not synonymous with 
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imprisonment.120 Thus, no specific state circumstances are required for the 
crime against humanity that is torture, and no specific purpose is required.121 
However, if the purpose to inflict harm is legal, namely within the scope of 
jurisprudence and a fair trial, then the purpose does not count as a crime 
against humanity. 122  This is mentioned in Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states this in the following terms. 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.123  
Furthermore, the words of the Rome Statute are explicit in its description of 
torture as ‘the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, upon a person in custody or under the control of the accused; 
except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions.’124 This definition may hint that the crime 
of torture must be committed by a state or by its authorities.125 
Torture is also prohibited under the following treaties and conventions: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,126 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,127 the American Convention against Torture,128 and the 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 129  These international 
conventions aim to protect mankind from outrageous crimes and to protect the 
integrity of individuals not to be violated. However, these international 
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conventions mainly focus on preventing states from committing crimes and on 
respecting human rights. In slight contrast, the Rome Statute focuses on the 
perpetrators who have committed these crimes and on criminal responsibility, 
whether or not the perpetrators officially represent state authority.130 Thus, 
one feature of the Rome Statute is that the Court does not require the specific 
purpose element that distinguishes between inhumane treatment and 
torture.131  
Islamic international law does not provide a list of prohibited acts that 
constitute torture. However, Islamic criminal law prohibits torture, since torture 
can result in death or serious injury to a person.132 Because the aim of torture 
is to obtain a confession or information, in Islamic jurisprudence any 
information extracted in this way is not thought of as reliable, because the 
mind of the victim may not be functioning properly, and the victim may offer 
any information just to receive a break from torture.133 In Islamic criminal law, 
torture is defined ‘as the enforcement of unlawful and immoral measures by 
force which are not acceptable in Islamic theory and are against the spiritual 
dignity of the victim or accused as they are imposed by physical or 
psychological force'.134  
Islamic criminal law places emphasis on respect and dignity for the individual, 
and so any act that violates the dignity of an individual is prohibited, whether 
this is carried out by individuals or states. Article 8 of the Arab Charter of 
Human Rights stipulates that ‘no one shall be subjected to physical or 
psychological torture to cruel, degrading, humiliating, or inhuman 
treatment'.135 Islamic jurisprudence can make use of the facility of an oath. An 
oath can be taken from the accused or witnesses when acquiring information. 
An oath can be used as a final resort if there is a lack of evidence. However, 
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if there is evidence, an oath cannot be applied.136 The prohibition of torture in 
Islamic criminal law is applied at all levels, namely it is not allowed at the arrest 
stage, at the pre-trial stage, at the trial stage, in prison, in custody, or after a 
court verdict is issued, even if the accused is found guilty.  
 
6.3.6 Sexual Violence, Rape, Sexual Slavery, Enforced Prostitution, 
Enforced Sterilisation, and Forced Pregnancy  
In the Rome Statute, forced pregnancy, rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, and enforced sterilisation constitute crimes against humanity. 
These crimes have also been noted in previous international tribunals at the 
ICTY and at the ICTR.137 The Elements of Crimes in ICC Article 7(1)(g)-1 
defines sexual violence as a crime if ‘the perpetrator invaded the body of a 
person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the 
body of the victim, or by the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or 
genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body'. 
This explanation covers the following: a) all ages of persons; b) it requires the 
absence of the invaded person’s approval; and c) the sexual violence must be 
committed physically. 
The Elements of Crimes in the ICC Statute Article 7(1)(g) gives the meaning 
of sexual slavery as when ‘the perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons'. The 
perpetrator’s acts must also have been carried out in the following 
circumstances.  
a) The sexual acts must have been committed by the perpetrator against a 
person or more than one person, or by imposing on a person or more than 
one person to engage in sexual acts that involve inhumane behaviour such as 
‘bartering, or the deprivation of liberty'.  
b) The act of sexual slavery must be committed ‘as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population'. 
c) The perpetrator must know that his or her conduct constitutes ‘part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population'.138  
The Rome Statute does not only hold to account the doer of the criminal act, 
but also the person who imposes or commands sexual violence by any 
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means, whether by abduction or imposing constraints that facilitate the 
criminal act.139  
Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute affirms that enforced prostitution 
constitutes a crime against humanity. The Rome Statute classes this as a 
crime against humanity if it is committed in non-international or international 
conflict. Furthermore, enforced prostitution must be committed in ‘a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population'.140  
The Elements of Crimes in the Rome Statute Article7(1)(g)-3 deems that 
enforced prostitution is classed as a crime against humanity in the following 
circumstances.  
1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts 
of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, or 
abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ 
incapacity to give genuine consent. 
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary 
or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual 
nature. 
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population. 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct 
to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.141 
Forced pregnancy is also classed as a crime against humanity according to 
Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute. For enforced pregnancy to constitute a 
crime against humanity, it must encompass: a) the illegal confinement of a 
woman; b) being made pregnant by force; and c) must affect the ethnic 
composition of any population and be carried out with other grave violations 
of international law. This applies to one woman or more than one woman, if 
the acts are carried out because of widespread or systematic conduct with 
intent and knowledge.142 Furthermore, the Article states that these provisions 
‘shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
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pregnancy'.143 The latter may explain why legal abortion is accepted in some 
domestic jurisdictions and is not classed as a crime against humanity.144  
To be recognised as enforced sterilisation the actions of the perpetrator ‘must 
deprive one person or more than one person of biologically reproductive 
capacity’ with the knowledge and intent of the perpetrator. Furthermore, the 
acts of the perpetrator must be ‘part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population'.145 In addition, the consent of the person 
is not recognised even if it was genuine consent, and acts include the medical 
treatment of the person that is carried out in hospital or ‘birth-control measures 
which have a non-permanent effect in practice’.146 
Sexual crimes such as enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, rape, enforced 
sterilisation, and forced pregnancy, attack an individual’s integrity, honour, 
and freedom.147 Thus, under Islamic criminal law they are crimes against Allah 
and the rights of individuals regardless of whether they are committed in war 
or peacetime.148 The crime of adultery (ziná’) is prohibited and punishable by 
divine law without any discrimination between whether this is committed 
during war or peacetime.149 Thus, the basic difference between the two legal 
systems is that these crimes do not only constitute crimes against humanity 
in Islamic law, but also crimes against Allah and the rights of individuals. 
Islamic criminal law prohibits adultery, defamation, and sodomy. These are 
dealt with by the punishments of ḥudúd (divine law). This means that Muslim 
countries or jurists should criminalise all mechanisms that assist the spread of 
sexual crimes, including enforced prostitution or forced pregnancy.  
Jurists of Islamic criminal law deem that acts that go against the rights of 
individuals in its jurisdiction constitute crimes against the rights of those 
people.150 Thus, sexual violence, adultery, and fornication are forbidden under 
Islamic criminal law, and punishments in respect of these issues are set out 
in divine law. 151  However, Islamic international law does not distinguish 
between committing adultery and fornication against women who are captive 
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or who are civilians of a state in conflict, or citizens of a Muslim state.152 The 
prescribed punishment is death for the married person and whipping for a non-
married person.153 The female victim shall also receive ‘bride-money’ that is 
similar in amount to any received by her nearest female relatives upon 
marriage.154 However, Islamic criminal law deems that rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, and enforced sterilisation are separate types of criminal 
conduct.155 This is because rape is a crime that is linked to adultery. The rape 
offender is punished under the terms of ta‘zír if he does not commit adultery, 
while an adultery offender is subject to the divine law punishment as explained 
above.156   
Enforced prostitution and forced sterilisation are crimes that are subject to 
ta‘zír punishments. However, the question of forced pregnancy was debated 
at the Rome Conference because some Muslim countries reject the inclusion 
of the term ‘forced pregnancy' as it is written in the provisions of the Statute, 
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practised in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts 
committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one 
racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and 
systematically oppressing them'.161 
Apartheid is classed as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute, 
and is classed as an inhumane act of a character similar to other acts referred 
to in Paragraph 1 of Article 7. The paragraph provides that ‘for the purpose of 
this Statute, crimes against humanity means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack'. The crime of apartheid must 
be committed in the context of systematic oppression and domination by one 
racial group over another racial group with intent. 162  Acts of apartheid 
comprise inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in 
Paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalised regime of 
systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other 
racial group or groups, and committed with the intention of maintaining that 
regime.’163 
Islamic international law does not include the term ‘apartheid’ in its sources. 
However, Islamic criminal law provides a broad scope for prohibiting the crime 
of apartheid. This is because Islamic criminal law prevents and prohibits every 
type of discrimination whether is practised against one person or a group of 
persons. This highlights a point of difference between international criminal 
law and Islamic international law. International criminal law requires that the 
crime of apartheid is practised against ‘a group of individuals’.164 The basis for 
prohibiting apartheid in Islamic criminal law is the principle of equality between 
mankind according to the following Quranic verse: ‘Surely we have accorded 
dignity to the sons of Adam.’165  In addition, Islamic criminal law has the 
general aim of promoting the rights of mankind in all communities and in all 
locations so that everyone can enjoy an equal standard of life.166 In order to 
achieve this aim, it is necessary to prohibit and criminalise acts that lead to 
breaching the rights of mankind. Thus, acts committed by one or more than 
one perpetrator against one person or a group of people are prohibited under 
Islamic criminal law, since those acts constitute the crimes of apartheid, which 
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violates the principles of equality. This means that acts such as discriminating 
on religious, racial, national, ethical, language, and colour grounds are 
prohibited.  
6.3.8 Other Inhumane Acts of Similar Gravity 
The Rome Statute goes further in prohibiting inhumane acts in the form of 
crimes against humanity in Article 7 (1)(k). This Article talks about ‘other 
inhumane acts of a similar character, intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health'. This brings us to how 
the Statute defines ‘crimes against humanity’ and its use of the words ‘any’ 
and ‘when’ in defining its terms. ‘Any’ could refer to the type of prohibited act 
and the location of the crime. The word ‘when’ could refer to the time the 
prohibited act happened. This leads to an extension of the jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute to prosecute other inhumane acts that are not mentioned in 
Article 7. Article 7(1)(k) has been interpreted by Cassese as follows: ‘In spite 
of its relatively loose character, which has been rightly narrowed down by case 
law, the rule is important, for it may function as a residual clause covering and 
criminalising instances of inhumane behaviour that do not neatly fall into any 
of the other existing categories of crimes against humanity, [therefore] it can 
cover acts of terrorism not falling under the sub-category of murder [or] 
torture.’167 He explains that the positive point of adding the phrase ‘other 
inhumane acts of a similar gravity’ is that ‘the more specific and complete a 
list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes’. Moreover, negative points 
include an exhaustive enumeration of individual criminal acts that ‘would 
merely create opportunities for evasion of the letter of the prohibition'.168 Thus, 
there are some features of Article 7 of the Rome Statute that provide no 
connection to armed conflict. This can be covered with other international 
conventions such as the Control Council Law No. 10 and the Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity. 169  Article 7 also provides no discriminatory element. This is 
because including this element may place an unnecessary burden on the 
Prosecutor of the Court; thus, the discriminatory element is required for the 
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6.4 Conclusion  
The Rome Statute and Islamic international law/Islamic criminal law prohibit 
inhumane acts in times of conflict and peace. The Rome Statute explains that 
crimes against humanity must be committed in the following circumstances: 
a) they must be part of an attack; b) they must be widespread; and c) they 
must be systematic. Under these terms, crimes against humanity do not 
include imprisonment because this is mostly undertaken by the arrest and 
detention of individuals with or without due process. Inclusion of the term 
‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ is the main difference between both legal 
systems. According to the Statute, these terms are used in order to prevent 
states or state officials committing inhumane acts. Crimes that fit the terms 
‘systematic’ and ‘widespread’ were committed by officials who had power in 
the governments of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Timor. The 
authors of the Statute emphasise these terms. The terms are used as 
guidance for the Court, namely the jurisdiction of the Court will examine 
alleged crimes in its jurisdiction if the crimes are committed with widespread 
or systematic attack. Thus, it may be appropriate to add the phrase ‘whether 
or not’ before ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’. However, the prosecution may fail 
if crimes were not widespread or systematic. It seems to be that the provisions 
of the Rome Statute are result-orientated in favour of states, while Islamic law 
considers both the individual and the state.  
Although Islamic international law may not rely on modern criminal terms that 
exist in the Rome Statute, it covers the rights of individuals, which must be 
respected and not violated. In addition, if these rights are violated, and when 
the crimes cannot be categorised under ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ, Islamic criminal law 
looks to the decisions of Muslim jurists and Muslim states, and considers the 
public interest of Muslim nations at an international and/or national level. 
However, there could be compatibility between international criminal law and 
Islamic international law in terms of criminalising and punishing crimes against 
humanity because both legal systems look to prohibit acts that violate 
fundamental human rights. However, although the Rome Statute includes a 
definition of crimes and describes elements of the crimes, Islamic criminal law 
prohibits crimes that violate inherent human rights, and leaves some 
punishments that are not mentioned in the main sources of Islamic law (ḥudúd 
or qiṣáṣ)171 to the discretion of jurists and/or to a Muslim state to set up 
definitions, elements, and punishments. In future, it may be necessary to 
codify crimes against humanity in Islamic international law. For instance, the 
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international community has taken a proactive step to prohibit slavery, which 
is now a crime against humanity. In Islamic jurisprudence, there are still 
divergent views among jurists despite the ratification and signature by many 
Muslim countries of the International Convention on Slavery. This goal may 
be achieved using consensus, which is one of the sources of Islamic law.     
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Chapter Seven 
The Crime of Genocide 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Genocide is the most heinous international crime because the perpetrators 
aim to confiscate the right to life of a group of people.1 It is prohibited under 
international law by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide 1948.2 The Genocide Convention was introduced by the 
international community not just for member states but for all states because 
prevention is an integral part of customary international law.3 Genocide was 
described at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as the 
‘crime of crimes'.4 However, there is a debate among academics about the 
precise definition of the term genocide. Going forward, this study will use the 
definition of genocide as it is used in the International Convention of Genocide 
(1948) and reiterated in the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR and in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC.5  
On 11th December 1946, the international community unanimously voted to 
pass The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (the Genocide Convention).6 This Convention defines genocide as 
 
1 Kai Ambos, ‘What Does “Intent to Destroy” in Genocide Mean?’ (2009) 91 International 
Review of the Red Cross Volume 91 Number 876, 833. Ambos states that ‘genocide is a 
crime with a double mental element'.  
2
 The Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin coined the word ‘genocide’ in his work Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe (1944). He derived the word by combining the Greek word ‘genos’ which 
means ‘race’ with the Latin word ‘cide’ which means ‘killing’, as quoted from Lawrence 
Leblanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Duke University Press 1991) 17; 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
(1948) came into force (1951) (the Genocide Convention) Article I ; Robert Cryer (ed), An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 2007) 165; Florian 
Jessberger, ‘The Definition and The Elements of The Crimes of Genocide’ in Paola Gaeta, 
The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2009) 88. 
3
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), Advisory Opinion Reservations to the Convention 
on Genocide (28 May 1951) as cited in Yuval Shany (ed) ‘The Road to The Genocide 
Convention and Beyond’ in Paola Gaeta (ed) The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 15.  
4 Prosecutor v Kambanda, (ICTR 97-23-S) (Judgment 4 September 1998), (16). Winston 
Churchill, who was the Prime Minister of the UK from 1940 to 1945, describes genocide as 
the ‘crime of crimes’. See William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of 
Crimes (Cambridge University Press 2009).  
5 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) entered into force in July (2002) 
UNTS 2187 (the Rome Statute) Article 21; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); Adam Jones, Genocide: 
A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd edn, London, Routledge 2011); May Larry, Genocide: A 
Normative Account (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
6 General Assembly Res. 96 (1) (11 December 1946) 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm> accessed 10 February 2019. 
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‘a denial of the right to existence of an entire human group'.7 Article II of the 
Convention defines the mental element (mens rea) and physical element 
(actus rea) of the crime of genocide. It stipulates that ‘genocide means any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. The categories are a) killing 
members of a group of people; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to a 
group of people; c) deliberately inflicting on a group of people conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group of people; and 
e) forcibly transferring children of a group of people. 
Islamic international law does not explicitly refer to the term ‘genocide’, but 
prohibits killing one person or a group of people. This is because it focuses on 
the rights to life and existence.8 This is based on the following Quranic verse: 
‘… whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or corruption [done] in the land – it is 
as if he had slain mankind entirely.’ 9  Bassiouni notes that Islamic law 
‘contains both general prohibitions against killing and harming others, and 
protection for specific persons and places'.10  The main point here is that 
people must be allowed to enjoy their rights to life and existence regardless 
of their ethnic, religious, racial, and national identity. Thus, difficulties can arise 
when trying to compare the definition of the crime of genocide as it is used in 
international criminal law, and how genocide is dealt with in Islamic 
international law. This is because the former uses specific legal terms to 
define crimes committed with specific intention, while Islamic international law 
provides more general prohibitions relating to the killing of innocent people 
and causing harm whether mental or physical. However, carrying out a 
comparative approach here can be undertaken by looking at the prohibition of 
the entire prohibited physical acts in Islamic international law as mentioned in 
the Genocide Convention as well as the underlying reasons of committing 
such a crime, namely discrimination against a group of people in whole or in 
part. 
This chapter aims to examine compatibilities and incompatibilities between 
international criminal law and Islamic international law in terms of the 





This refers to the term ‘killing’ as it is used in the Genocide Convention and as proposed by 
Saudi Arabia; UN Doc. A/C.6/86, as cited in William Schabas, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law (4th edn. Cambridge 2014) 157. 
9 The Quran 5:32 
10 
M Cherif Bassiouni, The Shari'a and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace, 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 175. 
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people; the underlying reasons behind committing these crimes; and the 
criminalisation of acts mentioned in international criminal law against a group 
of people, whether in whole or in a part.  
From this point of view, the prohibition in Islamic international law is primarily 
based on Quranic verses and the words of the Prophet Mohammed as 
recalled in the Hadiths. These sources are interpreted according to Islamic 
jurisprudence and the views of Islamic jurists. Islamic international law 
provides rights for people to life and existence, whatever the group they 
belong to, using the equality principle. 
 
7.2 The Element of Intent (Mens Rea)11 
7.2.1 International Criminal Law 
Intent to commit genocide is expressly dealt with in the preamble of Article II 
of the Genocide Convention, which reads, ‘Genocide means any acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group.’ This statement reveals that intent to commit genocide 
requires ‘special intent’ to destroy a group of people ‘in whole or in part’ and 
knowledge of the act of doing so.12 Committing violent acts without specific 
intent to destroy a group of people does not constitute genocide.13 An example 
of this is when the United Nations appointed a panel led by Antonio Cassese 
to discuss the Darfur crisis. Cassese found that ‘Sudanese government forces 
and militias were responsible for mass killings, torture, rapes, and forced 
displacement of civilians, but not genocide due to a lack of intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such'.14   
 
11 This part of the study explores the debate between scholars regarding intent. However, the 
views presented are a guide, and the context of the study does not explore the actual debates 
because the scope of the study is about the compatibility and incompatibility between 
international criminal law and Islamic international law; thus, it is not appropriate to extend the 
scope of the study.   
12 Schabas (n 4). There has been significant discussion among scholars working in the field 
of international criminal law about the meaning of ‘as such’ and the meanings of ‘in whole’ 
and ‘in part’ as worded in the Genocide Convention. See Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta 
International Criminal Law (3rd edn, Oxford 2013).   
13 Schabas (n 4) 102. 
14 The UN Report says that the element of intent could have been missing. It is stated that 
although the Sudanese forces committed indiscriminate attacks against groups of black 
African tribes, it refrained from killing or attacking groups that did not flee. Thus, the 
Commission ruled that for the crimes committed in Darfur to be classed as genocide, the 
circumstances must include 'beyond a reasonable doubt' within the intent to commit genocide. 
Thus, in this case, it was shown that the element of intent could have been missing. See also 
Samuel Totten, ‘The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: New and Disturbing 
Findings’ (2009) International Association of Genocide Scholars 354; see also Michael J Kelly, 
‘The Debate Over Genocide in Darfur, Sudan’ (2011) 18 U.C. Davis Journal of International 
Law & Policy 205. 
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Another recent example can be found in the Report of the Independent 
International Fact-finding Mission on Myanmar in its Thirty-ninth Session 
September 2018, which states that ‘The Rohingya is a protected group under 
[the definition of genocide convention]'. The Rohingya's treatment by the 
Myanmar security forces, acting in concert with certain civilians, includes 
conduct that amounts to four of the five defined prohibited acts as follows: a) 
killing; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm; c) inflicting conditions of life 
calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group in whole or in 
part; and, d) imposing measures intending to prevent births.15 This is because 
the Myanmar forces intended to change the 'demographic composition of 
Rakhine State. The intent included an oppressive context to destroy those 
minorities on religious and ethnical grounds.’16 
In respect of the element of intent, there are two sides of the debate. The first 
deems that if there is destruction of a group of people in whole or in part, and 
the perpetrator did not intend to destroy, then he or she could be liable to be 
prosecuted for genocide in terms of aiding or abetting.17 This view considers 
that the intent to commit genocide is based on a ‘purpose-based approach’.18 
The second view is based on the meaning of intent for genocide as ‘a 
knowledge-based approach’, which identifies intent when the perpetrator has 
knowledge, or has reason to know, that the special intent of the genocide 
crime has arisen.19 Thus, the 'knowledge-based approach' deems that the 
actual offender is liable for complicity even if the accomplice did not intend a 
genocidal act.20  
The element of intent for committing the crime of genocide must encompass 
both a) special intent and b) knowledge. 21  Special intent means that the 
accused must have understand the surrounding circumstances of the 
situation, and have been aware of the consequences of his or her act and 
what would have occurred in an ordinary situation.22 ‘Knowledge’ is classed 
as a main element of the principle of ‘intent’. It means that the perpetrator must 
have knowledge of the ‘scope of committing genocide crimes mostly planned 
 
15 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/39/64, 
12 September 2018 <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-
Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf> accessed 10 February 2019, 16. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Prosecutor v Krstic (Appeal Chamber Judgment 134) (19 April 2004). 
18 Jessberger (n 2) 105. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For more information, see Elies van Sliedregt, 'Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to 
Convicting Individuals for Genocide' (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 184. 
21 Prosecutor v Akayesu, (ICTR-96-4-T) (Judgment 25 September 1998) (524). 
22 The Genocide Convention Article 2; The Rome Statute Article 30. 
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or organised by the state or by individuals who are associated with the state'.23 
This is based on the ruling issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in the Kayishema and Ruzindana cases when the Tribunal wrote that 
‘the existence of such a plan would be strong evidence of the specific intent 
requirement for the crime of genocide'.24  
The intent, as it is referred to in the Genocide Convention, means ‘a specific 
intent’ or ‘a precise description of the intent’.25 This means that the prosecutor 
shall seek reasons beyond the intent of the accused that he or she, with 
awareness, engaged in the criminal conduct of a genocidal act to cause the 
consequences of the criminal act.26  Based on the comments of the Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Akayesu 
case, special intent means when ‘the intent of a crime is the specific intention, 
required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the 
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged’. 27  Another factor 
associated with specific intent as it relates to genocide is ‘to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'. The Elements of the 
Crimes of the Rome Statute explains that the meaning of ‘destroy’ is when 
‘the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct 
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such 
destruction'. 28  The International Law Commission also describes the 
meaning of ‘destroy’ as ‘the material destruction of a group either by physical 
or by biological means'.29  
Genocide mostly occurs ‘with the specific intent to destroy a number of a 
relevant group'.30 Hence, genocide in this sense could mean that killing a few 
people on the basis of their national, ethnic, racial or religious status may not 
constitute a crime of genocide unless there is evidence that the act ‘was the 
first of a series of acts amid the destruction of an entire group'.31 Schabas 
argues that the size of the group or the number of victims is not relevant in 
respect of the crime of genocide.32 Thus, the principle of ‘intent’ is a specific 
 
23 Schabas (n 4) 207. 
24 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, (ICTR-95-1-T) (Judgment, 21 May 1999) (94). 
25 Schabas (n 4) 214. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 21) (497). 
28 The Elements of the Genocide Crime in the Rome Statute Article 6(a). 
29 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-first session 
UN Doc.A/CN.4 SER.A/1989/Add.1 (2-4). 
30 Leila Sadat and Wexler and Jordan Paust, ‘Model Draft Statute Preamble' in Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (Volume 5 Cambridge University Press 2002). 
31 The Elements of the Crimes of the ICC Statute Article 6. 
32 Ibid. One may observe that the term ‘genocide’ used in the Genocide Convention and the 
term ‘group of people’ indicate that the victim is more than one person, since the Convention 
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factor that distinguishes between crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.33 Thus, intent must be established whether the victims are many or 
just one individual.34   
The international community has declared that all states must refrain from 
committing genocide during times of war and peace.35 This is articulated in 
The United Nations Resolution 180 (II) passed in 1947, which reads as 
follows. 
It should be clarified that not only those States party to the Genocide 
Convention are compelled to abide by its rules, but also non-party states, 
since the rules thereof protect the collective interest of the international 
community, i.e. the rules of jus cogens, which are mandatory to all nations, 
including those not party to the international convention.36   
 
7.2.2 Islamic International Law 
Islamic international law, which is part of Islamic law, deals with the element 
of ‘intent’ in its jurisprudence, in that intent must include elements of both 
‘knowledge’ and ‘will’.37 The meaning of ‘knowledge’ is that an offender must 
have known that his or her act was criminalised and is punishable.38 The 
meaning of ‘will’ is that an offender must have been conscious of the 
consequences of the criminal act, and that the perpetrator had the capacity to 
commit the criminal act in order to accomplish the result.39 In essence, these 
two required elements are similar to those specified for ‘specific intent’ under 
international criminal law. Moreover, the same elements can be observed in 
Islamic criminal law when considering that the burden is mostly placed on the 
prosecution authority.40 Intent in Islamic criminal law refers to ‘the offender’s 
intent to carry out the criminal act in aiming to achieve the result'.41  
Under Islamic criminal law, one Quranic verse indicates the importance of the 
principle of intent when a person carries out a criminal action. The verse states 
 
does not speak of a ‘group of individuals’, which may mean that one or more than one can be 
victimised with specific intent.    
33 Cryer (n 2) 166. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The Genocide Convention Article 1. 
36 The UN, Resolution 180 II (1947), <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/Resolution/Gen/NR0/038/87/Img/NR003887.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 2 
October 2018.  
37 Abdul qader Awda, a- tashrI al-Jiyn’ai fi al-Islam muqarānh bi al-qanon al-wadāi (al-
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that ‘man can have nothing but what he strives for'.42 Jurists also adopt the 
Islamic maxim of intent al-Umūr bi Maqāsidihā, which states that ‘an act 
should be judged in accordance with the intention of the offender'.43 According 
to Bahnassi, intent means ‘the inclination of one’s will toward the performance 
of a punishable act or toward a punishable omission'.44 Islamic criminal law 
classes intent as when an offender intends to carry out a physical element that 
brings about the result of the act.45 This means that ‘it is sufficient to prove 
that the act was carried out with the purpose of assault and not for the purpose 
of amusement or discipline'.46 Jurists of Islamic criminal law also require proof 
of the results of a criminal act, namely there need to be clear results of a 
criminal act for an applicable punishment to be imposed.47 In conclusion, in 
Islamic criminal law, ‘specific intent’ can be seen within the Islamic maxim of 
al-Umūr bi Maqāsidihā. 
 
7.3 The Material Elements of Genocide (Actus Rea) and Categories of 
Genocide 
The crime of genocide is defined in the 1946 General Assembly of the United 
Nations Resolution 96 (I) as ‘a denial of the right to existence of entire human 
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human 
beings'.48 Furthermore, Article II of the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of 
the Rome Statute cover the crime of genocide. Provisions of the Genocide 
Convention stipulate that the following actions constitute genocide. 
a) Killing a group of people in whole or in part.  
b) Causing serious harm whether mental or bodily to a group of people, in 
whole or in part. 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life that cause physical 
destruction, in whole or in part. 
 
42 The Quran 53:39. 
43 L Zakariyah, ‘Applications of Legal Maxims in Islamic Criminal Law with Special Reference 
to Sharia Law in Northern Nigeria (1999–2007)’ (D. Phil Thesis, University of Wales 2009) 64. 
44 Aaḥmad Bahansī, al-Masʾūliyyah al-Jināʾiyyah fī al-Fiqh al-ʾislāmī (Dār al-Shurūq Egypt 
1998) (Arabic source) 177. 
45 Sanad Nagaty, The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law, Sharia 
(Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois 1991) 87. 
46 Mohamed Elewa Badar and Iryna Marchuk, ‘A Comparative Study of the Principles 
Governing Criminal Responsibility in the Major Legal Systems of the World: England, the 
United States, Germany, France, Denmark, Russia, China, and in the Islamic Legal Tradition’ 
(2013) 1:48 Criminal Law Forum 1. 
47 
The perspective of criminal responsibility in Islamic law is discussed in chapter three of 
this study. 
48
 The Genocide Convention Article II and Article 6 of the Rome Statute.  
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d) Imposing anti-birth measures against a group of people, in whole or in part. 
e) Transferring children forcibly from their group, in whole or in part, to another 
place, or to another group of people, and preventing them from being with 
their parents or culture.49  
 
These acts constitute the physical element (actus rea) of the Genocide 
Convention. In order to examine compatibility and incompatibility between 
Islamic international law and international criminal law in respect of these acts, 
it is important to highlight the perspective of international criminal law in 
relation to genocide, and then present an analysis of each element.  
The Genocide Convention is part of the field of public international law, which 
encompasses international human rights law, international humanitarian law, 
and international criminal law. 50  Schabas outlines the basic principles 
recognised under this law as follows.  
a) Improving international criminal law in defining the elements of the crimes 
of genocide (actus rea and mens rea). 
b) The protection of individuals from being victimised by their own state. 
c) Prosecuting perpetrators who have committed crimes that violate 
fundamental human rights and humanitarian law. 
d) Imposing international obligations upon states to criminalise the crime of 
genocide as it is prohibited and punishable on a domestic level. 
 
These principles are designed to ‘pierce the hitherto impenetrable wall of state 
sovereignty'.51 Thus, if international crimes such as genocide are committed 
at a domestic level, perpetrators will be punished, whether in domestic or 
international courts. 52  This is because the crime of genocide is a prime 
concern at international level.53  
Article II of the Genocide Convention and its preamble describes the physical 
elements of genocide in the following terms: ‘In the present Convention, 
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’  
 
 
49 The Genocide Convention Article 1. 
50 Schabas (n 4) 7. 
51 Ibid.  
52
 Ibid. 
53 Leo Kuper, ‘Genocide and Mass Killing, Illusion and Reality’ in Bertrand Ramcharan (ed) 
The Right to Life in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher Dordrecht 1985) 144. 
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7.3.1 Killing 
Article II of the Genocide Convention notes that killing members of a group in 
whole or in part constitutes genocide. Moreover, this kind of genocide is 
positioned at the top of the hierarchy of the crime of genocide.54 Killing a group 
of people (whether in whole or in part) is classed as a crime against innocent 
people because these people did not take part directly in a situation of 
international war or in a domestic conflict situation.55 Killing must contain two 
material factors as follows: a) the death of the victim, and b) death must result 
from an unlawful act according to the International Criminal Court for Rwanda 
as ruled in the Akayesu case.56 In the Akayesu case, the Court interpreted the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention, stating that genocide can be 
committed whether or not the victim was a member of the group of people who 
were victimised, since killing within the context of genocide constitutes the 
crime of genocide.57   
In Islamic international law, killing one person or a group of persons falls under 
the crime of murder.58 This is because Islamic international law considers that 
unlawful killing constitutes the crime of murder.59 Hence, it prohibits the killing 
of a person whatever the reasons behind the crime. It does not distinguish 
between killing one person or a group of people on the basis of ethnicity, 
religion, colour, or nationality.60 This is confirmed in the following Quranic 
verse: ‘If anyone slays a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading 
mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if anyone 
saves a life, it is as if he has saved the life of the whole people.’61 However, 
this Quranic verse has been interpreted by Muslim scholars in different ways. 
 
54 The Genocide Convention Article 1. 
55 Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 21) (577); see also Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the 
Rights of Minorities (Oxford 1991) 51. 
56 Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 21) (90). 
57
 Ibid. 
58 Here it can be difficult to compare the crime of genocide between international criminal law 
and Islamic international criminal law because the crime of genocide in international criminal 
law carries provisions of specific intent. However, it can be argued that since Islamic 
international criminal law prohibits killing one person and/or killing a group of people (as the 
criminal act), and it prohibits discrimination between peoples (as the basis of committing such 
a crime), then Islamic international criminal law is consonant with the prohibition of the mass 
killing of people, whether in whole or in part, based on discrimination. This is because Islamic 
international criminal law criminalises the criminal act of mass killing and prohibits the intent 
of the mass killing of people that is undertaken on the basis of discrimination.   
59
 See chapter four of this study. 
60
 Mohammad Shokry a-Daqaq, ‘Genocide from the Perspectives of International and Islamic 
Law’ in Muhammad Abdul Haleem, Adel Omar Sherif and Kate Daniels, Criminal Justice in 
Islam and Judicial Procedures in the Sharia (I B Tauris 2003) 139. 
61
 The Quran 5:32. 
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For example, Mansur argues that Allah commits to judge murder by punishing 
the offending person under the category of qiṣáṣ crimes62 and by punishing 
them in the hereafter.63 However, a-Daqaq argues that this verse connects 
with the idea of mental intent (mens rea), which infers that killing one person 
is like murdering a whole group of people since everyone has an equal right 
to life and existence. Consequently, the offender is responsible under the 
concept of intent if he intended to commit a crime.64  
Thus, Islamic international law prohibits and punishes the mass killing of 
people and of causing mental or physical injury or harm to the life of a person 
or to a group of people. 65  This is because the main sources of Islamic 
international law consider that people are equal in terms of human rights and 
there is no discrimination between individuals on the basis of their dignity.66 
The following Quranic verse encapsulates this principle. 
Mankind we created you from a single (pair) male and female, and made 
you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other. Verily the most 
honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of 
you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things).67 
Ibn Kathir argues that Allah speaks to mankind so that people can make 
communication with each other, and there is no kind of people better than the 
other except on the basis of piety.68 In this verse, Allah talks about all people, 
whatever their religion, ethnicity, or colour. Allah prevents discrimination 
between peoples on the basis of their ethnicity, indicating that all mankind 
originates from one male and one female. Allah also promotes good 
communication, and prevents murder or doing harm to each other.    
The Prophet Mohammed says, ‘O men, verily your God is one, and your father 
is one. No Arab is superior to a non-Arab except in righteousness, nor black 
to red or red to black, except in righteousness.’69 This Quranic verse and the 
Hadiths of the Prophet constitute a strong statement of deterrence for any 
discrimination against any group of people in all aspects, whether in whole or 
 
62
 See chapter four of this study under the heading of qiṣáṣ crimes. 
63 Ansar Mansour, a-Sharia al-Islamiyah (Volume 1 The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs 
Egypt 1971) 299 (Arabic source). 
64 a-Daqaq (n 60) 139. 
65 Wahba al-Zuhili, ‘Islam and International Law’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red 
Cross Volume 87, Issue 858 (Religion) 269. 
66
 Ibid. 
67 The Quran 49:13. 
68
 Ibn Kathir, Tafsīr al Quran (Vol. 7 Dar Ṭayybah 1997) (Arabic source) 385. 
69
 Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari (Maktabat Al-Rushid Riyadh 1427 H) 
(Arabic source). 
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in part, on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, colour, or even language. Islamic 
international law focuses on preventing discrimination that leads to killing or 
causing harm to peoples in whole or in part.70  
In Islamic international law, crimes of genocide would fall under qiṣáṣ laws 
and punishments.71 This is because when proving these crimes, both the 
mental element and physical element must be considered to make sure that 
‘genocide’ has been committed (if the latter results in the death of a group of 
people and the former results in the intention of the offenders to undertake 
mass killing).72 Furthermore, in Islamic international law, the prohibition of the 
mass killing of people involves looking at the reasons behind committing this 
crime, and whether this was because of religion, ethnicity, or nationality.73 This 
applies to whenever a crime is committed, and if the victim is a Muslim, a 
foreigner living in a Muslim state, a Muslim living in a non-Muslim state, or a 
non-Muslim living in non-Muslim state, and whether this occurs during 
domestic conflict or in times of war or peace.74  
 
7.3.2 Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm  
Article II of the Genocide Convention refers to, ‘causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group in whole or in part'. International criminal 
law prohibits causing serious harm to a group of people, whether this is bodily 
or mental; inflicting injuries or torture that affect the group's health; and/or 
deliberately inflicting on the group life conditions that result in permanent or 
non-permanent illness or disability, or that cause death.75 The Elements of 
Crimes of the Rome Statute Article 6(b)(1) stipulates that the acts which 
constitute serious harm to the group, whether bodily or mental, ‘may include, 
but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or 
inhuman or degrading treatment'.76 For example, this may include depriving a 
group of people of food, water, medicine, and housing that results in the 
decimation of the group of people in whole or in part.77  
Another example is subjugating a group of people in whole or in part to difficult 
living conditions, such as leaving them without food or water; leaving them in 
 
70 Farhad Malekian, ‘The Homogeneity of International Criminal Court with Islamic 
Jurisprudence’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 595. 
71 For more information see chapter four of this study. 
72






The Genocide Convention Article 2. 
76 The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute Article 6(b)(1) Footnote 3. 
77 Schabas (n 4) 139.  
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severe weather conditions, whether cold or hot; and leaving sick people 
without treatment and medicine. 78  This may include instances where 
responsible individuals, a state, or an organisation refrains from carrying out 
its legal duty of providing people with what they need.79 The Elements of 
Crimes of the Rome Statute also rules that sexual violence and rape is an 
integral part of the Genocide Convention, which was previously ruled by the 
ICTR Akayesu case.80 Sub-paragraph 4 of The Elements of Crimes states that 
this is the case if ‘the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern 
of similar directed conduct'.81  
The terms ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ have been interpreted by the 
Rwanda Tribunal in the Akayesu case to include acts that are not limited to 
torture, persecution, sexual violence, inhuman, or degrading treatment, 
whether the serious harm is permanent or not.82 Writers have argued that the 
sexual violence that occurred in Bosnia when Muslim women were raped and 
were separated from Muslim men would have created ‘a condition of life 
calculated to bring about the group’s destruction'.83 
In Islamic international law, Muslim societies are like any other societies 
around the world in that they include, play host to, and represent a diversity of 
peoples who contribute to their communities, including other religions, 
nationalities, and ethnicities. This position of Muslim society was considered 
at the time of the revelations of the Prophet Mohammed, and when Muslim 
communities included a minority of Jews and Christians.84 These minority 
communities are protected by the provisions of Sharí‘ah, the Quran, and the 
Sunnah from any discrimination or ill treatment. This protection was realised 
in the Sahifaht al-Madinah (the first constitutional law in Islam). 85  These 
minority peoples, namely Jews and Christians, were known as ahl al-kiātb (the 
People of the Book) and others were known as ahl a-Dimāh (idolaters who 
are tolerant of Islam).86 In this regard, the Prophet says, ‘Whoever killed a 
mu'ahid (a person who is granted the pledge of protection by the Muslims) 
 
78 Prosecutor v Rutaganda, (ICTR 96-3-T 6) (Judgment December 1999) (73), see 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/1999.12.06_Prosecutor_v_Rutaganda.pdf/> 
accessed 2 October 2018. 
79 Schabas (n 4) 159. 
80 Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 21) (731). 
81 The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute. 
82 Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 21) (447) and (501). 
83 M Cherif Bassiouni and Peter Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers 1996) . 
84 Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadr, The Constitution of Medina (Forest Gate, London, E7 9HD 
United Kingdom 2012) 10. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Majid Khadduri, Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Muslim International Law 
(London 1940) 177. 
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shall not smell the fragrance of Paradise though its fragrance can be smelt at 
a distance of forty years (of travelling).’ 87  The Prophet prevents any 
discrimination that leads to killing or causing harm against any human being, 
as he or she is protected by the law of Islam.  
Islamic international law prohibits mental or bodily harm whether this is serious 
or not, based on the following Hadith of the Prophet: ‘There should be neither 
harming nor reciprocating harm.’88 This covers mental or physical harm.89 It 
can be noted that the Prophet does not distinguish between peoples whether 
they are Muslim or not, but prevents any harm whether physical or mental 
against people on the basis of their identity, ethnicity, or religion. In his last 
sermon, the Prophet says, ‘Hurt no one so that no one may hurt you. 
Remember that you will indeed meet your Lord, and that He will indeed reckon 
your deeds.’90  Thus, Islamic international law prevents discrimination that 
causes death or serious harm to people, whether mental or physical. 91 
Furthermore, it prohibits annihilation, whether systematic or non-systematic, 
against the whole or part of a group of people, and prohibits causing serious 
harm or inflicting destructive conditions on the lives of a group of people.92 
The protection of people from an Islamic perspective is derived from the right 
of people to life, religion, property, and from any destruction against them. 
This can be comparable to the International Convention of Genocide 194 
Article (II) and the Rome Statute Article 6.   
In Islamic international law, protecting people’s lives, religion, and property 
covers times of war and peace.93 This is because Islamic law guarantees the 
rights of people to live peacefully and prohibits fighting with non-combatants 
(whether these civilians are women or children).94 Similar views exist in the 
provisions of the International Convention of Genocide Article I, which 
stipulates that ‘the contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether 
 
87 Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhari Hadith No 49 Book 83, (Maktabat Al-
Rushid Riyadh 1427 H) (Arabic source). 
88 Quoted from Hadith Commentary Website, 
<https://hadithcommentary.com/nawawi/hadith32/> accessed 2 October 2018. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Prophet Mohammed’s Last Sermon cited on the Islamic Religion website 
<https://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_articles/single2/en_Prophet_Muhammad_Last_Serm
on.pdf> accessed 8 December 2018. 
91 a-Daqaq (n 60) 157. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, (Islamic Publications Pvt 
Lahore 1960) 4, 5. 
94 Mohammed Al-Naisaburi, Sahih Muslim, Hadith 2577, as quoted from Daily Hadith online 
<https://abuaminaelias.com/dailyhadithonline/2011/02/05/allah-has-forbidden-oppression/> 
accessed 30 September 2018. 
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committed in times of peace or in times of war, is a crime under international 
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish'.95 
 
7.3.3 Deliberately Inflicting Conditions of Life that Cause Physical 
Destruction, in Whole or in Part 
The Genocide Convention criminalises causing mental or physical harm to 
people intentionally that affects their conditions of life. It prohibits ‘deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part'.96 The meaning of this clause was interpreted 
by the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal as ‘the methods of destruction 
by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, 
but which, ultimately, seeks their physical destruction'.97 It adds that physical 
destruction can include the whole or part of the group. Moreover, physical 
destruction can include the expulsion of the group systematically from their 
homes, or preventing essential medications, even in a minimum services 
capacity, that leads to the destruction of the group of people. The ICC 
jurisdiction and the Elements of the Crimes refer to the essential resources of 
human beings ‘as including’ but ‘not necessarily restricted to’ items such as 
food, housing, medicine, and water.’98  
Islamic international law prohibits causing harm to people through the 
deprivation of food, water, and essential medical treatment. This is because it 
guarantees essential medical treatment, food, and water to prisoners and 
captives during war, even if these people are fighting against a Muslim army.99 
Preventing necessary resources and medical treatment is prohibited in 
peacetime as well as during war.100 Islamic international law prevents the 
killing of non-combatants and does not allow the mass killing of innocent 
people on the basis of ethnicity or religion during warfare. Thus, it undoubtedly 
prevents the mass killing of any people whatsoever. This is because the 
values of Islamic law promote the rights of people. These values are outlined 
as follows.  
 
95 The Genocide Convention Article 1.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Prosecutor v Akayesu (n 21) (505). 
98 The Rome Statute, The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute, General Introduction and 
Article 6(c); see also Alexander Greenwalt, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a 
Knowledge-Based Interpretation’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 2259; see also Claus 
Kress, ‘The Crime of Genocide under International Law’ (2006) 6 International Law Review 
461. 
99 Shaheen Whyte, ‘The Foundations of International Humanitarian Law in Islamic Tradition’ 
(2014) 10 (7) Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law 7. 
100
 Muhammed Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (Kashmiri Bazar Lahore 1954) 360. 
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a) The administration of justice promotes justice and prohibits injustice, as 
reported in the Hadith al-Qudsi: ‘Allah Almighty said: O my servants, I have 
forbidden injustice for myself and I have forbidden it among you, so do not 
oppress one another.’101 Another example is when the Prophet suggests to 
his companions that they migrate to the Kingdom of Abyssinia because it is 
ruled by a just governor.102  
 
b) Compliance for the benefit of the entire people without any discrimination. 
This can be seen in the five imperative conditions for people (life, mental 
health, religion, the body, honour, and property). These values of Islamic law 
can contribute to the welfare of mankind. The protection of people in Islamic 
law covers imperative aspects of their life. Islamic international law prohibits 
and punishes the killing of individuals whatever race or religion they belong 
to, for whatever reasons, unless a person was convicted under the ḥudúd and 
qiṣáṣ punishments after judges have reached a final verdict.103 Furthermore, 
Islamic international law prohibits causing harm whether bodily or mentally on 
the grounds of racial conflict. 
 
The provisions of Islamic international law classify genocide as punishable 
whether committed in war or peacetime, whether relating to the mass killing 
of people or causing serious harm, and whether physical or mental.104 Leaving 
a person or a group of people without food or water or in severe weather (cold 
or hot) on the basis of discrimination (whichever mechanism is used) is 
criminalised in Islamic international law. This is deemed in the Hadith of the 
Prophet when he said the following. 
 
Every one of you is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock. The leader 
of people is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects. A man is the 
guardian of his family and he is responsible for them. A woman is the 
guardian of her husband’s home and his children and she is responsible 
for them. The servant of a man is a guardian of the property of his master 
 
101 
Mohammed Al-Naisaburi, Sahih Muslim, Hadith 2577, quoted from Daily Hadith online 
<https://abuaminaelias.com/dailyhadithonline/2011/02/05/allah-has-forbidden-oppression/> 
accessed 30 September 2018. 
102 
Shahnaze Safieddine, ‘Migration to Abyssinia’ (2011) 12 Message of Thaqalayn 88 
https://www.al-islam.org/message-thaqalayn/vol-12-no-2-summer-2011/migration-abyssinia-
shahnaze-safieddine/migration> accessed 30 September 2018. 
103 For more information about ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ crimes, see chapter four of this thesis.  
104 Majid Khadduri, Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Muslim International Law 
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and he is responsible for it. No doubt, every one of you is a shepherd and 
is responsible for his flock.105 
 
 
7.3.4 Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births 
 
The Genocide Convention also prohibits using anti-birth measures or 
transferring children to another place from where they live.106 In relation to 
imposing severe measures against a group of people by using anti-birth 
measures, the physical act of imposing these measures against a group of 
people in whole or in part constitutes biological genocide and includes a) 
compulsory abortion, b) restricting births, c) segregation between women and 
men, and d) placing obstacles in the path of marriage. 107  The Genocide 
Convention confirms that the act of separating children forcibly from their 
parents or families constitutes a crime of genocide.108 In relation to the intent 
to impose measures on and restrict the births of a group of people in whole or 
in part, the Genocide Convention talks about acts aimed at abolishing the 
proliferation of a group of people on the basis of their ethnicity or national and 
religious identity, and about acts that aim to prevent a group from bearing new 
generations. Examples of this can be through forced abortion, sterilisation, 
compulsory drugs, the separation of women from men, and by preventing 
marriage.109  
 
In Islamic international law, imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within a group may also include the subjugation of women into undergoing 
hysterectomy and injecting women with anti-pregnancy drugs, or injecting 
men with drugs that cause infertility, for the purpose of preventing the 
proliferation of a group of people, whether in whole or in part.110 These actions 
are prohibited in Islamic international law in accordance with the following 
Quranic verse: ‘And to Thamud [we sent] their brother Salih. He said, "O my 
people, worship Allah; you have no deity other than Him. He has produced 
you from the earth and settled you in it so ask forgiveness of Him and then 
 
105 Quoted from Daily Hadith online <https://abuaminaelias.com/dailyhadithonline> 
accessed 26 October 2018. 
106 Cryer (n 2) 177.  
107 
The Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-first 
session, paragraph 102. 
108 The Genocide Convention Article 2, paragraph (e).  
109 M Cherif Bassiouni, Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Tribunal (Dordrecht 1987) 73. 
110 Majmi’ al-Figh al-Islami qrar 39 (5/1) [1] (1409), the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation 
(Arabic source) <http://www.iifa-aifi.org/1746.html> accessed 6 February 2019. 
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repent to Him. Indeed, my Lord is near and responsive".’ 111  Tantawi’s 
interpretation of this verse is as follows: ‘The reason for the creation of Allah 
for mankind is worship and also the reconstruction of the land through 
reproduction and proliferation of the land and its construction.’112 It can be 
noted that worship for Allah cannot be practised without people who populate 
the earth. Thus, existence and proliferation are needed to ensure continuous 
worship of Him. Consequently, trying to remove human beings from the earth 
by birth regulation is against the principles of existence, whatever the reason.  
 
7.3.5 The Forcible Transfer of Children 
The forcible transfer of children is criminalised and punishable in international 
criminal law. This criminalisation also covers the threat of committing this kind 
of transfer. In the International Tribunal for Rwanda in the Akayesu case, the 
Tribunal stated that ‘the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible 
physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threat or shock which would lead 
to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another'.113 Under ICC 
jurisdiction, the Elements of Crimes identifies the meaning of ‘forcibly’ as to 
threaten, coerce, oppress, or physically separate in terms of the methods used 
for separation.114 It should be noted that the Genocide Convention does not 
specifically identify criminal acts against children, but considers genocide in 
the context of child kidnapping and/or the separation of children from their 
parents or relatives.115  
According to the Genocide Convention, the taking and gathering of a group of 
children can cause serious mental harm to the children and their parents. 
These actions are forbidden in Islamic international law. As the following 
Quranic verse says, ‘Do no mischief on the earth, after it hath been set in 
order, but call on Him with fear and longing [in your hearts] for the Mercy of 
Allah is [always] near to those who do good.’116 Ibn Kathir’s interpretation of 
this Quranic verse is that any act that causes harm or death is forbidden in 
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The Quran 11:61. 
112
 Mohammad Tantawi, al-Waseet Tafsīr Qurʾān (Dar a-Nhdah 1998) available online at 
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Islam, and this principle extends to the mischief of acting against the 
environment.117 In respect of forcibly transferring children belonging to one 
group to another group, Sulaiman argues that, from an Islamic international 
law perspective, this may lead to the enslavement or recruitment of children 
into rough labour that is not suited to their age.118  
Islamic international law per se guarantees the rights of children to life and an 
education, and to prevent abortion.119 In relation to the rights of a mother to 
breastfeed, the Quran says the following. 
Mothers may breastfeed their children two complete years for whoever 
wishes to complete the nursing [period]. Upon the father is the mother’s 
provision and their clothing according to what is acceptable. No person is 
charged with more than his capacity. No mother should be harmed through 
her child and no father through his child.120  
With regard to the rights of children to an education, Ibin 'Umar reports that 
the Prophet said the following. 
All of you are shepherds and each of you is responsible for his flock. A 
man is the shepherd of the people of his house and he is responsible. A 
woman is the shepherd of the house of her husband and she is 
responsible. Each of you is a shepherd and each is responsible for his 
flock.121  
Moreover, Islamic international law provides protection for captives in times of 
war. Such protection includes keeping children with their parents in times of 
war and peace. This is because the Prophet says, ‘Do not take a child from 
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7.4 Conclusion 
The Genocide Convention prevents certain categories of crimes mentioned in 
Article II. 123  Islamic international law offers a broader and general 
criminalisation of the prevention of killing and causing mental or physical harm 
to a group of people. The former refers to the principle of no crime and no 
punishment without law when defining crimes, while the latter refers to the 
principle that all people have the right to life. This principle is derived from the 
main sources, the Quran and Sunnah, which have been interpreted by jurists 
in cases of ambiguity. Consequently, interpretation is often undertaken by 
Muslim jurists/judges on the basis of estimations made about the case in 
question, whether or not the crimes they are judging are crimes of genocide 
or not.  
International criminal law and Islamic international law prohibit the mass killing 
of a group of people in whole or in part, even if the killing is committed by 
perpetrators who belong to the same group of people who have been 
victimised. This principle was illustrated in the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda in the Bagilishema case, which held that ‘a group may not have 
precisely defined boundaries ... the perpetrators of genocide may characterise 
the targeted group in ways that do not fully correspond to conceptions of the 
group shared generally, or by other segments of society.’124  
International criminal law and Islamic international law deal with the prevention 
of genocide in times of war and peace. In Islamic international law, killing just 
one person, for whatever reason, is prohibited. Arguably, the Genocide 
Convention deals with genocide as being specifically applicable only when a 
group of people or part of a group of people is targeted. 125  In Islamic 
international law, crimes of genocide are not classed as ‘genocide’ unless the 
crimes have actually been committed, since Islamic law deems that human 
intention should not be punished, except in the hereafter, and because the 
terms of Islamic criminal law require a criminal result. The Genocide 
Convention and the Rome Statute both deal with attempts to commit the crime 




There has been significant discussion on this topic; see Cryer (n 2) 172.  
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Prosecutor v Bagilishema, (ICTR-95-lA-T) (Judgment 7 June 2001) (65). 
125 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on 13 July 1950. 
126 The Genocide Convention; The Rome Statute Article 25; with regard to Islamic Criminal 
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Islamic international law can be compared with international criminal law 
under broad provisions prohibiting murder and discrimination because it 
deems that genocide is prohibited under its provisions, whether or not these 
provisions have been recognised, or if certain acts have been criminalised at 
an international level. This means that Islamic law prohibits crimes at all levels, 
since its focus is on the prohibition of crimes per se, whether these are 
committed by authorities, states, a group of people, individuals, or militias (and 
whatever the basis for committing a crime). International criminal law 
recognises and defines that the crime of genocide must be committed 
systematically and be organised with intent against a group of people in whole 
or in part, and that these actions threaten the existence of mankind at all levels 
and result in serious threats to international peace and security.  
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Part Four 
Saudi Domestic Issues and the Reconciliatory Approach 
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Chapter Eight 
 The Quest for Compatibility between Saudi Domestic Laws and the 
Rome Statute 
8.1 Introduction 
The domestic laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprise both Sharí‘ah 
/Islamic law and secular laws (codified laws).
1
 The Basic Law of Governance 
allows for some laws to be codified if they do not contradict Sharí‘ah.
2
 This 
can be understood from an analysis of Article 48 of the Basic Law of 
Governance, which reads, ‘The Courts shall apply rules of the Islamic Sharí‘ah 
in cases that are brought before them, according to the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah, and according to laws which are decreed by the ruler in agreement 
with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah.’ This chapter looks at the quest for 
compatibility between Saudi Basic Law/Criminal Procedural Law and the 
Rome Statute. This study has used Saudi Arabia in special reference to 
Islamic law. The reasons for choosing these domestic laws are as follows. a) 
Because the Basic Law of the Saudi Government contains general principles, 
and the rights and duties of individuals, and outlines the form of the state, as 
well as regulating the relationship between the State and its citizens/residents. 
It also explains the internal and external policy of the state. b) With regard to 
the Criminal Procedural Law, this covers general criminal principles, trial 
procedures, and the rights of the accused, as well as appeal proceedings. 
Although Saudi Arabia has not yet ratified the Rome Statute, it has agreed to 
maintain international peace and security under the Charter of the United 
Nations, and has become a state party to the Genocide Convention.
3
 





 The Basic Law of Governance (The Basic Law) Article 1 provides that ‘The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall be Islam and its 
constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger, may 
God’s blessings and peace be upon him (PBUH). Its language shall be Arabic, and its capital 
shall be the city of Riyadh.’ Article 48 stipulates that ‘The courts shall apply to cases before 
them the provisions of Islamic Shari‘ah, as indicated by the Quran and the Sunnah, and 
whatever laws not in conflict with the Quran and the Sunnah which the authorities may 
promulgate.’ The Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia, issued by Royal Order No (A/91) 
27 Sha’ban 1412H – 1 March 1992, published in Umm al-Qura Gazette No 3397 2 Ramadan 
1412 H - 5 March 1992. The first Saudi State ran between 1744 and 1818. The second Saudi 
state ran between 1824 and 1891. The current state of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932; 
see Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936 (Oxford University Press 1993); 
Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (1st edn, Saqi Books London 1998).  
2
 Bryant Seaman, ‘Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the 
Sharia to Regulate Development’ (1979) 18 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 413.  
3 Saudi Arabia ratified the Genocide Convention on 13 July 1950. 
4 Saudi Arabia ratified the Geneva Conventions on 18 May 1963. 
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provisions of these international conventions are stipulated in the Rome 
Statute in Articles 6 and 8. Thus, Saudi Arabia is committed to the international 
community with regard to the prevention and criminalisation of the crime of 
genocide and war crimes for both internal and/or international armed conflict 
situations.  
Saudi Arabia has been described as a conservative state and one that 
sometimes hesitates to ratify some international treaties on the grounds that 
Islamic law supersedes secular international treaties and secular laws.
5 
However, Saudi Arabia is a member of the United Nations, a member of the 
Arab League, and a member of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation. 
These memberships reflect an awareness of the importance of co-operation 
between states to maintain international peace and security, as well as a 
regional commitment to enhance security and political stability. In addition, in 
the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia is classed as a central location of religious 
focus because it is home to two Holy Mosques, in Mecca and Medinah. In this 
light, international co-operation for the prevention of international crimes is 
important to Saudi Arabia, as is the desire to ratify international conventions 
that maintain international peace and security. However, legal harmony 
cannot be achieved by dismissing some international conventions and 
accepting others. International law pursues its objectives via international 
legal instruments that are applied by means of international law practised by 
states and international organisations.  
The legal system of government in Saudi Arabia is a monarchy in accordance 
with Article 5 of the Basic Law of Governance. The Government in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises three branches: the Judiciary, the 
Legislative Authority, and the Executive Branch, in accordance with Article 44 
of the Basic Law of Governance. Saudi Arabia applies Islamic law, and 
according to some international reports, certain aspects of law in Saudi Arabia 
have been deemed inadequate by some international organisations. For 
example, the Report of the Commission on Human Rights Number 
A/HRC/WG.6/4/SAU/3 of 14 November 2008 says that ‘the Basic Law of 
Governance in Saudi Arabia lacks guarantees to enjoy: freedom of religion or 
belief, freedom of expression and opinion, equality and equal enjoyment of 
the protection of the law, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment, freedom of association and assembly, the 
 
5
 Abdulhamid A Al-Hargan, ‘Saudi Arabia and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966: A Stalemate Situation’ (2005) 9 (4) International Journal of Human 
Rights 491. 
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right to a fair trial, and freedom of thought'.
6 The Report calls on the Saudi 
Government to introduce a system of penal procedures that are in line with 
international human rights standards, in particular giving detainees the right 
to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in a competent and independent 
court, and to protect their right to be presumed innocent.
7  In the goal of 
seeking legal compatibility, it is valuable to highlight an overview of the legal 
system of the Government of Saudi Arabia before analysing its domestic 
provisions. 
 
8.2 An Overview of the Legal System of Saudi Arabia  
The Basic Law of the Kingdom is the most significant constitutional document 
of the State. It outlines the basic legal system of Saudi Arabia, its authorities, 
the duties and rights of people, and the general policies of the state, both 
internal and international.
8
 The significance of this law for this study relates to 
how its provisions compare with those of the Rome Statute. It is important to 
give an overview of the authorities of the Kingdom before analysing the 
provisions of the Basic Law and Criminal Procedural Law, in seeking to find 
equivalent provisions to the Rome Statute. 
 
8.2.1 Judicial Authority 
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia is based on the rules and principles of 
Islamic law, namely the applicable law in the Kingdom is Sharí‘ah for all 
matters.9 The source of the Saudi judicial system is Sharí‘ah, and legislations 
issued by the regulatory authority must not conflict with Islamic law. Thus, 
judges in the Saudi Courts are obliged to apply Sharí‘ah rulings in all cases.
10 
Judges in Saudi Arabia subscribe to the Ḥanbalí school of thought in cases 
brought before the domestic courts. However, if there is no ruling that deals 
with the case in question, views are sought from another school of Islamic 
thought namely Ḥanafí, Sháfiʻí, and Málikí).
11 Saudi Arabia's judicial system 
 
6 Human Rights Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Fourth Session February 
(2009), discussing the summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Number A/HRC/WG.6/4/SAU/3 on 14 November 2008.  
7
 Ibid. 
8 The Basic Law Parts Two, Five, Six and Nine.  
9 The Basic Law Article 48 provides that ‘The courts shall apply to cases before them the 
provisions of Islamic Sharia, as indicated by the Quran and the Sunnah, and whatever laws 
not in conflict with the Quran and the Sunnah which the authorities may promulgate’; see also 
Frank E Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000). 
10 The Basic Law Article 48. 
11 Ahamed A Al-Ghadyan, ‘The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia’ (1998) Arab Law Quarterly 235. 
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derives its independence from the Basic Law of Governance.
12
 The sources 
of the judicial system and its independence are derived from Basic Law 
because this is the constitutional document of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi judicial 
system is based on a dual judicial system and comprises the Sharí‘ah Courts 
and the Board of Grievances (the Administrative Court).
13
 However, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is important to focus on the general Saudi judicial 
system because, in this respect, Criminal Procedural Law is applied and this 
relates more closely to the research question and the main objectives of the 
thesis. The general Saudi judicial system has undergone various stages of 
development since the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These 
stages are as follows. 
a) The First Stage. In 1927, the formation of the Sharí‘ah Courts was set up 
by Royal Decree No. 140 18-2-1346 H (14-8-1927), which regulates the 
procedures and different levels of Sharí‘ah Courts in the Kingdom.
14  
b) The Second Stage. In 1938, new judicial laws were set up by Royal Decree 
No. 3/1/32 1357 H and referred to as the Concentration of Sharí‘ah 
Responsibilities Law.
15 This law defines different types of Sharí‘ah Courts in 
Saudi Arabia, such as the criminal court, family courts, and the choosing of 
judges.  
c) The Third Stage. In 1970, King Faisal established the Ministry of Justice by 
Royal Decree No. A/126 in 13-8-1390 (14 October 1970). He also replaced 
previous judicial laws with a new law called The Judicial Law, issued by Royal 
Decree No. 64/M 14-7-1395 H (21 July 1975).
16
 This judicial law confirmed 
the rules of previous laws, but affirmed the importance of the independence 
and impartiality of the judicial system.  
d) The Fourth Stage. In 2007, King Abdullah set up new judicial laws by Royal 
Decree No. 87/M 19-9-1428 H (30-9-2007).
17
 This new judicial law outlines 
 
12
 The Basic Law, Article 46 provides that ‘The Judiciary shall be an independent authority. 
There shall be no power over judges in their judicial function other than the power of the 
Islamic Sharia.’ The independence of judges is reflected in Articles 2, 3, and 4, which state 
that judges are not empowered, except in the provisions of Islamic law, which cannot be 
isolated and removed from their work. 
13
 The Basic Law Article 53, provides that ‘The Law shall set forth the structure and jurisdiction 
of the Board of Grievances.’ The Board of Grievances was created by Royal Decree No 
2/13/8759 17-9-1374 H. It was later replaced by a new law issued by Royal Decree No 78 19-
9-1428 H. 
14 Um Al-Qura Gazette Number 140 21-2-1346 H (The National Centre for Archives and 
Documents in Riyadh).  
15
 Ibid No 1436 in 4-1-1357 H.  
16 Ibid No 2592 in 29-8-1395 H.  
17
 Preamble to the Judicial Law of Saudi Arabia. 
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the roles and the duties of the Supreme Judicial Council, and establishes 
levels of courts in the Saudi judiciary system as well as the jurisdiction of the 
courts.
18 According to Article 6 of the Saudi Judicial Law, the Supreme Judicial 
Council is responsible for the administrative aspects of the judiciary system. 
For instance, it sets conditions for appointing judges, outlines the duties and 
rights of judges, provides for their dismissal, sets out rules for trial, and 
outlines their administrative work and the role of the Ministry of Justice in 
administrative and financial supervision.
19
 
Courts in the Saudi judicial system are divided into three levels; namely, First 
Instance Courts, Appeal Courts, and the Supreme Court. Thus, it is 
appropriate to describe different court levels, and the terms for reference of 
each level of court in the Saudi judicial system, as follows. 
8.2.1.1 Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court is based in the capital city of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Riyadh. It comprises judges working in different chambers. Each chamber is 
allocated three judges, with the exception of the Criminal Chamber, which 
employs five judges. The Criminal Chamber deals with judgments relating to 
death, cutting, and stoning.
20
 According to Article 11 of the Judicial Law of 
Saudi Arabia, the Supreme Court shall oversee the proper application of the 
provisions of Sharí‘ah, and laws issued by the King that are not inconsistent 
with Sharí‘ah, in cases within the jurisdiction of the general courts and in 
relation to the following. 
a) The review of judgments and decisions issued or supported by courts of 
appeal relating to sentences of death, amputation, stoning, or qiṣáṣ 
(retribution) in cases of criminal homicide or lesser injuries. 
b) The review of judgments and decisions issued or supported by courts of 
appeal relating to cases not mentioned in the previous paragraph, or relating 
to ex parte cases or the like, without dealing with the facts of the cases 
whenever the objection to the decision is based upon the following: i) the 
violation of the provisions of Sharí‘ah or laws issued by the King which are not 
inconsistent with Sharí‘ah; ii) the rendering of a judgment by a court that was 
improperly constituted, as provided for in the provisions of this and other laws; 
iii) the rendering of a judgment by an incompetent court or panel; and iv) if an 




 Ibid Article 6.  
19
 Ibid Articles 30 to 47. 
20 Ibid Article 10(4). 
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8.2.1.2 Appellate Courts 
The appellate courts hear appealable judgments referred by the first instance 
courts, after hearing the statements of the litigants, in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed in Sharí‘ah Procedures and Regulations Criminal 
Proceedings.
21
 These chambers comprise financial chambers, criminal 
chambers, personal status chambers, commercial chambers, and labour 
chambers.
22   
 
8.2.1.3 First Instance Courts 
Courts of the First Instance must be competent in all cases and disputes in 
each province.
23
 Each court has its own chambers within its jurisdictional 
departments: the criminal cases chamber is concerned with ḥudúd, qiṣáṣ, and 
ta‘zír crimes.
24
 The Chamber of Personal Status specialises in all issues of 
inheritance, marriage, and divorce.
25
 The Commercial Chamber deals with all 
commercial disputes.
26 The Labour Chamber deals with labour issues.
27
 The 
Financial Chamber specialises in property, contracts, and money disputes.
28  
 
8.2.2 The Regulatory Authority 
In the Saudi legal system, the Majlis a-Shura ( Council of Consult or Shüra) is 
derived from the Sharí‘ah in accordance with the following Quranic verse: ‘And 
those who have responded to their Lord and established prayer and whose 
affairs are [determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what we 
have provided them, they spend.’
29 Shura was practised by the Prophet when 
he consulted his caliphs in matters that concerned the Muslim community.
30
 
Shüra means consultation or discussion on any issues concerning a nation. 
In other words, shüra refers to obtaining opinions from knowledgeable and 
 
21
 Ibid Article 17.  
22 Ibid Article 26; a lso according to Article 15(1), each district must have an Appeals Court. 
There are thirteen districts in the Kingdom set up by Royal Decree No A/92 on 27 August 
1412. 
23
 Ibid Article 18.  
24
 Ibid Article 20.  
25
 Ibid Article 21.  
26
 Ibid Article 22. 
27
 Ibid Article 23.  
28 Ibid.  
29 The Quran 42:38. 
30
 Badawi al-Ṭahir, ʻan Mabdaʼ al-Shūrá fī al-Islām (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah, 2008); 
see also Ragheb El-Sergany, ‘Shura in Islam its Concept and Importance’ (2010) Islam Story 
1 <https://ar.scribd.com/document/53677074/Shura> accessed 9 May 2019. 
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experienced representative people of the nation.
31
 Saudi Basic law refers to 
the Shüra as the Regulatory Authority in Article 44, which provides that ‘The 
Authorities of the State consist of: i) The Judicial Authority, ii) The Executive 
Authority, iii) The Regulatory Authority. These Authorities will co-operate in 
the performance of their functions, according to this Law or other laws. The 
King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.’ 
This means that the Regulatory Authority is one of the authorities of state, and 
plays a role in the establishment and amendment of domestic laws and 
regulations as well as discussing international treaties that Saudi aims to sign 
up to or ratify.
32
 
The Shüra Council is an institution that exercises the function of discussing, 
proposing, enacting, and amending domestic law, and expressing opinions on 
international treaties in accordance with Article 15 of the Shüra Council Law. 
The Council of Shüra consists of a hundred and fifty women and men with 
experience and knowledge in various disciplines.
33
 The members of the Shüra 
Council are appointed by Royal Decree issued by the King in accordance with 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Basic law. Members can only serve on the Council 
for four years in accordance with Article 13. The jurisdiction of the Regulatory 
Authority is specified in Article 15 as follows. 
a) To give an opinion on the public policies of the State. 
b) To discuss plans that support economic and social development, studying 
regimes, treaties, international agreements, proposals, and appropriate 
privileges for the benefit of the nation. 
c) To interpret and clarify regulations. 
d) To discuss the annual reports submitted by the government. 
Powers of the Regulatory Authority in accordance with Article 15 are as 
follows.  
a) Proposing and enacting domestic laws in all aspects whether commercial, 
criminal, labour, economic, or personal statute regulations. 
b) Proposing amendments to existing laws. 
c) Discussing international treaties that the Kingdom intends to sign or ratify 
and expressing opinions about the provisions of any treaty under discussion.  
 
31
 El-Sergany (n 30) 1. 
32
 Shüra Law was issued by Royal Decree No 91/27-8-1412 H, Article 15(b). 
33
 Shüra Council Law as amended by Royal Decree 44/29 -2-1434 H, Article 3. 
- 272 - 
All the functions of the Regulatory Authority must not contradict the provisions 
of Islamic law and the Basic Law of Governance, in accordance with Article 
67 of the Basic Law of Governance.
34
 
Article 17 of Shüra Council Law provides that the decisions of the Shüra 
Council shall be submitted to the King and he shall decide what shall be 
referred to the Council of Ministers. If he refers the decisions of the Shüra 
Council to the Council of Ministers and the views of the Council of Ministers 
agree with the Shüra Council, a Royal Decree shall be issued by the approval 
of the King. If the views of the two councils differ, the matter will be returned 
to the Shüra Council to discuss again, bearing in mind the observations or 
comments of the Council of Ministers. 
Article 20 of the Council of Ministers Law may give rights to the Council of 
Ministers to exercise the powers of the Shüra Council as follows: ‘While 
deferring to Majlis [council] Shüra Law, laws, treaties, international 
agreements and “concessions” shall be issued and amended by Royal 
Decrees after deliberations by the Council of Ministers.’ 
There may be an overlap between the functions of the Shüra Council and the 
Council of Ministers in exercising powers to enact and regulate domestic laws 
and discuss international treaties. In this regard, the Prime Minister is also the 
King, and he is the ultimate arbiter of [three] Authorities in accordance with 
Article 44 of the Basic Law. There can be no real separation of powers 
between these authorities in the Kingdom.
35
 
It can be argued that (via the jurisdiction of the Regulatory Authority in 
exercising a consultative role) the opinions issued by the Authority are not 
binding until they are endorsed by the King in accordance with Article 18 of 
Shüra Council Law. In this regard, Article 44 of the Basic Law of Governance 
provides that the King is the head of the three authorities in the Kingdom. It 
should be noted that the power owned by the King is not absolute power but 
restricted to the opinions issued from the appropriate regulatory, 
administrative, or judicial authorities. These authorities must raise their 
opinions to the King, who will then decide whether to approve or not to 
approve. Furthermore, Saudi Basic Law requires that international 
conventions must be examined by the relevant legislative and executive 
 
34
 Shüra Law Article 15 provides that ‘The Regulatory Authority shall be concerned with the 
making of laws and regulations which will safeguard all interests, and remove evil from the 
State's affairs, according to Sharia. Its powers shall be exercised according to the provisions 
of this Law and the Law of the Council of Ministers and the Law of the Shüra Council.’ 
35
 Bassam Abdullah Albassam, ‘Political Reform in Saudi Arabia: Luxury or Necessity?’ Vol 
2, No 3, (2011) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 200. 
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authorities. They will consider compliance in accordance with domestic 
regulations, and make any amendments to the conventions in question, so 
that they are compatible with Saudi domestic regulations.
36
 Furthermore, if the 
opinion of the Shüra Council and the Council of Ministers is similar, this gives 
an indication of a recommendation to accede to the opinion. If the views of the 
two councils differ, both views must be submitted to the King.
37 The King has 
the power to choose an opinion in accordance with Article 17 of the Shüra 
Council Law. 
In addition, any enactment of a law or approval to accede to any international 
treaty must go through various stages of discussion by the Regulatory 
Authority, and then the Administrative Authority, before referral to the Council 
of Ministers by the King. The Council of Ministers will return the matter to the 
King if they agree with the opinion of the Shüra Council or if the King supports 
the draft law or accedes to sign an international treaty. If there is a difference 
of opinion within the Council of Ministers on the opinion of the Shüra Council, 
the King will return the draft to the Shüra Council to discuss again, taking into 
account the opinions of the Council of Ministers. 
 
8.2.3 The Executive Authority  
The legal system of Saudi Arabia comprises three authorities in accordance 
with Article 44 of the Basic Law of Governance. These authorities are as 
follows.  
a) The Executive Authority, which was formed according to the Council of 
Ministers Law issued by Royal Decree No. A/13 on 21 August 1993.
38  
b) The Legislative Authoritym, fashioned by Shüra Council Law and 
promulgated by Royal Decree No. A/91 on 2 March 1992. 
c) The Judicial Authority, enacted by Judicial Law issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/87 on 30 September 2007.39  
The Council of Ministers in Saudi Arabia was established in 1958.
40
 This is a 
statutory body set up in accordance with law and presided over by the King. It 
comprises the following: a) the Prime Minister, b) the Deputy Prime Minister, 
 
36
 Basic Law Article 70. 
37 The Bureau of Experts on the Council of Minister’s Decision 380 in 2002. 
38
 The Council of Ministers Legislation Preamble. 
39
 Saudi Judicial Law Preamble. 
40
 Royal Decree No 38 (12 May 1958) in Aum Al-Qura Gazette No. 1717 (17 May 1958). 
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The term of membership of the Council of Ministers is four years (but is 
renewable).
42 The Council of Ministers in Saudi Arabia is made up of three 
main departments: the Cabinet of Ministers, the General Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers, and the Bureau of Experts, in accordance with Article 30 
of the Council of Ministers. 
The Council of Ministers is charged with running the executive branch of the 
state in accordance with Articles 19 and 20 of its law, which also specify 
competence.
43
 Article 19 states the following. 
While deferring to provisions of the Basic Law of Governance and the 
Shüra Council Law, the Cabinet shall draw up the internal, external, 
financial, economic, educational, and defence policies, as well as general 
affairs of the State and shall supervise their implementation. It shall also 
consider the resolutions of the Shüra Council. It has the executive power 
and is the final authority in financial and administrative affairs of all 
ministries and other government institutions. 
The Council of Ministers is also charged with drawing up internal and external 
policies of the state in the areas of finance, economics, commerce, education, 
and the military.
44  
The Council of Ministers examine draft regulations issued by ministries and 
governmental institutions.
45
 Draft regulations are discussed by a Bureau of 
Experts in the Council, before they are referred to the Shüra Council.
46 The 
Council of Ministers draws together points of view before passing on the draft 
to the King who, in turn, refers the draft to the Shüra Council.
47 Additional 
jurisdictions of the Council of Ministers include the discussion of a general 
plan for economic and social development, discussing annual reports that are 
 
41
 The Council of Ministers Law Article 12.  
42
 Ibid Article 9. 
43
 Ibid Article 19 stipulates that, ‘While deferring to provisions of the Basic Law of Governance 
and the Shüra Council Law, the cabinet shall draw up the internal, external, financial, 
economic, educational and defence policies as well as general affairs of the State and shall 
supervise their implementation. It shall also review the resolutions of the Shüra Council. It has 
executive power and is the final authority in the financial and administrative affairs of all 





 Shüra Council Law Article 15. 
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submitted by ministries and government agencies, formulating a general 





8.3 Saudi Domestic Provisions and the Rome Statute 
8.3.1 General Principles  
The general principles of law are stipulated in Saudi domestic laws, the Basic 
Law of Governance, and Criminal Procedural Law as explained below. 
8.3.1.1 No Crime without Law and No Punishment without Law  
These principles are inherent in both the Rome Statute and in Islamic criminal 
law, as detailed in previous chapters. The principle of no crime and no 
punishment without law are stipulated in the Basic Law of Governance in 
accordance with Article 38, which reads, ‘There shall be no crime or 
punishment except on the basis of a Sharí‘ah or a statutory provision, and 
there shall be no punishment except for deeds subsequent to the 
effectiveness of a statutory provision.’
49
 In Islamic criminal law, these 
principles are based on two sources: the Sharí‘ah and statutory provisions 
enacted by legislative authority. The main source of this principle is 
Sharí‘ah/Islamic law, according to Article 7 of the Basic Law of Governance, 
which stipulates that ‘Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its 
authority from the Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of his Messenger, 
both of which govern this Law and all the laws of the State.’
50 The second 
source is codified provisions that cannot contradict Sharí‘ah.   
These principles are also confirmed by Procedural Criminal Law in Article 3, 
which stipulates that ‘No person may be punished except for an act that is 
prohibited, punishable by law, and after conviction has been proved by a final 
judgment of the competent court.’
51
 These principles of legality are promoted 
in Saudi domestic law and are among the principles of the Basic Law of 
Governance. The Basic Law of Governance occupies a paramount position in 
the legal structure of the state and determines its form, the nature of the 
system, and its general powers. This is because crime and punishment are 
among the most important issues relating to the freedoms of individuals in 
 
48
 Ibid Articles 19 and 21. 
49
 Ibid Article 38. 
50
 Ibid Article 7.  
51
 Procedural Criminal Law Article 3. 
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society, and laws and punishments need to be preserved to protect the rights 
of individuals from criminal events.
52
 
The Basic Law of Governance directs itself to legislative authority, which is 
responsible for promoting the principles of no crime and no punishment.
53 This 
is based on Article 67, which reads as follows. 
The regulatory authority shall have the jurisdiction of formulating laws and 
rules conducive to the realisation of the well-being or warding off harm to 
State affairs in accordance with the principles of the Islamic Sharí‘ah. It 
shall exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with this Law, and Laws of the 
Council of Ministers and the Shüra Council.
54
 
Thus, the inclusion of these principles in the Basic Law of Governance reflects 
a set of important points: a) respect of the role of law in the state; b) promoting 
the rights of individuals to be free, with the exception of what is prohibited by 
law; c) embodying the principles of the separation of power in authorities of 
the state in order to promote legislative authority in enacting laws, and 
promoting the right of the judicial authority to issue/rule on laws; and d) 
restricting the use of power by executive and judicial authorities.
55 This is what 
can be achieved through legislative authority.  
Legislative authority first works to formulate criminal acts/conduct using legal 
codification, and states punishments thereto. It also details the time and 
location of entry into the force of the law, and details the individuals who are 
subject to the law. The principle of no crime and punishment without law works 
to confer justice and legitimacy on criminal acts and penalties. This relates 
both to personal punishment and individual responsibility. 
One may ask why Saudi Arabia has stipulated these principles in the Basic 
Law of Governance when they are already stipulated in Islamic law. This is 
because these principles are afforded a high status, and so have been 





 Ahmed Fathy Surur, a-Lqānūn al-Jiyn’ai a-distury (4th edn, Dār al-Shurūq Egypt 2006) 33 
(Arabic source). 
53
 This is based on Article 44, which explains the separation of powers in the hierarchical 
structure of the authorities and says that ‘Authorities in the State shall consist of: Judicial 
Authority, Executive Authority, and Regulatory Authority. These authorities shall co-operate 
in the discharge of their functions in accordance with this Law and other laws. The King shall 
be the final authority.'  
54 The Basic Law Article 67. 
55
 Khālid al-Shāfiʿ, Mabādiʾ al-Niẓām al-Distwrī fī al-Mamlakah al-ʿarabiyyah al-Suʿūdiyyah ،
(Maktabat al-Malik Fahad al-Waṭaniyyah 2012) 188. 
56
 Forms of individual responsibility in Saudi domestic laws are derived from Islamic law, 
which is discussed in chapter three.  
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8.3.1.2 The Principle of Personal Criminal Responsibility 
The principle of personal criminal responsibility is included in the Rome 
Statute in Article 25 as one of its general principles.57 As discussed in chapter 
four, there is harmony between the Rome Statute and Islamic law with respect 
to the principle of personal criminal responsibility. This principle means that 
individuals must bear the consequences of any unlawful conduct committed, 
depending on the awareness they have of the crime they are accused of.58 
Thus, no one can be responsible for a crime if they have not been involved in 
unlawful conduct, either as the principal perpetrator or as an accessory.59 
Saudi domestic laws do not have codified provisions that elucidate the 
principle of criminal responsibility exhaustively. This is because Saudi 
domestic law is based on Islamic law, which is applied in Saudi domestic 
courts.  
The principle of personal criminal responsibility works as a legal fence for 
individuals in society and determines the legal status of a) the accused during 
the period of criminal proceedings, b) the period of judgment by a competent 
court, and c) the final judgment to carry out the sentence by the executive 
authority as stated in Article 3 of the Criminal Procedural Law, which reads 
that ‘no penalty may be imposed on a person, unless a conviction has been 
found after a trial in accordance with the legitimate requirements.’   
 
8.3.1.3 The Principle of Non-Retroactivity 
The principle of non-retroactivity is stipulated in the Basic Law of Governance 
because it is derived from Islamic criminal law provisions. The principle means 
that the provisions of the law should not be applied until after they have been 
issued and have entered into force. Article 38 of the Basic Law of Governance 
states that ‘there shall be no punishment except for deeds subsequent to the 
effectiveness of a statutory provision'.60 
 
57 This sub-paragraph (a) refers to when a person ‘Commits such a crime, whether as an 
individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other 
person is criminally responsible.’ 
58
 Mohammad Saiful Islam, ‘Criminal Accountability and Juvenile Offenders: A Study of 
Islamic Principles, International Law and the Children Act (2013)’ (2015) International Journal 
of Ethics in Social Sciences Vol 3, No 2 51. 
59 Najaty Sanad, The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law Sharia 
(Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Chicago 1991) 71.  
60 Some argue that if the new law was issued during the investigation or during the judicial 
hearing, the accused will not benefit from the new law if it is in favour of the accused. Others 
argue that the state has a right to punish the accused from the time when the accused 
committed the criminal act, not from when the new law was issued; Andrew Ashworth and 
Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013); Antonio Cassese, 
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The application of this principle aims to protect the interests of society, achieve 
justice, and protect the rights of the accused. Two main factors underlie this 
principle. First, if a law criminalises certain acts, it can only be effective after 
it has been issued and published, and in accordance with its provisions. This 
means that the effects of any previous legal text continue until any new law is 
issued. Second, if the principle of non-retroactivity is not applied, this 
compromises the principle of legality, which provides that no crime or penalty 
can be applied except as stipulated within the law. Thus, if an act was 
permissible when it was undertaken, but then a new law prohibiting it is issued, 
the offender cannot be punished under the new law because the act was not 
deemed criminal at the time of the offence. 
 
8.3.1.4 A Person Shall Not be Tried Twice for the Same Criminal 
Conduct 
The principle that a person shall not be tried twice for the same offence is 
recognised in Islamic law. This principle aims to protect the rights of 
individuals from double jeopardy.
61  Saudi domestic laws do not explicitly 
mention the principle, but Saudi Criminal Procedural Law regulates the expiry 
of criminal proceedings when a final judgment is issued in a case in question.
62 
Saudi law is obliged to implement the principle in its domestic laws for two 
reasons. The first is that Islamic criminal law stipulates the importance of 
applying this principle and, since Islamic law is the main source of all Saudi 
legislations according to Article 1
63
 and Article 48, the principle must be 
adhered to.
64 The second reason is that the Kingdom is a member of the 
League of Arab States and has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 
which states in Article 19(1) that ‘no one may be tried for the same offence 




‘Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity of Criminal 
Law’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice; abdulfatāḥ al- Ṣayfī, Ḥaq al-Dawlah fī 
al-ʿiqāb (Dār al-Hudā, Egypt 1995) (Arabic source).  
61
 Farhad Malekian, Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Search 
(2nd edition Brill 2011) 162. 
62 Criminal Procedural Law Article 22.  
63
 ibid Article 1 states that ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic 
State. Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah 
(Traditions) of His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be upon him (PBUH). Its 
language shall be Arabic, and its capital shall be the city of Riyadh.’  
64
 ibid Article 48 stipulates that ‘The courts shall apply to cases before them the provisions of 
Islamic Sharia, as indicated by the Quran and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not in conflict 
with the Quran and the Sunnah which the authorities may promulgate.’ 
65 The Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted in Cairo on 15 September (1994). 
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Saudi Arabia is committed to international conventions such as the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights, which prohibits the trial of a person twice for the 
same criminal act. The Saudi judiciary system may hear a case again that 
relates to ḥudúd crimes and qiṣáṣ crimes.
66
 This is because these crimes 
carry specific sanctions imposed by Allah.
67
 This is also because most 
national laws in the world and international conventions do not penalise such 
crimes in the same manner as Islamic law does.  
This problem at a national level may not be a cause for grave concern because 
courts must abide by the rules contained in the Criminal Procedural Law, as 
stated in Article 22 of Saudi Domestic Law. Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute 
makes it clear that international criminal jurisdiction permits a retrial for the 
same criminal act twice.
68
 This provision allows individuals who have already 
been tried before national courts, for acts constituting serious violations of 
international criminal law, to be tried again before international courts if the act 
for which the defendant is accused of is a) defined as an ordinary offence, b) 
if the proceedings before the national court were not independent or impartial, 
or c) if the proceedings of the national court are designed to protect the 
accused from international criminal responsibility, and d) in the event of a 
delay in proceedings before the national court.
69
 In this regard, Lutfi explains 
that the Saudi judiciary system should follow the principles that a person shall 
not be tried twice for the same offence before the Saudi courts.
70   
 
8.3.1.5 Equality before the Law 
This principle is in the main sources of Islamic law, as mentioned earlier in 
chapter four.
71
 The source of its legality is derived from the main sources of 
Islamic law, but it also has procedural aspects and is applied in practice by 
states. Equality before the law in Saudi domestic law is seen as the right of all 
individuals to enjoy freedoms, rights, and the imposition of duties on an equal 
footing between individuals in society (within the rules of Islamic law). This 
means that no discrimination should be shown between individuals in relation 
to their legal positions in this respect. This principle also appears in the Basic 
Law of Governance, as part of the three fundamental pillars of justice. These 
 
66 Chapter four of this study deals with ḥudúd crimes and qiṣáṣ crimes. 
67
 Aḥmad Luṭfī ،ʾishkāliyyāt ʿadam Jawāz Muḥākamat al-Muttaham Maratayn fī Dhāt al-Jurm 
(Dār al-KutubCairo 2012) (Arabic source). 
68 See Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Luṭfī (n 67). 
71 See chapter four of this study. 
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pillars are stipulated in Article 8 of the Basic Law of Governance, which says 
that ‘Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be based on justice, 
Shüra (consultation), and equality in accordance with the Islamic Sharí‘ah.’ 
This means that the Saudi Government is obliged to apply the equality 
principle to all people without discrimination in all aspects within its sovereign 
borders.  
The principle of equality before the law is affirmed in the Basic Law of 
Governance as the right of litigation for all people without exception, in 
accordance with Article 47, which stipulates that ‘The right of litigation shall be 
guaranteed equally for both citizens and residents in the Kingdom. The Law 
shall set forth the procedures required thereof.’ The Basic Law of Governance 
also states that any person who has a complaint has the right to lodge the 
complaint with the competent authorities. The Council of the King and the 
Crown Prince are open to every citizen.
72
 The Basic Law of Governance also 
prescribes the principle of equality of property rights and prohibits the 
expropriation of property only in accordance with expropriation laws, provided 
that the person is compensated in accordance with Article 47.
73
 
Criminal Procedural Law provides that no person shall be arrested, searched, 
or imprisoned, except in cases provided for by law.
74 In terms of the application 
of sanctions, Criminal Procedural Law provides that no person may be 
punished unless he or she is found guilty of a legally prohibited act in 
accordance with a fair trial.
75
 This indicates that all individuals should enjoy 
their freedoms, and no one may be restricted except in accordance with the 
law, which affirms the principle of equality of all in the enjoyment of freedoms 
and equality before the law in due process, before a competent court, and in 
respect of punishment. Thus, the principle of equality before the law is a main 
axis for enforcing the rule of law and is connected to the principles of legality. 
 
8.3.1.6 The Presumption of Innocence  
The principle of the presumption of innocence is not expressly mentioned or 
codified in Saudi domestic laws, namely in the Basic Law of Governance and 
 
72
 The Basic Law Article 43. 
73
 Ibid Article 18. The equality principle is not limited only to certain areas, but also exists in 
relation to financial aspects; for example, tax is not taken except in accordance with law, 
Article 20, which provides that ‘Taxes and fees may be imposed only if needed and on a just 
basis. They may be imposed, revised, abolished, or exempted only in accordance with the 
Law.’ 
74 Criminal Procedural Law Articles 2 and 3. 
75
 Ibid. 
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in Criminal Procedural Law. 76  However, the idea and application of this 
principle is dealt with in Islamic criminal law.
77 Article 1 of the Basic Law of 
Governance confirms that the Quran and Sunnah are its constitution.78 In 
addition, Article 26 of the Basic Law of Governance says that ‘The State shall 
protect human rights in accordance with the Islamic Sharí‘ah.’ Article 48 
obliges the Kingdom to apply Islamic law principles in its rulings and states 
that ‘The courts shall apply to cases before them the provisions of Islamic 
Sharí‘ah, as indicated by the Quran and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not 
in conflict with the Quran and the Sunnah which the authorities may 
promulgate.’ Thus, domestic courts in Saudi Arabia must apply the 
presumption of innocence in all processes, whether during the prosecution 
process or judicial trial. The reason is that this principle is one of the most 
important forms of protection for personal freedoms, in that no one should be 
investigated or imprisoned except in accordance with the law. The 
presumption of innocence is the right of every person, including the accused, 
and this principle is protected by the constitution, which is the Quran and 
Sunnah, in Saudi Arabia according to the above-mentioned Articles. 
Taking all of the above into account, Baderin explains that ‘this is a major 
omission, considering the fact that the presumption of innocence of an 
accused person is recognised and greatly emphasised under the general 
principles of Islamic law'.79 He adds that Saudi domestic courts are obliged to 
apply the general principles of Islamic law.
80 Furthermore, this principle is 
included in the legislative texts of Saudi laws, although not explicitly. The 
principle of the presumption of innocence is implicitly referred to in the Basic 
Law of Governance in Article 36, which emphasises that freedoms should not 
be restricted except in accordance with the law.81 
The principle of presumption of innocence is based on two main factors: the 
first is the right of society for the accused to receive a fair trial; the second is 
 
76
 Mashood A Baderin, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process 
under International Human Rights Law and Saudi Arabian Domestic Law’ (2007) 10(3) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 241. 
77 See chapter four of this study. 
78 The Basic Law of Governance Article 1 says that ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully 
sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book 
of God and the Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be 
upon him (PBUH). Its language shall be Arabic, and its capital shall be the city of Riyadh.’ 
79
 Baderin (n 76) 262. The principles of law had been discussed in this thesis in chapter 
four.  
80
 Ibid.  
81 The Basic Law Article 36 says that ‘The State shall provide security to all its citizens and 
residents. A person’s actions may not be restricted, nor may he be detained or imprisoned, 
except under the provisions of the Law.’ 
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the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until he/she is proven guilty 
under the law. 82  Thus, the provisions of criminal procedural law must 
guarantee a balance between these two rights.83 
 
8.3.2 Protection from Prohibited Acts 
8.3.2.1 Protection from Killing  
Saudi domestic laws do not explicitly codify the right to life. However, Article 
26 of the Basic Law of Governance explains that ‘The State shall protect 
human rights in accordance with the Islamic Sharí‘ah.’ Thus, the right to life is 
derived from Islamic law. The right to life is the first right in Islamic law for 
individuals because it is granted by Allah to a person, and no one has the right 
to remove it; only Allah has the right to take it.84 This right is guaranteed by 
three principles. The first is that the individual must preserve themselves and 
not seek to kill themselves, according to the following Quranic verse: ‘And do 
not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful.’85 
The second principle is responsibility to the community in accordance with the 
following Quranic verse: ‘And do not kill the soul which Allah has forbidden, 
except by right. And whoever is killed unjustly.’86 The third principle is the 
responsibility of the state. The state must protect the lives of individuals in 
society through its mechanisms and authorities, through enactment of laws 
and the implementation of punishments imposed by Islamic law.87 
These elements are considered in Saudi Arabian domestic laws as follows. 
a) Adopting the Quran and Sunnah as the constitution of the state in 
accordance with Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance, which reads as 
follows: ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. 
Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the 
Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be 
upon him (PBUH). Its language shall be Arabic, and its capital shall be the city 
of Riyadh. This principle does not differentiate between people in the society 
and shall be applied to all according to the Quranic verse, "And We ordained 
for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear 
 
82




 Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī, Ḥuqūq al-ʾinsān fī al-ʾislām (Dār al-Kalām al-Ṭayb, Beirut 1424H) 
143. 
85 The Quran 4:29. 
86 Ibid 17:33. 
87
 Hani Tua'ymāt, Huquq al-Insan wa al-ḥuriyāt al-a’sasi’yāh (Dār al-Shurūq Jorden 
2001)115 (Arabic source). 
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for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever 
gives [up his right as] charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not 
judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the wrongdoers".’88 
 
b) Islamic law permits certain prohibited acts if these acts can save one’s own 
life or the life of another person from imminent death. For example, eating 
pork is permitted if no other food apart from pork is available. Another example 
is drinking alcohol. Islamic law allows drinking alcohol in the event of imminent 
death if there is nothing else available to drink or to save a life. Another 
example is not fasting at Ramadan if this could lead to illness or death.89 
 
c) The right to life is enshrined in Article 26 of the Basic Law of Governance, 
which deems that ‘the State shall protect human rights in accordance with the 
Islamic Sharí‘ah.’ The exception to this is the death penalty as issued by 
judicial ruling from a competent independent court after a fair trial.  
 
d) Punishments for qiṣáṣ must pass through several stages: a) the ruling must 
be issued by three judges in the Pre-trial Court, b) it must be reviewed by five 
judges in the Court of Appeal, c) the ruling must be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, d) then all documents must be submitted to the King to issue a royal 
order to the executive authorities to implement the sentence.90 
 
 
8.3.2.2 The Protection of Dignity 
The protection of dignity is affirmed in Saudi domestic law. The latter derives 
all human rights from Islamic law, which honours individuals’ dignity as stated 
in the following Quranic verse: ‘And We have certainly honoured the children 
of Adam and carried them on the land and sea and provided for them of the 
good things and preferred them over much of what We have created, with 
[definite] preference.’ 91  Thus, Saudi law provides for the preservation of 
human dignity through the following mechanisms.  
a) From a criminal procedural legal perspective. Saudi Criminal Procedural 
Law obliges domestic authorities (such as the police, investigative authorities, 
or public prosecution authorities) to respect human dignity and prevent 
 
88
 The Quran 5:45. 
89 al-Zuḥaylī (n 84) 21-22. 
90
 Criminal Procedural Law Article 10 states that ‘All court rulings issued by the Court of 
Appeal in cases of murder, stoning, cutting, and retribution must be brought to the Supreme 
Court.’ This is even in cases where the plaintiff or prosecutor does not object to the ruling; 
Criminal Procedural Law Article 195; Criminal Procedural Law Article 227 says that ‘All 
sentences issued for killing, cutting or stoning or qiṣáṣ must be submitted to the King prior to 
their execution in order to issue an order for implementation.’ 
91 The Quran 17:70. 
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physical or mental harm.
92
 The same law also prevents torture or degrading 
treatment at the time of arrest, inspection, or investigation. This is according 
to Article 2, which says that ‘it is prohibited to commit physical or mental abuse 
against the arrested person, and also to be subjected to torture or degrading 
treatment'. 
b) In the Basic Law of Governance. Saudi laws establish a moral basis for the 
domestic media, whether newspapers, television, radio, or social media, by 
preserving the dignity of individuals for preventing abuse against the dignity 
of others and not compromising them in any degrading manner. This is 
according to Article 39 of the Basic law, which states the following. 
Mass and publishing media and all means of expression shall use decent 
language and adhere to State laws. They shall contribute towards 
educating the nation and supporting its unity. Whatever leads to sedition 
and division or undermines the security of the State or its public relations 
or is injurious to the honour and rights of man, shall be prohibited. Laws 
shall set forth provisions to achieve this. 
These principles are also enshrined in Anti-Cyber Crime Law to prevent 
spying into other people’s personal lives.93 
c) At international level. Saudi Arabia has ratified the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
This treaty has become domestic law and affirms that the state is committed 
to protecting dignity and preventing torture and all inhumane and degrading 
treatment.94 
 
8.3.2.3 Unlawful Deportation and Forced Transport  
The forced deportation of people is prohibited in Saudi domestic law. This 
prohibition is derived from Islamic law, which affirms the right of a person to 
live peacefully, and affirms the right to free movement. The Quran states that 
‘It is He who made the earth tame for you - so walk among its slopes and eat 
of His provision - and to Him is the resurrection.’95 The same right is expressed 
in the Sunnah, in Sahefat Al-Medina (the first constitution in Islam) as written 
by the Prophet, when he says, ‘Whoever enters the city is safe and whoever 
 
92
 Criminal Procedural Law Articles 2 and 3. 
93
 Articles 3 and 4 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law were established by Royal Decree No M/17 
26 March 2007. 
94
 On 23 September 1997, Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (New York, 10 December 1984, 
entered into force on 26 June 1987). 
95
 The Quran 67:15. 
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comes out of it is safe.’96 Islamic law also affirms the right of free movement; 
in this regard, the severe punishment ḥirábah is imposed for armed robbery 
in order to protect travellers from roadside thieves.97 
The Basic Law of Governance mentions the right to live peacefully and have 
freedom of movement in Article 36, which says that ‘The State shall provide 
security to all its citizens and residents. A person’s actions may not be 
restricted, nor may be detained or imprisoned, except under the provisions of 
the Law.’ Moreover, Article 2 of Criminal Procedural Law states that ‘no one's 
actions, arrest or detention shall be restricted except under the provisions of 
the Law'. 
The right of individuals to free movement and protection from forced transport 
is an important right in most societies. It is needed in order to secure political 
and economic stability.98 In addition, the state also stresses the right of the 
family to protect its family members, as mentioned in Article 10, which explains 
that the forcible transfer of children from their parents or relatives goes against 
the child’s right to care. 99  This kind of domestic legislation regulates 
relationships between individuals and the state, and between individuals 
themselves, and goes hand in hand with legislation relating to the economy, 
politics, education, and health.  
 
8.3.2.4 Protection from Unlawful Imprisonment  
Unlawful imprisonment and physical deprivation of liberty are explicitly 
prohibited in Saudi domestic laws. The prohibition of these unlawful acts can 
be found in three main legal provisions. Article 38 of the Basic Law of 
Governance states that ‘punishment shall be carried out on a personal basis. 
There shall be no crime or punishment except on the basis of a Sharí‘ah or a 
statutory provision, and there shall be no punishment except for deeds 
subsequent to the effectiveness of a statutory provision.’ Furthermore, Article 
36 of the same law stipulates that ‘a person’s actions may not be restricted, 
nor may he be detained or imprisoned, except under the provisions of the 
 
96 Abd al-Malik Ibn Hishām, Sīrat al-Nabī ṣallá Allāhu ʻalayhi wa-sallam (Dār al-Qal‘am Egypt 
1424 H) 102 (Arabic source). 
97
 See chapter four for more information about ḥirábah punishments. There are exceptional 
cases where forced deportation can be applied as follows: (i) as punishment for an offender 
who commits a crime of ziná’, and (ii) where there is a contagious disease that is spreading 
between people. 
98
 Nasar al-Buqmi, Ḥuqūq al-ʾinsān fī al-ʾislām wa-Taṭbīqātihā fi al-Anzimāh a-Sudiyāh 
(Maktabat al-Malik Fahad al-Waṭaniyyah, Riyadh 2005) 155 (Arabic source). 
99
 The Basic Law Article 10 provides that ‘The State shall endeavour to strengthen family 
bonds, maintain its Arab and Islamic values, care for all its members, and provide conditions 
conducive to the development of their talents and abilities.’ 
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Law'. Finally, Article 2 of Criminal Procedural Law affirms that the unlawful 
imprisonment or physical deprivation of the liberty of individuals is prohibited, 
except in accordance with the law.100 
8.3.3 Considering Article 81 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance  
 Before discussing issues of inconsistency between the Rome Statute and 
Saudi domestic laws in the next section, it is important to elucidate the context 
of Article 81 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance. The Article states that 'the 
enforcement of this Law shall not prejudice whatever treaties and agreements 
with states and international organisations and agencies to which the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is committed'. This Article concerns the Saudi government's 
international obligations with the international community, especially with 
respect to international treaties and conventions. Thus, an agreement or a 
treaty that is signed by the Saudi government with a Muslim or non-Muslim 
state/organisation has its legal obligations at both domestic and international 
levels. This is based on two legal ideas. The first is derived from the Sharí‘ah 
concept of contractual commitment as set out in Quranic verse 5:1 as follows: 
‘O you who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts.' The second idea is that the 
Article, namely 81, provides that the provisions of the Basic Law of 
Governance should not affect any international conventions that the Saudi 
Government has ratified. Moreover, this Article indicates that all Articles of the 
Basic Law of Governance must not affect any international obligation to which 
the Saudi government has ratified, whether international treaties or bilateral. 
Consequently, it can be said that this explanation applies to all Saudi domestic 
laws, given that the Basic Law of Governance in Saudi Arabia is at the top of 
the legal pyramid of the state; thus, all Saudi domestic laws should not affect 










100 Criminal Procedural Law Article 2 provides that ‘no one's actions, arrest or detention shall 
be restricted except under the provisions of the Law'. 
- 287 - 
8.4 Inconsistencies with the Rome Statute 
8.4.1 The Extradition of a Muslim to be Tried Before a Non-Muslim 
Court 
There are obligations upon state parties of the Rome Statute to cooperate with 
the Court in respect of the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its 
jurisdiction.
101 The Rome Statute Article 89(1) explains the mechanisms of the 
surrender of persons to the Court as follows.  
The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, 
together with the material supporting the request outlined in Article 91, to 
any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall 
request the co-operation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such 
a person. State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part, 
and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest 
and surrender.
102  
This Article requires State parties of the Statute to cooperate with Court 
requests for the surrender and/or arrest of accused persons. Article 87(5)(b) 
also requires non-state parties to co-operate with the requests of the Court as 
follows. 
Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoc 
arrangement or an agreement with the Court, fails to co-operate with 
requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, the Court may 
so inform the Assembly of State Parties or, where the Security Council 
referred the matter to the Court, the Security Council.
103  
The extradition or surrender of a Muslim accused by a Muslim country to a 
non-Muslim state or court to be prosecuted may be not allowed in Islamic law, 
as well as Saudi domestic law, if the latter does not have an extradition treaty 
with another state, or more than one state, or with an international 
organisation, depending on Article 81 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance. 
However, Articles 87(5) and 87(7) of the Rome Statute do not talk about the 
procedures that the Security Council may apply to a non-state party that does 
not cooperate with the Court’s request. The question is left open as to whether 
 
101
 The Rome Statute Article 86; The Rome Statute Article 102 provides an explanation of 
the terms of surrender and extradition as follows: ‘(a) "surrender" means the delivering up of 
a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute; (b) "extradition" means the 
delivering up of a person by one State to another as provided by treaty, convention or 
national legislation.’ 
102
 The Rome Statute Article 89. 
103
 The Rome Statute Article 87(5)(b). 
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the Security Council will take further measures or enact international 
obligations.  
In Islamic law, the extradition of a Muslim person living in a Muslim state to a 
non-Muslim state, or to a non-Muslim organisation whether or not 
international, has raised debate among Muslim jurists. Their main concern is 
that the court to which the accused is extradited will not apply Islamic law and 
its punishments.  
The majority of Islamic jurists believe that Islamic law has authority and 
sovereignty in Islamic countries. Thus, there is no other legal power or 
influence within Islamic states. They argue that if international 
conventions/courts are not derived from Sharí‘ah and do not apply Islamic 
law's procedures and punishments, the extradition of a Muslim person from a 
Muslim state to a non-Muslim state is not allowed.
104
 This is based on the 
following Quranic verse: ‘and never will Allah give the disbelievers over the 
believers a way [to overcome them]’.
105 A second group of jurists argue that it 
may be possible to extradite a Muslim person living in a Muslim state to a non-
Muslim court based on what the Prophet agreed in the Treaty of Al-
Hudaibyiah.
106  This Treaty says that 'any Muslim man coming from the 
Quraysh to join the Muslims would be sent back but any man going from the 
Muslims to Quraysh would not be sent back.'
107 The Prophet sent Abu Basir 
and Abu Jandal back to Quraysh when they left Mecca without permission 
from their tribe, the Quraysh. The Prophet resorted to this decision as a basis 
for permitting extradition in the Treaty of Hudaibyiah.
108 The first group of 
jurists argue against the second group, stating that this incident was dealt with 
by the Prophet Mohammed, but was not meant to be undertaken after his 
death, because of the need for the Muslim community to undertake ḥajj 
(pilgrimage). They argue that the Prophet wanted to show how tolerant Islam 
was. Thus, extradition or the surrender of persons to other courts is not 
 
104
 These jurists are Abo Hanifa, Ahmed al-Kasani, and al-Mauardi; see Bilāl Ṣaffī al-Dīn wa 
ʾanwar Ṣaṭūf, ‘al-Jarāʾim al-Musnadah ʾ ilā Walī al-ʾmr al-Muslim wa-Ikhtiṣāṣ al-Maḥkamah al-
Jināʾiyyah al-Dawliyyah fī Muḥākamatihi ʿalayhā min Manẓūr al-Fiqh al-Jināʾī al-ʾislā’ (2011) 
27 Majalat Dimashq li-Lʿulūm al-ʾiqtiṣādiyyah wa-Lqānūniyyah 365 (Arabic source). However, 
based on the sovereignty principles in international law, if a Muslim living in a non-Muslim 
state has commited a crime in violating its national laws, he or she can be prosecuted by its 
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 The Quran 4:141. 
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 See Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, ‘The Concept of Treaty in Islamic Jurisprudence: A 
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information about The Treaty of Al-Hudaibyiah, see chapter three of this study.   
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regulated in Saudi domestic law. However, this matter is dealt with in the Arab 
Agreement 1983, which the Saudi Government adheres to and implements in 
its territories. 
Saudi Arabia does not operate domestic legislation with respect to the 
extradition or surrender of its citizens to another state or court. Its domestic 
law of criminal procedure is silent in this respect in relation to both citizens 
and/or residents. However, Saudi Arabia ratified the Riyadh Arab Agreement 
for Judicial Co-operation in 1983.
109 This Agreement prohibits the surrender 
or extradition of Saudi citizens who have committed crimes in the territories of 
any state party of the Agreement, unless the state agrees to prosecute the 
offender in its domestic courts. This is stipulated in Article 39, which reads as 
follows. 
Each of the contracting parties may refuse to extradite its nationals 
provided that it undertakes within the limits covered by its jurisdiction to 
charge whichsoever such national who has committed crimes punishable 
by law in the territories of any other contracting party, whenever the laws 
of the two states concerned impose a deprivate penalty of at least one 
year, or if a more severe penalty is foreseen in the laws of any of the two 
contracting parties, once the other contracting party issues a request for 
legal prosecution accompanied by the appropriate files, documents and 
information in its possession. The requesting party shall be notified of 
measures taken in this regard. 
Article 41 of the Agreement defines crimes that are not subject to the 
provisions of the Agreement. It stipulates that no extradition may be carried 
out in the following cases. 
a) 'If the crime for which extradition is requested is considered by the laws of 
the requested party as a crime of a political nature.’ (This paragraph is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Article VII. The latter stipulates that 
‘Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered 
as political crimes for the purposes of extradition. The Contracting Parties 
pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their 
laws and treaties in force.') 




 The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Co-operation (6 April 1983) available at 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 20 February 2019.  
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c) If the crime for which extradition requested was committed in the territory 
of the requested party, except when such crime has caused damage to the 
interests of the requesting party and its laws stipulate that the perpetrators of 
such crime be prosecuted and punished. 
d) If the crime has been the subject of a final judgment by the requesting party. 
e) If the legal action, at the time of receipt of the request for extradition, has 
lapsed or has been revoked, or the penalty has lapsed by the passage of time 
in accordance with the laws of the requesting party. 
f) If the crime has been committed outside the territories of the requesting 
party by a person not carrying its nationality, and the law of the requested 
party does not provide for prosecution of such a person when this crime is 
committed outside its territory.  
g) If an amnesty has been issued by the requesting party. (This paragraph is 
inconsistent with the Rome Statute, which does not give amnesty for crimes 
within its jurisdiction. The Preamble to the Rome Statute states ‘the Purposes 
and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all 
States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations'.) 
h) If charges relating to any crime have been made in the territory of the 
requested party, or if a judgment had been passed in respect of such crime in 
the territory of a third contracting party. 
In the application of the provisions of this Agreement, the following crimes, 
even when they have a political purpose, shall not be considered crimes of a 
political nature in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Article.  
a) Assault on Kings and Presidents of the contracting parties or their wives or 
their ascendants or descendants. 
b) Assault on heirs apparent or vice-presidents of the contracting parties. 
c) Murder and robbery committed against individuals, authorities, or means of 
transport and communications. 
Article 41 of the 1983 Agreement describes crimes that are not subject to 
extradition rules. One of these exceptions is when the crime is committed in 
accordance with military obligations by military men. The Article states, ‘if the 
crime for which extradition requested is limited to a breach of military 
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duties.’
110  This Article is inconsistent with Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
because crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC are mostly committed by 
military superiors or commanders of state, or soldiers who serve in military 
operations. 
Some points arise from the above provisions. The first is that most Muslim 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, have ratified the UN Charter, which binds 
signed up Islamic countries to international rules and principles, whether or 
not the sources of these rules and principles are derived from Islamic law. 
Thus, in this context, and in theory, Muslim countries must adhere to these 
international rules, even when the source of law is not Islamic law. The second 
point here is that most Muslim countries have also ratified the four Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols, which allow the extradition and prosecution 
of prisoners of war in their countries. This indicates an acceptance of the 
extradition of prisoners of war to non-Muslim countries. The third point 
concerns instances where crimes are committed by non-Muslim persons in 
the territories of Muslim countries.  
 
8.4.2 Applying the Provisions of the Rome Statute instead of Sharí‘ah   
Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute states the following: 
‘Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes at the first place.’ This 
sentence indicates that all member states must adhere to the prosecution of 
perpetrators, whether or not the perpetrators are citizens of the parties to the 
Court. Furthermore, if the authorities of the state where the crimes have been 
committed are unable or unwilling to prosecute the perpetrators who have 
committed crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, the Court's jurisdiction will still 
arise. This is in accordance with Article 17(1), which reads as follows. 
Having regard to Paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court 
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or the prosecution. 
b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
 
110
 ibid Article 41(b). 
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the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute.  
Thus, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is based on the 
principles of complementarity.
111
 However, Articles 1, 46, and 48 of Saudi 
Basic Law preclude applying any laws or regulations that are inconsistent with 
Sharí‘ah, even though there is compatibility between Islamic law and the 
Rome Statute with respect to prohibiting heinous crime against humanity.
112 
These Articles oblige Saudi domestic courts to apply the provisions of Islamic 
law, even though the provisions of Islamic law may not be applied by other 
non-Saudi courts.  
 
8.4.3 The Issue of Applicable Punishments  
Applicable punishments are outlined in the ICC Treaty in Article 77 as follows.  
a) Subject to Article 110,
113
 the Court may impose one of the following 
penalties on a person convicted of a crime referred to in Article 5 of this 
Statute: i) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not 
exceed a maximum of 30 years; or ii) A term of life imprisonment when 
justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person. 
b) In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order: i) A fine under the 
criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; ii) A forfeiture 
of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that 
crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. 
Looking at the above, it is clear that there is incompatibility between the 
punishments determined by Sharí‘ah, as adopted by Saudi domestic courts, 
and punishments meted out in accordance with the ICC Statute. Saudi Arabia 
applies Sharí‘ah punishments as they are outlined in the main sources of the 
Quran and the Sunnah. These Sharí‘ah punishments are classified according 
to ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ crimes, all which are explained in chapter four of this study. 
Furthermore, Article 81 of the Basic Law of Governance states that ‘the 
enforcement of this Law shall not prejudice whatever treaties and agreements 
with states and international organisations and agencies to which the Kingdom 
 
111
 See Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute, which states ‘that the International 
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions'. 
112
 Saudi Basic Law Article 48 stipulates that ‘The courts shall apply to cases before them the 
provisions of Islamic Sharia, as indicated by the Quran and the Sunnah, and whatever laws 
not in conflict with the Quran and the Sunnah which the authorities may promulgate.’ 
113 ibid Article 110 relates to the reduction of sentences.  
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of Saudi Arabia is committed'.
114 Thus, the following question arises: if the 
Saudi Government ratified the ICC Statute, what jurisdiction for punishments 
shall be applied?  
It can be argued that there are two main interpretations in respect of 
jurisdictional punishments. The first is a narrow interpretation and the second 
is a broad interpretation. The narrow interpretation deems that the Saudi 
judicial system must judge cases that fall within its jurisdiction, as well as those 
that fall under ICC jurisdiction, under Islamic law. The broad interpretation of 
Saudi law deems that cases can be dealt with under the jurisdiction of the ICC 
under the Rome Treaty, since ratification of the Treaty forms part of a contract 
in Islamic law, which must be respected in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic law. 
 
8.4.4 The Right of the Prosecutor of the ICC to Initiate an Investigation 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute explains that the jurisdiction of the Court 
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions of the member 
states, and that each member state can exercise its own national criminal 
jurisdiction over individuals responsible for committing crimes that fall under 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The Rome Statute grants permissions for the 
Prosecutor to start an investigation by either a) referring it from the member 
state or b) obtaining the permission of the Pre-trial Chamber of the Court or 
the Security Council.
115
 Thus, the Prosecutor of the Court has the right to 
initiate a lawsuit, start an investigation, and gather evidence by himself or 
herself, according to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, after he or she receives 
authorisation from the Pre-trial Chamber I.
116 Article 54(3) explains the powers 
and duties of the Prosecutor as follows. 
a) To collect and examine evidence. 
b) To request the presence of and question persons being investigated, 
and victims and witnesses. 
 
114 The Saudi Basic Law Article 81.  
115
 The Rome Statute Articles 13 and 14. 
116 The Rome Statute Article 15 (3) states that ‘If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber a request for authorisation of an investigation, together with any supporting material 
collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.’ 
- 294 - 
c) To seek the Co-operation of any State or inter-governmental 
organisation or arrangement in accordance with its respective competence 
and/or mandate. 
d) To enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with 
this Statute, as may be necessary to facilitate the co-operation of a State, 
inter-governmental organisation or person. 
e) To agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents 
or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality 
and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider 
of the information consents.  
f) To take necessary measures, or request that necessary measures be 
taken, to ensure the confidentiality of information, the protection of any 
person or the preservation of evidence. 
In light of the above, the role of the Prosecutor in the Rome Statute may 
conflict with the provisions of Saudi domestic law. Article 46 of the Basic Law 
of Governance stipulates that ‘the Judiciary system shall be an independent 
authority. There shall be no power over judges in their judicial function other 
than the power of the Islamic Sharí‘ah.’ Furthermore, Article 1 of Saudi 
Criminal Procedural Law provides that the judicature is independent but has 
no authority or power to affect or amend judicature because paramount 
authority is derived from Sharí‘ah. This principle conflicts with Article 17, 
Paragraph 10 of the Preamble to, and Article 1 of, the Rome Statute with 
respect to the prosecutorial discretion of the ICC. However, this conflict must 
be understood in the context of measuring the inability of domestic judicature 
to deal with a case, and in cases where a Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court wants to initiate an investigation using his or her powers but, 
at the same time, the Saudi domestic authorities want to conduct the 
investigation. This may lead to a situation where the independence of the 
judiciary is compromised, because conducting an investigation is one of the 
most important processes of exercising judicial power, even though the 
Court’s jurisdiction would be classed as a complementary jurisdiction.  
Article 42 of Saudi Criminal Procedural Law prohibits processes connected 
with starting an investigation, except in cases provided for in the law and when 
permission has been issued by the Prosecution Authority. Thus, the only 
power able to begin an investigation under Saudi law is the Saudi Prosecution 
Authority. In this respect, the provisions of the Rome Statute seem to be in 
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conflict with Saudi Criminal Procedural Law in relation to conducting an 
investigation, even if the crime is within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
The Rome Statute is also not compatible with Saudi law in terms of the 
procedures it outlines in connection with collecting evidence and hearing 
witnesses. Saudi law gives the Saudi Public Prosecutor the right to collect 
evidence and hear witnesses without any influence or interference from an 
internal or external authority.  
Another contentious issue relates to when domestic courts are unable or 
unwilling to conduct an investigation of a crime committed in Saudi’s territories 
because of Article 17(a) of the Rome Statute. This Article contradicts Article 
44 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance, which reads as follows: ‘Authorities 
in the State shall consist of: the Judicial Authority, the Executive Authority, and 
the Regulatory Authority. These authorities shall cooperate in the discharge 
of their functions in accordance with this Law and other laws. The King shall 
be their final authority.’ The last sentence here indicates that when the 
judiciary is unable or unwilling to perform its duties, it is the King of Saudi 
Arabia who has the right to initiate an assessment of the judicial system. 
 
8.4.5 Political Asylum  
Genocide is prohibited under the provisions of the Rome Statute. This rule is 
derived from the provisions of the Genocide Convention (1948). The latter 
does not class genocide as a political crime for the purposes of extradition. 
Indeed, Article VII of this Convention provides that ‘genocide and the other 
acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the 
purpose of extradition'. 
Article 42 of the Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia states that the 
Saudi Government ‘shall grant political asylum if public interest so dictates. 
Laws and international agreements shall specify the rules and procedure for 
the extradition of ordinary criminals.’ The granting of political asylum is 
provided by the King in accordance with Article 42, which states that ‘the King 
shall be their final authority'. However, the meanings of ‘public interest’ and 
‘ordinary criminals’ are not clear. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
has ratified the Genocide Convention (1948) and so has an international 
commitment to extradite persons who have committed genocide to The 
International Criminal Court. This suggests that a reform of the terms of Article 
42 of the Basic Law of Governance is needed so that it reads as follows: ‘The 
State shall grant political asylum if public interest so dictates in line with the 
international conventions to which the Kingdom is a party. Laws and 
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international agreements shall specify the rules and procedures for the 
extradition of criminals.’  
 
8.4.6 The Right of a Victim’s Family to Initiate a Lawsuit 
In cases of murder or injury, under Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute, 
the ICC Prosecutor has the right to initiate an investigation after obtaining 
judicial permission from the Pre-Trial Chamber I in accordance with Articles 
56 and 59 of the Statute.
117 However, in Islamic law, the victim’s family or 
relatives have the right to initiate a lawsuit and to demand diyah (blood 
money)
118 as an alternative to the relevant qiṣáṣ punishment. Thus, the two 
approaches conflict. Articles 75 and 77 of the Rome Statute give rights to 
judges to impose the Court’s punishments and undertake an assessment of 
reparation.
119 However, Article 16 of Saudi Criminal Procedural Law reads as 
follows: ‘The victim or his/her representative or his heirs shall have the right 
to file a criminal action in all cases in which a special right is concerned and 




8.4.7 Women Judges 
Article 36 of the Rome Statute states that the Court has eighteen judges 
elected by the two-thirds of the Assembly of State Parties. It also states that 
these judges must be well-qualified and have experience working as a judge 
or prosecutor in international criminal law, human rights, or international 
humanitarian law.
121 The Statute does not discriminate based on gender when 
appointing judges. However, the question of whether women should work as 
judges remains an issue of controversy and debate among Muslim jurists.
122
 
It is only very recently that Saudi Arabia has begun to discuss the idea of 
appointing women to the judiciary, even though the Saudi judiciary does not 
specify gender in the requirements to be a judge. However, in 2013, the King 
appointed thirty women to serve on the Shüra Council.
123   
 
117 The Rome Statute Articles 56 and 59. 
118
 For more information about diyah, see chapter three of this study.  
119
 The Rome Statute Articles 75 and 77. 
120
 Criminal Procedural Law Article 16. 
121
 The Rome Statute Article 36(3). 
122
 International Islamic Fiqh Academy Resolution 211 (22/7) <http://www.iifa-
aifi.org/3993.html> accessed 20 February 2019 (Arabic source); Muḥammd al-Qurṭubī, 
Bidāyat al-Mujtathid wa-Nihāyat al-Maqāṣid (Dār al- Ḥadīth, Maṣr 2004). 
123
 Saudi Arabia’s King Appoints Women to the Shüra Council 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20986428> accessed 8 June 2019. Some 
Muslim countries allow a woman to serve as judge such as Kuwait, Tunisia, Malaysia, and 
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In Islamic law, Abu Hanifa, namely the Ḥanafí school of thought, believes that 
women are able to work as judges in relation to all cases that they share the 
right to testify in, with the exception of ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ crimes.124 al-Tabari 
argues that if women are able to interpret the law as a Mufti, then women can 
work as judges in the same capacity as outlined by Abu Hanifa. This is 
because the requirements for working as a Mufti are as stringent as those 
needed for working as a judge. This school of thought also notes that Aisha, 
the wife of the Prophet, acted as a Mufti of the Caliphs after the death of the 
Prophet on issues of inheritance.125 However, all other Muslim schools of 
thought traditionally believe that women should not be allowed to work as a 
judge.126 This is based on the following Quranic verse: ‘Men are in charge of 
women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they 
spend [for maintenance] from their wealth.’
127  
Furthermore, in respect of the judiciary, if the Saudi Government ratified the 
entire Rome Statute and the ICC wanted to select judges from Saudi Arabia, 
this would pose problems because, currently, most Saudi judges are only 
conversant in, and have experience of, applying Islamic law and not 
international law. Indeed, most Saudi judges are not conversant in the 
aforementioned system of law but specialise in Islamic law. 
 
8.4.8 Accepting Amendments to the Rome Statute   
The Court Statute gives rights to any state party, its judges (by majority), and 
the Prosecutor of the Court to suggest amendments relating to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence in accordance with Article 51.
128 Paragraph 6 of 
 
Syria. While some countries do not allow this; for example, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, 
UAE, and Qatar. 
124 Karen Bauer, ‘Debates on Women's Status as Judges and Witnesses in Post-Formative 




 The Quran 4:34. 
128
 The Rome Statute Article 51 stipulates the following: ‘1. The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of the 
Assembly of States Parties. 
2. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be proposed by: (a) Any State 
Party; (b) The judges acting by an absolute majority; or (c) The Prosecutor. Such amendments 
shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly 
of States Parties. 3. After the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in urgent 
cases where the Rules do not provide for a specific situation before the Court, the judges 
may, by a two-thirds majority, draw up provisional Rules to be applied until adopted, amended 
or rejected at the next ordinary or special session of the Assembly of States Parties. 4. The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and any provisional Rule shall be 
consistent with this Statute. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as 
provisional Rules shall not be applied retroactively to the detriment of the person who is being 
investigated or prosecuted or who has been convicted.’ 
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Article 121 of the Rome Statute says that ‘If an amendment has been accepted 
by seven-eighths of State Parties in accordance with Paragraph 4, any State 
Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute 
with immediate effect, notwithstanding Article 127, Paragraph 1, but subject 
to Article 127, Paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year after the 
entry into force of such amendment.’ This Article indicates that when a state 
has ratified the Statute, but does not accept new amendments, it can either 
withdraw from the ratification or accept the amendments, if the amendments 
have been accepted by seven-eighths of the state parties.  
This Article, namely 121, of the Rome Statute is not compatible with the 
Procedures for Ratifying International Conventions as stated in Articles 6 and 
13 of the Procedures for Conclusion of International Treaties in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. Article 6 provides that ‘If the other party does not agree to the 
amendments that the Council of Ministers has seen, or requests that a party 
make substantive amendments to the Convention, the concerned body shall 
submit this to the Council of Ministers with its views thereon.’ Article 13 of the 
Procedures for Ratifying International Conventions states the following. 
The renewal, termination, withdrawal or suspension of the Agreement shall 
be in either of the following cases: (1) According to its provisions. (2) 
Agreement at any time with the Party or with other parties. Except in cases 
of automatic renewal or termination of the Convention in accordance with 
the provisions thereof, the concerned party shall submit to the Office of the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers in case of the renewal, termination, 
withdrawal or suspension of the Convention, or if it has received a request 
from the other Contracting State, This is done well in advance of the expiry 
date of the agreement, with reasons given. 
Under ICC rules, amendments that are suggested by a state party, by judges, 
or the Prosecutor can be accepted and enter into force if these amendments 
have been agreed by seven-eighths of the state parties of the ICC. If Saudi 
Arabia ratified the Rome Statute, but did not agree with a certain amendment, 
then it could either accept the amendment or withdraw from the Statute. Article 
121 paragraph 5 of the Rome Statute states the following.  
Any amendments to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall enter into force for those 
State Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a 
State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory. 
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Thus, in this context, the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction over a) land that 
is located in the territory of the state that has not accepted the amendments 
and b) citizens of the country that has rejected the amendments. 
Consequently, in this scenario some state parties have limited options with 
respect to amendments relating to rules, procedures, and evidence in the 
Treaty (namely either to accept or to withdraw). Any amendment to Articles 5, 
6, 7, and 8 in relation to rules, procedures, and evidence put before the Court 
can only be accepted if the approval of seven-eighths of the state parties of 
the ICC is gained, and countries who object have only the options of either 
acceptance or withdrawal.  
 
 
8.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined Saudi domestic provisions compared with the 
provisions of the Rome Statute and has looked at inconsistent issues. Thus, 
in order to conclude this chapter, recommendations must be suggested that 
may work to solve these issues of inconsistency. To do this, two sources are 
consulted. The first is maslahah mursalah (public interest). The second is 
Article 81 of the Basic Law of Governance. maslahah mursalah is a means of 
the sources of Islamic law that is sometimes used to resolve problems relating 
to Islamic law, such as the extradition of a Muslim to a non-Muslim country or 
organisation. Furthermore, Article 81 of the Basic Law of Governance 
provides that ‘The enforcement of this Law shall not prejudice whatever 
treaties and agreements with states and international organisations and 
agencies to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed.’
129
 This article 
indicates that the provisions of the Basic Law of Governance do not always 
negate the provisions of international conventions that the Kingdom has 
ratified, and can be used to resolve problems of compatibility between Saudi 
domestic laws and other laws. 
Maslahah Mursalah (public interest) is used as a means of interpretation, 
ijtihad, by jurists who seek to offer proportionate interpretation in order to 
maintain the public interest based on the needs of a community. 130  It is 
described by Hallaq as ‘a rational’ principle that examines the public interest 
by protecting society from what is harmful and promoting what is appropriate. 
Thus, maslahah mursalah can be used to interpret the suitability of the public 
 
129 The Basic Law Article 81. 
130
 Natana J Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford 
University Press 2004) 103. 
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interest and ‘to conform to the spirit of the law’.131 Moreover, it is usually 
associated with necessary procedures not explicitly mentioned in the main 
sources of Islamic law.132 It is often used to reform legal texts and international 
treaties in order to maintain international peace and security between Muslim 
countries and other Muslim states.133  
Maslahah Mursalah considers changes over time but requires two 
fundamental conditions for its use: it must bring benefits and must protect from 
harm.134 The significance and application of maslahah mursalah lies in the 
interpretation made by jurists/scholars of contemporary issues that do not 
appear and are not mentioned in the sources of Islamic law, namely the 
Quran, the Sunnah, ijmá‘ (consensus), and qiyás (analogy). Jurists study 
these new cases and incidents, whether civil, commercial, criminal, economic, 
or international, in order to assess disadvantages and benefits that will accrue 
to Muslim society as well as to prevent harm.135 
 Maslahah Mursalah is classed as a means of the sources of Islamic law and, 
in terms of how it relates to international treaties, as one of the sources of 
international Islamic law. This is because an agreement between a Muslim 
state and a non-Muslim state or organisation is treated as a treaty in Islamic 
law. The concept of the treaty is derived from the idea of the contract (pacta 
sunt servanda). Entering into a contract obliges Muslims to follow the terms 
and conditions of the contract as the following Quranic verse says: ‘O you who 
have believed, fulfil [all] contracts.’
136
 Thus, an agreement signed between a 
Muslim state and a non-Muslim state/organisation has the same legal 
obligations that cover the idea of the contract as it is set out in the Quran.137 
The obligation of honouring a contract was referred to in Roman law as pacta 
sunt servanda, namely the contract is the law of parties.138 Thus, it is possible 
to class the Rome Statute as a contract.   
 
131
 Wael Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge Unversity Press 2009) 25. 
132
 Delong-Bas (n 130).   
133
 Muhammed al Tahir ibn Ashur, Treaties on Maqasid (The International Institute of Islamic 
Thought 2006) 131. 
134 Abdallah Ṣāliḥ ‘al-Maṣlaḥah al-Mursalah wa-Taṭbīqātihā’ (2000) 15 (1) Majalt Dimashq 
Damascus 354 (Arabic source). 
135
 al-Tahir ibn Ashur (n133). 
136
 The Quran 5:1. 
137
 Michael Lecker, The Constitution of Medina Muhammed First Legal Document: Studies 
in Late Antiquity and Early Islam (The Drawn Press Inc 2004) 80-91. 
138
 The Oxford Law Dictionary refers to this Latin term as ‘Agreements are to be kept; 
treaties should be observed; pacta sunt servanda is the bedrock of the customary 
international law of treaties and, according to some authorities, the very foundation of 
international law. Without such an acceptance, treaties would become worthless.’ 
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Although some provisions of Saudi domestic laws are not consistent with the 
provisions of the Rome Statute, Article 81 of the Basic Law of Governance 
covers contentious points that may arise if the Kingdom wants to proceed to 
ratify the Rome Statute. In addition, the main principles, jurisdiction, and 
objectives of the Rome Statute are consistent with the main provisions of 
Islamic law, namely preventing heinous crimes against humanity and 
punishing perpetrators to achieve peaceful coexistence among the countries 
of the world. Thus, maslahah mursalah could be applied by the Shüra Council 
in Saudi Arabia because one of its responsibilities, according to Article 15, is 
‘revising laws and regulations, international treaties and agreements, 
concessions, and providing whatever suggestions it deems appropriate'.
139
  
The Saudi Arabian government can resort to maslahah mursalah (public 
interest) to reconsider the aforementioned inconsistencies. For instance, the 
extradition issue in relation to the ratification of the Rome Statute (if the 
government ratified the Rome Statute). The application of maslahah mursalah 
can be understood, as explained earlier, in the context of when the Prophet 
signed the Treaty of Al-Hudaibyiah with the non-Muslim community in Mecca, 
namely the Quraysh tribe. In the Treaty of Al-Hudaibyiah, the Prophet 
considered the public interest of the Muslim community to do ḥajj (pilgrimage). 
Signing this treaty was favourable to both parties because it sought to 
maintain peace and security between them; moreover, each community of the 
parties could practise its own worship. A current example of applying and 
considering maslahah mursalah to be a means in Islamic law for 
demonstrating the good office of the Saudi government in joining the 
international arena by ratifying international treaties that maintain peace and 
security, and to show the tolerance of Islam, is the government's ratification of 
the Genocide Convention and the Fourth Geneva Conventions, both of which 
are significant parts of the Rome Statute in Articles 6 and 8. Consequently, 
this thesis suggests that the Saudi government should consider the 'public 
interest' interpretation and application to overcome inconsistencies between 
its domestic laws and the Rome Statute through the Saudi Shüra Council. This 
is based on Article 81 of the Basic Law of Governance, which gives a strong 
legal statement for the Saudi government whereby it is bound by the 
international agreements that it has ratified and shall not violate commitments 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards other states, international 
organizations, and bodies. Thus, if the Saudi government has ratified the 
 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100300496> 
accessed on 27 February 2019.  
139
 Article 15 of Shüra Council Law in Saudi Arabia. 
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Rome Statute, its citizens or residents who have committed international 
crimes within the ICC jurisdiction should be extradited to the ICC when Saudi 
domestic courts cannot deal with such crimes. 
Moreover, the Saudi government is a member of The Organisation of Islamic 
Co-operation. The Charter of this organisation provides that all member states 
should ‘contribute to international peace and security, understanding and 
dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions, and promote and 
encourage friendly relations and good neighbourliness, mutual respect and 
Co-operation’.
140
 Thus, it is possible to deem that the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia's ratification of the Treaty of Rome can be achieved by applying 
maslahah mursalah (public interest).  
 
140 The Organisation of Islamic Co-operation was established in 1969 <https://www.oic-
oci.org/home/?lan=en> accessed on 14 May 2019; paragraph 8 of the Charter of the OIC. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
The research presented in this study has shown that there is compatibility 
between the principles of law and jurisdiction of both Islamic law and the Rome 
Statute. It is with regard to noted obstacles to ratifying the Rome Statute by the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which are mainly of a procedural nature such as 
extradition, the employability of women judges, the right of the victim’s family to 
initiate a lawsuit, the right of the prosecutor of the ICC to initiate an investigation, 
and political asylum, that incompatibilities arise. The aim of this study is to focus 
on substantive law and explore the extent to which there are similarities and 
commonalities between the principles underpinning Islamic international law 
and the law of the Rome Statute. A further aim is to suggest reforms to the Saudi 
government if there is a desire to ratify the Rome Statute. 
 
9.1 The Commonalities Between the Other Tiers of Sources of Both Legal 
Systems 
Although the main sources of the Rome Statute and Islamic law differ, there are 
commonalities between the sources of both legal systems in terms of 
international treaties, general principles, and custom. Compatibility also 
appears in terms of the concepts and philosophies used in both legal systems. 
In this context, differences between the two legal systems do not necessarily 
add up to a fundamental lack of commonality in the objectives and principles 
applied in both. Indeed, the commonalities between the two systems reveal the 
following picture at an international level: a) a respect for the importance of the 
existence of the sources of both legal systems used in international treaties, and 
b) a respect for the diversity of sources in Islamic law and international criminal 
law. This picture reveals a desire to preserve the security of mankind, ensure 
peace, respect human rights, and employ preventive international tools against 
people who seek to commit crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. 
The commonalities between the other tiers of sources in terms of jurisprudence, 
analysis, and the evaluation by scholars and researchers, works to encourage 
the development of both legal systems for maintaining international security and 
stability.  
International conventions constitute a core source of international law in terms 
of demonstrating commitment to the provisions of various conventions at an 
international and national level. The commitment is based on the pacta sunt 
servanda principle. This principle provides that the parties of the contracts must 
be committed to the provisions and terms of the contracts. The concept of 
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commitment to international conventions in Islamic international law falls under 
the concept of agreements that shall be fulfilled, as noted in Quranic verse 5:1, 
which indicates that contracts are binding on parties, whether these parties are 
Muslim and/or non-Muslim, by its provisions. Thus, the commitment of 
international treaties is undeniable at the international level in accordance with 
Islamic international law provisions. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has complied with 
various international treaties and classes them as entering into a contract, which 
carries both legal and religious obligations. Thus, international treaties under 
Islamic international law are one of its most important sources. Moreover, 
Islamic international law has developed into an independent international body 
of law, despite differences in the civilizations, history, geography, and cultures 
of Muslims countries. Islamic international law, in general, reflects the 
substantial influence of the Islamic regions and peoples living in these countries, 
and in this context, Islamic international law is based on rational and academic 
methods.  
Compatibility could be understood in terms of the general principles as 
stipulated in Article 38(1)(c) of the International Court of Justice Statute. This 
Article provides that general principles that have been accepted and applied by 
civilised nations should be recognised as sources of international law. Since 
Islamic law is one of the major legal systems of the world, it could harmonise 
with and accommodate international rules. Islamic law represents Muslim 
civilised nations worldwide, and compatibility should be viewed in terms of the 
legality principle that is applied and accepted among the major legal systems in 
the world.  
Compatibility between international criminal law and Islamic law is notable in 
the use of custom as one of the sources of law. Custom is considered to be one 
of the oldest legal sources and is shaped by the practices of states and by opinio 
juris in international law. In Islamic law, customs are formed by what is 
unanimously agreed by those dealing with the law, especially those who are 
well-informed, such as jurists. Customary international law is one of the sources 
of international law. Islamic law recognises that a custom, whether domestic or 
international, can be the source of law if it does not contradict its provisions, 
namely the Quran and Sunnah. Such an identified custom relates to the 
reciprocity rule in international law: when a custom has been practised and 
accepted, it shall be fulfilled. This rule has been embedded in both legal 
systems, especially in diplomatic international law. The reciprocity rule is 
described in international law as a guide rule and has powerful support. A similar 
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notion exists in Islamic law in accordance with the following Quranic verse: ‘And 
if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah.’   
It is noted that the concept of consensus is one of the sources practised in 
Islamic law by the companions of the Prophet Mohammed and then by Muslim 
jurists throughout the ages. The concept has been used to discuss and agree 
upon a number of cases in order to attain justice and protect human rights. 
Moreover, the concept has been considered in meetings and discussions 
connected with international law, whether at the General Assembly of the United 
Nations or its sub-committees, or at meetings of the State Parties of the 
International Criminal Court. These meetings and discussions practised in both 
legal systems aim to promote effective co-operation among the states in the 
world in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security by opening up dialogue and discussion surrounding various 
embargoes, cultures, and religions. Thus, there are common values between 
the two legal systems that concur that the concept of meetings in international 
law and the concept of consensus in Islamic law through discussion and 
dialogue lead to an agreed opinion in order to protect mankind from any 
practices that violate people's rights. 
The confluence of the other tiers of sources in both legal systems constitutes a 
real harmony that is revealed through jurisprudence and debate among 
scholars, either by making comparisons or by discussing the sources of each 
law separately. This confluence reveals a shared aim to protect human beings. 
Hence, it is impossible to deny the existence of compatibility between the other 
tiers of sources of both legal systems, as well as certain mechanisms used to 
achieve justice. 
 
9.2 Compatibility Between General Principles of Law of Both Legal 
Systems 
The principles of Islamic criminal law and the Rome Statute are universal 
principles, respected in both legal systems. This is evident through the 
continuous emphasis of these principles at domestic, regional, and international 
levels, where we find that the majority of conventions/charters, whether regional 
or international, assert to include the same principles. These principles cover 
the full application of human rights from arbitrary arrest or detention, whether 
domestic or international. This study shows that certain shared principles are 
rooted both in Islamic criminal law and in the Rome Statute in the main sources 
of both legal systems. However, what distinguishes Islamic criminal law is that 
these same principles are stipulated in the Holy Quran and are ordained by 
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Allah. What distinguishes international criminal law, as exemplified by the Rome 
Statute, is that it requires agreed views from representatives of states to agree 
to the principles contained in international conventions.  
The promotion of the shared principles of Islamic criminal law and the Rome 
Statute works to protect human rights and to promote the concept of the rule of 
law at national, regional, and international levels. Thus, there is universal 
acceptance between both legal systems to apply certain principles, and to codify 
these principles as important rights. There is also a commitment from competent 
authorities to apply these principles to show their legal effect. Both legal systems 
are vibrant and share common principles and interests with other legal systems 
relating to human rights. 
The main features of Islamic criminal law are a) its inclusiveness of Muslim 
persons covered/addressed by the law and the application of the law's principles 
to Muslims and non-Muslims (both dhimmi and mu'ahid); b) its inclusiveness of 
territorial jurisdiction, which must be applied over all Muslim regions and Muslim 
countries; and c) its inclusiveness in ratione temporis jurisdiction, since these 
principles originate from the beginning of Islam and will continue until the Day 
of Resurrection. The problem faced by the ICC is that it may lose credibility and 
disappear if member States start to withdraw from the treaty. 
As discussed in chapter four of this study, the legality principles of no crime and 
no punishment without law are confirmed in both legal systems in order to 
protect individuals’ rights and respect the role of law. The application of these 
principles reflects the human rights of freedom in society. Thus, in both legal 
systems, prosecution and judicial authorities cannot proceed with the trial of a 
person if the law does not include the prohibited crime and its relevant 
punishment.  
The principle of presumption of innocence in Islamic criminal law begins with 
the birth of man and must be applied in all cases, whether criminal or financial. 
In the Rome Statute, the application of this principle begins at arrest and trial 
proceedings and is considered a procedural principle. Both legal systems 
confirm that reasonable doubt is not accepted as evidence to prosecute or 
convict the accused: thus, reasonable doubt is interpreted in favour of the 
accused. In addition, the burden of proof in both legal systems is placed upon 
the accuser or the prosecuting authority.  
The principle of non-retroactivity is confirmed by Allah in Islamic criminal law; 
thus, this principle must be respected, whether or not it is codified in the 
domestic laws of Muslim countries. All countries that apply Islamic law, whether 
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Islamic law is the main source or one of its sources, understand that it is the 
duty of judges and prosecutors to apply this principle. Both legal systems share 
exceptions relating to the non-retroactivity principle. In the Rome Statute, one 
exception can be when the law of the ICC is changed or amended before the 
release of a final judgment, during an investigation, or during prosecution from 
the Court. If the change in law favours the accused, the latter law shall be 
applied. Another exception in the Rome Statute is articulated in Article 17(2), 
which provides that when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute 
criminals or exercise their jurisdiction over crimes (within the ICC jurisdiction), 
the ICC will exercise its jurisdiction. In Islamic criminal law, there is one 
exception to the application of the principle of non-retroactivity. This exception 
belongs to the rights of the accused. This means that if the accused benefits 
from previous laws, their punishment will remain unchanged. 
The principle of non-prosecution/trial for the same offence twice, together with 
the principle of equality before the law, and the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility are covered in the main sources of Islamic criminal law and in the 
Rome Statute despite the existence of different interpretations and applications. 
There is a minor difference between Islamic criminal law and the Rome Statute 
in relation to the principle that a person shall not be tried twice for the same 
criminal conduct. The minor difference is that Islamic criminal law focuses on 
the work of previous courts and procedures, documents, and witnesses in the 
case as an exception to the application of the principle. However, Article 20 of 
the Rome Statute focuses on the work of the Court, meaning that if there is 
doubt about the fairness of the previous trial in respect of independence and 
impartially, this principle shall be applied.   
In relation to the principle of individual criminal responsibility, the discussion has 
revealed that some differences exist between both legal systems. However, in 
this respect, differences also exist between the jurists and scholars of Islamic 
criminal law, although it is undeniable that all views seek to represent ‘diversity 
within unity’.
1
 It has been also noted that both legal systems carry the same 
factual meaning of the principle of equality before the law, which means 
providing rights and opportunities as well as imposing duties equally to all 
individuals of society in terms of not distributing wealth, jobs, and education 
equally among individuals. 
 
 
1 Mohammed Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (3rd edn, The Islamic Texts Society 
1991)169. 
- 308 - 
9.3 Compatibility Between the Jurisdiction of the Rome Statute and 
Islamic International Law 
International rules governing armed conflict, whether internal or international, 
have emerged because of lessons learned about the kind of methods used by 
persons who seek to commit heinous crimes against humanity. These rules 
seek to prevent harm, prevent recurrence, and to protect innocent people. 
Crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are criminalised 
under Islamic international law and the Rome Statute. Both legal systems offer 
protections to civilians in times of peace or armed conflict. This compatibility is 
undeniable and covers the criminalisation and prosecution of international 
crimes. 
The main source of Islamic international law offers provisions that prohibit 
attacks against, and fighting with, non-combatants because Allah says, ‘And 
fight in the way of God those who fight against you.' However, some jurists view 
that if non-combatants play a role in fighting a Muslim army in an actual battle 
and are captured alive, they must not be killed. Furthermore, if they constitute a 
danger to a Muslim army, or become involved in fighting, they lose their 
immunity. In international criminal law, attacking non-combatants during war is 
prohibited. With regard to the rights of civilians to receive a fair trial, the Rome 
Statute provides for this right in the detaining state, but Islamic international law 
provides for this right under its own laws.  
In relation to prisoners of war, the Rome Statute states that the killing of 
prisoners of war amounts to criminal conduct and is punishable. Islamic 
international law uses a comparable concept to prevent the killing of prisoners 
of war. This can be found within its main sources. However, Islamic international 
law is administered in accordance with the choices of the leader of an Islamic 
state based on certain criteria, such as releasing prisoners in exchange for a 
ransom, an exchange with Muslim prisoners, or a gratuity. In some cases, 
Muslim jurists permit the killing of prisoners of war if the prisoners constitute a 
danger to a Muslim community; for example, if they are working as spies against 
the Muslim community or pose a risk to the community.  
Islamic international law and the Roma Statute prohibit the destruction of 
property unless there is military necessity. With regard to human shields, 
Muslim jurists agree to attack the enemy when they are using a human shield if 
there is ‘military necessity’, but attacks on protected people should generally be 
avoided. This means that Muslim jurists may allow an attack but will not allow 
the killing of protected people because Islamic international law seeks to avoid 
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the targeting of protected people. However, any such attack is prohibited in the 
Rome Statute. 
In relation to crimes against humanity, Islamic international law may not rely on 
modern criminal terms that exist in the Rome Statute. However, it covers the 
rights of individuals. These rights must be respected and not violated in 
peacetime and/or during conflict. In addition, if these rights are violated, and 
when the crimes cannot be categorised under ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ, Islamic 
international law looks to the decisions of Muslim jurists and Muslim states, and 
considers the public interest of Muslim nations at an international and/or 
national level. Thus, there is compatibility between the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and those of Islamic international law in terms of criminalising and 
punishing crimes against humanity because both legal systems look to prohibit 
acts that violate fundamental human rights. However, although the Rome 
Statute includes a definition of crimes and describes elements of the crimes, 
Islamic international law prohibits crimes that violate inherent human rights, and 
leaves some punishments that are not mentioned in the main sources of Islamic 
law (ḥudúd or qiṣáṣ) to the discretion of jurists and/or to a Muslim state to set 
up definitions, elements, and punishments. In future, it may be necessary to 
codify crimes against humanity in Islamic international law. 
Islamic international law does not explicitly refer to the terms ‘genocide’ and 
'special intent'; however, it can be compared with international criminal law (the 
Rome Statute) under broad provisions prohibiting murder and acts constituting 
the physical element in the Rome Statute based on discrimination. This is 
because Islamic international law deems that genocide is prohibited under its 
provisions, whether or not these provisions have been recognised, or if certain 
acts have been criminalised at an international level. This means that Islamic 
international law prohibits crimes at all levels because its focus is on the 
prohibition of crimes per se, whether these are committed by authorities, states, 
a group of people, individuals, or militias (and whatever the basis for committing 
a crime). International criminal law recognises and defines that genocide must 
be committed systematically and organised with special intent against a group 
of people in whole or in part, and that these actions must threaten the existence 
of mankind at all levels and result in a serious threat to international peace and 
security. The Rome Statute deals with attempts to commit the crime of genocide 
as well as its actual realisation even if the result did not occur. While Islamic 
international law deems that crimes of genocide are not classed as ‘genocide’ 
unless the crimes have been committed in reality because Islamic international 
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law deems that human intention should not be punished, except in the hereafter, 
and because the terms of Islamic criminal law require a criminal result. 
A historical overview of the kind of heinous crimes committed during times of 
international conflict began to develop after World Wars I and II when 
international calls were made to set up various meetings/conferences to discuss 
a way forward to try to govern international armed conflicts and the conduct of 
military personnel and national leaders during armed conflict. Islamic 
international law draws its rules from the main sources of Islam, which lays down 
basic rules, and also draws on interpretations made by jurists/scholars in the 
public interest of Muslim communities in accordance with the main sources of 
Islamic law. In this context, there is no doubt about the legitimacy of the rules of 
Islamic international law because its main source is divine law. However, rules 
set up by international criminal courts and organisations needs the approval of 
a number of member states connected to an agreement. However, this thesis 
has not sought to defend one system or another; instead, it has sought to 
examine both legal systems in order to seek benefits to enhance international 
peace and security.  
Both legal systems have been influenced by different cultures. Islamic 
international law has been influenced by various Islamic cultures, while 
international law has been influenced by various Western cultures. However, 
there is no barrier to the harmony between both legal systems to reach unity 
and protect humanity because protecting humanity is at the heart of the 
enactment of international criminal laws. This study has not sought to criticise 
the scope of international laws but to undertake a comparative approach in order 
to identify points of commonalities and differences in both legal systems.  
The provisions of Islamic law prove that it is not merely an archaic religion that 
has not evolved. It comprises a set of sophisticated laws, both domestic and 
international, developed from incontrovertible main sources through the ages. 
Thus, in theory, Islamic international law is part of the level of evolving 
international law, regardless of some heinous practices against humanity 
conducted by some ‘in the name of Islam’. Ultimately, however, there is a 
common challenge that faces both legal systems, namely the enforcement of 
international laws that do not discriminate on the basis of political interests. 
 
 
9.4 How Can Saudi Domestic Law be Reconciled with the Rome Statute?   
The study has outlined two kinds of Saudi domestic laws: Islamic laws and those 
laws that are concerned specifically with Saudi Arabian domestic issues. In 
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terms of the former, the study has explained that there are divergent views 
between Muslim jurists with respect to the extradition of Muslim people to non-
Muslim states or courts in order to be prosecuted, since non-Muslim states or 
courts do not apply Islamic law. In addition, the issue of women serving as 
judges was raised. These issues are under discussion by contemporary Muslim 
jurists/scholars in order to try to rethink ways of overcoming these obstacles to 
the benefit of Muslims worldwide, taking into consideration maslahah mursalah 
(public interest) as a means of interpreting Islamic law based on variable 
changes/events in the world, and the extent of the need for Muslim societies to 
be protected from such international crimes. 
Other inconsistencies between the provisions of Saudi domestic laws and the 
provisions of the Rome Statute concern the right of an ICC Prosecutor to initiate 
an investigation, issues surrounding political asylum, and the acceptance of 
amendments to the Rome Statute. Article 81 of the Basic Law of Governance 
provides that the provisions of the Basic Law of Governance should not affect 
any international conventions that the Saudi Government has ratified. It reads 
as follows: ‘The enforcement of this Law shall not prejudice whatever treaties 
and agreements with states and international organisations and agencies to 
which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed.’ Thus, applying the broad 
interpretation that was mentioned earlier, Article 81 of Saudi Basic Law deems 
that cases can be dealt with under the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome 
Treaty since the ratification of the Treaty forms part of a contract in Islamic law 
that must be respected in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. 
Consequently, the Shüra Council in Saudi Arabia should be responsible for 
considering essential amendments regarding the inconsistencies between 
Saudi domestic laws and some provisions of the Rome Statute. This approach 
is based on Article 15(b) of the Shüra Council, which gives the right to suggest 
amendments to domestic laws and international treaties, and provide whatever 
suggestions it deems appropriate. These suggestions should be made with 
careful consideration by using maslahah mursalah (public interest) because the 
latter is a significant means in Islamic law by which it is possible to bring benefits 




9.5 Recommendations  
As this study has shown, there is compatibility between the Rome Statute and 
Islamic international law with respect to general principles and jurisdiction, 
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namely substantive law with regard to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide. Thus, it is appropriate for researchers to start a codification project 
regarding the provisions of Islamic international law in line with the Organisation 
of Islamic Co-operation Charter's role as an international treaty. 
For Saudi Arabia, non-ratification of the Rome Statute is not a key point. This is 
because the Kingdom has signed up to similar treaties and because a) the Saudi 
Government is committed to Islamic international law which, in many respects, 
is consistent with the Rome Statute in its provisions and goals to prevent 
international crimes; b) it is implicitly committed under the United Nations 
Charter to avert heinous crimes against humanity; and c) it is committed to 
prevent genocide and war crimes because it has ratified the Genocide 
Convention and the four Geneva Conventions. However, ratification of the 
Rome Statute is seen as substantial by some because Saudi Arabia plays a 
leading role in the Muslim world, and ratification would reflect the principle of 
good faith in terms of international law. Moreover, ratification is desirable in 
order to complement a system of compliance with the provisions of international 
criminal law. With regard to the domestic law issues that have been raised by 
the Saudi government as incompatible with the Rome Statute, they remain 
problematic and need to be tackled.  
Recommendations in relation to the reform of certain provisions of Saudi 
domestic law are elucidated below. 
 
i) Although Saudi domestic law is silent on the extradition of accused persons, 
the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Co-operation in 1983 prohibits the 
extradition of accused persons who have committed crimes in the territory of 
any state party to another state if the crime is considered political (the 
Agreement does not define political crime). Thus, if Saudi Arabia ratifies the 
Rome Statute, there will be a conflict between the ICC's provisions and the 
Riyadh Agreement for Judicial Co-operation. 
ii) Although the ICC’s jurisdiction is complementary, it contradicts Saudi 
domestic law with regard to the right of the Court's prosecutor to initiate an 
investigation based on his own discretion. This is because the Court's provisions 
do not specify who can assess the judicial system (within specific conditions) if 
the state concerned was unable, unwilling, or impartial to investigate a case in 
its territories.  
iii) The provision in relation to political asylum stipulated in Saudi Basic Law 
Article 42 should be reformed so that it reads as follows: ‘The State shall grant 
political asylum if the public interest so dictates in line with the international 
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conventions to which the Kingdom is a party. Laws and international 
agreements shall specify the rules and procedures for the extradition of 
criminals.’ 
If Saudi Arabia joins the International Criminal Court, it should take into account 
the inconsistencies mentioned in chapter nine by adopting amendments to 
some domestic provisions. 
 
General recommendations are also outlined as follows. 
a) It is advisable that Muslim and Arab countries should take into consideration 
their parts in codifying the provisions of Islamic international law or joining 
international criminal justice. This is because the general principles and 
jurisdiction of the ICC are compatible with those in Islamic law. 
b) Muslim or Arabic countries that wish to ratify the Rome Statute should 
consider reforms to their domestic legislation so as to be compatible with the 
Rome Statute provisions, especially regarding criminal laws. 
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- Fatić, A, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Routledge 
2015). 
 
- Fedtke, J, ‘Legal Transplants’ (2012) in Jan Smits (ed.) Elgar 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (2nd edn, Cheltenham 2012). 
 
- Firestone, R, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (Oxford University 
Press 1999).  
 
- 324 - 
- Fleck, D, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 
(Oxford University Press 1995). 
 
- Friman, H, ‘Rights of Persons Suspected or Accused of a Crime’ in Roy 
S Lee (ed.) The International Criminal Court: The Making of The Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer Law International 1999). 
 
- Futamura, M, The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremburg Legacy (Routledge 
2008). 
 
- Gaeta, P, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’ in Antonio Cassese (eds.) 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2002). 
 
- Gallant, K, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative 
Criminal Law (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative 
Law 2009). 
 
- Garland, D & Young, P The Power to Punish: Contemporary Penalty 
and Social Analysis (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1983). 
  
- Glenn, H, ‘The Aims of Comparative Law’ in J M Smits (ed.) Elgar 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
2006). 
 
- Goldman, R and Parks H, International Humanitarian Law (Spring 
2011).  
 
- Gordley, J, The Universalist Heritage (Cambridge University Press 
2003)  
 
- Gray, J, The Nature and Sources of the Law (Quid Pro, LLC 2012). 
- 325 - 
  
- Graziadei, M, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ (2003) in Pierre Legrand and 
Roderick Munday (eds.) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and 
Transitions (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
 
- Greenwood Christopher, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in 
Dieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2008). 
 
- Guillaume, A, The Life of Muhammed (Oxford University Press 1955). 
 
- Guishah, A, al-jihad tareeq al-nasr, (The Ministry of Endowments and 
Religious Affairs, Oman 1395 H) (Arabic source). 
 
- Gutteridge, H, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Method of Legal Study and Research (Cambridge University Press 
1949). 
    
- Guzman, A, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 
(University Scholarship Online, Oxford 2008).  
 
- Hakeem, F (ed.), Policing Muslim Communities: Comparative 
International Context (Springer Science Business Media, New York 
2012)  
 
- Hall C K, ‘Article 7’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers' Notes, Article by 
Article (Hart Publishing 2008). 
 




- 326 - 
- Hamidullah, M, Muslim Conduct of State (Muhammed Ashraf Kashmir 
Bazar, Lahore 1954). 
 
- Hashmi, S, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction; Religious and 
Secular Perspective (1st edn, Cambridge 2004).  
 
- Hathout, M, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Islamic Perspective’ in Farrukh 
B Hakeem, M R Haberfeld, Arvind, Policing Muslim Communities: 
Comparative International Context (New York, Springer 2002). 
 
- Hayashi, N and Bailliet, C, The Legitimacy of International Criminal 
Tribunals (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
 
- Hebel, H (ed.) Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays 
in Honour of Adriaan Bos (TMC Asser Press 1999). 
 
- Hebel, H and Robinson D, ‘Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Crimes’ 
in J Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (ICRC Vol. 1 Rules, Cambridge University Press 
2005). 
 
- Heyd, U, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press 1973). 
 
- Hoilc, D, Justice Denied: The Reality of the International Criminal Court 
(1st edn, The African Research Centre 2014).  
 
- Hola, B and Wijk, J, Life after Conviction at International Criminal 
Tribunals: An Empirical Overview (Oxford University Press 2013). 
 
- Huntington, S, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York 2003).  
- 327 - 
 
- Hussain, S, Human Rights in Islam (Kitab Bhavan 1994). 
 
 
- Hussein, G, ‘Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice System’ 
in Muhammad Abdul Haleem, Adel Omar Sherif and Kate Daniels, 
Criminal Justice in Islam and Judicial Procedures in the Sharia (I B 
Tauris 2003). 
 
- Ibn al-Qaiyyim, ʾiʿlām al-Mūqiʿīn ʿan Rab al-ʿālamīn (Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿilmiyyah Beirut 1991) 85 (Arabic source). 
 
- Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani A, Fatḥ al-Bārī fī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Vol. 6, 
Al-Maktaba a Salafiyyah 2015) (Arabic source). 
 
- Ibn Hishām, A, Sīrat al-Nabī ṣallá Allāhu alayhi wa-sallam (Dār al-
Qal‘am Egypt 1424 H) 102 (Arabic source). 
 
- Ibrahim, S, ‘Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure under Islamic 
Sharia’ in Muhammed Haleem, Criminal Justice in Islam Judicial 
Procedure in the Sharia (I B Tauris 2003).  
 
- Ismail ibn Kaṯhir, Tafseer al-Qur’an al-Kareem’ The King Saud 
University Website <http://quran.ksu.edu.sa/tafseer/tabary/sura8-
aya67.html> (Arabic source). 
 
- Janis M, An Introduction to International Law (16 Connecticut Law 
Review 1984). 
 
- Jensen, D and Halle, S (eds.) Protecting the Environment During 
Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (United 
Nations Environment Programme, Iraq, March 2004).  
 
- 328 - 
- Jessberger, F, ‘The Definition and The Elements of The Crimes of 
Genocide’ in Paola Gaeta, The UN Genocide Convention: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2009).  
 
- Johnson, J, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997). 
 
- Johnson, J and Kelsay, J, Just War and Jihad: Historical and 
Theoretical Perspectives of War and Peace in Western and Islamic 
Traditions (Press 1991). 
 
- Jones, A, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd edn, London, 
Routledge 2011). 
 
- Jones, J and Powles, S, International Criminal Practice: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff, 
October 1 2003). 
 
- Kaltner, J, What Non-Muslims Should Know, Revised and Expanded 
(Augsburg Fortress, Publishers 2016). 
 
- Kamali, M, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (3rd edn, The Islamic 
Texts Society 2003).  
 
- Kamali, M, The Right to Life, Security, Privacy and Ownership in Islam 
(Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, London 2008). 
 
- Kamali, M, Qawa‘id al-Fiqh: The Legal Maxims of Islamic Law (The 
Association of Muslim Lawyers UK 2013).  
 
- 329 - 
- Kelsay, J, ‘Arguments Concerning Resistance in Contemporary Islam’ 
in Richard Sorabji and David Rodin (eds) The Ethics of War: Shared 
Problems in Different Traditions (Ashgate, Aldershot 2007). 
 
- Khadduri, M, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (The Johns Hopkins 
Press 1955). 
 
- Khadduri, M, The Islamic Law of Nations, Shaybani Siyra (Johns 
Hopkins Press Baltimore, Maryland 1966).    
 
- Kiernan, B, The Cambodian Genocide (Samuel Totten 2004).  
 
- Kittichaisaree, K, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 
Inc. New York 2002).  
 
- Kostiner, J, The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936 (Oxford University 
Press 1993). 
 
- Kuper, L, ‘Genocide and Mass Killing, Illusion and Reality’ in Bertrand 
Ramcharan (ed.) The Right to Life in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher Dordrecht 1985). 
 
- Larry, M, Genocide: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press 
2010). 
 
- Lattanzi, F and Schabas, W, Essays on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (II Sieent 1999).  
 
- Lauren, P, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial 
Discrimination (2nd edn, Boulder/Oxford, Westview Press 1996). 
 
- 330 - 
- Lauterpacht, H, The Development of International Law by the 
International Court (CUP, Cambridge 1996).  
 
- Lawrence, J and Heller, K, The First Eco-Centric Environmental War 
Crime: The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute 
(Georgetown University Law Centre 2007). 
 
- Layish, A, The Transformation of the Shari’a from Jurists’ Law to 
Statutory Law (Brill 2004). 
 
- Lecker, M, The Constitution of Medina Muhammed First Legal 
Document; Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam (The Drawn Press 
INC 2004).  
 
- Lee, R (ed.), International Criminal Principles in The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of The Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (Kluwer Law International 1999).  
 
- Legrand, P and Munday, R, Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and 
Transitions (Cambridge University Press 2003).  
 
- Lepaulle, P, The Function of Comparative Law: With a Critique of 
Sociological Jurisprudence (Harvard Law Review 2016). 
 
- Lippman, M, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: An Introduction 
(New York 1998).  
 
- Luṭfī, A, ishkāliyyāt ʿadam Jawāz Muḥākamat al-Muttaham Maratayn fī 
Dhāt al-Jurm (Dār al-Kutub, Cairo 2012) (Arabic source). 
 
- MacArthur, T, The International Criminal Court: Observations and 
Issues before the 1997-1998 Preparatory Committee and 
- 331 - 
Administrative and Financial Implications (International Human Rights 
Law Institute, DePaul University Chicago 1997). 
 
- Mahmassani, S, The Principles of International Law in Light of Islamic 
Doctrine (Brill, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1966). 
 
- Malanczuk, P, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th 
edn, Routledge, London and New York 1997).  
 
- Malekian, F, The Concepts of Islamic International Criminal Law: A 
Comparative Study (Springer 1994). 
 
- Malekian, F, Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law (Brill 
Leiden, Boston 2011).  
 
- Mansour, A, A Shariah al-Islamiyāh Volume 1 (The Supreme Council 
for Islamic Affairs, Egypt 1971) (Arabic source). 
 
- Marboe, I, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law: UN, OIC and ILA Initiatives for 
Approaching Islamic Law’ in Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas Muller, 
Islam and International Law Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of 
Perspective (Brill 2013). 
 
- Masud, M, Islamic Legal Interpretation, Muftis and their Fatwas 
(Harvard University Press 1996). 
 
- Masud, M, Messick, B and Powers, D, Islamic Legal Interpretation 
(Harvard University Press 1996). 
 
- McArthur, E and Nowak, M, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture (Oxford University Press 2008). 
 
- 332 - 
- McAuliffe, J (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an (Vol. 4, Brill, Leiden 
2001-2006). 
 
- McAuliffe, M and Guzman, D, The Developing Law of Crimes Against 
Humanity (John Hopkins University Press 2000). 
 
- McCoubrey, H, International Humanitarian Law: Modern Development 
in the Limitation of Warfare (2nd edn, Dartmouth Publisher 1998). 
 
- McGoldrick, D, Rowe, P and Donnelly, E, The Permanent International 
Criminal Court (Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland Oregon 2004). 
 
- Michaels, R, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Mathias 
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (1st edn 2006). 
 
- Michaels, R, Comparative Law (Duke Law Scholarship Repository 
2011). 
 
- Moussa, A, Islam and Humanity’s Needs of It (Dar al-Katab Cairo 
1996). 
 
- Nasr, S, Ideals and Realities of Islam (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts 
Society 2001). 
 
- Oppenheim, L and Roxburgh, R, International Law: A Treatise, (3rd 
edn, The Law Book Exchange Limited New Jersey 2005).  
 
- Orücü, E, The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for 
the Twenty-First Century (Springer 2013).  
 
- 333 - 
- Peters, R, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern 
History (Mouton, The Hague 1979).  
 
- Peters, R, Crimes and Punishments in Islamic Law: Theory and 
Practice from the 16th to the 20th Centuries (Cambridge University 
Press 2005).  
 
- Pictet, J, Commentary on Geneva Convention IV (Legal Tool 
Databases Ltd 1960).  
 
- Politi, M and Nesi, G, The Rome Statute of The International Criminal 
Court: A Challenge to Impunity (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2002). 
 
- Rahman, F, Islam (Chicago 1966).  
 
- Rashid, A, a-Lqānūn al-jiyn’ai (Dar al-Nada al-Arabi, Cairo 1986) 
(Arabic source). 
 
- Rehman, J, Islamic States Practices, International Law and the Threat 
from Terrorism: A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the New 
World Order (Hart Publishing, Oregon 2005). 
 
- Roosevelt, E, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law’ in Leila 
Sadat (ed.) The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of 
International Law (Translation Publisher Inc., Ardsley, New York 2002). 
 
- Rosenne, S, The Law and Practice of The International Court of 
Justice: 1920-2015 (5th edn, Brill Nijhoff 1965). 
 
- Rosenthal, J, A Lawless Global Court: How the International Criminal 
Court Undermines the UN System (Hoover Institution Press 2004). 
 
- 334 - 
- Rudolph H, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the Institutionalization of 
European Diplomacy 1500-1700' in Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas 
Muller, Islam and International Law Engaging Self-Centrism from a 
Plurality of Perspective (Brill 2013). 
  
- Ruthven, M, Islam, a Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 
2000).  
 
- Sadat, L, The International Criminal Court and The Transformation of 
International Law: Justice for The New Millennium (Transitional 
Publishers Inc. 2002).  
 
- Sadat, L and Paust, J, ‘Model Draft Statute Preamble' in McDonald, 
Avril, Fischer, Horst (eds.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
 
- Saland, P, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in Roy S. Lee (ed.), 
The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute 
Issues, Negations, Results (Kluwer Law International 1999). 
 
- Sanad, N, The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islamic 
Law, Sharia (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 
University of Illinois 1991).  
 
- Saqr, A, al-Alaqat a-dawliyya’h fi al-Islam waqt al-harb. (al-fiker al-
Islami, Cairo 1996) (Arabic source). 
 
- Sarwar, G, Islam: Beliefs and Teachings (London: The Muslim 
Educational Trust 2006).  
 
- Schabas, W, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge 2000). 
 
- 335 - 
- Schabas, W, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press 
2006). 
 
- Schabas, W, The International Criminal Court, A Commentary on The 
Rome Statute (Oxford Press 2010). 
 
- Schabas, W, An Introduction to The International Criminal Court (4th 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2011). 
 
- Schacht, J, An Introduction to Islamic Law (The Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1964). 
 
- Schulz, P, Discussing Community-Based Outreach Activities by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Routledge 2017). 
 
- Sellars, K, Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo (Oxford 
Publishing Limited 2012). 
 
- Shahabuddeen, M, Precedent in the World Court (University of 
Cambridge, Research Centre for International Law 1996).  
 
- Shaw, M, International Law (6th edn, CUP, Cambridge 2008).  
 
- Shinhata, I, Islamic Law and the World Community (Harvard 
International Law Journal 1962). 
 
- Siddiqi, M, The Penal Law of Islam (Lahore, Kazi 1979).  
 
- Siems, M, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
 
- 336 - 
- Sliedregt, E, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (1st 
edn, Oxford University Press 2012).  
 
- Smits, J (ed.) Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar 2006).  
 
- Spencer, R (ed.), The Myth of Islamic Tolerance (Prometheus Books, 
New York 2005).  
 
- Stahn, C, The Law and Practice of The International Criminal Court 
(Volume 1, Oxford University Press 2015).  
 
- Subedi, S, The Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights System: Reform 
and the Judicialisation of Human Rights (Routledge, London/New York 
2017). 
 
- Sugarman, E (ed.), An Introduction to the Criminal Law of Afghanistan 
(2nd edn, Stanford Law School 2011). 
 
- Sulayman, A, Islamic Theory of International Relations (International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, Virginia 1987). 
 
- Sulieman, A, al-Mogdimāt fi al-Lqānūn a-dāuli al-Jināʾi, (Diwan al-
Maṭbwʿāt Algeria 2003) (Arabic Source). 
 
- Surur A, a-Lqānūn al-Jiyn’ai’ a-disūtry (4th edn, Dar Al-shuroq Egypt 
2006) (Arabic source). 
 
- Tahir-ul-Qadr, M, The Constitution of Medina (298 Romford Road, 
Forest Gate, London, E7 9HD United Kingdom 2012).  
 
- 337 - 
- Tantawi, M, al-waseet li a-Tantawi (Maktabah shamilah online) (Arabic 
source).  
 
- Thirlway, H, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2014).  
 
- Thornberry, P, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford 
1991).  
 
- Triffterer, O (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn, C H Beck, 
Munich 2008). 
 
- Tuāymat, H, huquq al-Insan wa huriyht al-asāsiyh (Dr a-Shoruq, 
Jorden 2001) (Arabic source). 
 
- Vassiliev, A, The History of Saudi Arabia (1st edn, Saqi Books, London 
1998). 
 
- Vogel, F, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 
2000).  
 
- Wallace, R, International Law (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, London 
2002).  
 
- Watson, A, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(Edinburgh 1974). 
 
- Watson, A, Legal Origins and Legal Change (1st edn, Hambledon 
Press 1991).  
 
- 338 - 
- Watt M, ‘Muhammed Prophet and Statement’ (1961) in Mohammad 
Omar Farooq, The Last Sermon of Prophet Muhammad: An Analytical 
Review (Islam and Civilizational Renewal 2018). 
 
- Weeramantry, C, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective 
(Macmillan, Basingstoke 1988).  
 
- Weiwei, L, Equality and Non-Discrimination under International Human 
Rights Law (The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/Li Weiwei 2004). 
 
- Werle G, Fernandez L and Vormbaum M, Africa and The International 
Criminal Court (International Criminal Justice Series 2014). 
 
- Westen, P, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force 
of 'Equality' in Moral and Legal Discourse (Princeton University Press 
1990).  
 
- Witschel, G and Rakert W, ‘Crimes against Humanity of Enforcement 
Disappearance of Persons’ in Cryer R (ed.), An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 2007). 
 
- Yetkin, Y, Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Medina Charter (Taylor 
& Francis Group 2006).  
 
- Youssef, M, (ed), al-harb wa qīyadha al-a’khlakih; Moqāranh fi al-figh 
al-Islami wa a-Lqānūn a-dauli al-Insani (Markz al-Hādarh, Beirut 2018) 
259 (Arabic source). 
 
- Zawati, H, Is Jihad A Just War? War, Peace and Human Rights under 
Islamic and Public International Law (The Edwin Mellen Press, Wales 
2011). 
 
- 339 - 
- Zidar, A and Bekou, O, Contemporary Challenges for the International 
Criminal Court (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
2014). 
 
- Zweigert, K and Kötz, H, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, 




- Abu-Nimer M, ‘A Framework for Non-Violence and Peace Building in 
Islam’ (2000-2001), Journal of Law and Religion 15 (1/2) 217. 
 
- Adel M, ‘Arab and Islamic Sharia Perspectives on the Current System 
of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 8 (3) International Criminal 
Review Brill, Volume 8: Issue 3 477. 
 
- Ahamat H and Hisham, M, Kamal, M, ‘Modern Application of Siyar 
(Islamic Law of Nations): Some Preliminary Observations’ (2011) 24 
(4) Brill Arab Law Quarterly, Criminal Law Review 401. 
 
- Akande D, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to The ICC 
and its Impact on Al Bashir's Immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 333. 
 
- Akande D, ‘Can The ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in 
Syria?’ (23 August 2013) EJIL: Talk <https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-
icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/> 1.  
 
- Alarefi A , ‘Overview of Islamic Law’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law 
Review 707. 
 
- Albassam B, ‘Political Reform in Saudi Arabia: Luxury or Necessity?’ 
Vol 2, No 3, (2011) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 200. 
- 340 - 
 
- Algase R, 'Protection of Civilian Lives in Warfare: A Comparison 
Between Islamic Law and Modern International Law Concerning the 
Conduct of Hostilities' (1997) Military Law and Law of War Review, Vol 
16, Issues 2 and 245. 
 
- Al-Ghadyan A, ‘The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia’, Arab Law Quarterly 
(1998) 235.  
 
- al-Ḥuzaymī, Y, ʾaṣl al-ʿurf ʿinda Mālik wa-Qāʿidat al-Maʿrūf ʿurfa ka-
Lmashrūṭ Sharṭā’ (2014) Dār al-Manẓūmah 20 (Arabic source). 
 
-  Aloisi R, ‘A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security 
Council and the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 13 International 
Criminal Law Review 147. 
 
- Al-Qatawneh I, ‘The Presumption of Innocence: Between Theory and 
Practice’ (2015) 44 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 46. 
 
- Alwazna R, ‘Islamic Law: Its Sources, Interpretation and the 
Translation of it into Laws Written in English’ (2016) Springer Science 
and Business Media Dordrecht 251. 
 
- Al-Zuhili W, ‘Islam and International Law’ (2005) 87 International 
Review of the Red Cross Volume 87, Issue 858 (Religion) 269. 
 
- Ambos K, ‘General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute’ 
(1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 1 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1972243.3>. 
 
- Ambos K, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility’ 
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 159. 
 
- 341 - 
-  Ambos K and Steeffen Wirth, ‘The Current Law of Crimes against 
Humanity: An Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000’ (2000) 13 
Criminal Law Forum 1. 
 
- An-Na’im A, ‘Islamic Law, International Relations and Human Rights’ 
(1987) 20 (2) Cornell International Law Journal 317. 
 
- An-Naim A, ‘Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights, and International Law’ (1990) Volume 25 Issue 1 International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 155. 
 
- Badar M, ‘Islamic law (Shari'a) and the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2011) 24 (2) Leiden Journal of International Law 411. 
 
- Badar M, ‘Jus in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 (3) 
International Criminal Law Review 393. 
 
- Badar M and Marchuk I, ‘A Comparative Study of the Principles 
Governing Criminal Responsibility in the Major Legal Systems of the 
World: England, the United States, Germany, France, Denmark, 
Russia, China, and in the Islamic Legal Tradition’ (2013) 1:48 Criminal 
Law Forum 1. 
 
- Baderin M, ‘The Evolution of Islamic Law of Nations and Modern 
International Order: Universal Peace through Mutuality and Co-
operation’ (2000) The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 57. 
 
- Baderin M, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Right to a Fair Trial and Due 
Process under International Human Rights Law and Saudi Arabian 
Domestic Law’ (2007) 10 (3) The International Journal of Human Rights 
241. 
 
- 342 - 
- Badr G, ‘Islamic Law: A Survey of Islamic International Law Contracts 
and Litigation in Islamic Law’ (1982) 76 Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law 56. 
 
- Bassiouni M, ‘Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human 
Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice System’ (1982) Oceana 
Publications 3. 
 
- Bassiouni M, ‘A Functional Approach to General Principles of 
International Law’ (1989-1990) 11 (3) Michigan Journal International 
Law 768. 
 
- Bassiouni M, ‘Crimes against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized 
Convention’ (1994) Vol 9 Issue 4 Journal of Transnational Law 575. 
 
- Bassiouni M, ‘Crimes and the Criminal Process’ (1997) 12 (3) Arab Law 
Quarterly 269. 
 
- Bassiouni M, ‘Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court’ (1999) vol 32 Cornell International Law 
Journal 443. 
 
- Bauer K, ‘Debates on Women's Status as Judges and Witnesses in 
Post-Formative Islamic Law’, (2010) 130 (1) Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 1. 
 
- Bayefsky F, ‘The Principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in 
International Law’ (1990) 11 Human Rights Quarterly 5. 
 
- Bennoune K, ‘As Salamu Alaykum: Humanitarian Law in Islamic 
Jurisprudence’ (1994) 15 (4) MJIL 605. 
 
- 343 - 
- Bilici M, ‘American Jihad: Representations of Islam in the United States 
after 9/11’ (2005) American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 50. 
 
- Bsoul L, ‘Historical Evaluation of Islamic Law of Nations/Siyar: Between 
Memory and Desire’ (2008) Vol 17 Digest of Middle East Studies 48.  
 
- Bsoul L, ‘The Concept of Treaty in Islamic Jurisprudence: A 
Comparative View of the Classical Jurists’ (2010) 7 (1) International 
Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) Journal of Islam in Asia 55. 
 
- Cassese A, ‘Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity 
and Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law’ (2006) 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 410.  
 
- Cassese A, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the 
Current Prospects of International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 25 (2) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 491. 
 
- Chapman T and Chaudoin S, ‘Ratification Patterns and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2013) 57 (2) International Studies 
Quarterly 400. 
 
- Conway G, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in International Law’ (2003) 3 (2) 
International Criminal Law Review 351. 
 
- Coulson J, ‘The State and the Individual in Islamic Law’ (1957) 6 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49. 
 
- Cupido M, ‘The Policy Underlying Crimes against Humanity: Practical 
Reflections on a Theoretical Debate’ (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum 
275. 
 
- 344 - 
- David R, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Perception of 
Justice: The Effect of the ICTY in Croatia’ (2014) International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 476. 
 
- Dayem M and Ayub F, ‘In the Path of Allah: Evolving Interpretations of 
Jihad and its Challenges’ (2008) 7 UCLA Journal of Islamic & Near 
Eastern Law 67. 
 
- Degan V, ‘On the Sources of International Criminal Law’ (June 2005) 4 
(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 45. 
 
- Drumbl M, ‘Waging War against the World: The Need to Move from 
War Crimes to Environmental Crime’ (1998) (22) (1) Fordham 
International Law Journal 122. 
 
- Dugard J and Reynolds J, ‘Apartheid, International Law and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2013) 24 (3) The European Journal of 
International Law 867.   
 
- Elsayed M, ‘Contracting into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia Enactments 
and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses’ (2012) 20 (3) 
George Mason Law Review 938. 
 
- El-Sergany R, ‘Shura in Islam its Concept and Importance’ (27 
November 2010) 14 On Islam 1 
<https://ar.scribd.com/document/53677074/Shura>. 
 
- Esgain A and Solf W, ‘The Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949: Its Principles, Innovations, and 
Deficiencies’ (1963) 41 (3) North Carolina Law Review 537. 
 
- Ewald W, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal 
Transplants’ (1995) 43 (4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 
489. 
- 345 - 
 
- Finlay L, ‘Does the International Criminal Court Protect Against Double 
Jeopardy: An Analysis of Article 20 of the Rome Statute’ (2009) (15) 
(2) U C Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 221. 
 
- Ford C, ‘Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Law and Islam’s 
Constitutional Crisis’ (1995) 30 Texas International Law Journal 499. 
 
- Ford R, ‘Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood’ (1995) 
Stanford Law Review 317. 
 
- Ford R, ‘Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood: A Review 
of Margaret Jane Radin’s Reinterpreting Property’ (1996) 48 Stanford 
Law Review 217. 
 
- Franck T, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Governing the 
Use of Force by States’ (1970) 64 (5) The American Journal of 
International Law 809. 
 
- Frandberg A, ‘Systematics of Legal Concepts’ (1987) Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 83. 
 
- Frankenberg G, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law’ 
(1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 411. 
 
- Goy B, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International 
Criminal Court: A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2012) 12 (1) 
International Criminal Law Review 1. 
 
- Grosswald V, ‘Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period 
in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on 
Substantive Law’ (2000) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 101. 
 
- 346 - 
- Gunawn Y and Resa W, ‘The Urgency of Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Ratification for Republic of Indonesia’ 
(2015) 12 (1) US-China Law Review 22. 
 
- Hale C, ‘Does the Evolution of International Criminal Law End with The 
ICC? The Roaming ICC, a Model International Criminal Court for a 
State-Centric World of International Law’ (2008) 35 Denver Journal of 
International Law & Policy 429. 
 
- Hall C, ‘The Powers and Role of the Prosecutor of The International 
Criminal Court in the Global Fight against Impunity’ (2004) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 121. 
 
- Hall K, ‘The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal 
Court’ on the official website of the International Committee of the 




- Hallaq W, ‘Was the Gate of ijtihád Closed?' (1984) International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, Vol 16, No 1. 3. 
 
- Hamid A and Sein K, ‘Islamic International Law and the Right of Self-
Defence of States’ (2009) 67 (2) Journal of East Asia & International 
Law 67. 
 
- Husa J, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’ 
(2003) 67 (3) The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International 
Private Law 419. 
 
- Hutchinson T and Duncan N, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: 
Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) Deakin Law Review 83. 
 
- 347 - 
- Islam M, ‘Criminal Accountability and Juvenile Offenders: A Study 
under Islamic Principles, International Law and the Children Act’ (2013) 
(2015) 3 (2) International Journal of Ethics in Social Sciences 51. 
 
- Jain N, ‘Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law’ 
(2011) 12 (1) Chicago Journal of International Law 159.  
 
- Jain N, ‘Judicial Law Making and General Principles of Law in 
International Criminal Law’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
Journal 111. 
 
- Janos J, ‘The Four Sources of Law in Zoroastrian and Islamic 
Jurisprudence’ (2005) 12 (2) Islamic Law and Society 291. 
 
- Javed A and Javed M, ‘The Need of ijtihád for Sustainable 
Development in Islam’ (2011) IIUC STUDIES ISSN 1813-7733 Vol. 8, 
215. 
 
- Jo H and Simmons B, ‘Can The International Criminal Court Deter 
Atrocity’ (2016) International Organization 1. 
 
- Kafayat Q, ‘The Proprio Motu power of The ICC Prosecutor: The 
Reasons Some States have Refused to Ratify The Rome Statute’ 
(2014) 2 (1) International Journal of Humanities and Management 
Sciences 11. 
 
- Kahn-Freund O, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 
The Modern Law Review 1. 
 
- Kamal M, ‘Is Neutral Humanitarian Action Permissible Under Islamic 
law?’ (2015) 97 (897/898) International Review of the Red Cross 423. 
 
- 348 - 
- Kelly M, ‘Islam & International Criminal Law: A Brief (In)Compatibility 
Study’ (2010) Pace International Law Review 1.  
 
- Kelly M, ‘The Debate Over Genocide in Darfur, Sudan’ (2011) 18 U.C. 
Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 205. 
 
- Kendall S, ‘The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of 
International Criminal Law’ (2012) Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 349. 
 
- Kreß C, ‘Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future 
of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus’ (2009) 20 (4) 
European Journal of International Law 1130. 
 
- Legrand P, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht 
Journals of European and Comparative Law 111. 
 
- Lippman M, ‘Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: Religious 
Fundamentalism v. Modern Law’ (1989) 12 (1) Boston College 
International & Comparative Law Review 29. 
 
- Malekian F, ‘The Homogeneity of International Criminal Court with 
Islamic Jurisprudence’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 
595. 
 
- Marboe I, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law: UN, OIC and ILA Initiatives for 
Approaching Islamic Law’ (2013) Islam and International Law 184.  
  
- Mattar M,’ Human Rights in Islamic Law, Specifically the Guarantee of 
Procedural Justice’, (2014) 16 European Journal of Law Reform 274. 
 
- 349 - 
- Meicrhenrich J and Ko K, ‘How Do States Join The International 
Criminal Court? (2009) 7 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
233. 
 
- Morosin M, ‘Double Jeopardy and International Law: Obstacles to 
Formulating a General Principle’ (1995) 64 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 261. 
 
- Mousazadeh R, ‘The Islamic View on International Criminal Law’ 
(2005) 71 International Students Journal 71. 
 
- Munir M, ‘Suicide Attacks and Islamic Law’ (2008) 90 International 
Review of the Red Cross 71. 
 
- Munir M, ‘Rights of the Child: An Islamic Perspective on Preventing 
Violence, Abuse, and Exploitation of Children and Pakistani Law’ 
(2014) XXXVIII Hamdard Islamicus 33. 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2538104>. 
 
- Munir M ‘The Principle of Legality in Islamic Criminal Justice Systems’ 
(2015) 1 Islamic Criminal Law 1. 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596774>. 
 
- Murphy R and El Zeidy M, ‘Prisoners of War: A Comparative Study of 
the Principles of International Humanitarian Law and the Islamic Law 
of War’ (2009) 9 Int'l Crim L Rev 623. 
 
- Mushkat R, ‘Is War Ever Justifiable: A Comparative Survey’ (1987) 9 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 722. 
 
- Namli E, ‘Universal Rights versus Sharia? Reflections on the Moral and 
Legal Dimensions of Human Rights Law and Sharia’ (2013) 8 (2) 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 139. 
- 350 - 
 
- Nichols P, ‘The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception 
of a Transplanted Foreign Investment Code’ (1997) 18 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 1235. 
 
- Nsereko D ‘The ICC and Complementary in Practice’ (2013) 26 (2) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 427. 
 
- Ochoa J, ‘The Settlement of Disputes Concerning States Arising from 
the Application of the Statute of The International Criminal Court: 
Balancing Sovereignty and the Need for an Effective and Independent 
ICC’ (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 1. 
 
- Ohlin J, van Sliedregt E, and Weigend T, ‘Assessing Control Theory’ 
(2013) 26 (3) Leiden Journal of International Law 725. 
 
- Okon E, ‘Hudúd Punishments in Islamic Criminal Law’ (2014) 10 (14) 
European Scientific Journal 227.  
 
- Orucu E, ‘What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?’ 
(2008) 12 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
<http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-15.pdf> 
 
- Osakwe C, ‘Introduction: The Problems of the Comparability of Notions 
in Constitutional Law’ (1984) 59 Tulane Law Rev 875. 
 
- Owaydhah K, ‘Justifications and Concept of Criminal Liability in 
Shariah’ (2014) 3 (2) Humanities and Social Sciences Review 55. 
 
- Paris F and Ghei N, ‘The Role of Reciprocity in International Law’ 
(2003) 36 (1) Cornell International Law Journal 93. 
 
- 351 - 
- Paust J ‘Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status 
as Law of the United States’ (1990) 12 (1) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 59. 
 
- Plattner D, ‘ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance’ 
(1996) 311 International Review of the Red Cross 161.  
  
- Rashīd M, ʾistirātījiyyāt Tafādī al-Nizāʿ Siyāsatuhā wa-Taktīkātuhā 
Ṣulḥ al-Ḥudaybiyyah Inmūdhajan (2015) 3 (42) Dār al-Manhal 973 
(Arabic source). 
 
- Reimann M, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the 
Second Half of the Twentieth Century’ (2002) 50 (4) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 671. 
 
- Reza S, ‘Torture and Islamic Law’ (2007) 8 (1) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 21. 
 
- Roach S, ‘Arabic States and the Role of Islam in The International 
Criminal Court’ (2005) 53 Political Studies 134. 
 
- Roberts R, ‘The Lubanga Trial Chamber's Assessment of Evidence in 
Light of the Right of the Accused to the Presumption of Innocence’ 
(2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 923. 
 
- Rodenbeck M, ‘Islam Confronts its Demons’ (2004) The New York 
Review of Books 14. 
 
- Rory C, ‘A Law of War? English Protection and Destruction of 
Ecclesiastical Property during the Fourteenth Century’ (2013) The 
English Historical Review Vol 128) No (535) 1381. 
 
- 352 - 
- Ruys T, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of Jus ad Bellum: 
Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?’ 
(2014) 108.2.015 American Journal of International Law 1. 
 
- Ṣaffī al-Dīn B wa Ṣaṭūf, A ‘al-Jarāʾim al-Musnadah ʾilā Walī al-ʾmr al-
Muslim wa-Ikhtiṣāṣ al-Maḥkamah al-Jināʾiyyah al-Dawliyyah fī 
Muḥākamatihi ʿalayhā min Manẓūr al-Fiqh al-Jināʾī al-ʾislām’ (2011) 
Majalat Dimashq li-Lʿulūm al-ʾiqtiṣādiyyah wa-Lqānūniyyah 27 (Arabic 
source). 
 
- Ṣāliḥ A 'al-Maṣlaḥah al-Mursalah wa-Taṭbīqātihā' (2000) 15 (1) Majalt 
Dimashq Syria 354 (Arabic source). 
 
- Sardar Ali S, ‘Women's Human Rights in Islam: Towards a Theoretical 
Framework’ (1997) Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 117. 
 
- Sardar Ali S, ‘Resurrecting Siyar through Fatwas (Re)Constructing 
Islamic International Law in a Post-(Iraq) Invasion World’ (2009) 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 115. 
 
- Sardar Ali S and Javaid R, ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic 
International Law’ (2005) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 321. 
 
 
- Schabas W, ‘The International Criminal Court and Non-Party States’ 
(2010) 28 (1) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 209. 
 
- Seaman B, ‘Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia 
Supplements the Shari’a to Regulate Development’ (1979) 18 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 413. 
 
- Seidman A and Seidman R, ‘Drafting Legislation for Development: 
Lessons from a Chinese Project’ (1996) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1. 
- 353 - 
 
- Shah N, ‘The Use of Force under Islamic Law’ (2013) 24 (1) The 
European Journal of International Law 343. 
 
- Smith P, ‘Of War and Peace: The Hudaibiya Model of Islamic 
Diplomacy’ (2006) Florida Journal of International Law 133. 
 
- Tellenbach S, ‘Fair Trial Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings under 
Islamic, Afghan Constitutional and International Law’ (2004) Max-
Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
929. 
 
- Terrence C and Chaudoin S, ‘Ratification Patterns and the International 
Criminal Court’ (2013) 57 (2) International Studies Quarterly 400. 
 
- Teubner G, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying 
Law Ends up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 (1) The Modern Law 
Review 11. 
 
- Tiemessen A, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Politics of 
Prosecution’ (2014) 18 (4-5) The International Journal of Human Rights 
442. 
 
- Tunkin G, ‘Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of 
International Law’ (1961) 49 (3) California Law Review 419. 
 
- Twinning W, ‘Generalizing About Law: The Case of Legal Transplants’ 
(2000) The Tilburg-Warwick Lectures General Jurisprudence 1. 
 
- Tzevelekos V, ‘The Use Article of 31(3)(a) of the VCLT in the Case Law 
of the ECtHR: an Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or Selective 
Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology-Between 
- 354 - 
Evolution and Systemic Integration’ (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 621. 
 
- Vanhullebusch M, ‘General Principles of Islamic Law of War: A 
Reassessment’ (2006-7) 13 Islamic & Middle Eastern Law 37. 
 
- Wansbrough J, ‘Safe Conduct in Muslim Chancery Practice' (1977) 20 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 20. 
 
- Ward I, ‘The Limits of Comparativism: Lessons from UK-EC Integration’ 
(1995) 2 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23. 
 
- Watson A, ‘Legal Evolution and Legislation’ (1987) Brigham Young 
University Law Review 353. 
 
- Watson A, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4 (4) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
<http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html>.  
 
- Watts S, ‘Reciprocity and the Law of War’ (2009) 50 Harvard 
International Law Journal 365. 
 
- Weisburd A, ‘Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties’ 
(1988) 21 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1. 
 
- Werle G, 'Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute' 
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 453. 
 
- Whitman J, ‘The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment’ (2005) 1 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 17. 
 
- 355 - 
- Whyte S, ‘The Foundations of International Humanitarian Law in 
Islamic Tradition’ (2014) 7 (10) Journal of Islamic State Practices in 
International Law 7. 
 
- Yackee J, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign 
Investors before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality’ 
(2008) 32 (5) Fordham International Law Journal 1550. 
 
- Yamani A, ‘Humanitarian International Law: A General Outlook’ (1985) 
7 Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies 189. 
 
- Yildirim Y, ‘Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Medina Charter’ 
(2006) Social Justice 109. 
 
- Yousaf O., ‘IHL as Islamic Humanitarian Law: A Comparative Analysis 
of International Humanitarian Law & Islamic Military Jurisprudence 
amidst Changing Historical Contexts’ (2012) 24 Florida Journal of 




- Resolution on the Activation of the Jurisdiction of the Court over the 
Crime of Aggression (New York ASP Resolution) Doc ICC-
ASP/16/Res 5, 14 December 2017 Review Conference in Kampala 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf>. 
 
- UNGA Res 96 (1) (11 December 1946) 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm>. 
 
- UNGA Res 96 (1946) on the Work of its Fourth-First Session, UN Doc 
A/CN.4 SER.A/1989/ADD.1 paragraphs 2-4 A/RES/96-I 
<http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html>. 
 
- 356 - 




- UNGA Res 217 A in Paris held on 10 December (1948).  
 
- UNGA Res 521 (1982) 37/123 D. 
 




- UNSC Res Doc 827 (1993) <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/ictr-milestones>. 
 
- UNSC Res Doc 955 (1994) 
<http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/establishment>. 
 




- UNSC Res 1744 (2007) adopted by the Security Council at its 5633rd 
meeting on 20 February 2007 <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/1744.pdf/>. 
 




- UNSC Res 2216 (2015) 
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf>. 




- Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (1996) I ICJ Rep. 
 
- Amendment submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement to the Bureau 
Proposal, A/Conf.183. C.1/L.75.  
 
- Definition of Aggression, Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, UN GAOR, 29th 
Sess, Supp No. 31, at 142, UN Doc A/9631 (1974) <http://www.un-
documents.net/a29r3314.htm>. 
 
- International Commission of Jurists: Jamil at Kuwait, and Ittillad al-
Mulatmin al-Odarab, ‘Chapter One: Conclusions of the Seminar’ in 
Human Rights in Islam: Report of a Seminar held in Kuwait on 




- Mujama Al-Figh Al-Eslami Resolution 39 (5/1) [1] in 1-6-1409, The 
Islamic Figh Academy, belonging to the Organisation of Islamic Co-
operation (Arabic source) <http://www.iifa-aifi.org/1746.html>.  
 
- Parliamentarians for Global Action. See 
<http://www.pgaction.org/news/cap-icc-vii.html>. 
 
- Professional Training Series No. 9 in Human Rights in the 
Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, 
Prosecutors and Lawyers 634 United Nations 2003. 
 
- Prosecutions Case Studies, The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: From Hybrid to Domestic Court (International Centre for 
Transitional Justice 2008) 5 




- Report 44 ICJ Reports North Sea Continental Shelf: International Court 
of Justice Judgment (1969) (77). 
 
- Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 
Forty-First Session, paragraph 102. 
 
- Report of the Credentials Committee, A/CONF. 183/7 and Corr. l and 




- Report of the Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review, Fourth Session February 2009: discussed the 
Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights No A/HRC/WG.6/4/SAU/3 14 November 2008. 
 
- Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 




- Report of the International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights in 
Islam: Report of a Seminar held in Kuwait in December 1980 (1982).  
 
- Report of the International Law Commission, GAOR 45th Session Sup 
Number 10 UNDOC A/45/10, 36-55. 
 
- Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Eighth Session, 6 May to 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Fifty-First Session, Supp No10 A/51/10 Vol. II (2) 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf>. 
- 359 - 
 
- Reports of Judgments, International Court of Justice (Judgment 1985) 
Advisory Opinions and Orders: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) 29 <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/68/068-19850603-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>. 
 
- Reports of Judgments, The International Court of Justice (Judgment 
1986) Advisory Opinions and Orders on Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua 97 <https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>. 
 
- Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (Rome 15 June-17 July 1998) 3 UN Doc A/CONF/183/13 192-
194. 
 
- Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (15 June-17 July 1998), UN Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (14 April 1998) UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 
 
- Report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by The 
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War and on the 





- The Allied Powers (the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union) met in London on 8 August 1945 to establish the International 
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (1945). And the Far East, Tokyo (1946). 
 
- 360 - 
- The Bureau of Experts in the Council of Mistress’s decision 380 in 2002 
International Islamic Figh Academy Resolution 211 (22/7) 
<http://www.iifa-aifi.org/3993.html>. 
 
- The High Commission on Islamic Affairs in Cairo, the MEMRI Website 
Special Dispatch No1703 (2007) <https://www.memri.org/reports/al-
azhar-sheikhs-islam-forbids-taking-civilians-hostage/>(Arabic source). 
 
- The Nuremberg Trials Final Report Appendix D: Control Council Law 
Number 10, ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
against Peace and against Humanity’ (1948). 
 
- UN Doc A/C.6/86, as cited in William Schabas, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law (4th edn, Cambridge 2014). 
 
- UN General Assembly Human Rights Council Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review, Seventeenth Session (21 October-1 





- UN General Assembly Report of the Third Committee, A/50/635/Add 
2, 27 February 1996; respect for the principles of national sovereignty 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral 
processes <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/ares50-172.htm/>.  
 







- 361 - 
Theses 
 
- Al-harthi, M. ‘The Legal and Security Dimensions to the Relationship 
between Arabic States and the International Criminal Court’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis at Naïf Arab University for Security Sciences, 
2011). 
 
- Alobaidy, O. ‘The International Criminal Court: An Arabic Perspective 
in View of Islamic Law and the 1998 Rome Statute’ (unpublished PhD 
thesis at Washington University, School of Law, 2000). 
 
- Basheer, Muhammad ‘Islamic Diplomatic and International Diplomatic 
Law: A Quest for Compatibility’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Hull, 2012). 
 
- Luqman, Zakariyah ‘Applications of Legal Maxims in Islamic Criminal 
Law with Special Reference to Sharia Law in Northern Nigeria’ (D. Phil. 




- A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Studies 
<http://www.messageofthaqalayn.com/>. 
 
-    Ahmed 22161, Abu Dawood 3592, and Tirmidhi 1332. See Multaqa Ahl 
Al Hadeeth. Meeting Place of Students of Knowledge 
<http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vbe/f/>. 
 
- al-Bukhārī M, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Hadith No. 6830, Daily Hadith online) 
<https://abuaminaelias.com/dailyhadithonline>.   
 
- Arab Human Rights Committee, League of Arab States 
<http://www.lasportal.org/ar/humanrights/Committee/Documents/>. 
 
- 362 - 
- Dar al-Mandwma’h al-IslamIha 








- Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Vol. II, North-Holland 1992) 
109 in Andreevska, Elena and Aziri, Etem ‘Principles of Equality in 




- Hadith Commentary Website 
<https://hadithcommentary.com/nawawi/hadith32/>.  
 
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/585?OpenDocument>. 
 
- International Humanitarian Law Database Customary International 
Humanitarian Law ICRC Website <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul>. 
 
- Islam Question and Answer website <https://islamqa.info/en/78978>.  
 




- Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nullum_crimen_sine_lege>. 
- 363 - 
 
- Mājālyt al-Būhūth al-ʿilmiyyah is the official website used by religious 
scholars (Muftis) in Saudi Arabia, (Arabic source) 
<https://www.alifta.gov.sa/Ar/Pages/default.aspx> . 
 
- Oxford Law Dictionary < https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/>. 
 








- The Arab Human Rights Committee, League of Arab States 
<http://www.lasportal.org/ar/humanrights/Committee/Documents/>. 
 
- The Battles of the Prophet, the Jordanian Chechen Site 
<http://www.sukhneh.com>. 
 
- The Daily Hadith online 
<https://abuaminaelias.com/dailyhadithonline/>.  
 
- The Human Rights Watch States <https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2018/country-chapters/syria>. 
 




- 364 - 




- The League of Arab States 
<http://www.lasportal.org/ar/Pages/default.aspx>. 
 




- The Official Website of Abdallah Ibin Bayyah 
<http://binbayyah.net/english/islamic-criminal-law/>.  
 
- The Official Website of the ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp>. 
 
- The Official Website of the m’ajmai' al-Figh al-Islami, Organisation of 
Islamic Co-operation <http://www.iifa-aifi.org/> . 
 
- The Official Website of Sheikh al-Alarefy Mohammed 
<http://arefe.ws/ar/>. 
 
- The Organisation of Islamic Co-operation <http://www.oic-
oci.org/home/?lan=en/>. 
 
- The Religion of Islam Website, the Prophet Mohammad’s Last Sermon 
<www.islamreligion.com website>. 
 
- The Sunnah <https://sunnah.com/muslim>.  
 
- The UN, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, GA/L/3115, 
Statement of the Presenter for Umayya Centre for Research and 
- 365 - 
Strategic Studies: An Independent Centre (2014) 
<http://www.umayya.org/.>. 
 
- UN Commission of Inquiry: Syrian victims reveal ISIS’s calculated use 










- Um-Al-Qura Gazette Number 140, 21-2-1346H in the National Centre 
for Archives and Documents in Riyadh. 
 
- Um Al-Qura Gazette Number 1436, 4-1-1357H in the National Centre 
for Archives and Documents in Riyadh. 
 
- Um Al-Qura Gazette Number 2592 in 29-8-1395H in the National 




- A statement made by Mr Abdullah M Mohammed Ibrahim Al Sheikh on 
behalf of the Saudi Government on the drafting of the Statute, 
paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28 at the 28th meeting 
on Wednesday 8 July 1998. Consideration of the question concerning 
the finalisation and adoption of a convention on the establishment of 
an international criminal court in accordance with General Assembly 
Resolutions 51/207 of 17 December 1996 and 52/16 of 15 December 
1997, A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 and Corr. L and A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 
 
- 366 - 
- Alturky A, ‘Huquq al-Insan bayna a-Sariah wa-Lqānūn Al-Wadi’ (2001) 
conference held at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (Arabic 
source) 
 
- Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UN 
Doc A/CONF/183/10 192 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pd
f>   
 








- The African Union Strategy of Withdrawal, Assembly of the Union 





- The Arab Group’s statement by the representative of Sudan on behalf 
of the Arab States and the UN Diplomatic Conference concluded in 




- The Effect of Islamic Legislation on Crime Prevention in Saudi Arabia-
The Ministry of Interior in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh 9-13 October 1976 
 
- The Group of Arab States declared their statement in the 9th plenary 
meeting on 17 July 1998 A/Conf.183/SR.9; Report of the Credentials 
- 367 - 




- UN A/CONF.18/13 (Vol 11) Summary Record of the Plenary Meetings 




- UN A/CONF.183/SR.9 Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings 
(A/CONF. 183/7 and Corr l and 2) (24) 
 
- UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court Rome (15 June-17 July 1998) 
Official Records Volume II 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v
2_e.pdf> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
